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
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THE JOURNAL

OF THE

ROYAL

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

OFFICIAL LETTERS

OF THE

MILITARY AND NAVAL OFFICERS

OF THE

UNITED STATES,

DURING THE

War with Great Britain

IN THE YEARS 1812, 13, 14, & 15.

**WITH SOME ADDITIONAL LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS
ELUCIDATING THE HISTORY OF THAT PERIOD.**

COLLECTED AND ARRANGED

BY JOHN BRANNAN.

Washington City:

PRINTED BY WAY & GIBSON, FOR THE EDITOR.

.....

1823.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, to wit:

L. S. *****
BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the sixth day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America, the forty-seventh, JOHN BRANNAN, of the said District, hath deposited in the office of the Clerk of the District Court for the District of Columbia, the title of a book, the right whereof he claims as proprietor in the words following, to wit:

"Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States during the War with Great Britain in the years 1812, 1813, 1814, and 1815, with some additional Letters and Documents, elucidating the history of that period, collected and arranged by JOHN BRANNAN."

In conformity to the act of the Congress of the United States, entitled "An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned," and also to the act, entitled "An Act supplementary to an act, entitled 'An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned,' and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching historical and other prints."

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, and affixed the public seal of my office, the day and year aforesaid.

EDMUND I. LEE,

Clerk of the District Court for the District of Columbia.



PREFACE.

AT the termination of the late war between the United States and Great Britain, it frequently occurred to the editor that it would be performing a useful service to his country, to collect and publish all the *important* official letters of the American officers, to preserve them to the rising and to future generations; having himself frequently regretted the impossibility of obtaining access to the letters of the officers of our revolution, with very few exceptions. He delayed the task from time to time, in consequence of the great labour attending it; he has, at length, completed the work which is now presented to the patronage of the public.

A part of these letters were copied *from*, and many of the others compared *with*, the originals on file in the War and Navy Departments; those taken from the official public documents and the National Intelligencer, were found to be uniformly correct.

It was deemed proper to commence the work with the President's message and the report of the committee of foreign relations, showing the causes of the war; to embody in the work some historical documents; and conclude with the treaty of peace, forming in a measure, a documentary history from its commencement to its termination.

The young men of America now advanced, and advancing, to manhood, must be highly gratified in perusing this volume; they will there see their fathers, their brothers, and their friends, in their true colours, in the most trying times. The names of those valuable men who have shed their blood in defence of their country, in whatsoever station, ought to be inscribed on the roll of fame, held up to general imitation, and handed down to posterity for their admiration. The highest honours are due to those whose bravery repelled the savage and the civilized foe, both by sea and land; whose undaunted valour and heroism was never excelled in the proudest days of the ancient republics.

To the officers of the army and navy, (to whom it is most respectfully dedicated) it is presumed this volume will prove truly acceptable.

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PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

June 1, 1812.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.

I COMMUNICATE to Congress certain documents, being a continuation of those heretofore laid before them, on the subject of our affairs with Great Britain.

Without going back beyond the renewal, in 1803, of the war in which Great Britain is engaged, and omitting unrepaid wrongs of inferior magnitude, the conduct of her government presents a series of acts hostile to the United States as an independent and neutral nation.

British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it; not in the exercise of a belligerent right founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects. British jurisdiction is thus extended to neutral vessels in a situation where no laws can operate but the law of nations and the laws of the country to which the vessels belong; and a self-redress is assumed, which, if British subjects were wrongfully detained and alone concerned, is that substitution of force, for a resort to the responsible sovereign, which falls within the definition of war. Could the seizure of British subjects in such cases be regarded as within the exercise of a belligerent right, the acknowledged laws of war, which forbid an article of captured property to be adjudged without a regular investigation before a competent tribunal, would imperiously demand the fairest trial, where the sacred rights of persons were at issue. In place of such a trial, these rights are subject to the will of every petty commander.

The practice, hence, is so far from affecting British subjects alone, that under the pretext of searching for these, thousands of American citizens, under the safeguard of public law, and of the national flag, have been torn from their country and from everything dear to them; have been dragged on board ships of war of a foreign nation, and exposed, under the severities of their discipline, to be exiled to the most distant and deadly climes, to see their lives in the battles of their oppressors, and to be the melancholy instruments of taking away those of their own brethren.

Against this crying enormity which Great Britain would not prompt to avenge if committed against herself, the United States have in vain exhausted remonstrances and expostulations. That no proof might be wanting of their conciliatory disposition, and no pretext left for a continuance of the practice, the British government was formally assured of the readiness of the United States to enter into arrangements, such as could not be rejected if the recovery of British subjects was the real and the sole object. The communication passed without effect.

British cruisers have been in the practice also of violating the rights, and the peace of our coasts. They hover over and intercept our departing commerce. To the most insulting pretensions have added the most lawless proceedings in our very harbor. They have wantonly spilt American blood within the sanctuary of territorial jurisdiction. The principles and rules enforced by a nation, when a neutral nation, against armed vessels or privateers hovering near her coasts, and disturbing her commerce, are well known. When called on, nevertheless, by the United States to punish the greater offences committed by her own vessels, the British government has bestowed on their commander additional honors of honour and confidence.

Under pretended blockades, without the presence of a sufficient force, and sometimes without the practicability of applying force, our commerce has been plundered in every sea; the staples of our country have been cut off from their legitimate markets; and a destructive blow aimed at our agricultural and manufacturing interests. In aggravation of these predatory measures have been considered as in force from the dates of their notification; a retrospective effect being thus added, as has been done in other important cases, to the unlawfulness of the course pursued. And to render the outrage the more signal, these mock blockades have been reiterated and enforced in the face of official communications from the British government, declaring as the true position of a legal blockade, "That particular ports must be avoided, and no vessel is to enter, and previous warning given to vessels bound to them to enter."

Not content with these occasional expedients for laying waste to our neutral trade, the cabinet of Great Britain resorted, at length, to the sweeping system of blockades, under the name of orders in council, which has been moulded and managed, as might be

its political views, its commercial jealousies, or the avidity of British cruisers.

To our remonstrances against the complicated and transcendent injustice of this innovation, the first reply was, that the orders were reluctantly adopted by Great Britain as a necessary retaliation on the decrees of her enemy proclaiming a general blockade of the British isles, at a time when the naval force of that enemy dared not to issue from his own ports. She was reminded, without effect, that her own prior blockades, unsupported by an adequate naval force, actually applied and continued, were a bar to this plea: that executed edicts against millions of our property could not be a retaliation on edicts, confessedly impossible to be executed: that retaliation, to be just, should fall on the party setting the guilty example, not an innocent party, which was not even chargeable with an acquiescence in it.

When deprived of this flimsy veil for a prohibition of our trade with her enemy, by the repeal of his prohibition of our trade with Great Britain, her cabinet, instead of a corresponding repeal or a practical discontinuance of its orders, formally avowed a determination to persist in them against the United States, until the markets of her enemy should be laid open to British products; thus asserting an obligation on a neutral power to require one belligerent to encourage, by its internal regulations, the trade of another belligerent; contradicting her own practice towards all nations, in peace as well as in war; and betraying the insincerity of those professions which inculcated a belief that, having resorted to her orders with regret, she was anxious to find an occasion for putting an end to them.

Abandoning still more all respect for the neutral rights of the United States, and for its own consistency, the British government now demands as prerequisites to a repeal of its orders, as they relate to the United States, that a formality should be observed in the repeal of the French decrees no wise necessary to their termination, nor exemplified by British usage; and that the French repeal, besides including that portion of the decrees which operates within a territorial jurisdiction, as well as that which operates on the high seas against the commerce of the United States, should not be a single special repeal in relation to the United States, but should be extended to whatever other neutral nations, unconnected with them, may be affected by those decrees. And as an additional insult, they are called on for a formal disavowal of conditions and pretensions advanced by the French government, for which the United States are so far from having made themselves responsible, that, in official explanations, which have been published to the world, and in a correspondence of the American minister at London with the British minister for foreign affairs, such a responsibility was explicitly and emphatically disclaimed.

It has become indeed sufficiently certain, that the commerce of the United States is to be sacrificed, not as interfering with the

belligerent rights of Great Britain—not as supplying the wants of her enemies, which she herself supplies; but as interfering with the monopoly which she covets for her own commerce and navigation. She carries on a war against the lawful commerce of a friend, that she may the better carry on a commerce with an enemy—a commerce, polluted by the forgeries and perjuries which are, for the most part, the only passports by which it can succeed.

Anxious to make every experiment short of the last resort of injured nations, the United States have withheld from Great Britain, under successive modifications, the benefits of a free intercourse with their market, the loss of which could not but outweigh the profits accruing from her restrictions of our commerce with other nations. And to entitle these experiments to the more favourable consideration, they were so framed as to enable her to place her adversary under the exclusive operation of them. To these appeals her government has been equally inflexible, as if willing to make sacrifices of every sort, rather than yield to the claims of justice, or to renounce the errors of a false pride. Nay, so far were the attempts carried to overcome the attachment of the British cabinet to its unjust edicts, that it received every encouragement within the competency of the executive branch of our government, to expect that a repeal of them would be followed by a war between the United States and France, unless the French edicts should also be repealed. Even this communication, although silencing forever the plea of a disposition in the United States to acquiesce in those edicts, originally the sole plea for them, received no attention.

If no other proof existed of a predetermination of the British government against a repeal of its orders, it might be found in the correspondence of the minister plenipotentiary of the United States at London, and the British secretary for foreign affairs, in 1810, on the question whether the blockade of May, 1806, was considered as in force, or as not in force. It had been ascertained that the French government, which urged this blockade as the ground of its Berlin decree, was willing, in the event of its removal, to repeal that decree; which, being followed by alternate repeals of the other offensive edicts, might abolish the whole system on both sides. This inviting opportunity for accomplishing an object so important to the United States, and professed so often to be the desire of both the belligerents, was made known to the British government. As that government admits that an actual application of an adequate force is necessary to the existence of a legal blockade, and it was notorious, that if such a force had ever been applied, its long discontinuance had annulled the blockade in question, there could be no sufficient objection on the part of Great Britain to a formal revocation of it; and no imaginable objection to a declaration of the fact that the blockade did not exist. The declaration would have been consistent with her avowed principles of blockade, and would have

enabled the United States to demand from France the pledged repeal of her decrees ; either with success, in which case the way would have been opened for a general repeal of the belligerent edicts ; or without success, in which case the United States would have been justified in turning their measures exclusively against France. The British government would, however, neither rescind the blockade, nor declare its non-existence ; nor permit its non-existence to be inferred and affirmed by the American plenipotentiary. On the contrary, by representing the blockade to be comprehended in the orders in council, the United States were compelled so to regard it in their subsequent proceedings.

There was a period when a favourable change in the policy of the British cabinet was justly considered as established. The minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty here proposed an adjustment of the differences more immediately endangering the harmony of the two countries. The proposition was accepted with a promptitude and cordiality corresponding with the invariable professions of this government. A foundation appeared to be laid for a sincere and lasting reconciliation. The prospect, however, quickly vanished. The whole proceeding was disavowed by the British government, without any explanations which could at that time repress the belief, that the disavowal proceeded from a spirit of hostility to the commercial rights and prosperity of the United States. And it has since come into proof, that at the very moment when the public minister was holding the language of friendship and inspiring confidence in the sincerity of the negotiation with which he was charged, a secret agent of his government was employed in intrigues, having for their object a subversion of our government, and a dismemberment of our happy union.

In reviewing the conduct of Great Britain toward the United States, our attention is necessarily drawn to the warfare just renewed by the savages on one of our extensive frontiers : a warfare which is known to spare neither sex nor age, and to be distinguished by features peculiarly shocking to humanity. It is difficult to account for the activity and combinations which have for some time been developing themselves among tribes in the constant intercourse with British traders and garrisons, without connecting their hostility with that influence ; and without recollecting the authenticated examples of such interpositions heretofore furnished by the officers and agents of that government.

Such is the spectacle of injuries and indignities which have been heaped on our country ; and such the crisis which its unexampled forbearance and conciliatory efforts have not been able to avert. It might at least have been expected, that an enlightened nation, if less urged by moral obligations, or invited by friendly dispositions on the part of the United States, would have found, in its true interest alone, a sufficient motive to re-

spect their rights and their tranquillity on the high seas ; that an enlarged policy would have favoured that free and general circulation of commerce, in which the British nation is at all times interested, and which in times of war, is the best alleviation of its calamities to herself as well as the other belligerents ; and more especially that the British cabinet would not, for the sake of a precarious and surreptitious intercourse with hostile markets, have persevered in a course of measures which necessarily put at hazard the invaluable market of a great and growing country, disposed to cultivate the mutual advantages of an active commerce.

Other councils have prevailed. Our moderation and conciliation have had no other effect than to encourage perseverance, and to enlarge pretensions. We behold our seafaring citizens still the daily victims of lawless violence committed on the great common and highway of nations, even within sight of the country which owes them protection. We behold our vessels, freighted with the products of our soil and industry, or returning with the honest proceeds of them, wrested from their lawful destinations, confiscated by prize-courts, no longer the organs of public law, but the instrument of arbitrary edicts ; and their unfortunate crews dispersed and lost, or forced or inveigled, in British ports, into British fleets : whilst arguments are employed in support of these aggressions which have no foundation but in a principle equally supporting a claim to regulate our external commerce in all cases whatsoever.

We behold, in fine, on the side of Great Britain, a state of war against the United States ; on the side of the United States, a state of peace towards Great Britain.

Whether the United States shall continue passive under these progressive usurpations, and these accumulating wrongs ; or, opposing force to force in defence of their natural rights, shall commit a just cause into the hands of the Almighty Disposer of events, avoiding all connections which might entangle it in the contests or views of other powers, and preserving a constant readiness to concur in an honourable re-establishment of peace and friendship, is a solemn question, which the Constitution wisely confides to the legislative department of the government. In recommending it to their early deliberations, I am happy in the assurance that the decision will be worthy the enlightened and patriotic councils of a virtuous, a free, and a powerful nation.

Having presented this view of the relations of the United States with Great Britain, and of the solemn alternative growing out of them, I proceed to remark, that the communications last made to Congress on the subject of our relations with France, will have shown, that since the revocation of her decrees as they violate the neutral rights of the United States, her government has authorized illegal captures, by its privateers and public ships, and that other outrages have been practiced on our vessels and our

citizens. It will have been seen also, that no indemnity had been provided, or satisfactorily pledged, for the extensive spoliations committed under the violent and retrospective orders of the French government against the property of our citizens seized within the jurisdiction of France. I abstain at this time from recommending to the consideration of Congress definitive measures with respect to that nation, in the expectation, that the result of unclosed discussions between our minister plenipotentiary at Paris and the French government, will speedily enable Congress to decide, with greater advantage, on the course due to the rights, the interests and the honour of our country.

JAMES MADISON.

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1812.

June 3, 1812.

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the Message of the President of the United States, of the 1st of June, 1812,

REPORT—

That, after the experience which the United States have had of the great injustice of the British government towards them, exemplified by so many acts of violence and oppression, it will be more difficult to justify to the impartial world their patient forbearance, than the measures to which it has become necessary to resort, to avenge the wrongs, and vindicate the rights and honour of the nation. Your committee are happy to observe, on a dispassionate review of the conduct of the United States, that they see in it no cause for censure.

If a long forbearance under injuries ought ever to be considered a virtue in any nation, it is one which peculiarly becomes the United States. No people ever cherished it with greater sincerity and zeal.

But the period has now arrived, when the United States must support their character and station among the nations of the earth, or submit to the most shameful degradation. Forbearance has ceased to be a virtue. War on the one side, and peace on the other, is a situation as ruinous as it is disgraceful. The mad ambition, the lust of power, and commercial avarice of Great Britain, arrogating to herself the complete dominion of the ocean, and exercising over it an unbounded and lawless tyranny, have left to neutral nations an alternative only, between the base surrender of their rights, and a manly vindication of them. Happily for the United States, their destiny, under the aid of Heaven, is

in their own hands. The crisis is formidable only by the of peace. As soon as it becomes a duty to relinquish that tion, danger disappears. They have suffered no wrongs have received no insult, however great, for which they obtain redress.

More than seven years have elapsed since the commencement of this system of hostile aggression by the British government against the rights and interests of the United States. The manner of commencement was not less hostile, than the spirit with which it has been prosecuted. The United States have invariably done every thing in their power to preserve the relations of friendship with Great Britain. Of this disposition, they gave a distinguishing proof at the moment when they were made the victims of an opposite policy. The wrongs of the last war had not been forgotten at the commencement of the present one. They were full of dangers, against which it was sought to provide. As early as the year 1804, the minister of the United States, at London, was instructed to invite the British government to enter into negotiation on all the points on which a collision might arise between the two countries in the course of the war, and to propose to it an arrangement of their claims on fair and reasonable terms. The invitation was accepted. A negotiation had commenced and was depending, and nothing had occurred to give a doubt that it would not terminate to the satisfaction of both parties. It was at this time, and under these circumstances, that an attack was made by surprise, on an important branch of American commerce, which affected every part of the United States, and involved many of their citizens in ruin.

The commerce on which this attack was so unexpectedly made was between the United States and the colonies of France, and other enemies of Great Britain. A commerce just in its nature, sanctioned by the example of Great Britain in regard to the colonies with her own colonies; sanctioned by a solemn act between two governments in the last war, and sanctioned by the practice of the British government in the present war, more than two years having then elapsed, without any interference with it.

The injustice of this attack could only be equalled by the absurdity of the pretext alleged for it. It was pretended by the British government, that in case of war, her enemy had no right to modify its colonial regulations, so as to mitigate the calamities of war to the inhabitants of its colonies. This pretension, so contrary to the rights of Great Britain, is utterly incompatible with the right of sovereignty in every independent state. If we recur to the established and universally admitted law of nations, we shall find no sanction to it in that venerable code. The sovereignty of every state is co-extensive with its dominions, and cannot be invaded or curtailed in its rights, as to any part, except by conquest. Neutral nations have a right to every port of either belligerent which is not legally blockaded, and in all articles which are

contraband of war. Such is the absurdity of this pretension, that your committee are aware, especially after the able manner in which it has been heretofore refuted and exposed, that they would offer an insult to the understanding of the house, if they enlarged on it; and if any thing could add to the high sense of the injustice of the British government in this transaction, it would be the contrast which her conduct exhibits in regard to this trade, and in regard to a similar trade by neutrals with their own colonies. It is known to the world, that Great Britain regulates her own trade in war and in peace, at home and in her colonies, as she finds for her interest—that in war she relaxes the restraints of her colonial system in favour of the colonies, and that it never was suggested that she had not a right to do it; or that a neutral, in taking advantage of the relaxation, violated a belligerent right of her enemy. But with great Britain *every thing* is lawful. It is only in a trade with her enemies that the United States can do wrong: with them all trade is unlawful.

In the year 1793, an attack was made by the British government on the same branch of our neutral trade, which had nearly involved the two countries in war. That difference, however, was amicably accommodated. The pretension was withdrawn, and reparation made to the United States for the losses which they had suffered by it. It was fair to infer, from that arrangement, that the commerce was deemed by the British government lawful, and that it would not be again disturbed.

Had the British government been resolved to contest this trade with neutrals, it was due to the character of the British nation that the decision should be made known to the government of the United States. The existence of a negotiation which had been invited by our government, for the purpose of preventing differences by an amicable arrangement of their respective pretensions, gave a strong claim to the notification, while it afforded the fairest opportunity for it. But a very different policy animated the then cabinet of England. Generous sentiments were unknown to it. The liberal confidence and friendly overtures of the United States were taken advantage of to ensnare them. Steady to its purpose, and inflexibly hostile to this country, the British government calmly looked forward to the moment when it might give the most deadly wound to our interests. A trade, just in itself, which was secured by so many strong and sacred pledges, was considered safe. Our citizens, with their usual industry and enterprise, had embarked in it a vast proportion of their shipping, and of their capital, which were at sea, under no other protection than the law of nations, and the confidence which they reposed in the justice and friendship of the British nation. At this period the unexpected blow was given. Many of our vessels were seized, carried into port, and condemned by a tribunal, which, while it professes to respect the law of nations, obeys the mandate of its own government in op-

position to all law. Hundreds of other vessels were driven from the ocean, and the trade itself, in a great measure, suppressed. The effect produced by this attack on the lawful commerce of the United States, was such as might have been expected from a virtuous, independent, and highly injured people. But one sentiment pervaded the whole American nation. No local interests were regarded; no sordid motives felt. Without looking to the parts which suffered most, the invasion of our rights was considered a common cause, and from one extremity of our union to the other, was heard the voice of an united people, calling on their government to avenge their wrongs, and vindicate the rights and honour of the country.

From this period the British government has gone on in a continued encroachment on the rights and interests of the United States, disregarding in its course, in many instances, obligations which have heretofore been held sacred by civilized nations.

In May, 1806, the whole coast of the continent, from the Elbe to Brest inclusive, was declared to be in a state of blockade. By this act, the well established principles of the law of nations, principles which have served for ages as guides, and fixed the boundary between the rights of belligerents and neutrals, were violated: by the law of nations, as recognized by Great Britain herself, no blockade is lawful, unless it be sustained by the application of an adequate force, and that an adequate force was applied to this blockade, in its full extent, ought not to be pretended. Whether Great Britain was able to maintain, legally, so extensive a blockade, considering the war in which she is engaged, requiring such extensive naval operations, is a question which it is not necessary at this time to examine. It is sufficient to be known, that such force was not applied, and this is evident from the terms of the blockade itself, by which, comparatively, an inconsiderable portion of the coast only was declared to be in a state of *strict and rigorous blockade*. The objection to the measure is not diminished by that circumstance. If the force was not applied, the blockade was unlawful, from whatever cause the failure might proceed. The belligerent who institutes the blockade, cannot absolve itself from the obligation to apply the force under any pretext whatever. For a belligerent to relax a blockade, which it could not maintain, with a view to absolve itself from the obligation to maintain it, would be a refinement in injustice, not less insulting to the understanding than repugnant to the law of nations. To claim merit for the mitigation of an evil, which the party either had not the power, or found it inconvenient to inflict, would be a new mode of encroaching on neutral rights. Your committee think it just to remark, that this act of the British government does not appear to have been adopted in the sense in which it has been since construed. On consideration of all the circumstances attending the measure, and particularly the character of the distinguished statesman who announce

it, we are persuaded that it was conceived in a spirit of conciliation, and intended to lead to an accommodation of all differences between the United States and Great Britain. His death disappointed that hope, and the act has since become subservient to other purposes. It has been made by his successors a pretext for that vast system of usurpation, which has so long oppressed and harrassed our commerce.

The next act of the British government which claims our attention, is the order of council of January 7, 1807, by which neutral powers are prohibited trading from one port to another of France or her allies, or any other country with which Great Britain might not freely trade. By this order the pretension of England, heretofore claimed by every other power, to prohibit neutrals disposing of parts of their cargoes at different ports of the same enemy, is revived, and with vast accumulation of injury. Every enemy, however great the number or distant from each other, is considered one, and the like trade even with powers at peace with England, who from motives of policy had excluded or restrained her commerce, was also prohibited. In this act the British government evidently disclaimed all regard for neutral rights. Aware that the measures authorized by it could find no pretext in any belligerent right, none was urged. To prohibit the sale of our produce, consisting of innocent articles, at any port of a belligerent, not blockaded, to consider every belligerent as one, and subject neutrals to the same restraints with all, as if there was but one, were bold encroachments. But to restrain or in any manner interfere with our commerce with neutral nations with whom Great Britain was at peace, and against whom she had no justifiable cause of war, for the sole reason that they restrained or excluded from their ports her commerce, was utterly incompatible with the pacific relations subsisting between the two countries.

We proceed to bring into view the British order in council of November 11th, 1807, which superseded every other order, and consummated that system of hostility on the commerce of the United States which has been since so steadily pursued. By this order all France and her allies, and every other country at war with Great Britain, or with which she was not at war, from which the British flag was excluded, and all the colonies of her enemies, were subjected to the same restrictions as if they were actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner, and all trade in articles the produce and manufacture of the said countries and colonies, and the vessels engaged in it, were subjected to capture and condemnation as lawful prize. To this order certain exceptions were made, which we forbear to notice, because they were not adopted from a regard to neutral rights, but were dictated by policy to promote the commerce of England, and so far as they related to neutral powers, were said to emanate from the clemency of the British government.

It would be superfluous in your committee to state, in this order the British government declared direct and open war against the United States. The dominion of the ocean was completely usurped by it, all commerce forbidden, and ever driven from it, or subjected to capture and condemnation, did not subserve the policy of the British government by paying it a tribute and sailing under its sanction. From this period the United States have incurred the heaviest losses and most humiliating humiliations. They have borne the calamities of war without retorting them on its authors.

So far your committee has presented to the view of the people the aggressions which have been committed under the authority of the British government on the commerce of the United States. We will now proceed to other wrongs, which have been still more severely felt. Among these is the impressment of our seamen, a practice which has been unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the wars to which she has been a party since our revolution. Your committee cannot convey, in adequate terms, the deep sense of wrong which they entertain of the injustice and oppression of this practice. Under the pretext of impressing British seamen, our fellow-citizens are seized in British ports, on the high sea, in every other quarter to which the British power extends, taken on board British men of war and compelled to serve as British subjects. In this mode our citizens are wrenched from their country and their families, deprived of liberty and doomed to an ignominious and slavish bondage, compelled to fight the battles of a foreign country, and often to die in them. Our flag has given them no protection; it has been unceasingly violated, and our vessels exposed to danger and loss of the men taken from them. Your committee need not remark, that while this practice is continued, it is impossible for the United States to consider themselves an independent nation. Every new case is a new proof of their degradation. Its continuance is the more unjustifiable, because the United States have repeatedly proposed to the British government an arrangement which would secure to it the controul of its own people. The exemption of the citizens of the United States from this degrading oppression, and their flag from violation, is all that they have sought.

This lawless waste of our trade, and equally unlawful impressment of our seamen, have been much aggravated by the insults and indignities attending them. Under the pretext of blockading the harbours of France and her allies, British squadrons have been stationed on our own coast, to watch and intercept our own trade. To give effect to the blockade of European ports and harbours of the United States have been blockaded. In executing these orders of the British government, or in maintaining the spirit which was known to animate it, the commands of these squadrons have encroached on our jurisdiction, and

our vessels, and carried into effect impressments within our limits, and done other acts of great injustice, violence and oppression. The United States have seen, with mingled indignation and surprise, that these acts, instead of procuring to the perpetrators the punishment due to unauthorized crimes, have not failed to recommend them to the favour of their government.

Whether the British government has contributed by active measures to excite against us the hostility of the savage tribes on our frontiers, your committee are not disposed to occupy much time in investigating. Certain indications of general notoriety may supply the place of authentic documents; though these have not been wanting to establish the fact, in some instances. It is known that symptoms of British hostility towards the United States have never failed to produce corresponding symptoms among those tribes. It is also well known, that on all such occasions, abundant supplies of the ordinary munitions of war have been afforded by the agents of British commercial companies, and even from British garrisons, wherewith they were enabled to commence that system of savage warfare on our frontiers, which has been at all times indiscriminate in its effect, on all ages, sexes, and conditions, and so revolting to humanity.

Your committee would be much gratified if they could close here the detail of British wrongs; but it is their duty to recite another act of still greater malignity, than any of those which have been already brought to your view. The attempt to dismember our union and overthrow our excellent constitution, by a secret mission, the object of which was to foment discontents and excite insurrection against the constituted authorities and laws of the nation, as lately disclosed by the agent employed in it, affords full proof that there is no bound to the hostility of the British government towards the United States—no act, however unjustifiable, which it would not commit to accomplish their ruin. This attempt excites the greater horror from the consideration that it was made while the United States and Great Britain were at peace, and an amicable negotiation was depending between them, for the accommodation of their differences, through public ministers regularly authorized for the purpose.

The United States have beheld, with unexampled forbearance, this continued series of hostile encroachments on their rights and interests, in the hope, that, yielding to the force of friendly remonstrances, often repeated, the British government might adopt a more just policy towards them; but that hope no longer exists. They have also weighed impartially the reasons which have been urged by the British government in vindication of those encroachments, and found in them neither justification nor apology.

The British government has alleged, in vindication of the orders in council, that they were resorted to as a retaliation on France, for similar aggressions committed by her on our neutral

trade with British dominions. But how has this plea been supported? The dates of British and French aggressions are well known to the world. Their origin and progress have been marked with too wide and destructive a waste of the property of our fellow-citizens, to have been forgotten. The decree of Berlin of November 21, 1806, was the first aggression of France in the present war. Eighteen months had then elapsed after the attack made by Great Britain on our neutral trade with the colonies of France and her allies, and six months from the date of the proclamation of May, 1806. Even on the seventh of January, 1807, the date of the first British order in council, so short a term had elapsed, after the Berlin decree, that it was hardly possible that the intelligence of it should have reached the United States. A retaliation which is to produce its effect, by operating on a neutral power, ought not to be resorted to, 'till the neutral had justified it by a culpable acquiescence in the unlawful act of the other belligerent. It ought to be delayed until after sufficient time had been allowed to the neutral to remonstrate against the measures complained of, to receive an answer and to act on it, which had not been done in the present instance and when the order of November 11, was issued, it is well known that a minister of France had declared to the minister plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris, that it was no intended that the decree of Berlin should apply to the United States. It is equally well known, that no American vessel had then been condemned under it, or seizure been made, with which the British government was acquainted. The facts prove incontrovertibly, that the measures of France, however unjustifiable in themselves, were nothing more than a pretext for those of England. And of the insufficiency of that pretext, ample proof has already been afforded by the British government itself, and in the most impressive form. Although it was declared that the orders in council were retaliatory on France for her decrees, it was also declared, and in the orders themselves, that owing to the superiority of the British navy, by which the fleets of France and her allies were confined within their own ports, the French decrees were considered only as empty threats.

It is no justification of the wrongs of one power, that the like were committed by another, nor ought the fact, if true, to have been urged by either, as it could afford no proof of its love of justice, of its magnanimity, or even of its courage. It is more worthy the government of a great nation, to relieve than to assail the injured. Nor can a repetition of the wrongs by another power repair the violated rights or wounded honour of the injured party. An utter inability alone to resist, would justify a quiet surrender of our rights, and degrading submission to the will of others. To that condition the United States are not reduced, nor do they fear it. That they ever consented to discuss with either power the misconduct of the other, is a proof of their love of peace, of their

moderation, and of the hope which they still indulged, that friendly appeals to just and generous sentiments would not be made to them in vain. But the motive was mistaken, if their forbearance was imputed, either to the want of a just sensibility to their wrongs, or a determination, if suitable redress was not obtained, to resent them. The time has now arrived when this system of reasoning must cease. It would be insulting to repeat it. It would be degrading to hear it. The United States must act as an independent nation, and assert their *rights* and avenge their *wrongs*, according to their own estimate of them, with the party who commits them, holding it responsible for its own misdeeds, unmitigated by those of another.

For the difference made between Great Britain and France, by the application of the non-importation act against England only, the motive has been already too often explained, and is too well known to require further illustration. In the commercial restrictions to which the United States resorted as an evidence of their sensibility, and a mild retaliation of their wrongs, they invariably placed both powers on the same footing, holding out to each in respect to itself, the same accommodation, in case it accepted the condition offered, and in respect to the other, the same restraint, if it refused. Had the British government confirmed the arrangement which was entered into with the British minister in 1809, and France maintained her decrees with France would the United States have had to resist, with the firmness belonging to their character, the continued violation of their rights. The committee do not hesitate to declare that France has greatly injured the United States, and that satisfactory reparation has not yet been made for many of those injuries. But that is a concern which the United States will look to and settle for themselves. The high character of the American people, is a sufficient pledge to the world, that they will not fail to settle it, on conditions which they have a right to claim.

More recently the true policy of the British government towards the United States has been completely unfolded. It has been publicly declared by those in power that the orders in council should not be repealed until the French government had revoked all its internal restraints on the British commerce, and that the trade of the United States with France and her allies, should be prohibited until Great Britain was allowed to trade with them. By this declaration it appears, that to satisfy the pretensions of the British government, the United States must join Great Britain in the war with France, and prosecute the war, until France should be subdued, for without her subjugation, it were in vain to presume on such a concession. The hostility of the British government to these states has been still further disclosed. It has been made manifest that the United States are considered by it as the commercial rival of Great Britain, and that their prosperity and growth are incompatible with her welfare.

When all these circumstances are taken into consideration it is impossible for your committee to doubt the motives which have governed the British ministry in all its measures towards the United States since the year 1805. Equally is it impossible to doubt, longer, the course which the United States ought to pursue towards Great Britain.

From this view of the multiplied wrongs of the British government since the commencement of the present war, it must be evident to the *impartial world*, that the contest which is now forced on the United States, is radically a contest for the sovereignty and independence. Your committee will not enlarge on any of the injuries, however great, which have had a transitory effect. They wish to call the attention of the house to those of permanent nature only, which intrench so deeply on our most important rights, and wound so extensively and vitally our best interests, as could not fail to deprive the United States of the principal advantages of their revolution, if submitted to. The controul of our commerce by Great Britain, in regulating at pleasure and expelling it almost from the ocean; the oppressive manner in which these regulations have been carried into effect, by seizing and confiscating such of our vessels with their cargoes, as were said to have violated her edicts, often without previous warning of their danger; the impressment of our citizens from on board our own vessels, on the high seas, and elsewhere, and holding them in bondage until it suited the convenience of their oppressors to deliver them up, are encroachments of that high and dangerous tendency which could not fail to produce this pernicious effect, nor would these be the only consequences that would result from it. The British government might, for a while, be satisfied with the ascendancy thus gained over us, but its pretensions would soon increase. The proof, which so complete and disgraceful a submission to its authority would afford of our degeneracy, could not fail to inspire confidence that there was no limit to which its usurpations and our degradation might not be carried.

Your committee believing that the free born sons of America are worthy to enjoy the liberty which their fathers purchased at the price of so much blood and treasure, and seeing, in the measures adopted by Great Britain, a course commenced and persisted in, which must lead to a loss of national character and independence, feel no hesitation in advising resistance by force, in which the Americans of the present day, will *prove* to the *enemy* and to the world, that we have not only inherited the liberty which our fathers gave us, but also the *WILL* and *POWER* to maintain it. Relying on the patriotism of the nation, and confidently trusting that the Lord of Hosts will go with us to battle in a righteous cause, and crown our efforts with success—your committee recommend an immediate appeal to *ARMS*.

AN ACT,

Declaring War between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territories.

BE it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That War be, and the same is hereby declared to exist between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territories; and that the President of the United States be, and he is hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the same into effect, and to issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States, against the vessels, goods and effects of the government of the same United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the subjects thereof.

June 18, 1812.

APPROVED,

JAMES MADISON.

On the passage of the preceding Act, the vote, in the House of Representatives was as follows, viz.

IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.

New-Hampshire—Samuel Dinsmoor, Obed Hall, John A. Harper, 3.

Massachusetts—Francis Carr, Isaiah L. Green, William M. Richardson, Ebenezer Seaver, Charles Turner, jun. William Widgery, 6.

Rhode-Island—None.

Connecticut—None.

Vermont—James Fisk, Saml. Shaw, William Strong, 3.

New-York—Daniel Avery, Benjamin Pond, Ebenezer Sage, 3.

New-Jersey—Lewis Condict, James Morgan, 2.

Pennsylvania—William Anderson, David Bard, Robert Brown, William Crawford, Roger Davis, William Findley, John M. Hyneman, Abner Lacock, Joseph Lefevre, Aaron Lyle, William Piper, Jonathan Roberts, Adam Seybert, John Smilie, George Smith, Robert Whitehill, 16.

Delaware—None.

Maryland—Stevenson Archer, Joseph Kent, Peter Little, Alexr. M'Kim, Saml. Ringgold, Robt. Wright, 6.

Virginia—Burwell Bassett, William A. Burwell, John Clopton, John Dawson, Thomas Gholson, Peterson Goodwyn, Aylett Hawes, William M'Coy, Hugh Nelson, Thomas Newton, James Pleasants, jr. John Roane, John Smith, John Taliaferro, 14.

North-Carolina—Willis Alston, jr. William Blackledge, James Cochran, William R. King, Nathaniel Macon, Israel Pickens, 6.

South-Carolina—Wm. Butler, John C. Calhoun, Langdon Cheves, Elias Earle, William Lowndes, Thomas Moore, David R. Williams, Richard Winn, 8.

Georgia—William W. Bibb, Bolling Hall, George M. Troup, 3.

Kentucky—Joseph Desha, Richard M. Johnson, Samuel M'Kee, Anthony New, Stephen Ormsby, 5.

Tennessee—Felix Grundy, John Rhea, John Sevier, 3.

Ohio—Jeremiah Morrow, 1.

YEAS, 79.

IN THE NEGATIVE.

New Hampshire—Josiah Bartlett, George Sullivan, 2

Massachusetts—Elijah Brigham, Wm. Ely, Josiah Quincy,—Reed, Samuel Taggart, Peleg Tallman, Laban Wheaton, Leonard White, 8.

Rhode Island—Richard Jackson, jr. Elisha R. Potter, 2.

Connecticut—Epaphroditus Champion, John Davenport, jr. Lyman Law, Jonathan O. Moseley, Timothy Pitkin, Lewis B. Sturges, Benjamin Tallmadge, 7.

Vermont—Martin Chittenden, 1.

New York—Hermanus Bleeker, Thomas B. Cooke, James Emot, Asa Fitch, Thomas R. Gold, Arunah Metcalf, Samuel L. Mitchell, Thomas Sammons, Silas Stow, Uriah Tracy, Pierre Van Cortlandt, jr. 11.

New Jersey—Adam Boyd, Jacob Huffy, George C. Maxwell, Thomas Newbold, 4.

Pennsylvania—James Milnor, William Rodman, 2.

Delaware—Henry M. Ridgely, 1.

Maryland—Charles Goldsborough, Philip B. Key, Philip Stuart, 3.

Virginia—John Baker, James Breckenridge, Joseph Lewis, jr. John Randolph, Thomas Wilson, 5.

North Carolina—Archibald M'Bride, Joseph Pearson, Richard Stanford, 3.

South Carolina—None.

Georgia—None.

Kentucky—None.

Tennessee—None.

Ohio—None.

YEAS,	79
NAYS,	49

Majority for War,	30
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IN THE SENATE.

YEAS.

New Hampshire—Charles Cutts,

Massachusetts—Joseph B. Varnum,

Vermont—Jonathan Robinson,

New York—John Smith,

New Jersey—John Condit,

Pennsylvania—Andrew Gregg, Michael Leib,

Maryland—Samuel Smith,

Virginia—Richard Brent, William B. Giles,

North Carolina—Jesse Franklin,

James Turner,

South Carolina—John Gaillard, John Taylor,

Georgia—Wm. H. Crawford, Charles Tait,

Kentucky—George M. Bibb,

Tennessee—Joseph Anderson, George W. Campbell.

NAYS.

New Hampshire—Nicholas Gilman,

Massachusetts—James Lloyd,

Connecticut—Saml. W. Dana, Chauncey Goodrich,

Rhode Island—Jeremiah B. Howell, William Hunter,

New York—Obadiah German,

New Jersey—John Lambert,

Delaware—James A. Bayard, Outenbridge Horsey,

Maryland—Philip Reed,

Kentucky—John Pope,

Ohio—Thomas Worthington.

YEAS,	19
NAYS,	13

Majority for War,	6
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DECLARATION OF WAR ANNOUNCED.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS the Congress of the United States, by virtue of the constituted authority vested in them, have decided by their act, bearing date the eighteenth day of the present month, that war exists between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territories: Now therefore, I, JAMES MADISON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the same to all whom it may concern; and I do especially enjoin on all persons holding offices, civil or military, under the authority of the United States, that they be vigilant and zealous in discharging the duties respectively incident thereto; and I do moreover exhort all the good people of the United States, as they love their country; as they value the precious heritage derived from the virtue and valor of their fathers; as they feel the wrongs which have forced on them the last resort of injured nations; and as they consult the best means, under the blessings of Divine Providence, of abridging its calamities; that they exert themselves in preserving order, in promoting concord, in maintaining the authority and the efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and invigorating all the measures which may be adopted by the constituted authorities, for obtaining a speedy, a just, and an honourable peace.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed to these presents. Done at the city of Washington, the nineteenth day of June, one thousand eight hundred and twelve, and of the Independence of the United States the thirty-sixth.



JAMES MADISON.

By the President,

JAMES MONROE,
Secretary of State.



OFFICIAL
MILITARY AND NAVAL
LETTERS, &c.

BLACK ROCK, June 28, 1812.

SIR,

THERE is every reason to believe that the British meditate an attack on Fort Niagara, and that it may be attempted within twenty-four hours from this time. If they once pass the river it is impossible to say how far they may proceed. Under these very urgent circumstances, I despatch an express to request that you will immediately march the men under your command to our assistance. Although you may not have received orders authorizing you to comply with this request, I am persuaded the occasion will justify you, as your men can be of no possible use at Canandaigua, or any other place along the south shore of the lake, and are undoubtedly intended, ultimately, for this place. Bring with you all the arms and ammunition in the Canandaigua arsenal.

In great haste, yours respectfully,

PETER B. PORTER, Q. M. G.
of the State of New-York.

Maj. Mullany, commanding at Canandaigua.

[Major General Hall addressed Major Mullany by the same conveyance, and equally urgent, with an assurance that the people would bear him harmless in the event of his being censured by the government for marching for their protection, &c. &c.]

CANANDAIGUA, June 29, 18

9 o'clock

SIR,

I avail myself of the same express which conveyed a letter of general Porter and yours of yesterday, to inform that I will not hesitate in assuming the responsibility of making for the defence and protection of the Niagara frontier under existing circumstances; should I be fortunate in preventing repelling invasion, and inspiring our frontier settlers with confidence, I shall feel well rewarded.

It is only two months since I arrived in the district, and commenced the recruiting service, and with the blessing of Providence I will march by two o'clock to day, three companies of infantry and one of artillery, and I trust I will quarter them in fort Niagara on the 4th of July. Be pleased to make known to general Porter, and inform him that the arms and munition will accompany my command.

Respectfully yours,

JS. ROBT. MULLAN

Major U. S. Inf

To Major Genl. Hall, Batavia.

BY WILLIAM HULL,

Brigadier general and commander in chief of the North-western army of the United States.

A PROCLAMATION.

INHABITANTS OF CANADA!

After thirty years of peace and prosperity, the United States have been driven to arms. The injuries and aggressions, the insults and indignities of Great Britain, have once more left us no alternative but manly resistance or unconditional submission. The army under my command has invaded your country, and a standard of union now waves over the territory of Canada. The peaceable, unoffending inhabitant, it brings neither danger nor difficulty. I come to find enemies, not to make them; I come to protect, not to injure you.

Separated by an immense ocean and an extensive wild from Great Britain, you have no participation in her council or interest in her conduct; you have felt her tyranny, you have seen her injustice, but I do not ask you to revenge the one, or to resist the other. The United States are sufficiently powerful to afford every security consistent with their rights and your expect

I tender you the invaluable blessing of civil, political and religious liberty, and their necessary result, individual and general prosperity. That liberty which gave decision to our councils and energy to our conduct, in a struggle for independence, and which conducted us safe and triumphantly through the stormy period of the revolution. That liberty which has raised us to an elevated rank among the nations of the world, and which afforded us a greater measure of peace and security, of wealth and improvement, than ever fell to the lot of any country.

In the name of my country, and by the authority of government, I promise you protection to your persons, property and rights; remain at your homes, pursue your peaceful and customary avocations, raise not your hands against your brethren. Many of your fathers fought for the freedom and independence we now enjoy. Being children, therefore, of the same family with us, and heirs to the same heritage, the arrival of an army of friends must be hailed by you with a cordial welcome. You will be emancipated from tyranny and oppression, and restored to the dignified station of freemen. Had I any doubt of eventual success, I might ask your assistance, but I do not. I come prepared for every contingency. I have a force which will look down all opposition. And that force is but the van-guard of a much greater. If, contrary to your own interest and the just expectation of my country, you should take part in the approaching contest, you will be considered and treated as enemies, and the horrors and calamities of war will stalk before you. If the barbarous and savage policy of Great Britain be pursued, and the savages be let loose to murder our citizens, and butcher our women and children, this war will be a war of extermination. The first stroke of the tomahawk, the first attempt with the scalping knife, will be the signal of one indiscriminate scene of desolation. No white man found fighting by the side of an Indian will be taken prisoner; instant destruction will be his lot. If the dictates of reason, duty, justice and humanity, cannot prevent the employment of a force which respects no rights, and knows no wrong, it will be prevented by a severe and relentless system of retaliation. I doubt not your courage, and firmness. I will not doubt your attachment to liberty. The United States offer you peace, liberty and security—your choice lies between these and war, slavery and destruction. Choose then, but choose wisely; and may He who knows the justice of our cause, and who holds in his hands the fate of nations, guide you to a result the most compatible with your rights and interests, your peace and happiness.

By the General,

A. P. HULL,

Captain of the 13th U. S. reg. of Infantry and Aid de-camp.

HEAD QUARTERS,
Sandwich, July 12, 1812.

WILKINSON'S GENERAL ORDER.

HEAD-QUARTERS, NEW-ORLEANS, July 15, 1861

Brigadier General Wilkinson resumes his command of the district of the Mississippi.

The eventful moment in which he enters on the arduous critical duties of his station, will, he trusts, justify the deviation from ordinary rule, when he appeals to the pride, the spirit, the zeal and patriotism of those who may be placed under his orders.

After a series of long continued aggressions, which the long peace only could have induced the American people to tolerate after reiterated wrongs without remedy or relief; after he has drained the cup of conciliation to its very dregs; the government of the United States of America have been driven to this last appeal of nations in support of its independence, to assert those inalienable rights which are derived from God and nature. The patience and forbearance which have marked the course of the public councils furnish the strongest assurance of the firmness and inflexibility with which that course will be maintained until its objects are accomplished.

The crisis is imperative, and the call to arms must animate every citizen and every soldier. But we owe still more to the public service and the common safety of our beloved country. Let political feuds and personal animosities be buried at the shrine of patriotism, and let our only contest be for national glory and the national weal.

The respect in which the general holds his own humble person presents to his subordinates a safe guarantee for the justice and impartiality of the commander in the exercise of his functions; and while he requires from his officers a candid and manly opinion for the support of those principles of subordination and discipline, without which military bodies become worse than useless, while he demands from them harmony, zeal, discretion, constancy, valour, as the best security for personal reputation and efficient service. Considerations of delicacy require that he should draw an impenetrable veil over the scenes which ensued during his absence; and he pledges himself to make impartial justice the rule of his conduct, rewarding merit according to its worth, and awarding punishments with inflexible rigor when the laws may impose them.

SANDWICH, UPPER CANADA, July 17, 1861

SIR,

In conformity with your instructions, I proceeded with a detachment of 280 men, to reconnoitre the enemy's advanced posts. We found them in possession of a bridge over the

Canas, at the distance of four miles from Malden. After examining their position, I left one company of riflemen, to conceal themselves near the bridge, and upon our appearance on the opposite side of the river, to commence firing, in order to divert their attention, and to throw them into confusion. I then proceeded with the remainder of the force about five miles, to a ford over the Canas, and down on the southern bank of the river. About sun-set we arrived within sight of the enemy. Being entirely destitute of guides, we marched too near the bank of the river, and found our progress checked by a creek, which was then impassable. We were then compelled to march up a mile, in order to effect a passage over the creek. This gave the enemy time to make their arrangements, and prepare for their defence. On coming down the creek we found them formed; they commenced a distant fire of musketry. The riflemen of the detachment were formed upon the wings, and the two companies of infantry in the centre. The men moved on with great spirit and alacrity. After the first discharge the British retreated—we continued advancing. Three times they formed, and as often retreated. We drove them about half a mile, when it became so dark that we were obliged to relinquish the pursuit. Two privates in the 41st regiment were wounded and taken prisoners. We learn from deserters, that nine or ten were wounded, and some killed. We could gain no precise information of the number opposed to us. It consisted of a considerable detachment from the 41st regiment, some militia, and a body of Indians. The guard at the bridge consisted of fifty men. Our riflemen stationed on this side the Canas, discovered the enemy reinforcing them during the whole afternoon. There is no doubt but their number considerably exceeded ours. Lieutenant colonel Miller conducted in the most spirited and able manner. I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the whole detachment.

Very respectfully, sir, I have the honour, &c.

LEWIS CASS,
Col. 3d reg. O. vol.

His Excellency Brigadier General Hull.

British account of the capture of Fort Michilimackinac.

MACKINAC, 18th July, 1812.

DEAR SIR,

I am happy to have it in my power to announce to you that Mackinac capitulated to us on the 15th instant, at 11 o'clock, A. M. Captain Roberts at our head, with a part of the 10th B. V. battalion. Mr. Crawford had the command of the

Canadians, which consisted of about 200 men ; Mr. Dickenson 143 Sioux, Forlansians, and Winnebagoes ; and myself about 284 men, Attawas and Chippewas, part of Attawas of L'harb Croche had not arrived. It was a fortunate circumstance, the fort capitulated without firing a single gun, for had they done so, *I firmly believe not a soul of them would have been saved.** My son Charles Longdale, Augustin Nolin, and Machello Badotte, jr. have rendered me great service in keeping the *Indians* in order, and in executing, from time to time, such commands as were delivered by the commanding officer. I never saw so *determined a set of people* as the Chippewas and Attawas.

Since the capitulation they have not drank a single drop of liquor, nor even killed a fowl belonging to any person, (a thing never known before) for they generally destroy every thing they meet with.

I am, dear sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ASKIN, Jun.

Store keeper's Depot

The hon. col. W. Claus, &c. Fort George.

DETROIT, 4th August, 1812.

SIR,

I take the earliest opportunity to acquaint your excellency of the surrender of the garrison of Michilimackinac, under my command, to his Britannic majesty's forces under the command of captain Charles Roberts, on the 17th ultimo, the particulars of which are as follows :—On the 16th, I was informed by the Indian interpreter, that he had discovered from an Indian that the several nations of Indians then at St. Joseph, (a British garrison, distant about forty miles) intended to make an immediate attack on Michilimackinac. I was inclined, from the coolness I had discovered in some of the principal chiefs of the Ottawa and Chippewa nations, who had but a few days before professed the greatest friendship for the United States, to place confidence in this report. I immediately called a meeting of the American gentlemen at that time on the island, in which it was thought proper to despatch a confidential person to St. Joseph to watch the motions of the Indians. Captain Daurman, of the militia, was thought the most suitable for this service. He embarked about sun-set, and met the British forces within ten or fifteen miles of the island, by whom he was made prisoner and put on his parole of honor. He was landed on the island at day-break, with positive directions to give me no intelligence whatever. He was also instructed to take the inhabitants of the village indiscriminately to a place on the west side of the island, where their persons and property

* British magnanimity.

should be protected by a British guard ; but should they go to the fort, they would be subject to a general massacre by the savages, which would be inevitable if the garrison fired a gun. This information I received from doctor Day, who was passing through the village when every person was flying for refuge to the enemy. Immediately on being informed of the approach of the enemy, I placed ammunition, &c. in the block-houses ; ordered every gun charged, and made every preparation for action. About 9 o'clock I could discover that the enemy were in possession of the heights that commanded the fort, and one piece of their artillery directed to the most defenceless part of the garrison. The Indians at this time were to be seen in great numbers in the edge of the woods. At half past 11 o'clock, the enemy sent in a flag of truce, demanding a surrender of the fort and island to his Britannic majesty's forces. This, sir, was the first information I had of the declaration of war ; I, however, had anticipated it, and was as well prepared to meet such an event as I possibly could have been with the force under my command, amounting to 57 effective men, including officers. Three American gentlemen, who were prisoners, were permitted to accompany the flag: from them I ascertained the strength of the enemy to be from nine hundred to one thousand strong, consisting of regular troops, Canadians and savages ; that they had two pieces of artillery, and were provided with ladders and ropes for the purpose of scaling the works if necessary. After I had obtained this information, I consulted my officers and also the American gentlemen present, who were very intelligent men ; the result of which was, that it was impossible for the garrison to hold out against such a superior force. In this opinion I fully concurred, from the conviction that it was the only measure that could prevent a general massacre. The fort and garrison were accordingly surrendered.

The enclosed papers exhibit copies of the correspondence between the officer commanding the British forces and myself, and of the articles of capitulation. This subject involved questions of a peculiar nature ; and I hope, sir, that my demands and protests will meet the approbation of my government. I cannot allow this opportunity to escape without expressing my obligation to doctor Day for the service he rendered me in conducting this correspondence.

In consequence of this unfortunate affair, I beg leave, sir, to demand that a court of inquiry may be ordered to investigate all the facts connected with it ; and I do further request, that the court may be specially directed to express their opinion on the merits of the case.

I have the honour to be, sir, &c

P. HANKS,
Lieutenant of Artillery.

His Excellency Gen. Hull,
Commanding the N. W. Army.

P. S. The following particulars relating to the British were obtained after the capitulation, from a source that is of no doubt.

Regular troops,	46 (including 4 officers.)
Canadian Militia,	260
Total,	<u>306</u>
SAVAGES—Sioux,	56
Winnebagoes,	48
Taliesawains,	39
Chippewas and	
Ottawas,	<u>572</u>
	715 Savages,
	306 Whites.
	<u>1021</u>

It may also be remarked, that one hundred and fifty Chippewas and Ottawas joined the British two days after the capitulation.

P. 1

SANDWICH, August 7,

SIR,

On the 4th instant major Van Horn, of colonel Findlay's regiment of Ohio volunteers, was detached from this army, with the command of 200 men, principally riflemen, to proceed to the river Raisin, and further, if necessary, to meet and receive captain Brush, of the state of Ohio, commanding a company of volunteers, and escorting provisions for this army. At Brownstown, a large body of Indians had formed an ambuscade, and a major's detachment received a heavy fire, at the distance of 100 yards from the enemy. The whole detachment retreated in order. Major Van Horn made every exertion to form, and prevent the retreat, that was possible for a brave and gallant officer, but without success. By the return of killed and wounded, it will be perceived that the loss of officers was uncommonly great. Their efforts to rally their companions was the occasion of

I am, very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

WM. HU

Hon. Wm. Eustis, Secretary of War.

Killed, 7 officers—10 privates;—number of wounded unknown.

DETROIT, August 13,

SIR,

The main body of the army having re-crossed the river Raisin, on the night and morning of the 8th instant, 600 men were immediately detached under the command of lieutenant colonel Miller, to open the communication to the river Raisin.

protect the provisions under the escort of captain Brush. This detachment consisted of the 4th United States' regiment, and two small detachments under the command of lieutenant Stansbury, and ensign M'Labe of the 1st regiment, detachments from the Ohio and Michigan volunteers, a corps of artillerists, with one six pounder and an howitzer under the command of lieutenant Eastman, and a part of captains Smith and Sloan's cavalry, commanded by captain Sloan of the Ohio volunteers.

Lieutenant colonel Miller marched from Detroit on the afternoon of the 8th instant, and on the 9th, about 4 o'clock, P. M. the van guard, commanded by captain Snelling of the 4th United States' regiment, was fired on by an extensive line of British troops and Indians at the lower part of the Magaugo, about 14 miles from Detroit. At this time the main body was marching in two columns, and captain Snelling maintained his position in a most gallant manner, under a very heavy fire, until the line was formed and advanced to the ground he occupied, when the whole, excepting the rear guard, was brought into action.

The enemy were formed behind a temporary breast-work of logs, the Indians extending in a thick wood on their left. Lieutenant colonel Miller ordered his whole line to advance, and when within a small distance of the enemy made a general discharge, and proceeded with charged bayonets, when the British line and Indians commenced a retreat. They were pursued in a most vigorous manner about two miles, and the pursuit discontinued only on account of the fatigue of the troops, the approach of evening, and the necessity of returning to take care of the wounded. The judicious arrangements made by lieutenant colonel Miller, and the gallant manner in which they were executed, justly entitle him to the highest honour. From the moment the line commenced the fire, it continually moved on, and the enemy maintained their position until forced at the point of the bayonet. The Indians on the left, under the command of Tecumseh, fought with great obstinacy, but were continually forced and compelled to retreat. The victory was complete in every part of the line, and the success would have been more brilliant had the cavalry charged the enemy on the retreat, when a most favorable opportunity presented. Although orders were given for the purpose, unfortunately they were not executed. Majors Van Horn and Morrison, of the Ohio volunteers, were associated with lieutenant colonel Miller, as field officers in this command, and were highly distinguished by their exertions in forming the line, and the firm and intrepid manner they led their respective commands to action.

Captain Baker of the 1st United States' regiment, captain Brevoort of the 2d, and captain Hull of the 13th, my aid-de-camp, and lieutenant Whistler of the 1st, requested permission to join the detachment as volunteers. Lieutenant colonel Miller assigned to captain Baker and lieutenant Whistler, separate commands; and captains Brevoort and Hull, at his request,

attended his person and aided him in the general arrangements. Lieutenant colonel Miller has mentioned the conduct of those officers in terms of high approbation. In addition to the captains who have been named, lieutenant colonel Miller has mentioned captains Burton and Fuller of the 4th regiment, captains Saunders and Brown of the Ohio volunteers, and captain Delandre of the Michigan volunteers, who were attached to his command, and distinguished by their valour. It is impossible for me, in this communication, to do justice to the officers and soldiers, who gained the victory which I have described. They have acquired high honour to themselves, and are justly entitled to the gratitude of their country.

Major Muir of the 41st regiment, commanded the British in this action. The regulars and volunteers consisted of about 400, and a large number of Indians. Major Muir and two subalterns were wounded, one of them since dead. About forty Indians were found dead on the field, and Tecumseh, their leader, was slightly wounded. The number of wounded Indians who escaped has not been ascertained. Four of major Muir's detachment have been made prisoners, and fifteen of the 41st regiment killed and wounded. The militia and volunteers attached to his command, were in the severest part of the action, and their loss must have been great—it has not yet been ascertained.

I have the honour to be, yours, &c.

WM. HULL,

Brig. Gen. commanding N. W. Army.

Hon. Wm. Eustis, Secretary of War.

Killed and wounded in the action near Maguago, Aug. 9, 1812.

4th U.S. regiment—10 non-commissioned officers and privates killed, and 45 wounded.

Ohio and Michigan volunteers—8 killed and 12 wounded.

GENERAL HULL'S CAPITULATION.

DETROIT, August 12, 1812.

DEAR SIR,

I have several times written to you since I heard you were on your march, but I find that my letters have never reached you. Two detachments have been sent to meet you, but both returned with loss. We have abandoned Canada, and the British force is now opposite this place pointing their artillery; the firing will commence shortly. I fear you will not be able to see us. If possible take care of yourself and party. The enemy may not have force to see you and attend to us.

The bearer will, or can give you a hint of our situation. Adieu, I have not time to write.

Respectfully yours,
DUNCAN M'ARTHUR.

Captain H. Brush.

DETROIT, 14th August, 1812.

SIR,

The state of the communication between this and the river Raisin, is such that a sufficient detachment cannot be sent at present to bring on the provisions with safety. You will therefore remain at the river Raisin, and in conjunction with Le Croix's corps and your own, protect the provisions and yourselves until further orders. The detachment sent for the purpose of opening the communication are so fatigued after a severe and victorious battle that it will return here.

I am, respectfully,

W. HULL, *Gen. Commanding.*

Captain Brush, or the commanding
officer at the river Raisin.

P. S. If consulting with colonel Anderson and captain Jobart, the bearer of this, and from all the information you can obtain, it should be the opinion, you can come an upper road crossing the river Huron, at Godfrey's trading establishment, you are authorized to proceed that route, in which case you will give me an immediate notice. No person must know this excepting colonel Anderson, captain Jobart, and yourself. Take captain Jobart for a guide, and if he recommends other guides, with him, they shall be paid. Captain Le Croix, with his company, will proceed on with you.

Respectfully,

W. HULL.

Captain Brush.

RIVER RUSH, August 16th, 1812.

SIR,

By the within letter you will see that the army under general Hall has been surrendered. By the articles you will see that provision has been made for the detachment under your command; you will, therefore, I hope, return to Ohio with us.

DUNCAN M'ARTHUR.

Captain Henry Brush.

HEAD QUARTERS, AT DETROIT, August 16th, 1812.

SIR,

I have signed articles of capitulation for the surrender of this garrison in which you and your detachment are prisoners of war. Such part of the Ohio militia as have not joined the army, will be permitted to return to their homes, on condition that they will not serve during the war. Their arms, however, will be delivered up if belonging to the public.

I am, very respectfully, &c.

W. HULL, *Brig. Gen.**Commanding the N. W. army.*

Colonel Duncan M'Arthur.

HEAD QUARTERS, DETROIT, August 16, 1812,

GENERAL ORDERS.

It is with pain and anxiety that brigadier-general Hull announces to the North-western army, that he has been compelled from a sense of duty, to agree to the following articles of capitulation :

CAMP AT DETROIT, 16th August, 1812.

Capitulation for the surrender of Fort Detroit, entered into between major general Brock, commanding his Britannic majesty's forces, on the one part, and brigadier-general Hull, commanding the North-western army of the United States, on the other part—

ART. 1. Fort Detroit, with all the troops, regulars as well militia, will be immediately surrendered to the British force under the command of major general Brock, and will be considered as prisoners of war; with the exception of such of the militia of the Michigan territory who have not joined the army.

2. All public stores, arms and all public documents, including every thing else of a public nature, will be immediately given up.

3. Private persons and property of every description will be respected.

4. His excellency brigadier-general Hull having expressed a desire that a detachment from the state of Ohio, on its way to join his army, as well as one sent from Detroit, under the command of colonel M'Arthur, shall be included in the above capitulation, it is accordingly agreed to; it is however to be understood that such part of the Ohio militia as have not joined the army, will be permitted to return to their homes, on condition that they will not serve during the war. Their arms, however, will be delivered up, if belonging to the public.

4. The garrison will march out at the hour of twelve o'clock this day, and the British forces will take immediate possession of the fort.

J. MACDONALD, *Lieut. Col.*
Militia, P. A. D. C.

J. B. GLEGG, *Major, A. D. C.*

JAMES MILLER, *Lieut. Col.*
5th U. S. Infantry.

E. BRUSH, *Col. 1st regt.*
Michigan militia.

APPROVED,
WM. HULL,
Brigadier-general commanding the N. W. Army.

APPROVED,
ISAAC BROCK,
Major General.

The army, at 12 o'clock this day, will march out of the east gate, where they will stack their arms, and then be subject to the articles of capitulation.

WM. HULL,
Brigadier general commanding the N. W. Army.

HEAD QUARTERS, SANDWICH, August 15, 1812.

SIR,

The force at my disposal authorizes me to require of you the immediate surrender of fort Detroit. It is far from my inclination to join in a war of extermination, but you must be aware, that the numerous body of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops, will be beyond my controul the moment the contest commences. You will find me disposed to enter into such conditions as will satisfy the most scrupulous sense of honour. Lieutenant colonel Macdonald and major Glegg are fully authorized to conclude any arrangement that may lead to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Your most obedient servant,

ISAAC BROCK,

Major General.

*His Excellency brigadier general Hull,
commanding at Fort Detroit.*

HEAD QUARTERS, DETROIT, August 15, 1812.

SIR,

I have received your letter of this date. I have no other reply to make, than to inform you, that I am prepared to meet any force, which may be at your disposal, and any consequences which may result from any exertion of it you may think proper to make.

I avail myself of this opportunity to inform you that the flag of truce under the direction of captain Brown, proceeded contrary to the orders, and without the knowledge of colonel Cass who commanded the troops which attacked your picket, near the river Canardbridge.

I likewise take this occasion to inform you that Cowie's house was set on fire contrary to my orders, and it did not take place until after the evacuation of the fort. From the best information I have been able to obtain on the subject, it was set on fire by some of the inhabitants on the other side of the river.

I am, very respectfully,

Your excellency's most obedient servant,

W. HULL,

Brig. Gen. Commanding the N. W. Army U. S

*His excellency major general Brock,
commanding his Britannic majesty's
forces, Sandwich, Upper Canada.*

An article supplemental to the articles of capitulation, concluded at Detroit, 15th August, 1812.

It is agreed that the officers and soldiers of the Ohio militia and volunteers shall be permitted to proceed to their respective homes on this condition, that they are not to serve during the present war, unless they are exchanged.

W. HULL,
Brig. Gen. Commanding N. W. army U. S.
ISAAC BROCK,
Major General

An article in addition to the supplemental article of the capitulation, concluded at Detroit, 16th August, 1812.

It is further agreed that the officers and soldiers of the Michigan militia and volunteers, under the command of major Wetherell, shall be placed on the same principles as the Ohio volunteers and militia are placed by the supplemental article of the 16th instant.

W. HULL,
Brig. Gen. Commanding N. W. army U. S.
ISAAC BROCK,
Major General

Return of ordnance taken in the fort and batteries at Detroit August 16th, 1812.

Iron pieces of ordnance,	25
Brass do.	8
Total,	33

FELIX TROUGHTON,
Lieutenant commanding Roy. Art.

Major general Brock, commanding
the forces of Upper Canada.

GENERAL ORDER OF GENERAL BROCK.

HEAD QUARTERS, DETROIT, August 16th, 1812.

Major general Brock has every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the troops he had the honour to lead this morning against the enemy. The state of discipline which they so eminently displayed, and the determination they evinced, to under-

take the most hazardous enterprise, decided the enemy, infinitely more numerous in men and artillery, to propose a capitulation, the terms of which are herewith inserted for the information of the troops.

The major general requests colonel Proctor will accept his thanks for the assistance he derived from his experience and intelligence.

The steadiness and discipline of the 41st regiment and the readiness of the militia to follow so good an example, were highly conspicuous.

The ability manifested by captain Dixon of the royal engineers in the choice and construction of the batteries, and the high state of the royal artillery under lieutenant Troughton, afforded the major general much gratification, and reflects great credit on those officers.

The willing assistance given by captain Hall and the marine department during the whole course of the service has been very conspicuous, and the manner the batteries were served this morning evinced a degree of steadiness highly commendable.

Lieutenant Dewar, deputy assistant quarter master general, afforded strong proof of the local knowledge he has acquired of the country, of an unremitting attention to his duty; and the care and regularity with which the troops were transported across the river, must in a like degree be ascribed to his zeal for the service.

To lieutenant colonel St. George, majors Tallon and Chambers, who commanded brigades, every degree of praise is due for their unremitting zeal and attention to their respective commands. The detachment of the royal Newfoundland regiment, under the command of major Moekler, is deserving every praise for their steadiness in the field, as well as when embarked in the king's vessels.

The major general cannot forego this opportunity of expressing his admiration at the conduct of the several companies of militia who so handsomely volunteered to undergo the fatigues of a journey of several hundred miles to go to the rescue of an invaded district; and he requests major Salmon, captains Hatt, Steward, Boswick and Robinson, will assure the officers and men under their respective commands, that their services have been duly appreciated and will never be forgotten.

The major general is happy to acknowledge the able assistance he has derived from the zeal and local information of lieutenant colonel Nicholl, acting quarter master general of militia.

To his personal staff the major general feels himself under much obligation; and he requests lieutenant colonel Macdonald, majors Glegg and Givens, will be assured that their zealous exertions have made too deep an impression on his mind ever to be forgotten.

The conduct of the Indians under colonel Elliot, captain McKee, and the others of that department, joined to that of the

gallant and brave chiefs of their respective tribes, has since the commencement of the war been marked with acts of true heroism and in nothing can they testify more strongly their love to the king, their great father, than in following the dictates of honour and humanity, by which they have been hitherto actuated. Two fortifications have already been captured from the enemy without a drop of blood being shed by the hand of the Indian; the instant the enemy submitted, his life became sacred.

By order of MAJOR GENERAL BROCK.

J. B. GLEGG, *capt. A. D. C.*

CAPTURE OF THE ALERT.

AT SEA, August 17, 1812.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that upon the 13th, his Britannic majesty's sloop of war Alert, Captain T. L. P. Langhorn ran down on our weather quarter, gave three cheers and commenced an action (if so trifling a skirmish deserves the name) and after eight minutes firing struck her colours with seven feet of water in her hold, much cut to pieces, and three men wounded.

I need not inform you that the officers and crew of the Essex behaved as I trust all Americans will in such cases, and it is only to be regretted that so much zeal and activity could not have been displayed on an occasion that would have done them more honour. The Essex has not received the slightest injury. The Alert was out for the purpose of taking the Hornet.

I have the honour, &c.

D. PORTER.

Hon. Paul Hamilton.

PORT GEORGE, August 26, 1812.

SIR,

Enclosed are the articles of capitulation, by which the Fort of Detroit has been surrendered to major general Brock, commanding his Britannic majesty's forces in Upper Canada, and by which the troops have become prisoners of war. My situation at present forbids me from detailing the particular causes which have led to this unfortunate event. I will, however, generally observe, that after the surrender of Michilimackinac, almost every tribe and nation of Indians, excepting a part of the Miami and Delawares, north from beyond Lake Superior, west from beyond the Mississippi, south from the Ohio and Wabash, and east from every part of Upper Canada, and from all the intermediate country, joined in open hostility, under the British

standard, against the army I commanded, contrary to the most solemn assurances of a large portion of them to remain neutral: even the Ottawa chiefs from Arbecrotch, who formed the delegation to Washington the last summer, in whose friendship I know you had great confidence, are among the hostile tribes, and several of them distinguished leaders. Among the vast number of chiefs who led the hostile bands, Tecumseh, Marpot, Logan, Walk-in-the-water, Split Log, &c. are considered the principals. This numerous assemblage of savages, under the entire influence and direction of the British commander, enabled him totally to obstruct the only communication which I had with my country. This communication had been opened from the settlements in the state of Ohio, two hundred miles through a wilderness, by the fatigues of the army, which I marched to the frontier on the river Detroit. The body of the lake being commanded by the British armed ships, and the shores and rivers by gun boats, the army was totally deprived of all communication by water. On this extensive road it depended for transportation of provisions, military stores, medicine, clothing, and every other supply, on pack horses—all its operations were successful until its arrival at Detroit, and in a few days it passed into the enemy's country, and all opposition seemed to drop before it. One month it remained in possession of this country, and was fed from its resources. In different directions, detachments penetrated sixty miles in the settled part of the province, and the inhabitants seemed satisfied with the change of situation, which appeared to be taking place; the militia from Amherstburg were daily deserting, and the whole country, then under the controul of the army, was asking for protection. The Indians, generally, in the first instance, appeared to be neutralized, and determined to take no part in the contest. The fort of Amherstburg was eighteen miles below my encampment. Not a single cannon or mortar was on wheels suitable to carry before this place. I consulted my officers, whether it was expedient to make an attempt on it with the bayonet alone, without cannon, to make a break in the first instance. The council I called was of the opinion it was not. The greatest industry was exerted in making preparation, and it was not until the 7th of August, that two 24 pounders, and three howitzers were prepared. It was then my intention to have proceeded on the enterprize. While the operations of the army were delayed by these preparations, the clouds of adversity had been for some time and seemed still thickly to be gathering around me. The surrender of Michilimackinac opened the northern hive of Indians, and they were swarming down in every direction. Reinforcements from Niagara had arrived at Amherstburg under the command of colonel Proctor. The desertion of the militia ceased. Besides the reinforcements that came by water, I received information of a very considerable force under the command of major Chambers, on the river Le

French, with four field pieces, and collecting the militia route, evidently destined for Amherstburg; and in addition this combination, and increase of force, contrary to all expectations, the Wyandots, Chippewas, Ottawas, Pottawats, Munsees, Delawares, &c. with whom I had the most friendly intercourse, at once passed over to Amherstburg, and accepted the tomahawk and scalping knife. There being now a large number of Indians at the British post, they were sent to the Huron, Brownstown, and Maguago to intercept my communication. To open this communication, I detached major Van of the Ohio volunteers, with two hundred men, to proceed up the river Raisin, under an expectation he would meet at Bush with one hundred and fifty men, volunteers from the west of Ohio, and a quantity of provision for the army. An ambush was formed at Brownstown, and major Van Horn's detachment defeated and returned to camp without effecting the object of the expedition.

In my letter of the 7th instant you have the particulars of this transaction, with a return of the killed and wounded. I was surprised at this sudden and unexpected change of things, and having received an express from general Hall, commanding opposite the British shore on the Niagara river, by which it appeared that there was no prospect of a co-operation from that quarter, and the senior officers of the artillery having stated to me an opinion it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to pass the Turkey river and river Aux Cannard, with the 24 pounder that they could not be transported by water, as the Queen's letter, which carried eighteen 24 pounders, lay in the river above the mouth of the river Aux Cannard; and as it appeared indispensably necessary to open the communication to the Raisin and the Miami, I found myself compelled to suspend operation against Amherstburg, and concentrate the main body of the army at Detroit. Fully intending at that time, after communication was opened, to re-cross the river, and pursue my object at Amherstburg, and strongly desirous of continuing protection to a very large number of the inhabitants of Upper Canada, who had voluntarily accepted it under my proclamation, I established a fortress on the banks of the river, a little above Detroit, calculated for a garrison of 300 men. On the evening of the 7th, and morning of the 8th instant, the army, excepting a garrison of 250 infantry, and a corps of artillerymen, all under the command of major Denny of the Ohio volunteers, re-crossed the river, and encamped at Detroit. In pursuance of the object of opening the communication, on which I considered the existence of the army depending, a detachment of 600 men, under the command of lieutenant colonel Miller, was immediately ordered. For a particular account of the proceedings of this detachment, and the memorable battle which was fought at Maguago, which reflects the highest honour on the American arms, I refer you

my letter of the 13th of August instant, a duplicate of which is enclosed, marked G. Nothing however but honour was acquired by this victory ; and it is a painful consideration, that the blood of seventy-five gallant men could only open the communication, as far as the points of their bayonets extended. The necessary care of the sick and wounded, and a very severe storm of rain, rendered their return to camp indispensibly necessary for their own comfort. Captain Brush, with his small detachment, and the provisions being still at the river Raisin, and in a situation to be destroyed by the savages, on the 13th instant in the evening, I permitted colonels M'Arthur and Cass to select from their regiment four hundred of their most effective men, and proceed an upper route through the woods, which I had sent an express to captain Brush to take, and had directed the militia of the river Raisin to accompany him as a reinforcement. The force of the enemy continually increasing, and the necessity of opening the communication, and acting on the defensive, becoming more apparent, I had, previous to detaching colonels M'Arthur and Cass on the 11th instant, evacuated and destroyed the fort on the opposite bank. On the 13th, in the evening, general Brock arrived at Amherstburg about the hour that colonels M'Arthur and Cass marched, of which at that time I had received no information. On the 15th I received a summons from him to surrender fort Detroit, of which the paper marked A is a copy. My answer is marked B. At this time I had received no information from colonels M'Arthur and Cass. An express was immediately sent, strongly escorted, with orders for them to return. On the 15th, as soon as general Brock received my letter, his batteries opened on the town and fort, and continued until evening. In the evening all the British ships of war came nearly as far up the river as Sandwich, three miles below Detroit. At day light on the 16th (at which time I had received no information from colonels M'Arthur and Cass, my expresses, sent the evening before, and in the night having been prevented from passing by numerous bodies of Indians) the cannonade re-commenced, and in a short time I received information, that the British army and Indians, were landing below the Spring Wells, under the cover of their ships of war. At this time the whole effective force at my disposal at Detroit did not exceed eight hundred men. Being new troops, and unaccustomed to a camp life ; having performed a laborious march ; having been engaged in a number of battles and skirmishes, in which many had fallen, and more had received wounds, in addition to which a large number being sick, and unprovided with medicine, and the comforts necessary for their situation ; are the general causes by which the strength of the army was thus reduced. The fort at this time was filled with women, children, and the old and decrepid people of the town and country ; they were unsafe in the town, as it was entirely open and exposed to the enemy's batteries. Back of the fort,

above or below it, there was no safety for them on account of the Indians. In the first instance the enemy's fire was principally directed against our batteries ; towards the close, it was directed against the fort alone, and almost every shot and shell had their effect.

It now became necessary either to fight the enemy in the field ; collect the whole force in the fort ; or propose terms of capitulation. I could not have carried into the field more than six hundred men, and left any adequate force in the fort. There were landed at that time of the enemy a regular force of much more than that number, and twice the number of Indians. Considering this great inequality of force I did not think it expedient to adopt the first measure. The second must have been attended with a great sacrifice of blood, and no possible advantage, because the contest could not have been sustained more than a day for the want of powder, and but a very few days for the want of provisions. In addition to this, colonels M'Arthur and Cass would have been in a most hazardous situation. I feared nothing but the last alternative. I have dared to adopt it. I well know the high responsibility of the measure, and take the whole of it on myself. It was dictated by a sense of duty, and a full conviction of its expediency. The bands of savages which had then joined the British force were numerous beyond any former example. Their numbers have since increased, and the history of the barbarians of the north of Europe does not furnish examples of more greedy violence than these savages have exhibited. A large portion of the brave and gallant officers and men I commanded would cheerfully have contested until the last cartridge had been expended, and the bayonets worn to the sockets. I could not consent to the useless sacrifice of such brave men, when I knew it was impossible for me to sustain my situation. It was impossible in the nature of things that an army could have been furnished with the necessary supplies of provision, military stores, clothing and comforts for the sick, or pack horses, through a wilderness of two hundred miles, filled with hostile savages. It was impossible, sir, that this little army, worn down by fatigue, by sickness, by wounds, and deaths, could have supported itself not only against the collected force of all the northern nations of Indians ; but against the united strength of Upper Canada, whose population consists of more than twenty times the number contained in the territory of Michigan, aided by the principal part of the regular forces of the province, and the wealth and influence of the north-west and other trading establishments among the Indians, which have in their employment, and under their entire controul, more than two thousand white men. Before I close this despatch, it is a duty I owe to my respectable associates in command, colonels M'Arthur, Findlay, Cass, and lieutenant colonel Miller, to express my obligations to them for the prompt and judicious manner they have performed

their respective duties. If aught has taken place during the campaign, which is honourable to the army, these officers are entitled to a large share of it. If the last act should be disapproved, no part of the censure belongs to them. I have likewise express my obligation to general Taylor, who has performed the duty of quarter master general, for his great exertions in securing every thing in his department which it was possible to furnish for the convenience of the army; likewise to brigade major Jessup for the correct and punctual manner in which he has discharged his duty; and to the army generally for their exertions, and the zeal they have manifested for the public interest. The death of Dr. Foster soon after he arrived at Detroit, was a severe misfortune to the army; it was increased by the capture of the Chachago packet, by which the medicine and hospital stores were lost. He was commencing the best arrangements in the department of which he was the principal, with the very small means he possessed. I was likewise deprived of the necessary services of captain Partridge by sickness, the only officer of the corps of engineers attached to the army. All the officers and men have gone to their respective homes, excepting the 4th United States' regiment, and a small part of the 1st, and captain Dyson's company of artillery. Captain Dyson's company was left at Amherstburg, and the others are with me prisoners—they amount to about three hundred and forty. I have only to solicit an investigation of my conduct, as early as my situation and the state of things will admit; and to add the further request, that the government will not be unmindful of my associates in captivity, and of the families of those brave men who have fallen in the contest.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

WM. HULL,

Brig. Gen. commanding the N. W. Army U. S.

Hon. W. Eustis, Secretary of
the Department of War.

UNITED STATES' FRIGATE CONSTITUTION,
off Boston Light, August 30, 1812.

DR.

I have the honour to inform you, that on the 19th instant, 2 P. M. being in latitude 41, 42, longitude 55, 48, with the Constitution under my command, a sail was discovered from the mast-head bearing E. by S. or E. S. E. but at such a distance we could not tell what she was. All sail was instantly made in chase, and soon found we came up with her. At 3 P. M. could

plainly see that she was a ship on the starboard tack, under sail, close on a wind; at half past 3 P. M. made her out to frigate; continued the chase until we were within about miles, when I ordered the light sails taken in, the courses hauled up, and the ship cleared for action. At this time the chase backed his main top-sail, waiting for us to come down. As the Constitution was ready for action, I bore down with intention to bring him to close action immediately; but on coming within gun-shot she gave us a broadside and filled us and wore, giving us a broadside on the other tack, but without effect; her shot falling short. She continued wearing and manoeuvring for about three quarters of an hour, to get a position, but finding she could not, she bore up, and run up top-sails and gib, with the wind on the quarter. Immediately made sail to bring the ship up with her, and 5 minutes before 5 P. M. being along side within half pistol shot, we commenced heavy fire from all our guns, double shotted with round and grape, and so well directed were they, and so warmly kept up, that 15 minutes his mizen-mast went by the board, and his main in the slings, and the hull, rigging and sails very much to pieces. The fire was kept up with equal warmth for 15 minutes longer, when his main-mast and fore-mast went, taking with every spar, excepting the bowsprit; on seeing this we ceased firing, so that in 30 minutes after we got fairly along side the enemy she surrendered, and had not a spar standing, and her below and above water so shattered, that a few more broadsides must have carried her down.

After informing you that so fine a ship as the Guerriere, commanded by an able and experienced officer, had been totally masted, and otherwise cut to pieces, so as to make her not worth towing into port, in the short space of 30 minutes, you can have no doubt of the gallantry and good conduct of the officer and ship's company I have the honour to command. It only remains therefore, for me to assure you, that they all fought with bravery; and it gives me great pleasure to say, that from the smallest boy in the ship to the oldest seaman, not a look of cowardice was seen. They all went into action, giving three cheers on requesting to be laid close along side the enemy.

Enclosed I have the honour to send you a list of killed and wounded on board the Constitution, and a report of the damage she has sustained; also, a list of the killed and wounded on the enemy, with his quarter bill, &c.

I have the honour to be,

With very great respect,

Sir, your obedient servant

ISAAC HULL

The Hon. Paul Hamilton, &c.

Killed and wounded on board the United States' frigate Constitution, Isaac Hull, Esqr. Captain, in the action with his Britannic majesty's frigate Guerriere, James A. Dacres, Esqr. Captain, on the 20th of August, 1812.

Killed —W. S. Bush, lieutenant of Marines, and six seamen,	7
Wounded —lieutenant C. Morris, Master J. C. Aylwin, four seamen, one marine,	7
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Total killed and wounded,	14
	<hr/>

U. S. frigate Constitution, Aug. 21, 1812.

ISAAC HULL, *Captain.*
T. I. CHEW, *Purser.*

Killed and wounded on board the Guerriere.

Killed —3 officers, 12 seamen and marines,	15
Wounded —J. A. Dacres, captain, 4 officers, 57 seamen and marines,	62
Missing ,—lieutenants Pullman and Roberts, and 22 seamen and marines, supposed to have gone overboard with the masts,	24
	<hr/>
Total killed, wounded and missing,	101
	<hr/>

The Constitution rates 44 guns, and mounted 55, her complement 450 men. The Guerriere rates 38 guns, and mounted 49, her complement 300 men.

Three days before the engagement with the Constitution, the Guerriere spoke the John Adams, captain Fash, from Liverpool, and endorsed on his register the following lines :

“ Captain Dacres, commander of his Britannic majesty's frigate Guerriere, of 44 guns, presents his compliments to commodore Rodgers, of the United States frigate President, and will be very happy to meet him, or any other American frigate of equal force to the President, off Sandy Hook, for the purpose of having a few minutes *tete-a-tete*.”

Captain Hull saved him the trouble of going so far for the desired *tete-a-tete*, which resulted not quite to the satisfaction and pleasure of Captain Dacres.

Extract of a letter from Captain Hull to the Secretary of the Navy, dated August 30, 1812.

“ I cannot but make you acquainted with the very great assistance I received from that valuable officer, lieutenant Morris, in bringing the ship into action, and in working her whilst along side the enemy, and I am extremely sorry to state that he is badly wounded, being shot through the body ; we have yet hopes of his

recovery, when I am sure he will receive the thanks and gratitude of his country, for this and the many gallant acts he done in its service. Were I to name any particular officer having been more useful than the rest, I should do them great injustice; they all fought bravely, and gave me every possible assistance that I could wish. I am extremely sorry to state to you the loss of lieutenant Bush, of marines: he fell at the head of his men in getting ready to board the enemy. In him our country has lost a valuable and brave officer. After the fall of lieutenant Bush, lieutenant Contee of the corps, took command of the marines, and I have pleasure in saying that his conduct was that of a brave, good officer, and the marines behaved with great coolness and courage during the action, and annoyed the enemy very much whilst she was under our stern."

UNITED STATES' FRIGATE PRESIDENT,
BOSTON, September 1, 1812.

SIR,

I had the pleasure of informing you of the arrival of the squadron, and now to state the result and particulars of the cruise.

Previous to leaving New York on the 21st of June, I heard that a British convoy had sailed from Jamaica for England, or about the 20th of the preceding month, and on being informed of the declaration of war against Great Britain, I determined the event of commodore Decatur joining me with the United States, Congress and Argus, as you had directed, to go in pursuit of them. The United States, Congress and Argus, did me on the 21st, with which vessels, this ship and the Hornet accordingly sailed in less than an hour after I had received orders of the 18th of June, accompanied by your official communication of the declaration of war.

On leaving New York, I shaped our course south-eastward, with the expectation of falling in with vessels, by which I should be enabled to intercept the before mentioned convoy, and the following night we were joined by an American brig that gave me the sought for information. The squadron now crowded sail in pursuit; but the next morning we were taken out of its course, by the pursuit of a British vessel, that I since find was the Belvidera, relative to which I beg to refer you to the enclosed extract from my journal: "In pairing as far as possible the injury done by the Belvidera to our spars and rigging, we again crowded all sail and resumed our course in pursuit of the convoy, but did not receive further intelligence of it until the 29th of June, on the western coast of Newfoundland, where we spoke an American vessel, the master of which reported that he had two days before seen them in latitude 43, longitude 55, steering to the east."

was surprised to find that the squadron was still so far to the eastward of us, but was urged, however, as well by what I considered my duty, as by inclination, to continue the pursuit.

On the 1st of July, a little to the eastward of Newfoundland bank, we fell in with quantities of cocoa-nut shells, orange peels, &c. which indicated that the convoy were not far distant, and we pursued it with zeal, although frequently taken out of our course by vessels it was necessary to chase, without gaining any further intelligence until the 9th of July, in latitude 45, 30, longitude 23, we captured the British private armed brig *Dolphin*, of *Jersey*, and was informed by some of her crew that they had seen the convoy the preceding evening, the weather was not clear at the time, but that they had counted 85 sail, and that the force charged with its protection consisted of one two decker, a frigate, a sloop of war, and a brig.

This was the last intelligence I received of the before mentioned convoy, although its pursuit was continued until the 13th of July, being then within 18 or 20 hours sail of the British channel. From this we steered for the island of *Madeira*, passed close by it on the 21st of July, thence near the *Azores*, and saw *Corvo* and *Flores*; thence steered for the banks of *Newfoundland*; and from the latter place (by the way of *Cape Sable*) to this port, it having become indispensibly necessary (by the time we reached our own coast) to make the first convenient port in the *United States*; owing, I am sorry to say, to that wretched disease the scurvy, having made its appearance on board of the vessels, most generally to a degree seriously alarming.

From the western part of the banks of *Newfoundland* to our making the island of *Madeira*, the weather was such, at least six days out of seven, as to obscure from our discovery, every object that we did not pass within four or five miles of, and indeed for several days together the fog was so thick as to prevent our seeing each other, even at a cable's length asunder, more than twice or thrice in twenty-four hours.

From the time of our leaving the *United States* until our arrival here we chased every vessel we saw, and you will not be a little astonished when I inform you that, although we brought to every thing we did chase, with the exception of four vessels, we only made seven captures and one re-capture.

It is truly an unpleasant task to be obliged to make a communication thus barren of benefit to our country: the only consolation I individually feel on the occasion, being derived from our knowing that our being at sea obliged the enemy to concentrate a considerable portion of his most active force, and thereby prevented his capturing an incalculable amount of American property that would otherwise have fallen a sacrifice.

I am aware of the anxiety you must have experienced at not hearing from me for such a length of time, but this I am sure you will not attribute in any degree to neglect, when I inform you that

not a single proper opportunity occurred from the time of leaving the United States until our return.

Mr. Newcomb, who will deliver you this, you will find an intelligent young man, capable of giving such further information as you may deem of any moment: he will at the same time deliver you a chart, shewing the track in which we cruised: annexed is a list of vessels captured, re-captured and burnt.

The four vessels we chased and did not come up with were, the *Belvidera*, a small pilot-boat schooner, supposed to be an American privateer, the hermaphrodite privateer brig, *Yankee*, which we lost sight of in a fog, but whose character we afterwards learnt, and a frigate supposed to be British, that we chased on the 28th ultimo near the shoal of George's bank, and should certainly have come up with, had we have had the advantage of two hours more day-light.

On board of the several vessels of the squadron there are between 80 and 100 prisoners taken from the vessels we captured during our late cruise: the government not having any agent for prisoners here, I shall send them to commodore Bainbridge, to be disposed of in such manner as best appears with the interest of the United States, and which I hope may meet your approbation.

With the greatest respect,
I have the honour to be, sir,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN RODGERS.

The Hon. Paul Hamilton,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

One ship, four brigs, and two schooners were captured during this cruise.

VOLUNTEERS WANTED.

FELLOW CITIZENS OF OHIO,

At a moment like this, I appeal to your valor and patriotism. Major general Harrison will rendezvous a respectable force of Kentucky volunteers at Dayton on the 15th instant for a short expedition. General Harrison desires to add to his troops any number of volunteers from the state of Ohio, who will serve on the expedition thirty days. All those who will embrace this favourable opportunity of distinguishing themselves under an able commander, and of rendering to the state of Ohio a valuable service, will in their equipments and movements follow the directions of General Harrison, hereunto subjoined.

R. J. MEIGS,
Governor of Ohio.

Piqua, September 2, 1812..

VOLUNTEERS—TO ARMS! TO ARMS!

Any number of volunteers, mounted and prepared for active service, to continue twenty-five or thirty days, will be accepted, to rendezvous at the town of Dayton, on the Great Miami, on the 15th instant. It is expected that the volunteers will provide themselves with salt provisions, and a proportion of biscuit; those who are unable to procure them will be furnished if possible. Those brave men who give their country their services on this occasion, may be assured that an opportunity of distinguishing themselves will be offered. I shall command the expedition in person; and the number of troops employed will be entirely adequate to the object proposed. I wish also to hire a number of substantial horses: fifty cents per day will be allowed for each horse which is provided with saddle and bridle. Those patriotic citizens who are unable to afford their personal assistance, will render essential service to their country by furnishing the horses, which must be delivered in Dayton on the 14th instant, to a person who will be authorized to receive and receipt for them.

W. H. HARRISON.

Head Quarters, Piqua, Sept. 2, 1812.

S. W. Culbertson to Mr. Chambers, editor of the Zanesville Messenger, 1812.

MR. CHAMBERS,

I have just returned from Urbanna, where governor Meigs is at present with about 1000 soldiers. Brigadier general Harrison is at Piqua with 2000 Kentucky soldiers, and 2000 more in his rear. Harrison's presence appears to inspire every person with courage, and makes even cowards brave. His present conduct evinces a determination to retrieve the injured reputation of our country. He has made a most animated speech to the friendly natives at Piqua, who are numerous, and suing for a continuance of peace. He has promised them protection, at the same time assuring them in terrific language, which struck terror to all hearts, that the name of an Indian foe should not long be known among us—that the American army will no longer be commanded by an *old woman*.

Governor Meigs's late patriotic conduct and exertions appear to be rewarded only with ingratitude. He has ordered the 2d detachment of militia, which marched from this place under the command of colonel M'Connell, to be dismissed, having been called out contrary to his instructions and intentions, which must have been misunderstood.

S. W. CULBERTSON.

Extract of a letter from Gov. Harrison to Gov. Shelby, dated

HEAD QUARTERS, PIQUA,

September 5th, 1812, 4 o'clock, A. M.

"The British and Indians have laid siege to Fort Wayne, perhaps have taken it. It is their object to push on to Fort Harrison and Vincennes. You will, my dear sir, leave nothing undone, I am convinced, to relieve those places; but it must be done with mounted men, who will carry the greater part of their own provisions. Miller's regiment I hope have marched from the falls; it ought to be followed by a considerable force of mounted men. I have already detached colonel Allen, with 900 Kentucky infantry, (towards Fort Wayne) he is to be joined by 700 mounted men that are advanced of this; but I have been unable to move with the rest of the army for the want of two essential articles; a small supply will be up to day, and the troops will be ready to march in two hours. Great God! what an opportunity I may lose of avenging my country and saving the frontiers, for the want of a few trifling articles. However, we are amply supplied with bayonets, and our spirits are roused to the highest pitch. Indignation and resentment fire every breast."

WASHINGTON, September 10th, 1812.

SIR,

Having been ordered on to this place by colonel M'Arthur, for the purpose of communicating to the government such particulars respecting the expedition lately commanded by brigadier general Hull and its disastrous result, as might enable them correctly to appreciate the conduct of the officers and men, and to develop the causes which produced so foul a stain upon the national character, I have the honour to submit to your consideration the following statement:

When the forces landed in Canada, they landed with an ardent zeal, and stimulated with the hope of conquest. No enemy appeared within view of us, and had an immediate and vigorous attack been made upon Malden, it would doubtless have fallen an easy victory. I knew general Hull afterwards declared he regretted this attack had not been made, and he had every reason to believe success would have crowned his efforts. The reasons given for delaying our operations was to mount our heavy cannon, and to afford to the Canadian militia time and opportunity to quit an obnoxious service. In the course of two weeks the number of their militia who were embodied, had decreased by desertion, from six hundred to one hundred men; and, in the course of three weeks, the cannon were mounted, the ammunition fixed, and every preparation made for an immediate invest-

ment of the fort. At a council, at which were present all the field officers, and which was held two days before our preparations were completed, it was unanimously agreed to make an immediate attempt to accomplish the object of the expedition. If by waiting two days we could have the service of our heavy artillery, it was agreed to wait; if not, it was determined to go without it and attempt the place by storm. This opinion appeared to correspond with the views of the general, and the day was appointed for commencing our march. He declared to me that he considered himself pledged to lead the army to Malden. The ammunition was placed in the wagons; the cannon were embarked on board the floating batteries, and every requisite article was prepared. The spirit and zeal, the ardor and animation displayed by the officers and men on learning the near accomplishment of their wishes, were a sure and sacred pledge, that in the hour of trial they would not be found wanting in duty to their country and themselves. But a change of measures, in opposition to the wishes and opinions of all the officers, was adopted by the general. The plan of attacking Malden was abandoned, and instead of acting offensively, we broke up our camp, evacuated Canada, and re-crossed the river in the night, without even the shadow of an enemy to injure us. We left to the tender mercy of the enemy, the miserable Canadians who had joined us, and the protection we afforded them was but a passport of vengeance. This fatal and unaccountable step dispirited the troops, and destroyed the little confidence which a series of timid, irresolute and indecisive measures had left in the commanding officer.

About the 10th of August, the enemy received a reinforcement of four hundred men. On the 12th, the commanding officers of three of the regiments (the fourth was absent) were informed through a medium which admitted of no doubt, that the general had stated, that a capitulation would be necessary. They on the same day addressed to governor Meigs, of Ohio, a letter, of which the following is an extract:

"Believe all the bearer will tell you. Believe it, however it may astonish you, as much as if told by one of us. Even a _____ is talked of by the _____. The bearer will fill the vacancy."

The doubtful fate of this letter rendered it necessary to use circumspection in its details, and therefore the blanks were left. The word 'capitulation' will fill the first, and 'commanding general' the other. As no enemy was near us, and as the superiority of our force was manifest, we could see no necessity for capitulating, nor any propriety in alluding to it. We therefore determined in the last resort to incur the responsibility of divesting the general of his command. This plan was eventually prevented by two of the commanding officers of regiments being ordered upon detachments.

On the 15th, the British took a position opposite to Detroit, and began to throw up works. During that and the two following days, they pursued their object without interruption, and established a battery for two 18 pounders and an 8 inch howitzer. About sun-set on the evening of the 14th, a detachment of 350 men, from the regiments commanded by colonel M'Arthur and myself, was ordered to march to the river Raisin, to escort the provisions, which had some time remained there protected by a party under the command of captain Brush.

On Saturday, the 15th, about 1 o'clock, a flag of truce arrived from Sandwich, bearing a summons from general Brock, for the surrender of the town and fort of Detroit, stating he could no longer restrain the fury of the savages. To this an immediate and spirited refusal was returned. About 4 o'clock their batteries began to play upon the town. The fire was returned and continued without interruption and with little effect till dark—their shells were thrown till 11 o'clock.

At day light the firing on both sides re-commenced ; about the same time the enemy began to land troops at the Spring Wells, three miles below Detroit, protected by two of their armed vessels. Between 6 and 7 o'clock they had effected their landing, and immediately took up their line of march ; they moved in a close column of platoons, twelve in front, upon the bank of the river.

The 4th regiment was stationed in the fort ; the Ohio volunteers and a part of the Michigan militia, behind some pickets, in a situation in which the whole flank of the enemy would have been exposed. The residue of the Michigan militia were in the upper part of the town to resist the incursions of the savages. Two 24 pounders loaded with grape shot were posted on a commanding eminence, ready to sweep the advancing column. In this situation, the superiority of our position was apparent, and our troops, in the eager expectation of victory, awaited the approach of the enemy. Not a sigh of discontent broke upon the ear ; not a look of cowardice met the eye. Every man expected a proud day for his country, and each was anxious that his individual exertion should contribute to the general result.

When the head of their column arrived within about five hundred yards of our line, orders were received from general Hull for the whole to retreat to the fort, and for the twenty-four pounders not to open upon the enemy. One universal burst of indignation was apparent upon the receipt of this order. Those, whose conviction was the deliberate result of a dispassionate examination of passing events, saw the folly and impropriety of crowding 1100 men into a little work, which 300 could fully man, and into which the shot and shells of the enemy were continually falling. The fort was in this manner filled ; the men were directed to stack their arms, and scarcely was an opportunity afforded of moving. Shortly after a white flag was hung out upon

the walls. A British officer rode up to enquire the cause. A communication passed between the commanding generals, which ended in the capitulation submitted to you. In entering into this capitulation, the general took counsel from his own feelings only. Not an officer was consulted. Not one anticipated a surrender till he saw the white flag displayed. Even the women were indignant at so shameful a degradation of the American character, and all felt as they should have felt, but he who held in his hands the reins of authority.

Our morning report of that morning made our effective men present fit for duty 1060, without including the detachment before alluded to, and without including 300 of the Michigan militia on duty. About dark on Sunday evening the detachment sent to escort the provisions received orders from general Hull to return with as much expedition as possible. About ten o'clock the next day they arrived within sight of Detroit. Had a firing been heard, or any resistance visible, they would have immediately advanced and attacked the rear of the enemy. The situation in which this detachment was placed, although the result of accident, was the best for annoying the enemy and cutting off his retreat that could have been selected. With his raw troops enclosed between two fires and no hopes of succour, it is hazardous little to say, that very few would have escaped.

I have been informed by colonel Findley, who saw the return of the quarter master general the day after the surrender, that their whole force of every description, white, red and black, was 1030. They had twenty-nine platoons, twelve in a platoon, of men dressed in uniform. Many of these were evidently Canadian militia. The rest of their militia increased their white force to about seven hundred men.

The number of their Indians could not be ascertained with any degree of precision; not many were visible. And in the event of an attack upon the town and fort, it was a species of force which could have afforded no material advantage to the enemy.

In endeavouring to appreciate the motives and to investigate the causes which led to an event so unexpected and dishonourable, it is impossible to find any solution in the relative strength of the contending parties, or in the measures of resistance in our power. That we were far superior to the enemy; that upon any ordinary principles of calculation, we could have defeated them, the wounded and indignant feelings of every man there will testify.

A few days before the surrender, I was informed by general Hull, we had 400 rounds of 24 pound shot fixed, and about 100,000 cartridges made. We surrendered with the fort 40 barrels of powder and 2500 stand of arms.

The state of our provisions has not been generally understood. On the day of the surrender we had fifteen days of provisions of every kind on hand. Of meat there was plenty in the country, and arrangements had been made for purchasing and grinding

the flour. It was calculated we could readily procure three month's provisions, independent of 150 barrels of flour, and 1300 head of cattle which had been forwarded from the state of Ohio, which remained at the river Raisin under captain Brush, within reach of the army.

But had we been totally destitute of provisions, our duty and our interest undoubtedly was to fight. The enemy invited us to meet him in the field.

By defeating him the whole country would have been open to us, and the object of our expedition gloriously and successfully obtained. If we had been defeated we had nothing to do but to retreat to the fort, and make the best defence which circumstances and our situation rendered practicable. But basely to surrender without firing a gun—tamely to submit without raising a bayonet—disgracefully to pass in review before an enemy as inferior in the quality as in the number of his forces, were circumstances, which excited feelings of indignation more easily felt than described. To see the whole of our men flushed with the hope of victory, eagerly awaiting the approaching contest; to see them afterwards dispirited, hopeless and desponding, at least 500 shedding tears, because they were not allowed to meet their country's foe, and to fight their country's battles, excited sensations, which no American has ever before had cause to feel, and which, I trust in God, will never again be felt, while one man remains to defend the standard of the union.

I am expressly authorized to state, that colonel M'Arthur and colonel Findley, and lieutenant colonel Miller, view this transaction in the light which I do. They know and feel, that no circumstance in our situation, none in that of the enemy, can excuse a capitulation so dishonourable and unjustifiable. This too is the universal sentiment among the troops; and I shall be surprised to learn, that there is one man, who thinks it was necessary to sheath his sword, or lay down his musket.

I was informed by general Hull the morning after the capitulation, that the British forces consisted of 1800 regulars, and that he surrendered to prevent the effusion of human blood. That he magnified their regular force nearly five fold, there can be no doubt. Whether the philanthropic reason assigned by him is a sufficient justification for surrendering a fortified town, an army and a territory, is for the government to determine. Confident I am, that had the courage and conduct of the general been equal to the spirit and zeal of the troops, the event would have been as brilliant and successful as it now is disastrous and dishonourable.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

LEWIS CASS,

Col. 3d reg. Ohio volunteers.

The Hon. William Eustis,
Secretary of War.

ATTACK ON FORT HARRISON.

FORT HARRISON, September 10, 1812.

SIR,

On Thursday evening, the 3d instant, after retreat beating, four guns were heard to fire in the direction, where two young men (citizens who resided here) were making hay, about 400 yards distant from the fort. I was immediately impressed with the idea that they were killed by Indians, as the Miamies or Waes had that day informed me that the Prophet's party would soon be here for the purpose of commencing hostilities; and that they had been directed to leave this place, which they were about to do. I did not think it prudent to send out at that late hour of the night to see what became of them; and their not coming in, convinced me that I was right in my conjecture. I waited until 8 o'clock next morning, to find them, when I sent out a corporal, with a small party to find them, if it could be done without running too much risk of being drawn into an ambuscade. He soon sent back to inform me that he had found them both killed, and wished to know my further orders. I sent the cart and oxen, and had them brought in and buried; they had been each shot with two balls, scalped and cut in the most shocking manner. Late in the evening of the 4th instant, Joseph Lenar and between 30 and 40 Indians arrived from Prophet's town with a white flag, among whom were about 10 women, and the men were composed of the chiefs of the different tribes that compose the Prophet's party.

A Shawnee man, that spoke good English, informed me that old Lenar intended to speak to me next morning, and try to get something to eat. At retreat beating I examined the men's arms, and found them all in good order, and completed their cartridges to 16 rounds per man. As I had not been able to mount a guard of more than 6 privates and 2 non-commissioned officers, for some time past, and sometimes part of them every other day, from the unhealthiness of the company, I had not conceived my force adequate to the defence of this post, should it be vigorously attacked, for some time past. As I had just recovered from a very severe attack of the fever, I was not able to be up much through the night. After tattoo, I cautioned the guards to be vigilant, and ordered one of the non-commissioned officers (as the sentinels could not see every part of the garrison) to walk round the inside, during the whole night, to prevent the Indians taking any advantage of us, provided they had any intention of attacking us. About 11 o'clock I was awakened by the firing of the sentinels. I sprang up, ran out, and ordered the men to their posts, when my orderly sergeant, who had charge of the block house, called out that the Indians had fired the lower block house, which contained the property of the contractor, which was deposited in the lower part, the upper part having been assigned to a corporal and 10

privates, as an alarm post ; the guns had began to fire smartly from both sides. I directed the buckets to be go and water brought from the well, and the fire extinguish mediately, as it was hardly perceivable at that time ; but debility or some other cause the men were very slow in executing my orders ; the word appeared to throw them all into confusion and by the time they had got the water, and broke open the fire had communicated to a quantity of whiskey ; and in every exertion we could make use of, in less than a minute it ascended to the roof, and baffled every effort we could to extinguish it.

As that block house adjoined the barracks that make the fortifications, most of the men immediately gave them up for lost, and I had the greatest difficulty in getting my orders executed ; and, sir, from the raging of the fire, the roaring and howling of several hundred Indians, the cries of men and children who had taken shelter in the fort, and the ponding of so many of the men (which was worse than can assure you that my feelings were unpleasant. Indeed were not more than 10 or 15 men able to do a great deal, the others being either sick or convalescent, and to add to our fortunes, two of the stoutest men of the fort, and that I had confidence in, jumped the picket and left us. But my presence of mind did not for a moment forsake me. I saw by the off part of the roof that joined the block house that was cut and keeping the end perfectly wet, the whole row of buildings might be saved, and leave only an entrance of 18 or 20 feet for the Indians to enter, after the house was consumed ; and temporary breast work might be erected to prevent even entering there. I convinced the men that this could be accomplished, and it appeared to inspire them with new life, and did men act with more firmness or desperation : those that were able, (while the others kept up a fire from the other block and the two bastions,) mounted the roofs of the houses with doctor Clarke at their head, (who acted with the greatest presence and presence of mind the whole time the attack which was 8 hours under a shower of bullets,) and in a minute threw off as much of the roof as was necessary. This was with the loss of one man only, and two wounded, neither of them dangerously ; the man that was killed was a little deranged did not get off the house as soon as directed, or he would have been hurt ; and although the barracks were several in a blaze, the men used such exertions that they kept it under and before day-light, raised a temporary breast-work as high as a man's head, although the Indians continued to pour in a fire of ball, and an innumerable quantity of arrows, during the whole time the attack lasted, in every part of the parade.

I had but one other man killed, nor any other wounded the fort, and he lost his life by being too anxious : he got in

of the gallies in the bastions and fired over the pickets, and called to his comrades that he had killed an Indian, and neglecting to stoop down, in an instant he was shot dead. One of the men that jumped the picket returned an hour before day, and running towards the gate, begged for God's sake it might be opened. I suspected it to be a stratagem of the Indians to get in. As I did not recollect the voice, I directed the men in the bastion where I happened to be, to shoot him, let him be who he would, and one of them fired at him, but fortunately he ran up to the other bastion, where they knew his voice, and doctor Clarke directed him to lie down close to the pickets behind an empty barrel that happened to be there, and at day-light I had him let in. His arm was broke in a most shocking manner, which he says was done by the Indians, and which I suppose was the cause of his returning. The other man they caught about 120 yards from the garrison, and cut him all to pieces. After keeping up a constant fire, until about 6 o'clock the next morning, which we began to return with some effect after day-light, they removed out of the reach of our guns. A party of them drove up the horses that belonged to the citizens here, and as they could not catch them very readily, shot the whole of them in our sight, as well as a number of their hogs. They drove off the cattle, which amounted to 65 head, with the public oxen. I had the vacancy filled up before night (which was occasioned by the burning of the block house) with a strong row of pickets, which I got by pulling down the guard house. We lost the whole of our provisions, but must make out to live upon green corn until we can get a supply, which I hope will not be long. I believe the whole of the Miamies or Waes, were with the Prophet's party, as one chief gave his orders in that language, which resembled Stone-eater's voice, and I believe Negro-legs was there likewise. A Frenchman here understands their different languages, and several of the Waes that have been frequently here, were recognized by the soldiers next morning. The Indians suffered smartly, but were so numerous as to take off all that were shot: they continued with us until the next morning, but made no further attempt on the fort, nor have we seen any thing more of them since.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

Z. TAYLOR.

His excellency gov. Harrison.

FORT MADISON, September 10, 1812.

SIR,

On the 5th instant, this garrison was attacked by a numerous body of Indians. They began by their usual mode of sneaking up. One man, who had liberty to go outside upon a necessary occasion, was killed, tomahawked and scalped within twenty-five

paces of the sentinel who was stationed in a block house, notwithstanding the sentinel fired on them.

In a little time the attack commenced with a pretty general discharge of fire arms on all sides—the balls and buck shot fell in like hail and continued until dark. They then retired.

On the morning of the 6th, they appeared in small squads in every direction—a part under the bank firing into our loop holes, while others were employed in killing all the live stock in the place. At 4 o'clock P. M. they all collected under the bank of the river and commenced firing at our flag and block houses, and after firing about 400 shot they cut the halyards and the flag fell inside: a general shout was given by them as a triumph of victory. They continued in part till after night, and kept up a fire while one took away the man whom they had killed, which we were unable to effect, as we did not know the number that might be there.

On the morning of the 7th, about the first thing that presented to our view was the man's head and heart stuck upon sticks, the head painted after the manner of themselves. They kept a fire upon us all day, during which time a party of them set Mr. Juliean's houses on fire, and in a short time I discovered our boats were all in flames. I must confess that at this moment I felt some little confusion, but no alternative was left but the greatest exertions: we had 8 old gun barrels made into squirts, and made holes through the tops of the block houses, and in a few minutes we were able to make them as wet as if there had fallen a shower of rain. The little panic was soon dissipated and we felt ourselves again secure; but the greatest efforts were made on the part of the Indians to consume us in flames. They wounded one of our men in the face but not dangerous. By sundown I discovered Mr. McNabb's house on fire, which led me to believe that they intended to burn all. The wind had fallen. I despatched a man in the dark with a stick of port fire and instruments to set fire to the factory, which was performed.

On the 8th, they did not make their appearance until 9 o'clock A. M. which was in an old stable that they had fortified the preceding night, but were soon dislodged by two cannon shot.

They then resumed their old station under the banks and fired upon us, while others continued throwing showers of fire chunks and arrows prepared with suitable matter to take fire, but our gun barrel squirts soon extinguished them. This was their last and longest effort which was continued until 10 o'clock at night. We have not seen one since, but I fear a party hangs about to take the first man that shows his head.

It is incumbent on me to give you a very particular idea of our situation. This garrison is in the most ineligible place that ever could have been chosen by any man even if he would try. The Indians are much better fortified than we. On the south side of the river the bank affords them a complete shelter, and would take a

regiment of men a month to make it so that we could rake it. On the east it is worse yet. On the west a spring run affords another bank which cannot be removed. On the north a hill commands us completely, which I know from experience; as I could not pass from one block house to the other without being fired upon.

Indeed, sir, the Indians have nothing more to do than to possess themselves of these places and cut off every man that shows himself outside; for we must have wood in the winter and cold season. The fact is that I will *positively evacuate this post by the 15th of November next*, if there is no means taken to render the lives of the men more secure. The truth is, that it ought not to be occupied in a time of war, since it cannot be bettered in the place where it stands; it ought to be moved off this point entirely. I have not a yoke of cattle to provide us with a stick of wood, and if I had, I have no forage. You now will know my determination, and I hope you will endeavour to render me some relief.

I am, with respect yours, &c,
T. HAMILTON,

Lieut. 1st Regt. Lt. Infy. Comg.

Lieut. Col. D. Bissell.

CRUISE OF THE SCHOONER ROSSIE, October, 1812.

Extract from the log-book of the Schooner Rossie, Commodore Barney, commander.

July 12th, sailed from Baltimore. July 15th, left Cape Henry. July 17th, spoke ship Electra, of Philadelphia, informed her of the war. July 21st, spoke brig Triton, of Portsmouth, informed her of the war. Spoke ship Rising Sun, of Baltimore, informed her of the war. July 22d, seized brig Nymph, of Newburyport, for breach of the non-importation law; spoke ship Reserve of Bath; brig——, from Lisbon to New-London, informed her of the war. July 23d, was chased by a frigate; fired 25 shot at us; outsailed her. July 30th, chased by a frigate; outsailed her. July 31st, took and burnt the ship Princess-Royal. August 1st, took and manned the ship Kitty; 2d, took and burnt the following: brig Fame, brig Devonshire, schooner Squid, and took the brig Brothers—put on board her 60 prisoners, and sent her to St. Johns, to be exchanged for as many Americans. 3d, took and sunk the brig Henry and schooner Race-horse; burnt the schooner Halifax, manned the brig William (arrived) and gave the schooner Two Brothers to 40 prisoners, and sent them to St. Johns, on parole. 9th, took the ship Jeanie, after a short action; she mounting 12 guns; sent her for the United States

(arrived.) 10th, seized the brig Rebecca, of Saco, from London, for a breach of the non-importation law, (arrived.) 14th, spoke brig Hazard, from Cadiz, informed her of the war. 16th, spoke ship Hercules, from Malta, informed her of the war. 17th, spoke brig Favorite, from Cadiz to Boston. 20th, spoke brig John Adams, who had been captured and plundered by the Guerriere, and let go. August 25th, seized ship Euphrates, of New Bedford, for breach of the non-importation law, (arrived.) 28th, spoke a brig, prize to the Benjamin Franklin, privateer. 29th, spoke ship Jewell, of Portland, informed her of the war. 30th, spoke schooner Ann and Mary, of New London, informed her of the war. September 7, spoke brig ———, from Providence, Rhode Island, in distress; left her under care of the Revenue Cutter, of Newport. 9th, chased by three ships of war, a short chase. 10th, spoke ship Joseph, from Bonavista, informed her of the war. 10th, spoke a brig, prize to the schooner Saratoga, of New York. 12th, chased by a frigate six hours; outsailed her. 16th, took his Britannic majesty's packet ship Princess Amelia, after a severe action of nearly an hour, at pistol-shot distance. The captain, sailing-master, and one man was killed, the master's mate and six men wounded. We had Mr. Long, first lieutenant, severely wounded, and six men (most of whom have recovered), the ship cut to pieces, and the Rossie much injured in sails and rigging. September 16th, fell in with three ships and a brig armed, exchanged shot with the commodore, received an 18 pound shot through our quarter, wounded a man and lodged in our pump; continued to dog and watch the above vessels 4 days, in hopes to separate them, but in vain. September 23d, spoke the private armed schooner Globe, captain Murphy, of Baltimore, went in pursuit of the above vessels, but could not fall in with them. 25th, spoke a Spanish brig bound to Porto-Rico. October 8th, took (in company with the Globe,) the schooner Jubilee, and sent her in. 9th, spoke a Spanish schooner from Palma to Porto-Rico. 10th, chased and spoke the privateer schooner Rapid, of Charleston, S. C. 52 days out, had taken nothing. 22d, seized the ship Merimack, for breach of the non-importation act. Result is, *three thousand six hundred and ninety-eight tons of shipping, and two hundred and seventeen prisoners—valued at upwards of one million five hundred thousand dollars.*

BLACK ROCK, October 9, 1812.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that on the morning of the 8th instant, two British vessels, which I was informed were his Britannic majesty's brig Detroit, late the United States' brig Adams, and the brig Hunter, mounting 14 guns, but which afterwards proved to be the brig Caledonia, both said to be well armed

and manned, came down the lake and anchored under the protection of fort Erie. Having been on the lines for some time, and in a measure inactively employed, I determined to make an attack, and if possible to get possession of them. A strong inducement to this attempt arose from a consideration that with these two vessels and to those which I have purchased and am fitting out, I should be enabled to meet the remainder of the British force on the Upper lakes, and save an incalculable expense and labour to the government. On the morning of their arrival I heard that our seamen were but a short distance from this place, and immediately despatched an express to the officers, directing them to use all possible despatch in getting their men to this place, as I had an important service to perform. On their arrival, which was about 12 o'clock, I discovered that they had only 20 pistols, and neither cutlasses nor battle axes. But on application to generals Smyth and Hall of the regulars and militia, I was supplied with a few arms, and general Smyth was so good, on my request, as immediately to detach 50 men from the regulars, armed with muskets.

By 4 o'clock in the afternoon, I had my men selected and stationed in two boats, which I had previously prepared for the purpose. With these boats, 50 men in each, and under circumstances very disadvantageous, my men having scarcely had time to refresh themselves after a fatiguing march of 500 miles, I put off from the mouth of Buffalo creek, at 1 o'clock the following morning, and at 3 I was along side the vessels. In the space of about 10 minutes, I had the prisoners all secured, the top-sails sheeted home, and the vessels under way. Unfortunately the wind was not sufficiently strong to get me up against a rapid current into the lake, where I had understood another armed vessel lay at anchor, and I was obliged to run down the river, by the forts, under a heavy fire of round, grape, and canister, from a number of pieces of heavy ordnance, and several pieces of flying artillery, was compelled to anchor at a distance of about 400 yards from two of their batteries. After the discharge of the first gun, from the flying artillery, I hailed the shore, and observed to the officer, that if another gun was fired I would bring the prisoners on deck, and expose them to the same fate we would all share; but notwithstanding, they disregarded the caution and continued a constant and destructive fire. One single moment's reflection determined me not to commit an act that would subject me to the imputation of barbarity. The Caledonia had been beached, in as safe a position as the circumstances would admit of, under one of our batteries at the Black Rock. I now brought all the guns of the Detroit on one side next the enemy, stationed the men at them, and directed a fire which was continued as long as our ammunition lasted and circumstances permitted. During the contest I endeavoured to get the Detroit on our side by sending a line, there being no

wind, on shore, with all the line I could muster ; but the current being so strong, the boat could not reach the shore. I then hailed our shore, and requested that warps should be made fast on land, and sent on board : the attempt to all which again proved useless. As the fire was such as would, in all probability, sink the vessel in a short time, I determined to drift down the river out of the reach of the batteries, and make a stand against the flying artillery. I accordingly cut the cable, made sail with very light airs, and at that instant discovered that the pilot had abandoned me. I dropped astern for about 10 minutes, when I was brought up on our shore on Squaw island—got the boarding boat ready, had the prisoners put in and sent on shore, with directions for the officer to return for me and what property we could get from the brig. He did not return, owing to the difficulty in the boat's getting on shore. Discovering a skiff under the counter, I put the four remaining prisoners in the boat, and with my officers I went on shore to bring the boat off. I asked for protection to the brig of lieutenant colonel Scott, who readily gave it. At this moment I discovered a boat with about 40 soldiers from the British side, making for the brig. They got on board, but were soon compelled to abandon her, with the loss of nearly all their men. During the whole of this morning both sides of the river kept up alternately a continual fire on the brig, and so much injured her that it was impossible to have floated her. Before I left her, she had several shot of large size in her bends, her sails in ribbons, and rigging all cut to pieces.

To my officers and men I feel under great obligation. To captain Towson and lieutenant Roach of the 2d regiment of artillery, ensign Prestman of the infantry, captain Chapin, Mr. John M'Comb, Messrs. John Town, Thomas Dain, Peter Overstocks, and James Sloan, resident gentlemen of Buffaloe, for their soldier and sailor-like conduct. In a word, sir, every man fought as if with their hearts animated only by the interest and honour of their country.

The prisoners I have turned over to the military. The Detroit mounted 6 six pound long guns, a commanding lieutenant of marines, a boatswain and gunner, and 56 men—about 30 American prisoners on board, muskets, pistols, cutlasses, and battle-axes. In boarding her I lost one man, one officer wounded, Mr. John C. Cummings, acting midshipman, a bayonet through the leg ; his conduct was correct, and deserves the notice of the department. The Caledonia mounted two small guns, blunderbusses, pistols, muskets, cutlasses, and boarding pikes, 12 men including officers, 10 prisoners on board. The boat boarding her was commanded by sailing master George Watts, who performed his duty in a masterly style. But one man killed, and four wounded bad, I am afraid mortally. I enclose you a list of the officers and men engaged in the enterprize, and also a view of the lake and river in the different situations of attack. In a day or two

I shall forward the names of the prisoners. The Caledonia belongs to the N. W. company, loaded with furs, worth I understand \$ 200,000.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

JESSE D. ELLIOT.

The Hon. Paul Hamilton,
Secretary U. S. Navy.

URBANA, October 12th, 1812.

SIR,

On receiving your orders of the 4th instant to proceed to the Rapids with the whole force of mounted men under my command, whose horses were in a condition to perform the service ; I caused an examination to be immediately had ; and found that there still remained 960 men, including officers, in a condition to march, including also captain Bacon, and one other company, which left us the morning following.

The beeves expected at general Winchester's camp, did not arrive so as to enable us to draw, till the morning of the 5th. A good number of the men were destitute of provision the day you left Defiance. There being no flour to be issued to the mounted men, I ordered that eight days rations of beef should be drawn and immediately jerked, so as to lighten, and prepare it for the expedition, intending to move off on the evening of the 5th. On examining our ammunition it had been found that during the excessive rains which fell, while you were marching us from St. Mary's to Defiance, it had become so damaged as to be entirely useless ; not two rounds of sound cartridges were left to a man. I ordered returns made, so that each man should be furnished with 12 rounds. This return amounted to 4500 cartridges for the musket men, exclusive of major Roper's battalion ; the ammunition of the riflemen having received very little damage. Quarter master Basey called on the quarter master in general Winchester's camp and returned without a supply. About 1 o'clock this day, a man belonging to Manary's company of rangers was killed and scalped across the Miami, within two hundred yards of our camp. I gave immediate orders to arms, and in five minutes to horse, but owing to our being compelled to confine our horses during the night, and graze them by day, for want of forage ; the greater part at this moment were under keepers nearly one mile from our camp up the Auglaise. Conceiving from the bold manner in which the Indians approached our camp, that it was possible a considerable body was not distant, I wished to form the men and proceed over the river, by which we should be in a situation to contend with a considerable force, or pursue to effect a small one. In the mean time I permitted major Brush to cross over with about 50 foot to examine the

bank and see in what direction the Indians had retired ; but before he reached the opposite shore every horseman, whose horse was in camp was mounted to follow. It was in vain I made an attempt to keep them back till they were formed ; they broke off in numbers from two to thirty, mostly without their officers, and crossed the woods in every direction : a party of 15 fell on the trail of the Indians, and at seven or eight miles distance overtook them ; but as the Indians were superior to them, and formed, our men without waiting for a discharge from the enemy returned to camp. Logan, and the other Indians in our camp, were of the opinion that there was a considerable force of the enemy lying down the river, and offered to spy down. Early on the following morning they left our camp with instructions to proceed four miles below the Little Rapids, a distance of fourteen miles. They returned at evening, having found no trail of any size excepting the party which had been pursued, and those they computed at about forty ; that they had proceeded on towards the waters of Lake Michigan, and not on the direction to the Rapids. That the British and Indians which had fled before general Winchester, had retreated with apparent precipitancy, drawing their carriages over large logs, and tearing down every sappling that stood in their way.

Scarcely had this scout left our camp, when I received the following order from general Winchester :

“CAMP, NEAR DEFIANCE, October 6, 1812.

SIR,

Believing it to be essential that the Indians who committed the murder yesterday near your camp should be pursued and routed, or their strength and situation ascertained, and as that duty can be best, and most expeditiously done with mounted men, you will this morning pursue their trail with a part or the whole of your force, and dislodge, kill, and destroy them if in your power. This duty performed, you can take the course directed by general Harrison. The attitude of the enemy requires this change in your destination, and as commander of the north-western army, I have deemed it my duty to make it. If you do not return to report you will send an officer for that purpose.

J. WINCHESTER.

Brig. Gen. Comdg. left wing N. W. army

General Tupper.

I waited on general Winchester immediately on receipt of the foregoing order, informing him of having previously sent out a scout, and the object of it : that the Indians had the evening before been overtaken seven or eight miles from our camp ; and their number computed at from 20 to 40 : that in all probability they had then advanced too far to be overtaken without a long pursuit : that our horses were feeble, and that I wished to preserve as much of their strength as possible for the general object

of the expedition; and that if it was agreeable to him we would wait the return of the scout, to take such measures as were deemed proper on their return. General Winchester made no objections to this arrangement; at the same time I informed him that we had not three rounds of ammunition to a man, and requested him to order me a supply. He replied to me that he would order his ammunition examined, and would endeavour to furnish me a part of what was required to complete the 12 rounds. My brigade quarter master attended this day and returned at evening with information that no ammunition could be had. Early the following morning I ordered the horses for a march, and repaired to general Winchester's quarters, and again requested a supply of two thousand cartridges, being about one-third of the quantity required; without which I could not feel myself justifiable in proceeding on the expedition. In answer he stated to me, that he had but six thousand cartridges not issued; that his men had but very few in their boxes; that he had a good supply of powder and ball, but no paper; the latter was in the wagons and expected to arrive that or the day following—and then directed me to return to my camp and make report of the actual quantity on hand, and he would then inform me whether he would deliver the two thousand cartridges. I hastened back to my camp, and gave the necessary orders for furnishing the return; but in a few minutes after, received from general Winchester the following order:

General Tupper. Longer delay inconsistent with strict military principles cannot be indulged; you will therefore proceed immediately on the reconnoitering duty ordered yesterday with the troops under your command, except colonel Simral's corps, who shall return without delay to the settlement, to recruit their horses, agreeably to general Harrison's orders.

J. WINCHESTER,
Brigadier General, &c.

When colonel Simral's company moved off, a large proportion of two companies of major Roper's battalion from Kentucky followed, which reduced that battalion, (being the whole force now remaining from Kentucky) to less than eighty men. I was indebted to colonel Simral for all the cartridges he had excepting two rounds; but as the most of them had been damaged and dried, they did not add one sound round to each man. I was on the point of taking up the line of march to execute general Winchester's orders, when colonel Allen, commanding a regiment of Kentucky troops in general Winchester's camp, came up, and informed me he had obtained leave to accompany me to the Rapids in any station I thought proper to place him, from a soldier upwards. I thankfully accepted his services and caused him to be announced as an aid. Colonel Allen proposed, that as it was general Winchester's wish that the troops should move on the direct route to

the Rapids, that none should be taken but such as would go by. The experiment was made, when about 400 volunteered for the service. Scarcely had the troops moved forward from the ranks, when colonel Allen beckoned me aside and shewed me the order which general Winchester had that moment forwarded to him, giving colonel Allen the command of the men ordered to the Rapids. I requested of colonel Allen a copy of this order which he declined giving. It would be difficult for me to describe the state of my feelings at this moment: I turned to the men which had refused to volunteer, and ordered them across the Auglaise on the route you directed me to take, as the best route to carry your orders into effect. When it was found that general Winchester had superseded me in the command of the whole force from Ohio crossed the Auglaise and refused to march as directed by general Winchester. Colonel Allen and General Brush returned to general Winchester, who assured them that they had mistook the object of colonel Allen's request. General Winchester then proposed to divide the force and have a part to march on the direct route to the Rapids, the other to proceed by the towns, to unite at a certain time 12 miles above the Rapids. Colonel Allen was unwilling to consent to this measure. The force uniting was not half the number you thought necessary to order on the direct secret route. A division of less than 500 men, to meet in the enemy's country, where many circumstances might prevent junction, was to me a measure I could only consent to be imprudent—this measure was in the end abandoned.

It is a duty I owe to colonel Allen, that I have not the same reason to believe, he was privy to the order of general Winchester, giving to him the command: his character, and even the result of his conduct on that occasion, convinces me he is above such a charge.

The whole force proceeded to Tawawonga towns, where we arrived the day following. Early on the morning of the 9th, I ordered the march for the Rapids, when at the distance of half a day's march was found our whole force was reduced to 200 men, exclusive of officers: the other part of the force had refused to march and remained in the encampment: scarcely a man marched from the second battalion of colonel Findley's regiment, commanded by major Taylor. Manary's company of United States' ranger officers and soldiers, refused to march.

When it was ascertained that our whole force for the expedition was reduced to 200 men, I called a council of the officers to determine whether with that force it was advisable to proceed on to the Rapids.

The council considered that our force was not sufficient to carry the first object of your orders into effect; that we were too numerous to act as a spy party, and too weak to carry offensive operations into the enemy's country; and that it was improper and unadvisable under those circumstances to continue the expedition.

With the then remaining force I proceeded to this place, where I directed colonel Findley and major Roper, to discharge such men only as had continued to do their duty.

Thus, sir, has terminated an expedition, at one time capable of tearing the British flag from the walls of Detroit, wherein our troops might have returned with the pleasing reflection of having rendered their country an essential service.

It is a duty, sir, I owe to the officers of the Kentucky forces, to colonel Findley and the officers of his first battalion, to say that they were zealous of pressing forward the expedition; while the officers of the second battalion, commanded by major Taylor, with few exceptions, were shrinking from their duty, and shamefully deserting the cause of their country.

The detaching of colonel Simral's regiment from our force stands prominent among the causes of our failure. Already was there a panic in some parts of our camp: the enemy that had retired at general Winchester's approach had been greatly magnified. The day succeeding the alarm general Winchester drew in one wing of his lines and strengthened his camp with a breast work. Even this circumstance was noticed, and urged as an evidence, that he apprehended a force superior to his own. Thus, when imaginary obstacles unite with those that are real, to oppose the movement of a force so insubordinate, as that every man's will is his law, little can be expected to the officers, but a plentiful harvest of mortification and disgrace.

It cannot be denied that at the time those men refused to march, that there was a scarcity of provisions in the camp; not three days rations of meat to each officer and soldier remained, and no bread or flour. But we had found at those towns, an abundant supply of good sound corn, together with nearly 30 bushels cured when green, or *tossamonona*. Our sufferings with this supply could not have been great in going or returning from the Rapids.

The man whose courage and patriotism expires when his rations are reduced, ought never to place himself between his country and his enemies.

When you shall have examined and considered the whole causes of our failure, should doubts rest on your mind whether some part of it does not attach to my conduct, may I not hope, sir, that you will order a court of enquiry, that I may have an opportunity of meeting an investigation.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

EDW. W. TUPPER,

Brigadier General.

Gen. William Henry Harrison.

HEAD QUARTERS, LEWISTOWN, October 14, 1812.

SIR,

As the movements of the army under my command, since I had last the honour to address you on the 8th instant, have been of a very important character, producing consequences serious to many individuals; establishing facts actually connected with the interest of the service and the safety of the army; and as I stand prominently responsible for some of these consequences, I beg leave to explain to you, sir, and through you to my country, the situation and circumstances in which I have had to act, and the reasons and motives which governed me; and if the result is not all that might have been wished, it is such, that when the whole ground shall be viewed, I shall cheerfully submit myself to the judgment of my country.

In my letter of the 8th instant I apprized you that a crisis in this campaign was rapidly advancing; and that (to repeat the same words) "the blow must be soon struck, or all the toil and expense of the campaign go for nothing, and worse than nothing; for the whole will be tinged with dishonour."

Under such impressions, I had on the 5th instant written to brigadier general Smyth, of the United States' forces, requesting an interview with him, major general Hall, and the commandants of the United States' regiments, for the purpose of conferring upon the subject of future operations. I wrote major general Hall to the same purport. On the 11th, I had received no answer from general Smyth; but in a note to me on the 16th, general Hall mentioned that general Smyth had not yet then agreed upon any day for the consultation.

In the mean time, the partial success of lieutenant Elliott, at Black Rock, (of which however I have received no official information) began to excite a strong disposition in the troops to act. This was expressed to me through various channels in the shape of an *alternative*: that they must have *orders to act*; or at all hazards, they *would go home*. I forbear here commenting upon the obvious consequences to me, personally, of longer withholding my orders under such circumstances.

I had a conference with lieutenant colonel ——— as to the possibility of getting some person to pass over to Canada and obtain correct information. On the morning of the 4th, he wrote to me that he had procured the man who bore his letter to go over. Instructions were given him; he passed over—obtained such information as warranted an immediate attack. This was confidentially communicated to several of my first officers, and produced great zeal to act; more especially as it might have a controlling effect upon the movements at Detroit, where it was supposed general Brock had gone with all the force he dared spare from the Niagara frontier. The best preparations in my power were, therefore, made to dislodge the enemy from the heights of Queenstown, and possess ourselves of the village, where

the troops might be sheltered from the distressing inclemency of the weather.

Lieutenant colonel Fenwick's flying artillery, and a detachment of regular troops under his command, were ordered to be up in season from Fort Niagara. Orders were also sent to general Smyth to send down from Buffaloe, such detachment of his brigade as existing circumstances in that vicinity might warrant. The attack was to have been made at 4 o'clock in the morning of the 11th, by crossing over in boats at the Old Ferry opposite the heights. To avoid any embarrassment in crossing the river, (which is here a sheet of violent eddies) experienced boatmen were procured to take the boats from the landing below to the place of embarkation. Lieutenant Sim was considered the man of greatest skill for this service. He went ahead, and in the extreme darkness, passed the intended place far up the river; and there in a most extraordinary manner, fastened his boat to the shore, and abandoned the detachment. In this front boat he had carried nearly every oar which was prepared for all the boats. In this agonizing dilemma, stood officers and men, whose ardor had not been cooled by exposure through the night to one of the most tremendous north-east storms, which continued, unabated, for twenty-eight hours, and deluged the whole camp. The approach of day-light extinguished every prospect of success, and the detachment returned to camp. Colonel Van Rensselaer was to have commanded the detachment.

After this result, I had hoped the patience of the troops would have continued until I could submit the plan suggested in my letter of the 8th, that I might act under, and in conformity to, the opinion which might be then expressed. But my hope was idle: the previously excited ardor seemed to have gained new heat from the late miscarriage: the brave were mortified to stop short of their object, and the timid thought laurels half won by an attempt.

On the morning of the 12th, such was the pressure upon me from all quarters, that I became satisfied that my refusal to act might involve me in suspicion, and the service in disgrace.

Viewing affairs at Buffaloe as yet unsettled, I had immediately countermanded the march of general Smyth's brigade, upon the failure of the first expedition; but having now determined to attack Queenstown, I sent new orders to general Smyth to march; not with the view of his aid in the attack, for I considered the force detached sufficient, but to support the detachment should the conflict be obstinate and long continued.

Lieutenant colonel Chrystie, who had just arrived at the Four Mile Creek, had late in the night of the first contemplated attack, gallantly offered me his own and his men's service; but he got my permission too late. He now again came forward, had a conference with colonel Van Rensselaer, and begged that he might have the honour of a command in the expedition. The

arrangement was made. Colonel Van Rensselaer was to command one column, 300 militia; and lieutenant colonel Chrystie a column of the same number of regular troops.

Every precaution was now adopted as to boats, and the most confidential and experienced men to manage them. At an early hour in the night, lieutenant colonel Chrystie marched his detachment, by the rear road, from Niagara, to camp. At 7 in the evening lieutenant colonel Stranahan's regiment moved from Niagara Falls; at 8 o'clock Mead's; and at 9, lieutenant colonel Blain's regiment marched from the same place. All were in camp in good season. Agreeably to my orders issued upon this occasion, the two columns were to pass over together; and soon as the heights should be carried, lieutenant colonel Fenwick's flying artillery was to pass over; then major Mullan's detachment of regulars, and other troops to follow in order.

At dawn of day the boats were in readiness, and the troops commenced embarking, under the cover of a commanding battery, mounting 2 eighteen pounders and 2 sixes. The movements were soon discovered, and a brisk fire of musketry was poured from the whole line of the Canada shore. Our battery then opened to sweep the shore; but it was, for some minutes, too dark to direct much fire with safety. A brisk cannonade was now opened upon the boats from three different batteries. Our battery returned their fire, and occasionally threw grape upon the shore, and was itself served with shells from a small mortar of the enemy's. Colonel Scott, of the artillery, by hastening his march from Niagara Falls in the night, arrived in season to return the enemy's fire with 2 six pounders.

The boats were somewhat embarrassed with the eddies, as well as with a shower of shot: but colonel Van Rensselaer, with about 100 men, soon effected his landing amidst a tremendous fire directed upon him from every point: but to the astonishment of all who witnessed the scene, this van of the column advanced slowly against the fire. It was a serious misfortune to the van, and indeed to the whole expedition, that in a few minutes after landing, colonel Van Rensselaer received four wounds. A ball passed through his right thigh, entering just below the hip bone; another shot passed through the same thigh, a little below; the third through the calf of his leg; and a fourth contused his heel. This was quite a crisis in the expedition. Under so severe a fire it was difficult to form raw troops. By some mismanagement of the boatmen, lieutenant colonel Chrystie did not arrive until some time after this, and was wounded in the hand in passing the river. Colonel Van Rensselaer was still able to stand; and with great presence of mind ordered his officers to proceed with rapidity and storm the fort. This service was gallantly performed, and the enemy driven down the hill in every direction. Soon after this both parties were considerably reinforced, and the conflict was renewed in several places; many of the enemy

took shelter behind a stone guard-house, where a piece of ordnance was now briskly served. I ordered the fire of our battery directed upon the guard-house; and it was so effectually done, that with eight or ten shot the fire was silenced. The enemy then retreated behind a large store-house; but in a short time the route became general, and the enemy's fire was silenced except from a one gun battery, so far down the river as to be out of the reach of our heavy ordnance, and our light pieces could not silence it. A number of boats now passed over unannoyed, except from the one unsilenced gun. For some time after I had passed over, the victory seemed complete; but in the expectation of further attacks, I was taking measures for fortifying my camp immediately—the direction of this service I committed to lieutenant Totten of the engineers. But very soon the enemy was reinforced by a detachment of several hundred Indians from Chippawa—they commenced a furious attack, but were promptly met and routed by the rifle and bayonet. By this time I perceived my troops were embarking very slowly. I passed immediately over to accelerate their movements; but to my utter astonishment, I found at the very moment when complete victory was in our hands, the ardor of the unengaged troops had entirely subsided. I rode in all directions—urged men by every consideration to pass over, but in vain. Lieutenant colonel Bloom who had been wounded in action, returned, mounted his horse and rode through the camp; as did also judge Peck, who happened to be here, exhorting the companies to proceed, but all in vain.

At this time a large reinforcement from Fort George, were discovered coming up the river. As the battery on the hill was considered an important check against their ascending the heights, measures were immediately taken to send them a fresh supply of ammunition, as I had learnt there was left only 20 shot for the 18 pounders. The reinforcement, however, obliqued to the right from the road, and formed a junction with the Indians in the rear of the heights. Finding to my infinite mortification, that no reinforcement would pass over; seeing that another severe conflict must soon commence; and knowing that the brave men on the heights were quite exhausted and nearly out of ammunition, all I could do was to send them a fresh supply of cartridges. At this critical moment I despatched a note to general Wadsworth, acquainting him with our situation—leaving the course to be pursued much to his own judgment, with assurance, that if he thought best to retreat, I would endeavour to send as many boats as I could command, and cover his retreat, by every fire I could safely make. But the boats were dispersed—many of the boatmen had fled, panic struck, and but few got off. But my note could but have little more than have reached general Wadsworth, about 4 o'clock, when a most severe and obstinate conflict commenced and continued about half an hour, with a tre-

mendous fire of cannon, flying artillery and musketry. The enemy succeeded in repossessing their battery; and gaining advantage on every side, the brave men who had gained the victory, exhausted of strength and ammunition, and grieved at the unpardonable neglect of their fellow-soldiers, gave up the conflict.

I can only add, that the victory was really won; but lost for the want of a small reinforcement. *One-third part of the idle men might have saved all.*

I have been so pressed with the various duties of burying the dead, providing for the wounded, collecting the public property, negotiating an exchange of prisoners, and all the concerns consequent of such a battle, that I have not been able to forward this despatch at as early an hour as I could have wished. I shall soon forward you another despatch, in which I shall endeavour to point out to you the conduct of some most gallant and deserving officers. But I cannot in justice close this without expressing the very great obligation I am under to brigadier general Wadsworth, colonel Van Rensselaer, colonel Scott, lieutenant colonels Chrystie and Fenwick, and captain Gibson. Many others have also behaved most gallantly. As I have reason to believe that many of our troops fled to the woods, with the hope of crossing the river, I have not been able to learn the probable number of killed, wounded and prisoners. The slaughter of our troops must have been very considerable. And the enemy have suffered severely.

General Brock is among their slain, and his *aid-de-camp* mortally wounded.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

STN. VAN RENSSELAER, *Maj. Gen.*

Major general Dearborn.

EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FLORIDA INDIANS.

NEW-HOPE, ST. JOHN'S, October 19th, 1812.

DEAR SIR,

I have now the honour of transmitting to your excellency, an account of the several engagements which have taken place, between the Lotchaway and Alligator Indians, and the detachment of Georgia volunteers, under my command. As the object of this expedition, and the views of the persons engaged in it, have been misconstrued, and mis-statements, relative to its protraction, circulated, I ask the indulgence of your excellency, to detail every transaction, from its commencement to its termination. I arrived upon St. John's, in obedience to your orders, about the 15th of August, with the whole of my detachment, consisting of about 250 men including officers, and with a few on

the sick report. I immediately waited on colonel Smith, before Augustine, and received orders dated 21st of August, to proceed immediately against the hostile Indians, within the province of East Florida, and destroy their towns, provisions, and settlements. I then returned to the detachment upon the St. John's, and made every preparation to comply with my orders, by dispatching parties to procure horses, from the few inhabitants that had not fled from the province, in preparing packs and provisions, and taking every step which I deemed necessary, to ensure success to the enterprise. In consequence of the sickness of myself, and nearly one half the detachment, the period of our marching was delayed until the 24th of September; and, when just upon the eve of departing, an express arrived from colonel Smith, informing me, that his provision wagons and the escort were attacked by a body of negroes and Indians, and ordering me to join him immediately, with 90 men, and bring all the horses and carriages I could command, for the removal of his baggage, field pieces, and sick; he having only 70 men fit for duty. I marched to the relief of the colonel, with 130 men and 25 horses, and assisted him in removing to the block-house, upon Davis's creek. This service delayed, for a few days, our expedition to the nation; and when the detachment again assembled upon the St. John's and were about to commence their march, the men had but six or seven days to serve. About this time, I received a letter from colonel Smith, advising me to propose to the detachment, an extension of their service for 15 or 20 days longer, as the time for which they were engaged was deemed insufficient to accomplish any object of the expedition. This measure I had contemplated, and its sanction by the colonel, met with my most hearty approbation; for I was unwilling to proceed to an enemy's country, with a single man who would declare, that in any event, he would not serve a day longer than the time for which he had originally volunteered.

I accordingly assembled the detachment, and, after stating the necessity of a tender of further service, proposed that the men should volunteer for three weeks longer—when 84 men, including officers, stepped out, and were enrolled, which, with the addition of 23 volunteer militia, sent to my aid, by colonel Smith, and 9 patriots, under the command of captain Cone, made my whole force amount to 117. With this small body, provided with 4 days provisions, and 12 horses, I was determined to proceed to the nation, and give those merciless savages, at least, one battle; and I was emboldened in this determination, by the strong expectation of being succoured by a body of cavalry from St. Mary's; and which, it has since appeared, did assemble at Colerain, but proceeded no further. On the evening of the 24th of September, we left the St. John's, marching in Indian file; Captain Humphrey's company of riflemen in front, Captain Fort's company, under the command of lieutenant Fannin, in the centre, and captain

Coleman's company, with Cone's detachment, under the command of lieutenant Broadnax, in the rear. A small party marched in front of the main body, and another in the rear. The openness of the ground (except in particular places) rendered it unnecessary to employ men upon the right and left. Our encampments, at night, (there being three companies) were in the form of a triangle, with the baggage in the centre; the men, with their clothes on, lying with their feet pointing outwards, and their firelocks in their arms. In case of an attack, the officers were instructed to bring up their companies, upon the right and left of the company fronting the enemy, and attend to the Indian movements of fighting, until ordered to charge. In case of meeting the enemy upon our march, Humphrey's company was instructed to file off to the right; Fort's company to advance, and form to the front, in single rank; and Coleman's company to file off to the left: the whole, then, to advance, in the form of a crescent, and endeavour to encircle the enemy. On the morning of the 24th day of our march, when we were within 6 or 7 miles of the Lotchaway towns, our advanced party discovered a body of Indians, marching along the path, meeting us, and, at the same moment, they appeared to have discovered us. As soon as I was informed of it, I lost no time in giving the necessary directions for the companies to advance, and obey the instructions which had been previously given to them, and which appeared exactly suited to the situation in which we found the enemy. As soon as Fort's company (at the head of which I had placed myself) had advanced to its proper ground, I discovered the Indians falling back, and making every preparation for battle, by unslinging their packs, priming their rifles, and each man taking his tree. We continued to advance, taking advantage of the trees in our progress, until we were within 150 yards of the Indians, when many of them fired, and I instantly ordered the charge, which drove them from behind the trees, and caused them to retire with the greatest precipitation, our men, all the while, firing at them, slew several; and, by repeated charges, drove them half a mile, when they took shelter in the swamp. It unfortunately happened, (I presume through inadvertance) that Humphrey's company in filing to the right, took too great a circuit, got a small swamp between them and the enemy, and thereby rendered the victory less decisive than it would have been, had the whole charged together, and before the Indians had dispersed themselves, and extended their force (which they soon did) near half a mile up and down the swamp. The company however was of service afterwards, in preventing the enemy after their dispersion from entering our camp, retaking their baggage and provision (all of which fell into our hands) or falling upon the wounded that had been sent to the rear. The action, including the skirmishing upon the flanks, lasted two hours and a half—the Indians frequently attempting to outflank us, and get in our rear, but were repulsed by the com-

panies extending on our right and left. We had 1 man killed, and 9 wounded; 2 of which have since died of their wounds. The loss of the enemy must have been considerable; I saw 7 fall to the ground with my own eye, among whom was their king, Payne: two of them fell near the swamp, the rest our men had the curiosity to scalp. The rifle company on the right, and Broadmax's on the left, speak of killing several near the swamp, who were borne off by their comrades; it being a principle among the savages, to carry off their dead at the risk of their lives. We remained on the battle ground watching the movements of the Indians, who were near the swamp painting themselves, and appeared to be in consultation; all of which indicated an intention to renew the combat. Accordingly, half an hour before sun set, having obtained a considerable reinforcement of negroes and Indians, from their towns, they commenced the most horrid yells imaginable, imitating the cries and noise of almost every animal of the forest: their chiefs advancing in front, in a stooping, serpentine manner, and making the most wild and frantic gestures, until they approached within 200 yards of us, when they halted, and commenced firing. Our men were not to be alarmed by their noise and yells; but, as instructed, remained perfectly still and steady behind logs and trees, until the enemy, by this forbearance, had approached somewhat nearer, when a brisk and well directed fire from our line, soon drove them back to their original ground. I would now have ordered the charge; but, being under the necessity, from the extension of the enemy's line, of detaching nearly one half of my force to protect our camp and wounded, (the assailing of which, is a great object with Indians,) I was left to contend with a force three times as numerous as my own. The action lasted until 8 o'clock, when the enemy were completely repulsed in every attempt, whether made upon our centre or flanks. We had two men killed, and one wounded; the enemy carried off several of their men before it was dark; after which, all firing (of course at random) was at the spot from whence the flash arose. After fighting and fasting the whole day, we had to work through the night; and at day-light, had a tolerable breast-work of logs and earth, with port holes, on the ground on which the battle was fought: we were reduced to this necessity; for, in despatching captain Whitaker about dark, to St. John's for a reinforcement, six more men took the liberty to accompany him, taking with them our best horses: our pilot and surgeon, (who was sick,) was among the number. The two days succeeding the battle, we neither saw nor heard any thing of the enemy; but, on the evening of the third day, they commenced firing on our work, at a long distance, and renewed it every day, for 5 or 6 days, but without killing or wounding any of our men. After killing two or three of them, through our port holes, they seldom came within gun shot. Seven or eight days had now elapsed, since our express had left us; hun-

ger was staring us in the face, and we were reduced to the necessity of eating one of our horses ; we had no surgeon to dress the wounded, and apprehensions were entertained, that the enemy would receive reinforcements from Augustine, or the Makasukie Indians. Expecting relief every hour, I was unwilling to leave our breast-work, while we had a horse left to eat ; but I understood, from some of my officers, that a certain captain was determined to leave us, with his company ; and that many of the men, giving up all hopes of relief, talked of deserting in the night, rather than perish, or fall a sacrifice to the merciless negroes and Indians, whom they were taught to believe would surround us in great numbers in a few days. In this trying situation, when our few remaining horses were shot down by them, and the number of our sick daily increasing, I reluctantly assented to leave our works that night, and directed the litters to be prepared, to carry the wounded. About 9 o'clock we commenced our distressing march, carrying 5 wounded men in litters, and supporting two or three more. We had not proceeded more than eight miles, when the men became perfectly exhausted from hunger and fatigue, and were unable to carry the wounded any farther. About two hours after we left our breast-works, 25 horsemen, with provisions, arrived to our relief, on a different road from the one we had taken ; but, from motives best known to themselves, instead of following us, returned to St. John's, and we were left to encounter new difficulties ; two men that I had despatched on the path the horsemen came, by some means or other missing them. We again constructed a plan of defence, and I despatched sergeant-major Reese, with one private, to Picolata, to learn what had occasioned the delay of our expected supplies ; and told him I should remain where I was, until I could hear from him, and endeavoured to procure cattle, as I discovered signs of their being near us. The evil genius of captain ———, again prevailed ; and I have since learned from captain Cone, that this person instigated not only him, but many of the privates, to urge a departure from our works, even in the day time, when I was convinced that the Indians, knowing our weak situation, would endeavour to ambuscade. This gentleman, if *innocent*, will have an opportunity of proving himself so before a court martial.

With a burning fever on me, and scarcely able to walk, the march was ordered about 3 o'clock, P. M. I had directed the adjutant, captain Harden, to march in front, to avoid all places where there could be an ambuscade, and the litters should be distributed among the different companies. Being extremely weak, I marched in the rear, with captain ———, (who carried my firelock,) lieutenant Fannin, and about 15 or 20 privates. We had scarcely marched five miles, before the front of the detachment discovered the heads of several Indians, on both sides of the path, from among several pine trees that were laid prostrate by the hurricane ; the same instant, the enemy fired upon our

ced party, and shot down four of them; one, a Spaniard, on the spot, and two survived a few days; my negro boy one of them. The moment I heard the firing, I ordered the regiment to charge, and the Indians were completely defeated, in minutes; many of them dropping their guns, and the whole flying off, without ever attempting to rally; four were left dead on the field; and I am convinced, from the constant fire we kept at many more must have been slain, but were hid from our eyes by the thick palmetto bushes. We lay on the battle ground that night, and started next day at 10 o'clock—marched five miles, and then threw up breast-works, between two ponds, living upon the fish, alligators, and palmetto stocks, until sergeant-major arrived with provisions, and 14 horses, when we were enabled to proceed to St. John's with all our sick and wounded, by a gun-boat, by the direction of colonel Smith, was in charge for us, which conveyed us to his camp, where we met with the attention that humanity or benevolence could bestow. I cannot refrain from here expressing the high sense I have of the courage and anxiety which colonel Smith has manifested for the regiment under my command, and his promptitude in affording aid in his power, when apprized of our situation. My words scarcely do justice to the merits of the brave officers who served under my command, their fortitude under all their privations and distresses never forsaking them. Captain Hamilton volunteered as a private, his company having left him at the close of their time; lieutenant Fannin, ensign Hamilton and sergeant Harden distinguished themselves in a particular manner, being always among the first to charge, and first in pursuit; sergeants Holt and Attaway likewise acted very bravely, and the company in general (being always near me and under my immediate view) advanced to the charge with the steadiness of veterans. Lieutenant Broadnax showed a great deal of courage and presence of mind, and ensign Mann, who was wounded in the first action, fought well. Captain Cone, who was wounded in the second early in the action, behaved well, and lieutenant Willard did himself great honour in every action, but particularly in the night engagement, where he made in the night engagement. Sergeant Hawkins and corporal Neil, of Coleman's company, acted like soldiers, and sergeant-major Reese's activity was surpassed by his courage; he was every where and always in the front. Captain Humphrey's company acted bravely, particularly lieutenant Reed, sergeant Fields, sergeant Cowan, sergeant Mark, and many of the privates. I can only speak of captain Humphrey from the report of some of his men, who say that he acted well; it so happening he never met my eye during any of the engagements, while the conduct of every other man that I have named (except one or two) came under my personal observation.

The number of Indians, in the first engagement, from every circumstance that appeared, must have been from 75 to 100. In the second engagement, their number, including negroes (who are their best soldiers) was double our's; and, in the third engagement, there appeared to be 50, which was nearly equal to our force, after deducting the sick and wounded. From every circumstance I am induced to believe that the number of killed and wounded among the Indians, must be at least fifty.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

DANIEL NEWMAN.

Rts Excellency David B. Mitchell.

PITTSBURG, October 23d, 1812.

SIR,

I embrace this opportunity to render you an account of the garrison of Chicago.

On the 9th of August last, I received orders from general Hull to evacuate the post and proceed with my command to Detroit, by land, leaving it at my discretion to dispose of the public property as I thought proper. The neighbouring Indians got information as early as I did, and came in from all quarters in order to receive the goods in the factory store, which they understood were to be given them. On the 13th, Captain Wells, of fort Wayne, arrived with about 30 Miamies, for the purpose of escorting us in, by the request of general Hull. On the 14th, I delivered the Indians all the goods in the factory store, and a considerable quantity of provisions which we could not take away with us. The surplus arms and ammunition I thought proper to destroy, fearing they would make bad use of it if put in their possession. I also destroyed all the liquor on hand soon after they began to collect. The collection was unusually large for that place; but they conducted themselves with the strictest propriety till after I left the fort. On the 15th, at 9 o'clock in the morning, we commenced our march: a part of the Miamies were detached in front and the remainder in our rear, as guards, under the direction of captain Wells. The situation of the country rendered it necessary for us to take the beach, with the lake on our left, and a high sand bank on our right, at about 100 yards distance.

We had proceeded about a mile and a half, when it was discovered that the Indians were prepared to attack us from behind the bank. I immediately marched up with the company to the top of the bank, when the action commenced; after firing one round, we charged, and the Indians gave way in front and joined

use on our flanks. In about fifteen minutes they got possession of all our horses, provisions, and baggage of every description, and finding the Miamies did not assist us, I drew off the men I had left, and took possession of a small elevation in the open prairie, out of shot of the bank or any other cover. The Indians did not follow me, but assembled in a body on the top of the bank, and after some consultations among themselves, made signs for me to approach them. I advanced towards them alone, and was met by one of the Potawatamie chiefs, called the Black Bird, with an interpreter. After shaking hands, he requested me to surrender, promising to spare the lives of all the prisoners. In a few moments consideration, I concluded it would be most prudent to comply with his request, although I did not put entire confidence in his promise. After delivering up our arms, we were taken back to their encampment near the fort, and distributed among the different tribes. The next morning, they set me to the fort and left the place, taking the prisoners with them. Their number of warriors was between four and five hundred, mostly of the Potawatamie nation, and their loss, from the best information I could get, was about fifteen. Our strength was twenty-four regulars and twelve militia, out of which, twenty-six regulars and all the militia were killed in the action, with two women and twelve children. Ensign George Ronan and doctor Isaac V. Van Voorhis of my company, with captain Wells, of Fort Wayne, are, to my great sorrow, numbered among the dead. Lieutenant Lina T. Helm, with twenty-five non-commissioned officers and privates, and eleven women and children, were prisoners when we were separated. Mrs. Heald and myself were taken to the mouth of the river St. Joseph, and being both badly wounded, were permitted to reside with Mr. Burnet, an Indian trader. In a few days after our arrival there, the Indians all went off to take Fort Wayne, and in their absence, I engaged a Frenchman to take us to Michilimackinac by water, where I gave myself up as a prisoner of war, with one of my sergeants. The commanding officer, captain Roberts, offered me every assistance in his power to render our situation comfortable while we remained there, and to enable us to proceed on our journey. To me I gave my parole of honour, and came on to Detroit and reported myself to colonel Proctor, who gave us a passage to Buffalo; from that place I came by the way of Presque Isle, and arrived here yesterday.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

N. HEALD,
Captain U. S. Infantry.

Thomas H. Cushing, Esqr.
Adjutant General.

AFFAIR AT ST. REGIS.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP FRENCH MILLS,

October 24th, 1812.

On the 22d I despatched several confidential friends, to reconnoitre about the village of St. Regis; they returned with the information, that the enemy had landed in the village, and that we might expect a visit from them immediately. Their number was stated by no one at less than 110, and from that to 300; the most certain information fixed on the former number.

It was also believed that the enemy were determined to make a stand at that place, and would speedily increase their number: this determined me to make an immediate attempt to take those already landed, before any reinforcement could arrive. I ordered the men to be furnished with two days rations of provisions, with double rations of whiskey; and at 11 at night, we marched with the utmost silence, that we might give as little alarm as possible. We took a circuitous route, through the woods, and arrived at Gray's Mills, at half past 3, P. M. We found here, a boat, a small canoe, and two cribs of boards; captain Lyon's company crossed in the boat; captain McNeil's, in the canoe, and the remainder, with our horses, crossed on the cribs. We arrived, within half a mile of the village, at 5 o'clock; where, being concealed from the enemy by a little rise of ground, we halted to reconnoitre, refresh the men, and make disposition for the attack, which was arranged in the following order:—captain Lyon was detached from the right, with orders to take the road, running along the bank of the St. Regis river, with directions to gain the rear of captain Montaigny's house, in which, and Donally's, the enemy were said to be quartered. Captain Dilden was detached to the St. Lawrence, with a view of gaining the route of Donally's house, and also securing the enemy's boats, expected to have been stationed there to prevent their retreat. With the remainder of the force, I moved on in front, and arrived within a hundred and fifty yards of Montaigny's house, when I found by the firing, that captain Lyon was engaged. At the same instant, I discovered a person passing in front, and ordered him to stand; but not being obeyed, ordered captain Higbie's first platoon to fire, and the poor fellow soon fell; he proved to be the ensign named in the list of killed. The firing was at an end in an instant, and we soon found in our possession 40 prisoners, with their arms, &c.—4 killed—1 wounded mortally; took 1 stand of colours, 2 batteaux, 38 guns,—40 men.

After searching in vain for further military stores, we recrossed the river at the village, and returned to camp by the nearest route, where we arrived at 11 A. M.—the batteaux, with baggage, &c. arrived a few minutes before us. We had not a man hurt. I cannot close this letter, without stating to

your excellency, that the officers and soldiers, for their conduct on this occasion, deserve the highest encomiums; for so strict was their attention to duty and orders, that we entered the place without even being heard by the Indians' dogs. The prisoners I have just sent off to Plattsburg, to await the disposition of your excellency.

I have the honour to be, yours, &c.
G. D. YOUNG,
Major, commanding troops at French Mills.

Brig. General Bloomfield.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, October 27th, 1812.

SIR,

I have received, with great satisfaction, your communication of the 9th instant; I have been desired by the President of the United States, to return to you, and through you, to the officers and men, under your command, in the expedition to fort Erie, which terminated to the glory of the American arms, his particular thanks.

I am, with great respect, yours, &c.
PAUL HAMILTON.

P. S. Your having abstained from fulfilling your intimation that you would expose your prisoners to the enemy's fire, is highly approved.

Jesse D. Elliott, Esqr.
Lieut. Commanding, Black Rock.

U. S. SHIP UNITED STATES, AT SEA,
October 30th, 1812,

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you, that on the 25th instant, being in the latitude 29, N. longitude 29 30, W. we fell in with, and, after an action of an hour and a half, captured his Britannic Majesty's ship Macedonian, commanded by captain John Carden, and mounting 49 carriage guns (the odd gun shifting.) She is a frigate of the largest class, two years old, four months out of dock, and reputed one of the best sailors in the British service. The enemy being to windward, had the advantage of engaging us at his own distance, which was so great, that for the first half hour we did not use our carronades, and at no moment was he within the complete effect of our musketry or grape—to this circumstance and a heavy swell, which was on at the time, I ascribe the unusual length of the action.

The enthusiasm of every officer, seaman and marine on board this ship, on discovering the enemy—their steady conduct in battle, and precision of their fire, could not be surpassed. Where all met my fullest expectations, it would be unjust for me to discriminate. Permit me, however, to recommend to your particular notice, my first lieutenant, William H. Allen. He has served with me upwards of five years, and to his unremitting exertions in disciplining the crew, is to be imputed the obvious superiority of our gunnery exhibited in the result of this contest.

Subjoined is a list of the killed and wounded on both sides. Our loss, compared with that of the enemy, will appear small. Amongst our wounded, you will observe the name of lieutenant Funk, who died in a few hours after the action—he was an officer of great gallantry and promise, and the service has sustained a severe loss in his death.

The Macedonian lost her mizen-mast, fore and main-top-masts and main yard, and was much cut up in her hull. The damage sustained by this ship was not such as to render her return into port necessary, and had I not deemed it important that we should see our prize in, should have continued our cruise.

With the highest consideration, I am, yours, &c.

STEPHEN DECATUR.

The Hon. Paul Hamilton.

Killed	-	-	-	-	5
Wounded	-	-	-	-	7—1 since dead.

12

MACEDONIAN.

Killed	-	-	-	-	36
Wounded	-	-	-	-	68

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RUSSEL'S INDIAN EXPEDITION.

CAMP RUSSEL, October 31st, 1812.

SIR,

This will inform you, that I arrived at this place, from Vincennes, after general Hopkins had marched his mounted rifle-men up to fort Harrison. I took with me, a part of three companies of United States' rangers, where I was joined by governor Edwards, with his mounted riflemen; the whole of our strength amounted to 360 privates. We penetrated very far into the Indian country, with an expectation of co-operating with general Hopkins, who, by appointment, was to meet us at the Peoria, on the Illinois river. In this, we were sadly disappointed, as we

could get no intelligence of his army. This prevented us from doing as much damage to the Indians, as otherwise we could have done. As our numbers were too weak to make any delay in that quarter; as this was farther than any troops had hitherto penetrated, we stole a march upon the celebrated Pimartam's town, situated about 21 miles above Peoria, and immediately at the head of Peoria lake. This was a well built town, and contained a number of Indians; between the town and river, was a dismal swamp, in which they immediately flew for shelter, returning a few scattering shots. Our men nobly pursued them through the swamp; and also others, as they were crossing the Illinois river. The men also pursued them to the opposite bank, and brought back some of their canoes, and several dead bodies—the governor states, to be upwards of 20 killed, of the enemy. This was a flourishing town, with an immense deal of Indian plunder in it, together with a great deal of corn; all of which was committed to the flames. I believe not less than 80 horses fell into our hands belonging to the enemy. Several white persons' scalps were also found among their plunder. I had the immediate command of the battalion, and the superior command was retained by his excellency the governor. On this expedition we were fortunate; we had but 4 men wounded, none of which is mortal. This tour was performed from camp, and back to the same place, in 13 days.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

W. RUSSELL,
Colonel 7th Dist. Comdg.

The Secretary of War.

AT SEA, longitude 32, latitude 33, November 1, 1812.

SIR,

I wrote you on the 18th ultimo, by the British packet *Swallow*, informing you of having captured that vessel with between an hundred and fifty and two hundred thousand dollars on board; and I now write you by a British South Sea ship, loaded with oil, captured yesterday, one of two ships under convoy of the frigate *Galatea*.

The above ship is manned by the Congress, and it is now blowing so fresh, that I cannot learn from Captain Smith her name, having separated from him yesterday in chase of the *Galatea* whilst he was manning the prize, and owing to excessive bad weather, last night, was unable to join him to day.

I got within six or seven miles of the *Galatea* by sun-set, but the extreme darkness of the night enabled her to escape.

With the greatest respect, I am, &c.

JOHN RODGERS.

The Hon. Paul Hamilton,
Secretary of the Navy.

SACKETT'S HARBOR, November 13th, 1812.

SIR,

I arrived here last evening in a gale of wind, the pilots having refused to keep the lake. On the 8th I fell in with the Royal George, and chased her into the bay of Quanti, where I lost sight of her in the night. In the morning of the 9th we again got sight of her lying in Kingston channel. We gave chase, and followed her into the harbor of Kingston, where we engaged her and the batteries for one hour and 45 minutes. I had made up my mind to board her, but she was so well protected by the batteries, and the wind blowing directly in, it was deemed imprudent to make the attempt at that time; the pilots also refused to take charge of the vessel. Under these circumstances, and it being after sun-down, I determined to haul off and renew the attack next morning. We beat up in good order under a heavy fire from the Royal George and batteries to 4 mile point, where we anchored. It blew heavy in squalls from the westward during the night, and there was every appearance of a gale of wind. The pilots became alarmed, and I thought it most prudent to get into a place of more safety. I therefore (very reluctantly) deferred renewing the attack upon the ships and forts until a more favourable opportunity.

At 7 A. M. on the 10th, I made the signal to weigh, and we beat out of a very narrow channel, under a very heavy press of sail to the open lake. At 10 we fell in with the governor Sincos running for Kingston, and chased her into the harbor. She escaped by running over a reef of rocks under a heavy fire from the Governor Tompkins, the Hamilton and the Julia, which cut her very much. All her people ran below while under the fire of these vessels. The Hamilton chased her into nine feet water before she hauled off. We tacked to the southward, with an intention of running to our station at the Ducks, but it coming on to blow very heavy, the pilots told me it would be unsafe to keep the lakes. I bore up for this place, where I arrived last night.

In our passage through the bay of Quanti, I discovered a schooner at the village of Armingstown which we took possession of, but finding she would detain us (being then in chase of the Royal George) I ordered lieutenant Macpherson to take out her sails and rigging and burn her, which he did. We also took the schooner Mary, Hall, from Niagara, at the mouth of Kingston harbor, and took her with us to our anchorage. The next morning, finding that she could not beat through the channel with us, I ordered the sailing master of the Growler to take her under convoy and run down past Kingston, anchor on the east end of Long Island, and wait for a wind to come up on the east side. I was also in hopes that the Royal George might be induced to follow for the purpose of re-taking our prize, but her commander was too well aware of the consequences to leave his moorings. We lost in this affair one man killed, and three slightly wounded.

with a few shot through our sails. The other vessels lost no men and received but little injury in their hulls and sails, with the exception of the *Pert*, whose gun burst in the early part of the action, and wounded her commander (sailing-master Arundel) badly, and a midshipman and three men slightly. Mr. Arundel, who refused to quit the deck, although wounded, was knocked overboard in beating up to anchorage, and I am sorry to say was drowned.

The *Royal George* must have received very considerable injury in her hull and in men, as the gun vessels with a long 32 pounder were seen to strike her almost every shot, and it was observed that she was reinforced with troops four different times during the action.

I have great pleasure in saying that the officers and men on board every vessel behaved with the utmost coolness, and are extremely anxious to meet the enemy on the open lake, and as long as I have the honour to command such officers and such men, I can have no doubt of the result.

I think I can say with great propriety, that we have now the command of the lake, and that we can transport troops and stores to any part of it without any risk of an attack from the enemy. Although the whole of his naval force was not collected at Kingston, yet the force at the different batteries would more than counterbalance the vessels that were absent. It was thought by all the officers in the squadron, that the enemy had more than thirty guns mounted at Kingston, and from 1,000 to 1,500 men. The *Royal George*, protected by this force, was driven into the inner harbor, under the protection of the musketry, by the *Oneida* and four small schooners fitted out as gun boats; the Governor *Tompkins* not having been able to join in the action until about sun-down, owing to the lightness of the winds, and the *Pert's* gun having burst the second or third shot.

We are replacing all deficiencies, and I shall proceed up the lake the first wind, in the hopes to fall in with the *Earl Moira* and the *Prince Regent*; at any rate I shall endeavour to prevent them from forming a junction with the *Royal George* again this winter. I shall also visit *Niagara river* if practicable, in order to land some guns and stores that I have taken on board for that purpose. If the enemy are still in possession of *Queenstown*, I shall try to land them a few miles below. I shall have the honour of writing you more in detail upon this subject on my return, or perhaps before I leave here, if the wind should continue ahead.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

The Hon. Paul Hamilton,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

NEW YORK, November 24th, 1812.

SIR,

I here avail myself of the first opportunity of informing you of the occurrences of our cruise, which terminated in the capture of the *Wasp*, on the 18th of October, by the *Poictiers* of 74 guns, while a wreck from damages received in an engagement with the British sloop of war *Frolic*, of 22 guns; 16 of them 32 pound carronades, and four twelve pounders on the main deck, and two twelve pounders, carronades, on the top-gallant-forecastle, making her superior in force to us by four twelve pounders. The *Frolic* had struck to us and was taken possession of, about two hours before our surrendering to the *Poictiers*.

We had left the *Delaware* on the 13th. The 16th had a heavy gale, in which we lost our gib-boom and two men. Half past 11, on the night of the 17th, in the latitude of 37 degrees north, and longitude 65 degrees west, we saw several sail; two of them appeared very large. We stood from them for some time, then shortened sail and steered the remainder of the night the course we had perceived them on. At day-light, on Sunday the 18th, we saw them ahead—gave chase, and soon discovered them to be a convoy of six sail, under the protection of a sloop of war, four of them large ships, mounting from 16 to 18 guns. At 30 minutes past 11, A. M. we engaged the sloop of war, having first received her fire at the distance of fifty or sixty yards, which space we gradually lessened until we laid her on board, after a well-supported fire of 43 minutes; and although so near, while loading the last broadside, that our rammers were shoved against the side of the enemy, our men exhibited the same alacrity which they had done during the whole of the action. They immediately surrendered upon our gaining their fore-castle, so that no loss was sustained on either side after boarding.

Our main-top-mast was shot away between four and five minutes from the commencement of the firing, and falling together with the main-top-sail yard across the larboard fore and fore-top-sail braces, rendered our head-yards unmanageable the remainder of the action. At eight minutes the gaff and main top-gallant-mast came down, and at twenty minutes from the beginning of the action, every brace and most of the rigging was shot away. A few minutes after separating from the *Frolic*, both her masts fell upon deck, the main-mast going close by the deck, and the fore-mast twelve or fifteen feet above it.

The courage and exertions of the officers and crew fully answered my expectations and wishes. Lieutenant Biddle's active conduct contributed much to our success, by the exact attention paid to every department during the engagement, and the animating example he afforded the crew by his intrepidity. Lieutenants Rodgers, Booth, and Mr. Rapp, shewed by the incessant fire from their divisions, that they were not to be surpassed in

resolution or skill. Mr. Knight and every other officer acted with a courage and promptitude highly honourable, and I trust have given assurance that they may be relied on whenever their services may be required.

I could not ascertain the exact loss of the enemy, as many of the dead lay buried under the masts and spars that had fallen upon deck, which two hours' exertion had not sufficiently removed. Mr. Biddle, who had charge of the Frolic, states that from what he saw and from information from the officers, the number of killed must have been about thirty, and that of the wounded about forty or fifty—of the killed is her first lieutenant and sailing master; of the wounded, captain Whinyates and the second lieutenant.

We had five killed and five wounded as per list; the wounded are recovering. Lieutenant Claxton, who was confined by sickness, left his bed a little previous to the engagement, and though too weak to be at his division, remained upon deck and shewed by his composed manner of noting incidents, that we had lost, by his illness, the services of a brave officer.

I am, respectfully, yours, &c.

JACOB JONES.

The Hon. Paul Hamilton,
Secretary of the Navy.

—
FORT NIAGARA, November 25th, 1812.

SIR,

I beg leave to inform you that on the morning of the 21st instant, at 5 o'clock, a heavy cannonading opened upon this garrison from all the batteries at, and in the neighbourhood of, Fort George, which lasted, without intermission, until after sun-down. They had five detached batteries, two mounting 24 pounders, one mounting a 9, and two mortar batteries, one of 10½, the other 5½ inch. The batteries fired hot shot, which set some of our buildings on fire, but from the extraordinary vigilance of the officers and men, particularly major Armistead of the United States' corps of engineers, whose indefatigable exertions were extended to all parts of the garrison, the fires were got under without being observed by the enemy.

The garrison was not as well provided with artillery and ammunition as I could have wished; however, the batteries opened a tremendous fire upon them in return, with hot shot, admirably well directed.

Several times during the cannonading, the town of Newark was in flames, but was extinguished by their engines, as also the centre building in Fort George. Their mess house and all the buildings near it were consumed. Captain M'Keon commanded a 12 pounder in the south-east block house, and distinguished him-

self by his usual gallantry and skill. Captain Jacks, of the 7th regiment militia artillery, commanded a six pounder on the north block house, and together with a part of his own company, though placed in a situation most exposed to the fire of the enemy, maintained their position like veterans. Lieutenant Rees of the 3d regiment of artillery, had the command of an eighteen pounder on the south-east battery, which was pointed at a battery *en barbette*, mounting a twenty-four pounder, and also at Fort George; several well directed shot were directed from this gun, which proved the skill of its commander.

About 10 o'clock, lieutenant Rees had his left shoulder bruised by a part of the parapet falling on him; which, though it did not materially injure him, obliged him to retire, and captain Leonard, of the 1st regiment United States' artillery, at that moment arriving, he took command of the battery for the remainder of the day. Lieutenant Wendel, of the 3d regiment of artillery, had the command of an eighteen and four pounder on the west battery, and doctor Hooper, of captain Jack's company of militia artillery, had the command of a six pounder on the mess house. Of these gentlemen and their commands, I cannot speak with too much praise; they distinguished themselves highly, and from their shot, all of which was hot, the town of Newark was repeatedly fired, and one of the enemy's batteries silenced for a time.

An instance of extraordinary bravery in a female (the wife of one Doyle, a private of the United States' artillery, made a prisoner at Queenstown) I cannot pass over. During the most tremendous cannonading I have ever seen, she attended the six pounder on the old mess house with red hot shot, and showed fortitude equal to the *maid of Orleans*.

Lieutenants Gansevoort and Harris, of the 1st regiment United States' artillery, had command of the salt battery at Youngstown, mounting one eighteen and a four pounder. These two guns played upon the battery of Fort George and the buildings near it: from every observation I could make during their fire, I am happy to say they merited my warmest thanks for their skill in the service of these guns.

Lieutenant Harris, from his four pounder, sunk a schooner which lay at their wharf: she was one of those taken by the enemy at the mouth of Genesee river a short time since. He also assisted in burning and destroying the buildings near the wharf. These two officers and their men in the warmest part of the cannonading, having fired away all their cartridges, cut up their flannel waistcoats and shirts, and the soldiers their trowsers, to supply their guns.

I cannot say too much of all the officers and soldiers of the artillery immediately under my observation in this garrison; they merit the thanks and esteem of their country for the defence of it, and I believe it never sustained so sharp and continued a bombardment. The enemy threw more than two thousand red hot

balls into it, and a number of shells, amounting to more than 180, only one of which did injury to our men. Lieutenant colonel Gray commanded the artillery; the unremitting attention paid to his duty, proves him an officer whose zeal and science do honour to himself and country; to this gentleman I feel much indebted for the manner he acquitted himself. To the officers of my regiment (particularly captain Milligan) and the soldiers who assisted the artillery, and those employed in extinguishing the fires and carrying off the killed and wounded, I am also much indebted; they merit my warmest thanks. To doctor West of the garrison, doctor Hagan of the 14th regiment United States' infantry, and doctor Craig of the 22d regiment United States' infantry, I offer my thanks; they were employed during the entire day in the most critical duties of their profession.

Our killed and wounded amounted to eleven. From the numbers we saw carried off from the enemy's batteries, I presume many more were killed and wounded on their side.

Only two of the above men were killed by the enemy's shot, the rest by the bursting of a 12 pounder in the south-east block house, and by the sponges of the guns on the north block house, and at the salt battery.

GEORGE M'FEELEY,

Lt. Col. commanding Fort Niagara.

General Alex. Smyth.

EXPEDITION ON THE WABASH.

ON WABASH, NEAR THE MOUTH OF PINE-CREEK,
November 27th, 1812.

SIR,

By colonel Richard Taylor, quarter master general, who goes on as quick as possible to Frankfort, I have it in my power to give you general information of the movements of the army, since my last. On the 11th, the army marched from fort Harrison, on the road formerly made by governor Harrison's army, and the boats set out at the same time. The length of time the enemy had expected us, made it necessary to guard ourselves in an especial manner. The rise of the waters, from the heavy fall of rain preceding our march, and some large creeks, left us no doubt of considerable difficulty and embarrassment; insomuch, that not until the 14th did we pass Sugar creek, 3 miles above the road.

From every information, I had no hesitation in moving on the east side of the Wabash; the Vermillions, Pine creek, and other impediments on the west side, superadded to the presumption that we were expected, and might more easily be annoyed and ambuscaded on that route, determined me in this measure; the

boats too, with our provisions of rations, forage, and military stores, could be more easily covered and protected, as the line of march could be invariably nearer the river. Lieutenant colonel Barbour, with one battalion of his regiment, had command of the 7 boats, and encamped with us, on the bank of the river, almost every night. This so protracted our march, that we did not reach the Prophet's town until the 19th: on the morning of this day, I detached 300 men to surprize the Winebago town, lying on Ponce Passu creek, one mile from the Wabash, and 4 below the Prophet's. This party, commanded by general Butler, surrounded the place about break of day, and found it evacuated. There were in the main town about 40 houses, many of them from 30 to 50 feet in length; besides many temporary huts in the surrounding Prairie, in which they had cultivated a great deal of corn.

On the 20th, 21st and 22d, we were employed in the complete destruction of the Prophet's town, which contained about 40 cabins and huts, and the large Kickapoo village adjoining below it, on the west side of the river, consisting of about 160 cabins and huts; finding, and destroying their corn, reconnoitering the circumjacent part of the country, and constructing works for the defence of our boats and the army. Seven miles east of us, on the Ponce Passu creek, a party of Indians were discovered—they had fired on a small party of ours on the 21st, and killed a man by the name of Dunn, a gallant soldier in captain Duvall's company. On the 22d, upwards of sixty horsemen, under the command of lieutenant colonels Miller and Wilcox, anxious to bury their comrade, as well as gain a more complete knowledge of the ground, went on to a point near the Indian encampment, fell into an ambuscade, and 18 of our party were killed, wounded, and missing. Among these, are three hopeful young officers, and one private from the 8th (Wilcox's) regiment, viz:—Mars, Edwards, Murray, and the private Webb, presumed to be killed; the other 14 were of the rangers. On the return of this party, and the information of a large assemblage of the enemy, who, encouraged by the strength of their camp, appeared to be waiting for us, every preparation was made to march early, and engage the enemy at every risk; when, from the most violent storm, and fall of snow, attended with the coldest weather I ever saw or felt, at this season of the year, and which did not subside until the evening of the 23d, we were delayed until the 24th. Upon arriving on the ground, we found the enemy had deserted their camp before the fall of snow, and passed the Ponce Passu. I have no doubt but their ground was the strongest I ever have seen; the deep, rapid creek spoken of, was in their rear, running in a semi-circle, and fronted by a bluff 100 feet high, almost perpendicular, and only to be penetrated by three steep ravines. If the enemy would not defend themselves here, it was evident they did not intend fighting at all. After reconnoitering sufficiently, we re-

turned to camp, and found the ice so accumulated, as to alarm us for the return of the boats. I had fully intended to have spent some more week in endeavouring to find the Indian camps; but the shoeless, shirtless state of the troops, now clad in the remnants of their summer dress; a river full of ice; the hills covered with snow; a rigid climate, and no certain point to which we could further direct our operations; under the influence of the advice of every field and staff officer, orders were given, and measures pursued for our return, on the 25th. We are now progressing to fort Harrison, through the ice and snow, where we expect to arrive on the last day of this month.

From Vincennes I shall have the honour of addressing your excellency again: but, before I close this, I cannot forbear expressing the merits of the officers and soldiers of this command. After leaving at fort Harrison all unfit for duty, we had in privates of every corps, about 1000—in the total, 1250 or thereabout. At the Prophet's town, upwards of 100 of these were on the sick report. Yet, sir, have we progressed in such order as to menace our enemy, from any annoyance. Seven large keel boats have been covered and protected, to a point hitherto unknown in Indian expeditions. Three large Indian establishments have been burnt and destroyed, with near three miles of fence, (and all the corn, &c. we could find,) besides many smaller ones; the enemy have been sought in their strong holds, and every opportunity afforded them to attack or alarm us; a march on the east side of the Wabash, without road, or recognizance of the country, fully 100 miles perfected; and this was done with a naked army of infantry, aided by only about fifty rangers and spies: all this will have been done in twenty days—no sigh, no murmur, no complaint.

I have the honour to be, yours, &c.

SAMUEL HOPKINS.

His excellency Gov. Shelby.

CAMP, NEAR BUFFALOE, December 4th, 1812.

SIR,

The troops, under my command, having been ordered to hutch themselves for the winter, it becomes my duty to report to you the proceedings had here, since I took command on this frontier.

On or about the 26th of October, I ordered that 20 scows should be prepared for the transportation of cavalry and artillery, and put the carpenters of the army upon that duty. By the 26th November, ten scows were completed; and by bringing boats from lake Ontario, the number was increased to seventy.

I had issued an address to the men of New York; and perhaps 300 volunteers had arrived at Buffaloe. I presumed that the regular troops, and the volunteers, under colonels Smith and McClure, would furnish 2,300 men for duty; and, of general

Tannehill's brigade, reporting a total of 1,650, as many as 418 had volunteered to cross into Canada. I deemed myself ready "to cross with 3,000 men at once," according to your orders. Preparatory thereto, on the night of the 27th of November, I sent over two parties; one under lieutenant colonel Boerstler; the other under captain King, with whom lieutenant Angus, of the navy, at the head of a body of seamen, united.

The first mentioned party was to capture a guard and destroy a bridge, about five miles below fort Erie; the second party were to take, and render useless, the cannon of the enemy's batteries, and pieces of light artillery. The first party made some prisoners, but failed to destroy the bridge. The second party, after rendering unserviceable the light artillery, separated by some misapprehension. Lieutenant Angus, the seamen, and part of the troops returned, with all the boats, while captain King, captain Morgan, captain Sproul, Lieutenant Houston, and about sixty men, remained. Captain King, notwithstanding, with those under his command, advanced to the enemy's batteries, attacked and took two of them in succession, rendered unserviceable the cannon, and took a number of prisoners. In descending the Niagara some distance, two boats were found, on board of which captain King sent his prisoners, all his officers and half his men; his high sense of honour would not allow him to quit the remainder—he was captured with them.

Orders had been given, that all the troops in the neighbourhood should march at revellie to the place of embarkation. A part of the detachment sent in the night, having returned, and having excited apprehensions for the residue, about 250 men, under colonel Winder, put off in boats, for the opposite shore; a part of this force had landed, when a superior force, with a piece of artillery appeared:—a retreat was ordered, and colonel Winder's detachment suffered a loss of six killed, and 22 wounded; of whom three were officers. The general embarkation commenced as the troops arrived; but this being the first time the troops had embarked, the whole of the scows were occupied by about one-third part of the artillery; while about 800 regular infantry, something upwards of 200 twelve month's volunteers, and perhaps 200 of those militia who had volunteered their services for a few days, occupied all the boats that were ready. The troops then embarked, moved up the stream to Black Rock, without sustaining loss from the enemy's fire. It was now the afternoon, and they were ordered to disembark, and dine. The enemy showed a force, estimated at five or six hundred men, drawn up in a field, at some distance from the river; and had one piece of artillery, said to be a nine pounder, ready to fire on our troops.

There remained, unembarked, a part of the artillery; a few cavalry; the volunteers under colonel M'Clure, amounting, on that day, to 340 men; a detachment from general Tannehill's brigade, (number unknown, and little relied on;) there were al-

wards who might perhaps have followed the army, if it
 asful.

acting your instructions "to cross with 3,000 men at
 to consult some of my principal officers in "all im-
 rovements," I called for the field officers of the regular
 month's volunteers embarked; colonel Porter not
 at the moment, captain Gibson was called, as the
 officer of artillery. These questions were put:—
 edient now to cross over? Is the force we have, suffi-
 conquer the opposite coast?" The first question was
 the negative, by colonels Parker, Schuyler, Winder,
 colonels Boerstler and Coles, and major Campbell.
 wift, of the volunteers, *alone* gave an opinion for *them*
 ver. The second question was not decided: colonel
 onel Schuyler, lieutenant colonel Coles, and major
 were decidedly of opinion that the force was insuffi-
 onels Winder and Smith, lieutenant colonel Boerstler,
 in Gibson, deemed the force sufficient. I determined
 e crossing over, until more complete preparation would
 to embark the whole force *at once*, according to your
 is. The next day was spent in such preparations, and
 were ordered to be again at the place of embarkation,
 ck on the morning of the 30th November. On their
 y were sent into the adjacent woods, there to build
 remain until 3 o'clock in the morning of the 1st of
 , when it was intended to put off two hours before day-
 to avoid the fire of the enemy's cannon, in passing the
 hich it was believed they occupied below; to land above
 , assault that place, and, if successful, march through
 wn, to fort George. The contractor was called on
 rations for 2500 men, for four days; when it was
 could furnish the pork, but not the flour; sixty barrels
 aired, and only thirty furnished. The embarkation
 ed; but was delayed by circumstances, so as not to be
 l until after day-light, when it was found, the regular
 688 men, the artillery, 177 men, colonel Swift's volun-
 ut 230, six companies of federal volunteers, amounting
 n, about 100 militia, of colonel Dobbins's regiment, and
 n in a boat with Mr. P. B. Porter, contractor's agent,
 to pilot the enterprize, had embarked; the whole on
 hout the commissioned officers, being 1500 men; and it
 two hours later than the time fixed on for setting out.
 were some groups of men not yet embarked. They
 ied to, requested, and ordered, by the brigade major, to
 he boats; they did not. He estimated their number at
 as probably greater.

became a question, whether it was expedient to invade
 n open day-light, with 1500 men, at a point where no
 ment could be expected for some days. I saw the num-

ber of regular troops was declining rapidly. I knew that on them I was chiefly to depend.

I called together officers commanding corps of the regular army. Colonel Parker being sick, those present were colonel Porter, of the artillery, colonel Schuyler, colonel Winder, and lieutenant colonel Coles. I put to them this question:—"Shall we now proceed?" They *unanimously* decided that we ought not. I foresaw that the volunteers, who had come out for a few days, would disperse. Several of them had on the evening of the 25th broken their muskets, because they had not seen a battle; I foresaw that the number of regular troops would decrease; the measles had affected them generally; the constant use of fresh meat had produced dysenteries, and they were now in tents, in the month of December. I informed the officers, that the attempt to invade Canada would not be made, until the army was reinforced, and directed them to withdraw their troops, and cover them with huts immediately. The volunteers and neighboring people were dissatisfied, and it has been in the power of the contractor's agent to excite some clamor against the course pursued; he finds the contract a losing one, at this time, and would wish to see the army in Canada, that he might not be bound to supply it.

I am sorry that the situation of the force under my command, had not been such, as to make the propriety of a forward movement obvious to all. Circumstanced as we were, I have thought it my duty to follow the cautious counsels of experience, and not by precipitation, to add another to the list of our defeats.

You will perceive my motives by my letter of the 30th October, wherein I said "I would cross in three days, if I had the means; without them, it would be injustice to the nation and myself, to attempt it.—*I must not be defeated.*"

Allow me to recommend to your attention, and that of the Secretary of War, captain W. King of the 15th regiment infantry, as an officer of the first class. His dauntless bravery, refined mind, high sense of honour, and ambition to distinguish himself, render him a fit subject for promotion; and he is perhaps the best disciplinarian in the army. I have a wife and children; I have not seen them for fourteen months; I ask permission now to visit them.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

ALEXANDER SMYTH,

Brigadier General.

Major General Dearborn.

General Smyth to a committee of the patriotic citizens of the western counties of New York.

CAMP NEAR BUFFALOE, December 3d, 1812.

GENTLEMEN,

Your letter of December 2d is before me ; and I answer it in the following manner :

On the 26th October, I ordered that 20 scows should be prepared for the transportation of artillery and cavalry, and put the carpenters of the army upon that duty.

By the 26th of November, 10 scows were completed, and by bringing some boats from lake Ontario, above the falls of Niagara, the number was increased to seventy.

I had on the 26th of November, issued an address to the men of New York, and perhaps 300 had arrived at Buffaloe. I presumed that the regular troops, and the volunteers under colonels Swift and M'Clure, would furnish 2,300 men for duty ; and of general Tannehill's brigade (from Pennsylvania) reporting a total of 1,650, as many as 413 had volunteered to cross into Canada. My orders were to "cross with 3,000 men at once." I deemed myself ready to fulfil them.

Preparatory thereto, on the night of the 27th November, I sent over two parties, one under lieutenant colonel Boerstler, the other under captain King, with whom lieutenant Angus, of the navy, at the head of a body of seamen, united. The first was to capture a guard, and destroy a bridge about five miles below fort Erie ; the second were to take and render useless the cannon of the enemy's batteries, and some pieces of light artillery. The first party failed to destroy the bridge ; the second, after rendering unserviceable the light artillery, separated by some misapprehension. Lieutenant Angus, the seamen, and part of the troops, returned with all the boats ; while captain King, captain Morgan, captain Sproul, lieutenant Houston, and about sixty men remained. The party thus reduced, attacked, took, and rendered unserviceable two of the enemy's batteries, captured thirty-four prisoners, found two boats, in which captain King sent the prisoners and about half his party with the other officers ; he himself remaining with 30 men whom he would not abandon.

Orders had been given, that all the troops in the neighbourhood should march, at revellie, to the place of embarkation. A part of the detachment sent in the night having returned and excited apprehensions for the residue, about 250 men, under the command of colonel Winder, suddenly put off in boats for the opposite shore ; a part of this force had landed, when a force deemed superior, with one piece of artillery, was discovered ; a retreat was ordered ; and colonel Winder's detachment suffered a loss of six killed and nineteen wounded, besides some officers.

The general embarkation commenced as the troops arrived ; but this being a first embarkation, the whole of the scows were occu-

pied by about one third of the artillery, while about 800 regular infantry, about 200 twelve month's volunteers, under colonel Swift, and about 200 of the militia who had volunteered their services for a few days, occupied all the boats that were ready, the troops then embarked, moved up the stream to Black Rock without loss; they were ordered to disembark and dine.

I had received from my commanding general an instruction in the following words—"In all important movements you will, I presume, consider it advisable to consult some of your principal officers." I deemed this equivalent to an order; and the movement important. I called for the field officers of the regulars, and twelve month's volunteers embarked. Colonel Porter was not found at the moment. These questions were put—*Is it expedient NOW to cross over? Is the force we have sufficient to conquer the opposite coast?*

The first question was decided in the negative by colonel Parker, colonel Schuyler, colonel Winder, lieutenant colonel Boerstler, lieutenant colonel Coles, and major Campbell. Colonel Swift, of volunteers, *alone* gave an opinion for *then* crossing over.

The second question was not decided. Colonel Parker, colonel Schuyler, lieutenant colonel Coles, and major Campbell, were decidedly of opinion that the force was insufficient. Colonel Winder, colonel Swift, lieutenant colonel Boerstler, and captain Gibson, deemed the force sufficient.

I determined to postpone crossing over until more complete preparation would enable me to embark the whole force *at once*, the course prescribed by my orders. The next day was spent in such preparation, and the troops were ordered to be again at the place of embarkation at 8 o'clock in the morning of the 30th November. On their arrival they were sent into the adjacent woods, there to build fires, and remain until 3 o'clock in the morning of the 1st of December; when it was intended to put off two hours before day-light, so as to avoid the fire of the enemy's cannon in passing the position which it was believed they occupied below, to land above Chippeway, assault that place, and if successful, march through Queenstown for Fort George. For this expedition the contractor was called on to furnish rations for 2,500 men for four days, when it was found he could furnish the pork but not the flour; the deputy quarter master called for 60 barrels and got but 30.

The embarkation commenced, but was delayed by circumstances so as not to be completed until after day-light, when it was found the regular infantry, 688 men, the artillery, 177 men, Swift's volunteers estimated at 23, six companies of federal volunteers under captains Collins, Phillips, Allison, Moore, Mather and Marshall, amounting to 276 men, commanded by lieutenant colonel M'Clure, 100 men of colonel Dobbin's militia, and a few men in a boat with general P. B. Porter, had embarked, the whole on board amounting, exclusive of officers, to 1,466 men,

or thereabouts, and it was now two hours later than had been contemplated.

There were some groups of men not yet embarked; they were applied to, requested, and ordered by the brigade major to get into the boats; they did not. The number of these the brigade major estimated at about 150. It was probably greater.

It then became a question, whether it was expedient to invade Canada in open day-light, with 1,500 men, at a point where no reinforcements could be expected for some days. I saw that the number of regular troops was declining rapidly. I knew that on them chiefly I was to depend.

I called together the officers commanding corps of the regular army. Colonel Parker being sick, those present were, colonel Porter of the artillery, colonel Schuyler, colonel Winder, and lieutenant colonel Coles.

I put to them this question: *shall we proceed?* They unanimously decided that we ought not.

I foresaw that the volunteers, who had come out for a few days, would disperse—several of them had on the evening of the 28th, broke their muskets. I foresaw that the number of the regular troops would decrease; measles, and other diseases, being among them; and they were now in tents, in the month of December. I informed the officers that the attempt to invade Canada would not be made, until the army was reinforced; directed them to withdraw their troops, and cover them with huts immediately.

You say that on Saturday every obstruction was removed, and that a landing might have been effected "without the loss of a single man." This proves you unacquainted with the occurrences of the day. Colonel Winder, in retiring from the enemy's shore in the morning, lost a tenth part of his force, in killed and wounded. The enemy showed no more than 5 or 600 men, as estimated by colonel Parker, and one piece of artillery, supposed a 9 pounder. That force, we, no doubt, might have overcome, but not without loss; and that, from the great advantage the enemy would have had, might have been considerable.

To recapitulate.—My orders were to pass into Canada with 3000 men at once. On the first day of embarkation not more than 1,400 men were embarked, of whom 400, that is, half of the regular infantry, were exhausted with fatigue, and want of rest. On the second embarkation, only 1,500 men were embarked, and these were to have put off immediately, and to have descended the river to a point where reinforcements were not to be expected. On both days many of the regular troops were men in bad health, who could not have stood one day's march; who, although they were on the sick report, were turned out by their ardent officers.

The affair at Queenstown is a caution against relying on crowds, who go to the banks of Niagara, to look at a battle as on a theatrical exhibition; who, if they are disappointed at the sights,

break their muskets; or if they are without rations for a day desert.*

I have made you this frank disclosure, without admitting you authority to require it, under the impression that you are patriots and candid men; and that you will not censure me for following the cautious counsels of experience; nor join in the senseless clamor excited against me by an interested man.

I have some reason to believe that the cautious counsel given by the superior officers of my command, was good. From deserters, we learn that 2,314 rations are issued daily on the frontier on the British side. Captain King, prisoner at Fort George, writes to an officer thus—"tell our friends to take better care of themselves than it appears I have done."

I am, gentlemen, with great respect, yours, &c.

ALEXANDER SMYTH.

Brigadier General

To Messrs. George McClure, Lewis Birdsall, John Griffin, and William J. Rochester, a committee from the patriotic citizens of the western counties of New York.

P. S. It will be observed that the force *ready* could be no other wise ascertained than by an *actual* embarkation, it being uncertain what portion of the volunteer force would embark.

CAMP, ON MISSISSINIEWAY,
Two miles above Silver Heels, December 12th, 1811

DEAR GENERAL,

After a fatiguing march of three days and one night from Greenville, I arrived with the detachment under my command at a town on the Mississinewa, thought by the spies to be Silver Heel's town; but proved to be a town settled by a mixture of Delaware and Miami Indians.

About 8 o'clock on the morning of the 17th, a charge was made upon the town, when many fled over the river, others surrendered those who fled made resistance after crossing, by firing across the river. Thirty-seven prisoners are taken, whom I shall bring with me, including men, women and children; seven warriors were killed. After disposing of the prisoners, I marched a detachment down the river, and burned three villages without resistance. I then returned and encamped on the ground where stood the first village attacked.

This morning about day-light, or a little before, my camp was attacked by a party of Indians (the number unknown, but supposed to be between 2 and 300) on my right line, occupied by major

* Six hundred of general Tannehill's brigade deserted in twenty-four hours. A court martial of this brigade have fined a man twelve and one half cents for the crime of desertion!

Ball's squadron, who gallantly resisted them for about three quarters of an hour, when the Indians retreated, after being most gallantly charged by captain Trotter, at the head of his troop of cavalry. We lost in the first action, one killed and one wounded (by accident the last); in the action of this morning, we have eight killed and about thirty-five or forty wounded. Not having yet gotten a report, I am unable to state the number exactly. The Indians have lost about forty killed, from the discoveries now made; the spies are out at present ascertaining the number. I have sent to Greenville for a reinforcement, and send you this hasty sketch. A detailed report shall be hereafter made known to you, noticing particularly those companies and individuals who have distinguished themselves signally.

I anticipate another attack before I reach Greenville, but rest assured, my dear general, that they shall be warmly received. I have a detachment composed of the bravest fellows, both officers and soldiers, in the world. Our return will be commenced this morning. Among our killed, I have to deplore the loss of the brave captain Pierce. Lieutenant Waltz, of captain Markle's troop of cavalry, is also mortally wounded. Their gallant conduct shall be noticed hereafter.

Yours, with the greatest respect and esteem,

JOHN B. CAMPBELL,

Lt. Col. 19th Reg. U. S. Infantry.

General W. H. Harrison,
Commanding N. W. army.

GENERAL P. B. PORTER TO THE PUBLIC.

In the Gazette of last week, I promised to give an account of some of the most prominent transactions of the 28th of November and 1st of December. Having since that time, received from general Smyth, assurances, which, as a man of honor, I am bound to believe, that the course pursued by him on those days, was such as was required by his orders and instructions from the Secretary of War and general Dearborn, this communication will assume a character quite different from the one then contemplated. I am pledged, however, to the public, to give facts, which I shall proceed to do without comment; leaving it to time to develop the object of military movements which have appeared to me and others not only extraordinary, but inexplicable.

On the 27th of November there were collected at this point a military force of about 4,500 effective men; consisting of regular troops, New York, Pennsylvania, and Baltimore volunteers, all under the command of general Smyth. There were lying at the

Navy Yard near Black Rock, which had been previously prepared for the purpose of transporting the troops across the river—

70 public boats calculated to carry 40 men each	- - - - -	2800
5 long boats belonging to individuals, but which had been taken into the public service, calculated to carry 100 men each	- - - - -	500
10 scows for artillery, and 25 men each	- - - - -	250
		<hr/>
		3550
		<hr/>

besides a number of small boats.

At 2 o'clock on that day, I received a copy of general Smyth's order for the march of all the troops, the succeeding morning at reveille, to the Navy Yard, to embark for Canada. I immediately gave orders for the New York volunteers who had been placed under my command, to parade at 4 o'clock in the morning at their encampment about one and a half miles from the Navy Yard. In the evening, I learnt that the parties mentioned in general Smyth's despatch, were to cross the river at 11 o'clock at night, to attack the enemy's batteries opposite Black Rock. General Smyth not being here, I waited on lieutenant Angus, and suggested to him the propriety (if within the scope of his orders) of postponing the enterprize until nearly morning, to give as little time as possible, before the passage of the army, for the enemy's troops to collect from their stations down the river. They landed at three in the morning, under a severe fire of musketry and grape shot from two pieces of flying artillery. Lieutenant Angus, with our little band of sailors, assisted by captain Craig and a few of his party, attacked the principal force of the enemy, consisting of about 100, at the Red House (the seamen charging with their pikes and swords, against muskets and bayonets) and routed them in all directions. Captain Dox, who took a distinguished part in this affair, was severely wounded. After a hard and destructive engagement, the enemy was completely dispersed, the two field pieces spiked, and the house in which the enemy quartered, fired. The seamen returned to our shore, bringing off their wounded and several prisoners. Out of 12 naval officers who embarked in this enterprize, nine of them, with more than half their men, were killed or wounded. If bravery be a virtue, if the gratitude of a country be due to those who gallantly and desperately asserted its rights, the government will make ample and honourable provision for the heirs of those brave tars who fell on this occasion, as well as for those who survived. Captain King proceeded to spike and dismount the guns in the batteries. Lieutenant colonel Boerstler dispersed the enemy lower down the river, taking a number of prisoners.

By sun-rise in the morning, most of the troops had arrived at the place of embarkation, and the day was fine. I marched 300 of the volunteers who had rallied under general Smyth's invitation, well armed and provided, and in high spirits; about 150 more, who came in the evening before, were at Buffaloe drawing their arms and ammunition, with orders to join us as soon as possible. I

stationed my men as instructed by general Smyth, in a field at the Navy Yard, with directions to wait for further orders. The parties who had crossed in the night, aided by our batteries, which at daylight opened a powerful and well directed fire, and a piece of light artillery on the island, under charge of captain Gibson, had driven every thing from the opposite shore. Colonel Winder, an officer of great intelligence, zeal and bravery, under the mistaken apprehension that the party under lieutenant colonel Boerstler were in danger of being cut off, made an unsuccessful attempt (though his own boat landed) to land 250 men at a difficult point down the river, and had returned as stated by general Smyth. The general embarkation now commenced, but it went on so tardily, that at 12 o'clock, the whole of the regular troops, and colonel Swift's regiment, were not in boats. A considerable number of boats were lying on the shores of the river and creek, having been thrown up by the high water of the preceding day. Several were in the creek half filled with water and ice. I called on general Smyth and proposed to occupy part of these boats with my volunteers, many of whom were impatient to embark. Being, however, at this moment informed by colonel Porter, that the boats which had been used by colonel Winder were lying about a mile below, major Chapin and myself, with about 30 men, went down the shore, brought up five boats, filled them with men, and arrived at Black Rock, the point at which it was proposed to put off, as soon as any of the regular troops. About 2 o'clock, all the troops, which it appeared were intended to be crossed at first, collected in a group of boats at Black Rock under the cover of our batteries. I have seen no official account of the number of men in the boats. My opinion was that the number exceeded 2,000. Most men of observation who were present, estimated it at 2,600; the men were in fine spirits, and desirous of crossing.

General Tannehill's volunteers, colonel F. M'Clure's regiment, some riflemen, cavalry, &c. amounting to about 2,000, were still paraded on the shore, and, as I am informed, were ready to cross. Several boats of sufficient capacity to carry about 1000 men, were still lying at the Navy Yard unoccupied. I have not been able to learn that any order or request was made for the embarkation of the troops, other than the regulars, of colonel Swift's regiment. The enemy, estimated at about 500, were drawn up in a line about half a mile from the river.

After remaining in the boats till late in the afternoon, an order was received to disembark. It produced among the officers and men generally great discontent and murmuring, which was, however, in some degree allayed by assurances that the expedition was only postponed for a short time, until our boats could be better prepared.

On Sunday another order was issued by general Smyth, for the march of the troops to the Navy Yard, to embark at 9 o'clock on Monday morning. I was at Buffalo when it was received, and found that it was generally, as to time and manner, disapproved

by the officers of the volunteers. I saw general Smyth in the evening at Black Rock, with colonel Winder, and stated my objections to his plan. The enemy had remounted his guns on the batteries so as to render it inexpedient to cross at the favorable point which had been taken on Saturday, above the island that covers the Navy Yard. Immediately below the island, the enemy lay in force much augmented in consequence of the affair of Saturday, occupying a line of shore of about a mile, where the current is rapid, and the banks abrupt. I did not believe it possible to effect a landing with raw troops, in any tolerable order, if at all, in the face of the flying artillery and infantry, which a full view of our movement in the day time would enable them to oppose us. I proposed to postpone the expedition till night—to march and embark the troops silently—to put off about an hour and a half before day-light, so as to pass this dangerous line of shore in the dark, when we should suffer less from their fire, and to land about five miles below the Navy Yard, where the stream and the banks of the river were peculiarly favourable to a safe and orderly landing. Colonel Winder seconded with great earnestness and force, and it was adopted. The army was to embark at 3 o'clock on Tuesday morning, and to proceed at half past 4, according to the order of a line of battle submitted a few days before by general Smyth; the regulars on the right, or in the front boat; general Tannehill's troops in the centre, and the New York volunteers on the left. I was to go in the front boat with a chosen set of men, direct the landing, and join the New York volunteers on their arrival.

On Monday evening, seven boats for colonel Swift's regiment and eight for the late volunteers, were brought some distance up the river, and left at different points, to avoid the noise and confusion of embarking the whole army at one place. At half past 3 on Tuesday morning, the eight boats were filled with volunteers (a corps of which has, on every occasion while on the lines, shown great exactness of discipline, promptitude and zeal for the service, had embarked, and the residue were embarking. Not a man of the regular infantry was in the boats for about half an hour, when colonel Winder's regiment entered their boats with great order and silence.

About three quarters of an hour after this, the remaining regulars commenced the embarkation, when I dropped down to the front of the line, with a flag in my boat, to designate it as the leading boat. I was accompanied by majors Cyrenius Chapin and John W. Macomb, captain Mills, of the cavalry, adjutant Chase, and quarter master Chapin, two pilots and about 25 volunteers of Buffaloe, under lieutenant Haynes.

I mention the names of these gentlemen, because they had before decidedly objected to passing at the proposed point by day light; but when day appeared, and one of the men raised some difficulty on that account, he was induced to remain, and it was unanimously agreed to incur the additional hazard, and patiently

wait the order of the general to put off. At day-light we discovered the troops disembarking, and were informed that the invasion of Canada had been abandoned for this season, and that the troops were ordered to winter quarters. A scene of confusion ensued, which it is difficult to describe—about 4000 men, without order or restraint, discharging their muskets in every direction.

About 1000 volunteers came in under general Smyth's proclamation, but owing to the state of the roads, which was bad beyond example, many did not arrive until after the 1st of December.

It is impossible for me to form any estimate of the number of troops embarked at any time this morning; it was yet scarcely light, and I was at one end of a line of boats occupying a distance of half a mile. When the volunteers first arrived at the navy yard, and it was found that the regular troops had not yet appeared, their officers were instructed to permit them to land and keep themselves warm by exercise, as the boats were covered with snow which had fallen during the night; but they were instructed not to leave the side of the boats, that they might immediately re-enter.

PETER B. PORTER.

Black Rock, December 14, 1812.

HEAD QUARTERS, FRANKLINTON,
January 3d, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honour to enclose you, herewith, the official report of lieutenant colonel Campbell, of his expedition against the Mississineway towns, of the 25th ultimo, and 1st instant. I am entirely satisfied with the colonel's conduct, and beg leave to recommend him, major Ball, and the rest of the officers and soldiers of the detachment, who were fortunate enough to have an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, to the notice of the president. I will venture to predict that colonel Campbell's future career will support the character he has obtained in the commencement of his military service. Major Ball, my friend and associate in general Wayne's army, would do honour to any service. Lieutenant colonel Simral deserves great credit for the excellent discipline of his regiment, which perhaps equals that of any other regiment of light dragoons on the continent. The character of major M'Dowell has long been established in Kentucky for intrepidity. At an age when most men retire to the enjoyment of ease, this hardy veteran solicits every post of difficulty, fatigue and danger, with the ardour of a youthful warrior. The conduct of the other officers is so particularly described by colonel Campbell, that it is unnecessary for me to repeat them. Knowing each individual, I heartily accord in the sentiments he has expressed of their merits. There is, however, a circumstance which colonel Campbell has neglected to mention, that is so honourable to a young

hero, now no more, as well as to the army, that I cannot pass it over. Major M'Dowell, captain Trotter, and captain Hite, have all informed me that lieutenant Waltz, of captain Markle's troop of volunteer dragoons, like the gallant Spencer, could not be brought to leave his post, after having received two wounds, one of which shattered his arm. In this situation he was moving his horse to make a charge when a ball passed through his head. In short, sir, the whole detachment have redeemed a solemn pledge given to me at the moment of their departure, that they would obey their officers and support the character of American soldiers.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

Honourable James Monroe,
acting Secretary of War.

(INCLOSURE.)

FORT GREENVILLE, December 25th, 1812.

I left this place on my march out, on the 14th, with 600 rank and file, which number was reduced on my march by the return of some who became sick. My first order of march was in five columns, colonel Simral's regiment in two on the left, the infantry in one on the centre, and major Ball's squadron in two on the right. There were also strong front, rear, and flank guards, who marched at a distance from the columns of from two to four hundred yards, as the ground would permit.

From the flank guards I ordered small parties occasionally to examine the country to the right and left, and report to me whether they had made any discoveries. My encampments were in a square form, covering ground sufficient to embrace the horses within the first line of fires, without being crowded. I had a second line of fires made around the camp at the distance of sixty yards, outside of which, and opposite to each angle of the camp, a redoubt was constructed, in which the guards were placed. The want of axes prevented me from making the outer fires and constructing the redoubts as well as I wished. I had one-third of the men on guard every night, and formed a chain of sentinels around the camp so close that the enemy could not possibly penetrate without being discovered. At day-light each morning I sent out parties to patrol it at a considerable distance from camp. I found it necessary in a day or two to vary my order of march, and directed the infantry and riflemen to march in two columns, one on each side of the road. The pack horses and baggage, as also the detachment staff, in the road between them. Major Ball's squadron in four columns, on the right, and colonel Simral's regiment in four on the left. The flank columns served as guards.

this way I found I marched with more ease. I then dispensed with the taps of the drum and sound of the trumpet, which in my first order of march was necessary. I further ordered that if an attack was made on the march and in front, the troops would immediately form in order of battle by filing up on the left and passing by the front of columns; if on either flank, the flank column would face outwards and make resistance until reinforced; in the rear, the rear guard would face to the right-about and make resistance, whilst the other columns would file up, and wheeling to the right-about, form in succession on the left in line, the officers leading columns taking especial care to march at sufficient distances from each other, to form in line in open order, passing by the centre. If the attack was made in camp, the troops would immediately form in the rear of their fires, which could be extinguished as soon as possible, by throwing it out in front. I ordered the guards, if attacked, to stand their ground as long as possible, and then retreat through the angle of the camp nearest them, then form, defend the angle if attacked, if not, to wait for orders. These formed my disposable force. The weather, though cold, and the snow deep, was however well calculated to favor our enterprize, and I determined to make forced marches to avoid if possible a discovery. On the march I occasionally formed in order of battle to accustom the troops to it. They formed with the utmost celerity and in good order. The first two days I marched forty miles—the third day I pushed the troops as much as they could bear, marched the whole night, although excessively cold, stopping twice to refresh and warm. This day and night we marched forty miles. Early in the morning of the 17th, I reached, undiscovered, an Indian town on the Mississineway, inhabited by a mixture of Delawares and Mianies. The troops rushed into the town—killed eight warriors and took forty-two prisoners, eight of whom are warriors, the residue women and children. I ordered the town to be immediately burnt, a house or two excepted, in which I confined the prisoners; and I ordered the cattle and other stock to be shot. I then left the infantry to guard the prisoners, and with Simral's and Ball's dragoons, advanced to some Miami villages, a few miles lower down the Mississineway, but found them evacuated by all but a sick squaw, whom we left in her house. I burnt on this excursion three considerable villages, took several horses, and killed a great many cattle, and returned to the town I first burnt, where I had left the prisoners and encamped. My camp was in the usual form, but covered more ground than common. The infantry and riflemen were on the front line, captain Elliott's company on the right, Buttler's in the centre, and Alexander's on the left. Major Ball's squadron occupied the right and one half of the rear line, colonel Simral's regiment the left and other half of the rear line. Between Ball's right and Simral's left, there was an interval which had not been filled up, owing to the unusual extent of ground the camp embraced it having been

laid off in my absence to the lower towns. I now began to deliberate on our future movements, whether to go on further encumbered with prisoners, the men much fatigued, and a great many severely frost bitten, horses suffering from the want of forage, which was very partially relieved by the scanty supplies of corn obtained in the towns, or return. I determined to convene the field officers and captains of the detachment to consult, and then to take such a course as my own judgment might approve. At four in the morning of the 8th, I ordered to be beaten the revellie, and the officers convened at my fire a short time afterwards. Whilst we were in council, and about half an hour before day, my camp was most furiously attacked by a large party of Indians, preceded by, and accompanied with, a most hideous yell. This immediately broke up the council, and every man ran to his post. The attack commenced upon that angle of the camp formed by the left of captain Hopkin's troop and the right of captain Garrard, but in a few seconds became general from the extremes of the right to the left of Ball's squadron. The enemy boldly advanced to within a few yards of the lines and seemed determined to rush in. The guards posted at the different redoubts returned into camp and dispersed among their several companies, this leaving me without a disposable force. Captain Smith, of the Kentucky light dragoons, who commanded at one of the redoubts, in a handsome and military manner, kept his position until ordered in to fill up the interval in the rear line between the regiment and squadron. The redoubt at which captain Pierce commanded, was first attacked. The captain maintained his position until it was too late to get within the lines. He received two balls through his body and was tomahawked. He died bravely, and much lamented. The enemy then took possession of captain Pierce's redoubt, and poured in a tremendous fire upon the angle, to the right and left of which were posted, Hopkins' and Garrard's troops. But the fire was as warily returned; not an inch of ground was yielded. Every man, officer, and soldier, stood firm, and animated and encouraged each other. The enemy's fire became warm on the left of the squadron at which captain Markle's troop was posted, and the right of Elliott's company, which, with Markle's, formed an angle of the camp, was severely annoyed by the enemy's fire. I had assisted in forming the infantry, composed of Elliott's company of the 19th United States' regiment, Buttler's Pittsburgh blues, and Alexander's Pennsylvania riflemen, and ordered them to advance to the brink of a declivity from which they could effectually defend themselves and harrass the enemy, if they should attempt an attack on that line. This however they thought proper to omit. Whilst I was thus engaged, Major Ball rode up to me and observed, he was hard pushed and must be relieved. I galloped immediately to the left wing with an intention of ordering captain Trotter's troop to reinforce the squadron, but was there informed that the enemy were seen approaching in that direction, and believing it improper on second thoughts to

ch so large a troop from the line, which also covered an angle
 ie camp. I determined to give the relief from the infantry.
 eeled my horse and met major M'Dowell, who observed that
 pies and guides under the command of captain Paterson
 , consisting of ten men, were unemployed. We rode there
 her, and ordered captain Bain to the support of the squadron.
 n of them, to wit: James Audrain, William Conner, Silas
 allough, James Thompson, James Naggs, John Ruland, and
 h G. McClelland, followed their brave leader and rendered
 effectual assistance. I then ordered captain Buttler with
 Pittsburg blues to repair immediately to reinforce the squa-
 and directed captains Elliott and Alexander to extend to the
 and left, and fill the interval occasioned by the withdrawal
 e blues. Captain Buttler, in a most gallant manner and
 y worthy of the name he bears, formed his men immediately
 cellent order, and marched them to the point to which he was
 ed. The alacrity with which they formed and moved was
 excelled by any troops on earth. Hopkins made room for
 by extending his troop to the right. The blues were scarce-
 the post assigned them, before I discovered the effects
 produced. A well directed fire from them and Hopkins's
 ons nearly silenced the enemy in that quarter. They moved
 ce to the left of the squadron, and right of the infantry at
 captains Markles and Elliott's companies were posted.
 again they were warmly received. Lieutenant Guynne and
 n Batteal Harrison boldly stood their ground, and fired
 rely on the enemy. Those two young officers in a particular
 er signalized themselves and shed a lustre on the 19th.
 in Elliott and lieutenant Campbell were on the left of the
 any and were not engaged. Serjeant Levitt, quarter master
 unt to the 19th United States' regiment, deserves particular
 e for his bravery. At this time day-light began to dawn.
 n ordered captain Trotter, whose troop had been ordered by
 el Simral to mount for the purpose, to make a charge. The
 in cried out to his men to follow him, and they tilted off at
 allop. Captain Trotter's first lieutenant with eighteen of
 nen were on guard. Lieutenant Trotter, cornet Dishman,
 he residue of the troop, together with lieutenant Hobson and
 nen of Elinore's troop, doctor Moore and a few other gentle-
 including Mr. Thomas Moore, my private secretary, ad-
 d gallantly, and charged a numerous body of the enemy.
 r M'Dowell, with a small party, rushed into the midst of the
 y and exposed himself very much. I cannot say too much
 is gallant veteran. Captain Markle, with about fifteen of his
 , and lieutenant Warrens, also made a daring charge upon
 emy. Captain Markle avenged the death of his relation,
 nant Waltz, upon an Indian with his own sword. Captain
 er and his troop, captain Markle and his little band, per-
 d a most dangerous duty in the bravest manner. Captain

Trotter mentions to me as worthy of particular notice, Robert Mitchell, a wagoner who had volunteered for the expedition. Christian Willman, trumpeter to colonel Simral's regiment, who blew two charges and hewed down an Indian with his sword. William Montgomery, serjeant major to the regiment of Kentucky light dragoons, was in the charge and distinguished himself, as well as in the skirmish the day before. In this charge, captain Trotter was wounded slightly, corporal Riddle shot through the body, David Stule wounded in the thigh slightly, and the brave Piatt received his mortal wound, being shot through the body and hand. Fearing that captain Trotter might be too hard pressed, I ordered captain Johnson, of the Kentucky light dragoons, to advance with his troop to support him. I found Johnson ready; and colonel Simral reports to me that all his other captains, to wit: Elmore, Young and Smith, were anxious to join in the charge. But I called for only one troop. The colonel had the whole in excellent order. Captain Johnson did not join Trotter until the enemy was out of reach. He however picked up a straggler or two that Trotter had passed over. The cavalry returned and informed me the enemy had fled precipitately. I have on this occasion to lament the loss of several brave men, and a great many wounded; among the former, are captain Pierce of the Ohio volunteers, and lieutenant Waltz, of Markle's troop. From the enclosed list you will see the names and numbers of the killed and wounded. Eight being killed and forty-eight wounded, two of whom are since dead. The enemy paid dearly for their temerity. From the trails through the snow, and those found dead, we could not have killed less than thirty, which with those killed the day before, amounts to thirty-eight. The enemy did not take a scalp. The Indian who killed captain Pierce, attempted to scalp him, but was killed. Major Ball informs me that he can say with confidence, that there never were officers and soldiers who displayed more cool, firm, and soldierly conduct, than those of his squadron.

The zeal, activity and courage displayed by captain Hopkins and his officers, (captain M'Clelland and cornet Herod, of the Pennsylvania volunteers, having been attached to him) did not fail to arrest his attention, and met his fullest approbation. Lieutenant Hedges received a slight wound on the nose. Captain Garrard's troop sustained the action at that point where it raged with greater violence for some time after its commencement, than at any other (except upon the left) with the firmness of veterans; while the officers were unceasingly employed in stimulating and encouraging their men. Lieutenant Basey and Hickman were both wounded early, but performed their duty in the line to the close of the action. Cornet M'Clanahan, quarter master to the detachment, was equally active in the line with the other officers of the troop. Quarter master serjeant Strother J. Hawkins, who had no other fire arms, loaded and fired his pistol several times at

The enemy, and many others, similarly situated, used their pistols as fast as they could load them.

Young Mr. Baylor placed himself a little in front of the line and fought bravely during the action. Lieutenant Warren's and cornet Lee's detachments behaved with great firmness and used their pistols and carabines to the best advantage. Cornet Grear (of Warren's) was wounded in the arm, but remained some time afterwards in the line. Captain Markle's troop, as I have before stated, was situated upon the left of the squadron and most sorely galled. Lieutenant Waltz fell most gallantly. There never were men who sustained so heavy an action with more firmness; but one sentiment pervaded the whole, and victory or death was most obstinately determined upon. Colonel Simral's regiment, although not engaged, with the exception of Trotter's troop, were all ready and panting to engage. The colonel deserves the highest applause for his excellent disposition during the action, and for his cool, firm, and deliberate conduct. To major Ball the greatest praise is due for his bravery and activity during the action. No man could have done more. He informs he was greatly aided throughout the progress of the action by the exertions of lieutenant and adjutant Fullerton, and serjeant major Edwards. I must now mention in the highest terms of approbation, lieutenant Payne, of the Kentucky light dragoons, who acted as my adjutant on the expedition, for his great activity, attention to duty, and gallantry during the action. He rendered the most essential services. My extra adjutant, captain Hite, was very active and as brave as a lion. I always found him ready for any service I had for him to perform. Captain ——— of the Ohio volunteers, marched with me from this place as a private in the ranks, and in the action killed an Indian. He deserves my particular notice. Captain Alexander, with his riflemen, were on the left of the front line, and not engaged, but were all ready if an opportunity had offered. Beverly Brown and Thomas Bedford, of captain Garrard's troop, and Francis Lousong, of the blues, were killed fighting bravely in exposed situations. I have now, my dear sir, detailed to you the particulars of an engagement bravely fought, and victory gloriously won, after contending most warmly for at least an hour. From the length of our line simultaneously attacked by them, I am persuaded there could not have been less than 300 of the enemy. They fought most bravely. My strength on the morning of the action was about 590 rank and file, a considerable proportion of whom, amounting to at least forty or fifty, were almost rendered unfit for duty by the severity of the weather. Some were so badly frost-bitten as to be scarcely able to walk. There never was severer service performed by any troops, and yet there is not a murmur. Reports made to me yesterday morning informs of 303, who are so severely frost-bitten as to be entirely unfit for duty. On my march back I was compelled to move slowly on account of the wounded, 17 of whom we had to

carry on litters. I kept the troops always ready to meet an attack which I daily and nightly expected, until I reached this place. I fortified my camp every night by a breast work, which kept us very busily engaged. The scarcity of axes was now most sensibly felt. I have informed you how I advanced into the enemy's country. My return was much in the same manner. I determined to be always ready, to avoid surprises and falling into ambuscades. I assure you the responsibility attached to this command I most seriously felt. Being young in service and inexperienced I felt great diffidence in accepting this command. I however hope my conduct will meet your approbation. I shall hasten to join you, but it will take the troops some time to recruit and heal. Some will lose their toes; others' feet are so swollen as not to be able to put on their shoes. The night march was most severe upon them.

I met major Adams with 95 men on my return, about forty miles from this place, with a supply of provisions. This came most seasonably. Some companies were entirely without. Hopkins's had eat nothing for three days. That night I should have ordered a horse to be killed. The greatest praise is due major Adams for his promptitude in relieving us. My express arrived here on Saturday evening, and he started on Sunday morning. The next day I met colonel Holt, from Dayton, with additional supplies. Through the whole of this expedition we were certainly favoured by Divine Providence. The weather, though severe, was favourable to the enterprize. The snow enabled us to ascertain whether we were discovered. The moon gave light all the night, and on our return the water courses were blocked up by ice; there was not a drop of rain. Such a concatenation of favourable circumstances rarely happens. The Indian prisoners I will send off to-morrow to Piqua to the care of Mr. Johnson, escorted by an officer and 20 troops from this place. The few lines I wrote you from the battle ground I find in some particulars to be incorrect, not having at that time full reports of the wounded. My prisoners are also more than I then represented. I think, sir, that you may assure the government that the battle of Mississineway was not badly fought, and that the enemy suffered severely. That the troops deserve well of their country, and their losses ought to be compensated. The number of horses killed were considerable, and I have no doubt they saved the lives of a great many men. I hope to overtake you before Malden falls.

I have learned since my return that general Hopkins had returned to Vincennes after burning some Indian villages, and driving them, supposed to be 500 in number, up the Wabash. This still made my situation more perilous, and I shall not be surprised to learn that Tecumseh commanded in the action against me. Let him be who he may he was a gallant fellow, and manouevred well. Conner thinks it was Little Thunder (nephew to the Little Turtle) from his loud voice, which he knew. He heard him

ordering his men in the Miami language to rush on, that they would soon retreat. I think, sir, the Kentucky cavalry will scarcely be in a situation to render you much more service. Their losses in horses are considerable, and one hundred and thirty-eight frostbitten severely. They are fine fellows with a few exceptions, and as brave as any men in the world. Captain Prince is here very sick, and was unable to get on with us; this was to me a great loss.

I am, sir, very respectfully, &c.

JOHN B. CAMPBELL,

Lieut. Col. 19th U. S. regiment.

HIS Excellency
Gen. William Henry Harrison,
Commander in chief N. W. army.

In the battle of the 18th, and skirmish of the 17th, were killed 10,—
wounded 48.

(INCLOSURE.)

DAYTON, January 1st, 1813.

MY DEAR SIR,

In my report to you of the 25th ultimo, from fort Greenville, I omitted to notice some circumstances and individuals, inadvertently, which and who are as highly worthy of notice, as most of those I have already detailed. I must, therefore, in the most special manner, mention Mr. James Bradshaw, captain Lewis Hite, and Mr. Silas McCullough, who tendered their services to me on the battle ground, to carry intelligence to Greenville of our situation, and request a reinforcement of men, and a supply of provisions. This dangerous and fatiguing service they performed in the most prompt and expeditious manner. In twenty-two hours they travelled upwards of eighty miles without resting, except a few minutes, twice to feed their horses, and reached Greenville worn down with fatigue. At Greenville, in assisting to forward supplies, their conduct merits the highest praise. I must also mention by name, Lieutenants Magee and Irvin, of the Pittsburg blues, whose cool deliberate bravery was observed amidst the hottest fire of the enemy, and I regret extremely that those young gentlemen who highly merited distinction, should have been pretermitted in my first report.

I made a mistake in stating that captain ——— was abandoned by half his guard; only one or two went in for part of their arms, whilst the rest remained with their companions, and upon enquiry, were found to have behaved well. Captain Smith was aided in his excellent disposition at the redoubt he commanded, by lieutenants Adams and Fishel, whose names and bravery are synonymous terms. Adjutant Guy and quarter master Hite, of the Kentucky light

dragoons, are two fine young men, and were actually employed on the morning of the battle.

I am, sir, with great respect, yours, &c.

JOHN B. CAMPBELL,

Lieut. Col. 19th U. S. regiment.

His excellency Gen. Harrison.

UNITED STATES' FRIGATE CONSTITUTION,

St. Salvador, January 3d, 1812.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you, that on the 29th ultimo, at 2 P. M. in south latitude 13,06, and west longitude 38, 10 leagues distance from the coast of Brazils, I fell in with and captured his Britannic majesty's frigate Java, of 49 guns, and upwards of 400 men, commanded by captain Lambert, a very distinguished officer. The action lasted one hour and fifty-five minutes, in which time the enemy was completely dismasted, not having a spar of any kind standing. The loss on board the Constitution, was nine killed and 25 wounded, as per enclosed list. The enemy had 60 killed and 101 wounded, certainly, (among the latter—captain Lambert, mortally) but by the enclosed letter, written on board the ship, (by one of the officers of the Java) and accidentally found, it is evident that the enemy's wounded must have been much greater than as above stated, and who must have died of their wounds previously to their being removed. The letter states 60 killed and 170 wounded.

For further details of the action, I beg leave to refer you to the enclosed extracts from my journal. The Java had in addition to her own crew upwards of one hundred supernumerary officers and seamen, to join the British ships of war in the East Indies; also, lieutenant general Hislop, appointed to the command of Bombay, major Walker and captain Wood, of his staff, and captain Marshall, master and commander in the British navy, going to the East Indies to take command of a sloop of war there.

Should I attempt to do justice, by representation, to the brave and good conduct of all my officers and crew, during the action, I should fail in the attempt; therefore, suffice it to say, that the whole of their conduct was such as to merit my highest encomiums. I beg leave to recommend the officers particularly to the notice of government, as also the unfortunate seamen who were wounded, and the families of those men who fell in the action.

The great distance from our own coast, and the perfect wreck we made the enemy's frigate, forbid every idea of attempting to take her to the United States; and not considering it prudent to trust her into a port of Brazils, particularly St. Salvador, as you will perceive by the enclosed letters, No. 1, 2 and 3, I had no alternative but burning her, which I did on the 31st ultimo, after

receiving all the prisoners and their baggage, which was very tedious work, only having one boat left (out of eight) and not one left on board the Java.

On blowing up the frigate Java, I proceeded to this place, where I have landed all the prisoners on their parole, to return to England, and there remain until regularly exchanged, and not serve in their professional capacities in any place or in any manner whatever, against the United States of America, until the exchange shall be effected.

I have the honour to be, &c.

W. BAINBRIDGE.

The Secretary of the Navy.

ALBANY, January 5th, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

I deem it a duty I owe to you and to myself, to state in detail the conduct of my command in the expedition against Queenstown, Upper Canada, on the 13th of October last, which now readily embrace, having been informed last evening that I was exchanged.

I arrived at the old encampment, Lewistown, on the morning of the 13th of October, between 4 and 5 o'clock from Fort Niagara, with—

Captains Machesny and Nelson,	}	6th reg. Infantry.
Lieutenants Wendell and Buck,		

Captain Morris, Lieutenants Turner and Phelps, 13th do.

Lieutenants Clark, McCarty and Whiting, 23d do.

Lieutenant Bayly, of the 3d regiment United States' artillery, acting adjutant, and 250 non-commissioned officers and privates, all in high spirits and anxious for the field. I reported and received orders to repair to the old French ferry, and was there informed that there were no boats. Lieutenant colonels Fenwick and Christie had a short conversation at the ferry, and I was ordered by the former to "countermarch my men." At this time, firing commenced at Queenstown, and a cry of help! help! reinforcement! reinforcement! was heard from our advanced party. I was at this moment informed that there were a few boats, but neither boatmen or pilots. I immediately repaired to the river, and in marching towards the shore, one of my best officers, captain Nelson, received a musket ball, at the head of his company, in the abdomen, which caused his death. The enemy directed an incessant and heavy fire of grape and canister from their batteries, and a steady stream of fire from their muskets towards the ferry, to prevent our embarkation; notwithstanding, I persisted, followed by my brave men, under the most discouraging auspices. Three boats were immediately filled; colonel Fenwick gallantly embarked in the third boat. On finding the enemy's fire extremely galling, I commenced

a brisk fire from my boat in order to divest my men from the fire of the enemy, which had an excellent effect, and our dropping down the river, by the rapidity of the current, was taken for a manoeuvre to effect a landing below the town, for the purpose of storming the north battery and of attacking the enemy from the rear. At this moment, the enemy then engaged with the storming party, broke in disorder, when general Brock, endeavouring to rally them, was killed, and his aid mortally wounded. In the retreat of the enemy, lieutenant colonel Fenwick and all in his boat* were made prisoners, also lieutenant Clarke, and about forty men. I must inevitably have shared the same fate, did I not hazard re-crossing under all their fire, and which I effected without losing a man. I seized the boat that drifted from colonel Fenwick's party, put some of my wounded into it with five volunteers, who declared, desperate as the alternative was, they should not surrender—four of whom were my own men, and the fifth a doctor Lawson, of Philadelphia, a truly brave man, met accidentally on the shore. By this time, captain Machesny, gaining experience by my misfortune, effected a landing higher up the river and ascended the heights of Queens-town in time to secure the victory obtained by the valour of the storming party. On my arrival at Lewistown, I ordered a sergeant to collect such of the detachment as did not previously cross. I repaired to fort Gray and informed lieutenant Rees, of the 3d artillery, who commanded there, that his shot was lost for want of elevation. I returned and re-crossed with 25 men. On my arrival at the first battery, I was informed that a number of my men were still at Lewistown. I crossed again in search of an officer to collect them, found one, gave him necessary orders, and had the honour of accompanying you, sir, being the fifth time I passed over that river that day. I then took a command in the engagement against the Indians and militia, whom we drove into the woods, a service which was repeated preparatory to the arrival of the British reinforcement. Our men were paraded; lieutenant colonel Christie had sixty in his division, and I had sixty-five in mine, with 117 militia, officers included; we had captain Gibson and one piece of ordnance with nine rounds for it. This was our whole force, and commanded by colonel Scott; when the enemy very cautiously approached us with upwards of 2000 men and a train of artillery.

I shall ever look back with pleasure to the firmness and patriotic devotion exhibited at that moment by our little force; near half my men were in coloured clothes—mere recruits, yet their conduct would do honour to veterans, and from that day I date the superior excellence of our military materials. Satisfied that you are already acquainted with the remainder of that day's transactions at Queenstown, I will only state that my detach-

* The boat in which I embarked had the bow shot away in crossing, and was nearly full of water as we got on shore.

at braved every thing: that lieutenant Bayly merited honour-notice; he accompanied me in the boat and humanely stayed by wounded officer (lieutenant Sweeny, of captain Doxe's volunteers) on the Canada shore, and was made a prisoner early. To captain Chesny, of the 6th regiment infantry, lieutenants Clarke and Marty of the 23d, lieutenants Turner* and Phelps, of the 13th, I am grateful for their valuable support. Captain Morris having reached early to Lewistown with some prisoners, was engaged with the remainder of the day, and lieutenants Wendell and Smith were left to collect such of the detachment as were missing and in charge of public stores. I cannot, in justice to this brave detachment, close this communication without expressing astonishment at the omission of its arduous duties in your official detail of that day: although indifferent as to myself (satisfied that I will yet have justice done when the scenes of that engagement are better known) many of my officers merited a full measure of public notice, and from my knowledge of you, sir, to the want of correct information alone, I ascribe the omission.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

J. R. MULLANY,
Major 23d regt. Infantry.

To Major general
Stephen Van Rensselaer, Albany.

ALBANY, January 23d, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

I sincerely regret that you and the officers under your immediate command have not been represented to the commander in chief, which, from the statement you have made, their gallantry merits.

It certainly was my desire that ample justice should have been done to every individual under my command, and more especially to myself, for whom I entertain the highest respect as a military man.

The want of correct information, owing to your having been made a prisoner, and lieutenant colonel Fenwick dangerously wounded, induced me, before I left the army, to request brigadier general Smyth to mention to general Dearborn such officers as had been omitted by me in my official despatch, in a manner their conduct deserved. This duty, I presume, has been performed.

With great respect, &c.

S. VAN RENSSELAER.

Major Mullany.

* Lieutenant Turner was made a prisoner early, and was afterwards released.

HEAD QUARTERS, PORTAGE RIVER,
15 miles from Miami Rapids, January 24th, 1813.

SIR,

It is with the deepest regret that I have to inform you, that the detachment under general Winchester has been entirely destroyed by an Indian and British force, on the morning of the 22d instant, at the river Raisin. About 12 o'clock on that day I was informed at the Rapids, by a messenger from an officer who was marching to reinforce general Winchester, that the general had been attacked that morning, and that the Frenchman who brought this intelligence, supposed that our troops were retreating. I had then with me a regiment of Ohio militia, about three hundred and fifty strong. Two detachments were on the way to join general Winchester, but had taken different roads. One or two hundred Ohio troops were marching on the edge of the lake, and the other three hundred strong were pursuing Hull's road. Leaving direction for the regiment in camp to follow me, I proceeded on and overtook the detachment of Kentucky troops in about five miles. Additional information was now received. The French citizens were flying in considerable numbers in carryalls upon the ice, and about 3 o'clock some of the fugitives began to arrive. All agreed that the defeat was total and complete—that the troops were nearly all surrounded and cut off, or taken by 7 o'clock—that general Winchester was seen retiring a few miles from the river Raisin along Hull's trace, with a few men and two or three officers, all of whom were entirely exhausted—that they were pursued by Indians on horse back, who were constantly thinning their numbers by firing upon them, and that our men were unable to resist, as almost all of them had thrown away their arms. I could not hesitate as to the propriety of hurrying to their assistance as long as there was a possibility of being able to afford any; but I was much embarrassed in the choice of the roads which it was proper to take; that upon the ice, would afford the most easy and expeditious march, and that route, major Congrove, with the battalion before mentioned, had taken. On the contrary, all the accounts agreed that general Winchester had taken the land road, but in a short time, from the fugitives who began to drop in, I learnt that general Winchester and the forty or fifty men who were with him were all cut off, a few excepted, who had taken off to the margin of the lake; and from those who were last from the scene of action, I learnt that all resistance upon the part of the troops that had remained there, had ceased before 3 o'clock. The question then to be determined, was, whether it would be proper to advance to the scene of action or not. The force with me, when joined by colonel Grove's battalion, would amount to nearly nine hundred men. This battalion had made a forced march of twelve miles the morning of the action, and had arrived within about 15 miles of the river Raisin, when the major received such certain information of the result.

defeat of the troops, that he had thought proper to return, and was then within a few miles of us. General Payne, general Erkin, and all the field officers were consulted, and it was unanimously determined, that as there could be no doubt of the total defeat of general Winchester, there was no motive that could authorize an immediate advance, but that of attacking the enemy, who were reported to be greatly superior in numbers, and were certainly well provided with artillery; that after a forced march of thirty-two miles (the distance from our then position from the river Raisin) the troops would be too much exhausted to encounter the enemy; that colonel Grove's battalion, in having already marched twenty-five miles that day, would be unable to accompany us. It was therefore determined to return camp with the troops, but large detachments of the most large and vigorous men were sent along the different routes to assist in bringing in the fugitives. I had despatched colonel Wells early in the evening in a carryall to procure intelligence. He progressed within twelve miles of the scene of action and returned about 9 o'clock. A council of war was then called, consisting of the general and field officers, and two questions submitted to them, viz: whether it was probable that the enemy could attack us in our then situation, and if they did, could we resist them with effect?

At this council, major McClanehan, of the Kentucky volunteers, who escaped from the action, assisted. He was of opinion that there were from sixteen hundred to two thousand British and Indians opposed to our troops, and that they had six pieces of artillery, principally howitzers. It was the unanimous opinion of the council, that under all circumstances it would be proper to return a short distance upon this road which the artillery and reinforcements were approaching; for should we be able to maintain our camp, by getting in our rear the enemy would defeat our troops in detail, in spite of all the efforts we could make, and would make the all important convoy of artillery and stores coming from Upper Sandusky. The march to this place was accordingly made yesterday; where I shall wait for the artillery and a detachment under general Leftwich. I hope in a few days again to be at the Rapids. With respect to the disaster that has happened, and the cause which has produced it, it is proper that I should say, that the movement which led to it, was not only without my knowledge or consent, but entirely at variance with the instructions that I had given to general Winchester. As soon as I was informed that it had been made, every effort in my power was used to increase their strength. Three hundred men more than the general had asked for, were on their march to join him. As his situation enabled him to obtain the most correct information of the strength and position of the enemy, I could not doubt of his having obtained it. In justice to general Winchester, however, it is my duty to observe that I have understood that the

detachment under colonel Lewis was made at the earnest solicitations of his officers, and perhaps contrary to his judgment. However deeply to be lamented, sir, the destruction of the detachment under general Winchester may be as a national calamity, and as it regards the families of the valuable individuals who have fallen, it has by no means destroyed my hopes of success with regard to the accomplishment of the principal objects of the campaign, unless the weather should be uncommonly unfavourable. I shall return to the Rapids in a few days with a force considerably superior to any that the enemy can collect in the upper district of Canada. I can discover no despondence amongst the troops that are with me, and I trust that something may yet be done to compensate us for the hardships and difficulties which we every moment sustain.

The account given by major M'Clanehan and captain Groves, of the action of the 22d, is that the enemy commenced just after revellie to throw shells amongst our troops before the officers and men had risen from their beds. They were however formed, but very inconveniently posted, and being entirely surrounded, they were taken in twenty minutes. The general endeavoured to rally them after they had passed the river, but without effect. Forty or fifty with the general broke through in that direction, but from the depth of the snow those on foot were soon exhausted, and were in a short distance overtaken by the Indians. The general frequently attempted to form them to oppose the Indians, but his efforts were ineffectual. I am unable to say what are the proportion of the killed and prisoners. Some of the Frenchmen whom I have seen, assert that five hundred were killed; others, eight. I am still, however, in hopes that the greater part are prisoners. I have seen one man who asserts that he saw general Winchester killed, scalped, and his bowels taken out. Such are the allies of a power which boasts its attainments in every art and science, and such the war associates of British officers who claim distinction for their nice feelings and delicate sense of honour.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

But 2 officers and 25 or 30 privates have reached my camp from the battle of the river Raisin.

Honourable James Monroe,
acting Secretary of War.

OTTER CREEK, January 12th, 1813.

SIR,

I have taken the liberty to send per express to inform you that the enemy are apprized of your being at the Rapids, and have removed all the friends of our government to Malden prison,

and at present we are beset with spies. I expect the guard to search for me every moment. I have, agreeably to my orders from Mr. Shields, your acting contractor, engaged fifty barrels of flour, and two hundred bushels of wheat. If you, sir, see proper to send a detachment of cavalry and riflemen, with arms and ammunition for thirty men for this place, we can secure, it is supposed, three thousand barrels of flour and a great quantity of corn and wheat. There are but forty or fifty soldiers garrisoned at the river Raisin, and not one hundred savages; there is not one thousand English, French, and savages at Malden.

If you do not come to-morrow or the next day, you will not find a man at this place. The English are collecting all the savages to rally at the river Raisin for the purpose of giving battle. They are engaging sleighs to transport the flour and grain to their Pandora's box, Malden. Five hundred true and brave Americans can secure the district of Erie. A timely approach of our armies will secure us from being forced to prison, and the whole place from being burned by savage fury.

Your humble servant, &c.

ISAAC DAY.

P. S. Please to excuse this scroll, as I write in the woods without a fire.

His excellency Gov. Harrison.

HEAD QUARTERS N. W. ARMY, PORTAGE RIVER,
15 miles from the Miami Rapids, January 26th, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honour to enclose herewith, a duplicate of my letter of the 25th instant, together with the official report of colonel Lewis to general Winchester of the action of the 18th instant.

That you may be enabled to judge of the propriety of the steps which were taken by me previously to the unfortunate event at the river Raisin, I proceed to give you an account of the situation of the troops and the arrangements I had made for their advance:—the left wing of the army under the immediate orders of general Winchester, consisting of the 6th regiment Kentucky troops, a battalion of Ohio infantry, and a detachment of regulars under colonel Wells.

The importance of keeping a considerable force on this line after the advance of the army, from its vicinity to the Indian tribes of the Wabash and lake Michigan, induced me to direct general Winchester to take with him three Kentucky regiments and the regular troops only. With these, amounting to about thirteen hundred men, he marched from his camp, five miles below the mouth of the Anglaise river, on the 31st ultimo. On the

evening before, he despatched an express, informing me of his intention to march the next morning. This express was sent through the woods to general Tupper's camp, fourteen miles advanced of Urbanna, upon Hull's road. A violent snow storm prevented it from reaching general Tupper until the 9th instant, and it was not until the 11th, that it came to me at Upper Sandusky. I immediately gave orders for several droves of hogs, which had been stopped on their route, to proceed towards the Rapids, and I directed the artillery to be prepared to progress as soon as the general's arrival at the Rapids should be announced, which I directed him to do by express, to be sent immediately to Upper Sandusky. Not hearing from the general for some days, I began to conclude that his progress had been stopped by a considerable thaw, which took place about the 1st of the month. On the evening of the 16th instant, I received a letter from general Perkins, enclosing one from general Winchester to him, of the 15th, informing of his arrival at the Rapids on the 10th;—that it was his intention to advance against the enemy, and directing him (general Perkins) to send a reinforcement to the Rapids, of one battalion. Alarmed at this information, I despatched an express with the enclosed letter, by the direct route to the Rapids, and set out myself to Lower Sandusky, and reached it on the evening of the 17th. On the morning of the 18th, the battalion which general Winchester applied for, marched from Lower Sandusky. About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 19th, a letter from general Winchester was received, of which the enclosed is an extract. I gave immediate orders for the 2d regiment of Perkins's brigade (which consists of two regiments only) to march immediately for the Rapids, and proceeded thither myself. On my way, I received the general's letter of the 19th, informing me of the success of colonel Lewis, a copy of which I had the honour to enclose you from the Rapids. Upon my arrival at the latter place, on the morning of the 20th, I found that general Winchester had marched the preceding day, having left general Payne with about three hundred of the Kentucky troops. It was not until late on the 21st instant, that major Colgrove was enabled to extricate his baggage from the horrid swamp which separates the Miami and Sandusky rivers. He encamped that evening near the Miami bay, and by marching early on the following morning, he had arrived within fifteen miles of the river Raisin, when he was informed of the total defeat of our troops there.

The 2d regiment of Perkins's brigade arrived there on the 21st, and I immediately ordered the remaining part of the Kentucky troops under general Payne, to proceed with all possible expedition to the river Raisin. I was still uneasy for the troops there, but supposing general Winchester had obtained the best information of the strength of the disposable force of the enemy, and as I sent him three hundred men more than he deemed sufficient for maintaining his ground, and as there were a thousand reasons

which made it necessary to maintain it if practicable ; I did not think it proper to order him to retreat, although the advance in the first instance was contrary to my wishes, and opposed to a principle by which I have been ever governed in Indian warfare, i. e. never to make a detachment but under the most urgent circumstances. Amongst the many reasons why the post at the river Raisin should be maintained, the protection of the French inhabitants was not the last. The greater part of these people had received our troops with open arms. Many of them had sallied out of their houses upon the arrival of colonel Lewis, with their arms in their hands, and had even, in the opinion of some of our officers, won the palm of valour from our troops. They attacked and killed the straggling Indians wherever they met them ; their houses were all open to our men, and they offered to give up the whole of the provisions which yet remained to them, upon condition that they should not again be abandoned to the fury of the savages, or subjected, for what they had done, to be immured in the prisons of Malden. I had also been informed that the supplies to be procured there were considerable (see Day's letter enclosed in No. 3), and the assistance to be derived from the caryalls of the inhabitants was an object of the greatest importance. The former of these motives had made so strong an impression upon the minds of the general and his troops, that I am persuaded that nothing but a reiterated order to retreat, would have produced obedience upon the part of the latter. These reasons, together with the respect which it was necessary to shew to the opinion of an officer of high rank and experience, whose opportunities of procuring the most correct information, was much better than mine, produced the determination to support, rather than withdraw the detachment from the river Raisin. Indeed it appears that there was not time for either, after my arrival at the Rapids.

When I left Upper Sandusky, the artillery was ordered to be sent on immediately to the Rapids, escorted by three hundred men. Detachments were also ordered for the pack horses, wagons and sleds, which were constantly progressing thither. Another battalion could also have been drawn from Lower Sandusky, so that the troops at the Rapids would have been almost daily increased. On this day they would have amounted to twenty-five hundred, with two pieces of artillery ; and in four or five days more, the Virginia brigade and Pennsylvania regiment would have increased them to thirty-eight hundred, with a further supply of artillery. By the 5th of February the whole force, four thousand five hundred, which I contemplated assembling at the Rapids, would have been there ; and provisions and munitions of war in abundance.

I should have been enabled to advance to the Rapids again this day or to-morrow, but for a most unfortunate rain, which has broken up the roads so as to render them impassable for the artillery, although it is fixed on sleds. The whole train is stopped

twenty-five miles from this. I have reason to believe the Mian river has broken up.

I have the honour to enclose you a report made to me by major M'Clanehan, the senior of the two officers who escaped from the action at the river Raisin. It requires no comment from me.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON

Honourable James Monroe,
acting Secretary of War.

(INCLOSURE.)

CAMP AT FRENCH TOWN,
January 20th, 1813, on the River Raisin.

SIR,

In obedience to your order, I proceeded on the march with the detachment under my command to Presquile on the 17th instant, where the reinforcement under the command of lieutenant colonel Allen arrived at 7 o'clock P. M. On the 18th, as informed you it was my determination, we set out for the camp of the enemy at this village. From an early start, together with the advantage of a passage on the ice of the lake, and the rapid march we made, we were enabled to meet them by 3 o'clock in the evening.

When we were within three miles of the enemy, correct information was obtained that they were prepared to receive us. Having arranged the troops in the following order—they were directed to prepare for action: the right wing composed of the companies commanded by captain M'Cracken, subalterns lieutenant Williamson and ensign M'Clary; captain Bledsoe, subalterns ensign Morrison (acting as lieutenant, and ensign Chine captain Matson, subalterns ensign Nash (acting as lieutenant) and ensign Caldwell. The left wing composed of the companies commanded by captain Hamilton, subalterns lieutenant Moo and ensign Heron; captain Williams, subalterns lieutenants Higgins and ensign Havraw; captain Kelly, subalterns lieutenants M'Guine and ensign Wash. The centre composed of the companies commanded by captain Hightowen (17th United States' regiment) subalterns lieutenant Holden and ensign Butler; captain Collier subalterns lieutenant Story and ensign Fleet; captain Sebree, subalterns lieutenant Rule and ensign Bowles. Lieutenant colonel Allen commanding the right wing, major Groves the left, a major Madison the centre. Captain Ballard (acting as major) was placed in the advance of the whole with two companies, one commanded by captain Hickman, subalterns lieutenant Chinn, the other by captain Claver, subalterns lieutenant Comstock, and a captain James with his spies. In this order we proceeded with

a quarter of a mile of the enemy, when they commenced a fire on us with a howitzer, from which no injury was received. The line of battle was instantly formed and the whole detachment ordered to move on in the direction of the enemy without delay. The river at this time being between us and the enemy's lines, we succeeded well in crossing it, though the ice in many places was extremely slippery. Having crossed at this instant the long roll was beat, the signal for a general charge, when I ordered major Groves and major Madison to possess themselves of the houses and picketing about which the enemy had chiefly collected, and where they had placed their cannon. This order was executed in a few minutes; and both their battalions advanced amidst an incessant shower of bullets: neither the picketing nor the fencing over which they had to pass, retarded their progress to success—the enemy were dislodged in that quarter. Meantime colonel Allen had fallen in with them at considerable distance to the right, when after pursuing them to the woods (a distance of more than half a mile) they then made a stand with their howitzer and small arms covered by a chain of inclosed lots and a group of houses, having in their rear a thick brushy wood full of fallen timber. I directed brigade major Garrard (one of my aids) to instruct majors Groves and Madison to possess themselves of the wood on the left, and to move up towards the main body of the enemy as fast as practicable, to divert their attention from colonel Allen. At the moment the fire commenced, those battalions of the right wing advanced. The enemy were soon driven from the fences and houses, and our troops began to enter the wood after them. The fight now became close and extremely hot on the right wing, the enemy concentrating the chief of both kinds to force the line. They were still however kept moving in retreat, although slowly, our men being much exhausted. My orders to majors Groves and Madison were executed with despatch and success, which, joined with the exertions of colonel Allen's line, completely routed the enemy. The distance they retreated before us was not less than two miles, and every foot of the way under a continual charge. The battle lasted from 3 o'clock till dark. The detachment was then drawn off in good order, and encamped at the place which the enemy had first occupied, being the best for a camp then near us. The gallant conduct of lieutenant colonel Allen, during every charge of this warmly contested action, has raised for him no ordinary military merit. Majors Groves and Madison deserve high praise for their undeviating attention to orders and the energy and despatch with which they executed them. Captain Ballard led the van with great skill and bravery. I take this opportunity of tendering my most hearty thanks to brigade major Garrard, captain Smith and adjutant M'Caller, who acted as my aids-de-camp, for the great support they gave me during the whole of the action. The company officers acted with great bravery. It would be almost an endless task to particularize all who have

distinguished themselves; for as all had an opportunity so to do, there was none but what accepted it. There was not a solitary instance of a retreat on our part. Both officers and soldiers supported the "double character of Americans and Kentuckians."

I have not been able to ascertain the exact force of the enemy, but from the best information, there were between 80 and 100 British troops, and about 400 Indians. Major Reynolds was present, and it is understood, commanded the whole. The number of their killed and wounded is unknown, we having left the woods after dark, so that not only during the battle, but after night, they had an opportunity of carrying off all, except those who were left on the field where the action first commenced, say about fifteen. But from the blood, the trails of bodies dragged off, and the reports from the people who live near this place, the slaughter must have been great. One Indian and two of the Canadian militia were taken prisoners. So steady and composed were our men in this assault, that while the enemy were killed or drawn from the houses, not a woman or child was hurt.

Our loss in killed 12, and 55 wounded. One has since died.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM LEWIS,
Commdt. of the detachment.

Brigadier general Winchester.

(INCLOSURE.)

CAMP ON CANYING RIVER, January 26th, 1813.

SIR,

As the senior officer who escaped from the disaster which befell our troops under general Winchester on the 22d instant, it becomes my duty to report to you so much of that affair as comes within my knowledge.

On the morning of the 19th instant I marched from the camp at the Rapids of the Miami with the detachment under colonel Wells, consisting of about 300 men, including officers, to reinforce colonel Lewis at the river Raisin. Shortly after we left camp, general Winchester passed us in a carryall, and as I understand, reached the advanced troops that night. Our detachment arrived there about 3 o'clock, P. M. on the 20th, except captain Morris's company. It had been left as a rear guard with the baggage, and did not join us at all.

We found the detachment under lieutenant colonel Lewis encamped in the gardens on the north side of the river Raisin at French Town; not in any regular order, and apparently as they had settled down in the night after the battle of the 18th. The field officers were generally in houses. General Winchester had taken up his quarters in the house of Mr. Navarre, about three quarters of a mile from the troops, and on the opposite side of the river.

The land was cleared and entirely open, except fencing and some buildings for near a mile on every side from the encampment.

The detachment under colonel Wells encamped below, and on the right of the other troops, about one hundred yards from them, in ground entirely open; three companies in a line leading from the river; the fourth at right angles to those three, and leading down the river. These troops had about ten rounds of ammunition. They paraded and called their rolls as usual; the others did not.

On the morning of the 21st there was a talk of moving, and encamping on better ground, and in regular order. The general and some of the field officers rode out to view ground for that purpose, but nothing was done.

Our spies were not sent out to my knowledge after I reached camp. I saw them on the 21st, and understood that on that evening orders were given for their going out on the 22d.

The fixed ammunition, which was sent from the Rapids on the 21st, was taken to general Winchester's quarters at Mr. Navarre's on that evening. It remained there and was not distributed.

On the morning of the 21st, colonel Wells returned on some business to the camp at the Rapids and left the detachment under us to my command. He advised that the officers and men should remain at their posts as there was a probability of an attack.

That evening a rumour reached us that the enemy were coming against us with 3 or 4,000 men, and would be with us before day. I expected that the field officers would have been called together, and a consultation held and instructions given to meet the event should it happen. It was not done. I directed the officers under my command to form in case of an attack, so as to close the vacancy between us and the other troops.

At day break on the next morning, and during the beating of reveille, two of our sentinels fired alarm guns, and immediately the enemy commenced a heavy cannonade from six or eight pieces, with bomb shells and canister shot, followed up by small arms. The troops under my command, and apparently throughout the line, were soon formed, and returned the fire very briskly.

The enemy consisted of British forces in the centre, as extensive, and apparently in closer order than we were; and Indians on both flanks extending quite to our rear.

The action was warmly contested for near half an hour, at which time the Indians laid under cover of some fencing, and a band approached so near as to gall us severely in the flanks, whilst the British kept up an incessant fire in front. Our troops then began to give way; they retreated to the river. I then for the first time during the action saw general Winchester. He directed in a voice not loud, to form under the north bank of the river. Lieutenant colonels Lewis and Allen were present and assisted in rallying and forming the men. A considerable number took their position, and some of them renewed their fire, but it was not

long kept, as the Indians were still on our flank and fast gaining our rear.

A second attempt was made to form the troops about sixty yards on this side of the river along some fences, but not many of them formed. A third effort was made in some woods after crossing a branch, about a mile and a half from the place of action. Colonel Lewis was the only field officer I saw there. We used our endeavours to rally the men, but they could not then be stopped; the pursuit was then very hot. After continuing with the men about half a mile further, and finding nothing more could be done, I took captain Graves, who was wounded, behind me, and my son by the hand, and left the road and reached camp with them.

General Winchester and lieutenant colonel Lewis were riding slowly at the head of the retreat when I saw them rest; they could to all appearance easily have left the footmen and made their escape, had they intended leaving the men.

I have been informed from sources I cannot doubt, that frequent enquiries were made for ammunition during the action. The men appeared ardent and obedient to orders whilst it lasted.

When the first attempt was made to rally them, they could, I have no doubt, have been completely formed, had the place afforded an advantageous position. It did not appear to me to possess any.

During the retreat our men kept up an occasional but not a regular fire.

I received no orders from the general during the action. The order to form under the river bank was all I heard. The other orders to rally probably came from him.

The enemy must have been at least double our numbers. Many think much beyond it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ELIJAH MCCLANEHAN,

Maj. 2d B. 1st Reg. L. V. M.

General Wm. H. Harrison.

MALDEN, January 23d, 1813.

SIR,

A detachment from the left wing of the north-western army, under my command, at French Town, on the river Raisin, was attacked on the 22d instant by a force greatly superior in number, aided by several pieces of artillery. The action commenced at the dawn of day; the picket guards were driven in, and heavy fire opened on the whole line, by which a part thereof were thrown into disorder; and, being ordered to retire a small distance, in order to form on more advantageous ground, I found the enemy doubling our flank with force and rapidity.

A destructive fire was sustained for some time; at length we were down by numbers, the few of us that remained with the party that retired from the lines, submitted. The remainder of our force, in number about four hundred, continued to defend themselves with great gallantry, in an unequal contest, against small arms and artillery, until I was brought in as a prisoner to that part of the field occupied by the enemy.

At this latter place I understood that our troops were defending themselves in a state of desperation, and was informed by the commanding officer of the enemy, that he would afford them an opportunity of surrendering themselves prisoners of war; to which I acceded. I was the more ready to make the surrender, from being assured, that unless done quickly, the buildings adjacent would be immediately set on fire, and that no responsibility could be taken for the conduct of the savages, who were then assembled in great numbers. In this critical situation, being desirous to preserve the lives of a number of our brave fellows who still held out, I sent a flag to them, and agreed with the commanding officer of the enemy, that they should be surrendered prisoners of war on condition of being protected from the savages, allowed to retain their private property, and having their arms returned to them. It is impossible for me to ascertain with certainty the loss we have sustained in this action, from the impracticability of knowing the number who have made their escape.

Thirty-five officers, and about four hundred and eighty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates, are prisoners of war. A list of the names of the officers is herewith enclosed to you. Our loss in killed is considerable. However unfortunate may seem the affair of yesterday, I am flattered by a belief, that no material error is chargeable upon myself, and that still less censure is deserved by the troops I had the honour of commanding. With the exception of that portion of our force, which was thrown into disorder, no troops have ever behaved with more determined intrepidity.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JAMES WINCHESTER,

Brig. Gen. U. S. army.

Hon. Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 10th, 1813.

SIR,

I have the President's orders to communicate to you, as expeditiously as possible, the outline of campaign which you will immediately institute and pursue against Upper Canada.

1st. Four thousand troops will be assembled at Sacket's Harbor
2d. Three thousand will be brought together at Buffalo and its vicinity.

The former of these corps will be embarked and transported under convoy of the fleet to Kingston, where they will be landed. Kingston, its garrison and the British ships wintering in the harbor of that place, will be its first object. Its second object will be York, (the capital of Upper Canada) the stores collected and the two frigates building there. Its third object, Forts George and Erie, and their dependencies. In the attainment of this last, there will be a co-operation between the two corps. The composition of these will be as follows:

1st, Bloomfield's Brigade,	-	-	-	-	1,436
2d, Chandlers do.	-	-	-	-	1,044
3d, Philadelphia detachment,	-	-	-	-	400
4th, Baltimore do.	-	-	-	-	300
5th, Carlisle do.	-	-	-	-	200
6th, Greenbush do.	-	-	-	-	400
7th, Sacket's Harbor do.	-	-	-	-	250

4,030

8th, Several corps at Buffaloe under the command of colonel Porter, and the recruits belonging thereto 3,000

7,030

The time for executing the enterprise will be governed by the opening of lake Ontario, which usually takes place about the first of April.

The adjutant general has orders to put the more southern detachments in march as expeditiously as possible. The two brigades on lake Champlain you will move so as to give them full time to reach their place of destination by the 25th of March. The route by Elizabeth will, I think, be the shortest and best. They will be replaced by some new raised regiments from the east. You will put into your movements as much privacy as may be compatible with their execution. They may be masked by reports that Sacket's Harbor is in danger, and that the principal effort will be made on the Niagara in co-operation with general Harrison. As the route to Sacket's Harbor and to Niagara, is for a considerable distance the same, it may be well to intimate, even in orders, that the latter is the destination of the two brigades now at lake Champlain.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major Gen. H. Dearborn.

MASSACRE AT FRENCH TOWN.

MEADVILLE (PENNSYLVANIA,) February 20th, 1813.

At a meeting at Erie, Pennsylvania, of the following named officers who survived the battle at French Town, on the river Raisin, viz: Captains Uriel Sebree, Samuel L. Williams, Coleman Collins, and Richard Bledsoe; Lieutenants Dyndon, Comstock and Higgins; Ensigns Thomas M'Guine and Harrow:— Captain Williams was called to the chair, and John Beckley (one of the volunteers) appointed secretary; when the following resolutions were introduced, and unanimously adopted:

Whereas it is deemed necessary that our fellow citizens should be informed of the late perfidious and brutal acts of the British government, performed by their officers at the battle of French Town: *Resolved*, That the following statement of the conduct of the British officers, be published to our countrymen:

That when general Winchester was taken prisoner on the 22d of January, 1813, and brought before colonel Proctor, the British commander, he directed the commanding officer of the Americans (major Madison) to surrender. Major Madison refused so to do, unless those surrendered should be free from savage massacre; this was agreed to; and the British officers pledged themselves to leave a sufficient force with the wounded to protect them, and that they should be conveyed to Malden the next morning. They likewise promised to return to the officers their arms at Malden.

Captain N. G. F. Hart, inspector to the north-western army, being among the wounded, it was proposed by his friends, that they should carry him with them: this they were prevented from doing by captain Elliott,* a British officer, and an old acquaintance of captain Hart's, who promised captain Hart his special protection—to convey him in his own sleigh to Malden that evening, and informing him that he should be welcome to remain at his house there, until he should recover.

These were the promises of the British, let our countrymen and the world see how they were fulfilled.

At the break of day next morning the savages were suffered to commit every depredation upon our wounded which they pleased. An indiscriminate slaughter took place, of all who were unable to walk, many were tomahawked, and many were burned alive in the houses. Among the unfortunate thus murdered, it is with regret and sorrow we have to name captains Hart and Hickman.

The arms of the officers, as promised, were never returned. Every species of private property remaining in the tents, belonging to both officers and soldiers, were plundered by the savages.

* This Elliott is nephew to the savage colonel Elliott; he once held a commission in the United States' army.

Resolved, That in consideration of the high respect we hold the memories of both officers and soldiers who were thus cruelly murdered, by permission of the British commander, *Proctor*, and his subalterns, and those who gloriously fell in the field, *defending the only free government on earth*, that each of us wear black crape on our hats and left arm for the space of ninety days.

Resolved, That a similar precedence, testifying their respect for those who were murdered and fell on that day, be recommended to our brother officers and soldiers, who survived it.

SAMUEL WILLIAMS, *President*.

JOHN BECKLEY, *Secretary*.

NEAR OGDENSBURG, February 22d, 1813.

SIR,

I have only time to inform you that the enemy, with a very superior force, succeeded in taken Ogdensburg this morning about 9 o'clock. They had about two men to our one, exclusive of Indians. Numbers of the enemy are dead on the field. Not more than twenty of our men killed and wounded. Lieutenant Beard is among the latter.

I have made a saving retreat of about eight or nine miles. I could not get all the wounded off. We have killed two of the enemy to one of ours killed by them. We want ammunition and some provisions sent on to us; also sleighs for the wounded.

If you can send me *three hundred men all shall be retaken*, and *Prescott* too, or I will lose my life in the attempt. I shall write you more particularly to-day.

Your obedient servant,

BENJ. FORSYTH.

General Maccomb.

MESSAGE OF MR. MADISON.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.

I lay before Congress copies of a proclamation of the British lieutenant-governor of the island of Bermuda, which has appeared under circumstances leaving no doubt of its authenticity. It recites a British order in council of the 26th of October last, providing for the supply of the British West Indies, and other colonial possessions, by a trade under special licenses, and is accompanied by a circular instruction to the colonial governors, which confines licensed importations from ports of the United States to the ports of the eastern states exclusively.

The government of Great Britain had already introduced into her commerce, during the war, a system, which, at once violating

rights of other nations, and resting on a mass of forgery and
 y unknown to other times, was making an unfortunate
 ss in undermining those principles of morality and religion
 are the best foundation of national happiness.

policy now proclaimed to the world, introduces into her
 of warfare, a system equally distinguished by the deformity
 features, and the depravity of its character; having for its
 to dissolve the ties of allegiance, and the sentiments of
 r in the adversary nation, and to reduce and separate its
 nent parts, the one from the other.

general tendency of these demoralizing and disorganizing
 vances will be reprobated by the civilized and christian
 ; and the insulting attempt on the virtue, the honour, the
 ism, and the fidelity of our brethren of the eastern states,
 it fail to call forth all their indignation and resentment, and
 ch more and more all the states to that happy union and
 tution, against which such insidious and malignant artifices
 ected.

better to guard, nevertheless, against the effect of indivi-
 upidity and treachery, and to turn the corrupt project of
 emy against himself, I recommend to the consideration of
 ess, the expediency of an effectual prohibition of any trade
 ver, by citizens or inhabitants of the United States, under
 licenses, whether relating to persons or ports, and in aid
 f a prohibition of exportations from the United States in
 s bottoms, few of which are actually employed, whilst mul-
 ing counterfeits of their flags and papers, are covering and
 raging the navigation of the enemy.

JAMES MADISON.

uary 24th, 1813.

SACKETT'S HARBOR, March 3d, 1813.

Having been informed that sir George Prevost had adjourned
 gislature at Quebec, assigning as his motive that his majes-
 service required his presence in Upper Canada; and having
 red certain information of his having passed Montreal, and
 g arrived at Kingston, I set out immediately for this place,
 g ordered the force at Greenbush, and part of colonel Pike's
 and, in sleighs for this place. I arrived here in fifty-two
 . I am now satisfied from such information as is entitled to
 edit, that a force has been collected from Quebec, Montreal,
 pper Canada, of from six to eight thousand men, at Kingston,
 hat we may expect an attack in forty-eight hours and per-
 sooner.

a militia have been called in, and every effort will, I trust, be
 to defend the post; but I fear neither the troops from Green-

bush nor Plattsburg will arrive in season to afford their aid. I should feel easier if colonel Pike should arrive in season. I am in want of officers of experience. I have sent expresses to have them hurried on. Commodore Chauncey has not arrived; he will be here to-morrow. The armed vessels have not been placed in the positions intended by the commodore. Our total force may be estimated at nearly 3000 of all descriptions.

Sir George Prevost is represented to be determined to effect his object at all events, and will undoubtedly make every effort in his power for the purpose. We shall, I trust, give him a warm reception; but if his force is such as is expected, and should make an attack before our troops arrive from Greenbush and Plattsburg, at Sackett's Harbor, the result may at least be doubtful.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. DEARBORN.

Honourable John Armstrong.

HEAD QUARTERS, FRANKLINTON, March 12th, 1813.

SIR,

I had the honour to inform you in my letter of the 25th ultimo, that I had organized a detachment for the purpose of striking a blow at the vessels of war of the enemy lying near Malden. Captain Langham, with about two hundred and fifty men, in thirty sleds and sleighs, set out from Lower Sandusky on the 2d instant, and proceeded as far as Bass island, in the lake, without difficulty. Contrary, however, to the experience of former years, the lake beyond was found to be entirely open. He was therefore obliged to return to the Miami bay, where I met him with a detachment that was intended to cover his retreat. Finding that the original design was rendered abortive, I had determined upon an expedition to the river Raisin, for the purpose of burying the remains of our unfortunate countrymen who fell on the 22d January. But the ice was so weak as no longer to afford a safe passage along the edge of the lake. Our horses were constantly breaking through, and one man was unfortunately drowned. I therefore returned to camp with the whole detachment, and on the 7th instant set out for this place. I left general Lefwich in command at camp Meigs. Indeed the cause which prevented the advance of my detachment to the river Raisin, would also prevent the enemy from approaching the Rapids, at least with artillery.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a plan of camp Meigs. The redoubt marked F. is yet to be erected.

Colonel Morrison has determined to resign his appointment as deputy quarter master general. There is not a man in the United States who is, in my opinion, capable of discharging the duties of that department with as much advantage to the public as himself. He is lost to the service in consequence of the singular arrange-

which was made by the late secretary of war, of sending over deputy quarter master general with equal powers to those held in colonel Morrison. Since the departure of captain Piatt, I have used my utmost endeavours to prevail upon colonel Morrison to continue in service, but he perseveres in his determination to leave at the end of this month. A report has reached us this morning that general Lewis is appointed a major general. Should this be the case, I am convinced that the interests of our country will be greatly promoted by the appointment of colonel Morrison to succeed him. The duties of quarter master to the north-western army, do not require so much military information as is necessary for the officer at the head of that department in the other arms of the union. An intimate knowledge of the western country and its resources, with integrity and activity, are the essential qualifications. These are possessed by John C. Bartlett, who is acting at present as field commissary in an eminent degree. I could possess moreover the confidence of the western country, particularly of Kentucky. I have not yet had the honour to receive any communication from you upon the subject of the organization of the force for the coming campaign.

With great respect, I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

Secretary of War.

HEAD QUARTERS, CHILICOTHE, March 17th, 1813.

The known candour of your character is a sufficient security in receiving your pardon for the liberty I take in making suggestions to the plan of operations communicated in your letter of the 5th instant. If there is a positive certainty of our getting command of lake Erie, and having a regular force of three thousand five hundred, or even three thousand, well disciplined troops, the proposed plan of setting out from Cleveland, and landing on the northern shore below Malden, would perhaps be the best by which that place and its dependencies could be most easily reduced. I am unacquainted with the extent of the preparations that are making to obtain the naval superiority on lake Erie; but, should they fail, and the troops be assembled at Cleveland, it would be difficult to get again upon the proper track for directing the attack round the head of the lake. The attempt to cross the lake from Cleveland should not be made with any other than well disciplined troops. A comparatively smaller number of men of this description could effect the object, and for those means of conveyance might be obtained; but the means of transporting such an army as would be required of militia, or untrained militia, could not be procured. I can see no

reason why Cleveland should be preferred as the point of embarkation for the troops, or the deposit for the provisions and stores. These are already accumulated at the Rapids of Miami, or in situations easily to be sent thither, to an amount nearly equal to the consumption of a protracted campaign. Although the expense and difficulty of transporting the provisions, artillery, and stores for an army, round the head of the lake, would be very considerable, the lake being possessed by our ships, and the heavy baggage taken in boats along the margin, the troops would find no difficulty in the land route. The force contemplated in your letter is, in my opinion, not sufficient to secure success. Admitting that the whole should be raised by the time pointed out, they would be very little superior to militia; the officers having, with scarcely an exception, to learn their duty before they could instruct their men; we have, therefore, no alternative but to make up by numbers the deficiency in discipline.

I am well aware of the intolerable expense which attends the employment of a large militia force. We are now, however, in a situation to avoid those errors, which made that of the last campaign so peculiarly heavy. Our supplies are procured, and so deposited, that the period for the march of the army from the advanced posts can be ascertained to an hour, and of course the troops need not be called out until the moment they are to act. Experience has convinced me that militia are more efficient in the early, than in the latter part of their service. Upon the whole, it is my decided opinion that the Rapids of Miami should be the point of rendezvous for the troops, as well as the principal depot; indeed it must necessarily be the first deposit,—the provisions of the army are so placed, that they can be taken to the lake in no other way. The artillery and a considerable supply of ammunition are already there. Boats and perogues have been built in considerable numbers on the Auglaize and St. Mary's rivers; and every exertion is now making to increase them, intended for the double purpose of taking down the provisions to the Rapids, and for coasting the lake with the baggage of the army in its advance. I had calculated on being able partially to use this mode of transportation, even if the enemy should continue his naval superiority on the lake; but with this advantage on our side, the whole baggage of the army could be safely and expeditiously carried along the coast in the boats and perogues, which could be taken into the strait to transport the army to the Canada shore.

As I have before observed, the army, unincumbered with heavy baggage, would find no difficulty in marching round the lake at any season, but what the enemy would create, and we have the means of subsisting a force that would be irresistible.

The objections to proceeding this way, stated in my letter to colonel Monroe, arose from the time that would be necessary to construct boats after we should have arrived at the strait; but this objection is entirely obviated, by our obtaining the command

of the lake, as the boats and perogues built upon the Miami will answer the purpose. With regard to the quantum of force, my opinion is, that not only the regular troops, designated in your letter, but a large auxiliary corps of militia should be employed. The only objection arises from the expensiveness of troops of that description. This, however, could not be an object, considering the very short time that it would be necessary to employ them. Let the moment for the commencement of the march from the Rapids be fixed, and the militia might be taken to that point, proceed and accomplish the object, and return home in two months.

Amongst the reasons which make it necessary to employ a large force, I am sorry to mention the dismay and disinclination to the service which appears to prevail in the western country. Numbers must give that confidence which ought to be produced by conscious valour and intrepidity, which never existed in any army in a superior degree, than amongst the great part of the militia which were with me through the winter. The new drafts from this state are entirely of another character, and are not to be depended upon. I have no doubt, however, but a sufficient number of good men can be procured, and should they be allowed to serve on horseback, Kentucky would furnish some regiments that would not be inferior to those that fought at the river Raisin, and they were, in my opinion, superior to any militia that ever took the field in modern times. Eight troops of cavalry have been formed in Kentucky to offer me their service; and several of them were intended for twelve month's volunteers. Governor Shelby has some thought of taking the field in person—a number of good men will follow him. He thinks that an address from me to the people of the state would produce a good effect. I have strong objections to those addresses, but will nevertheless have recourse to one, should other means fail of bringing forward a sufficient force. Every exertion shall, in the mean time, be used to forward the recruiting service; for a few weeks I think that my services would be more useful in that, than any other employment.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

Hon. John Armstrong.

UNITED STATES' SHIP HORNET,
Holmes' Hole, March 19th, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you of the arrival, at this port, of the United States' ship Hornet, under my command, from a cruise of 145 days, and to state to you, that after commodore Bainbridge left the coast of Brazils, (on the 6th of January last,) the Hornet continued off the harbour of St. Salvador, blockading

the *Bonne Citoyenne* until the 24th, when the *Montagu* 74 hove in sight and chased me into the harbour; but night coming on, I wore and stood to the southward. Knowing that she had left Rio Janeiro for the express purpose of relieving the *Bonne Citoyenne* and the packet, (which I had also blockaded for fourteen days, and obliged her to send her mail to Rio, in a Portuguese smack,) I judged it most prudent to change my cruising ground, and stood to the eastward, with the view of cruising off Pernambuco,—and on the 4th day of February, captured the English brig *Resolution*, from Rio Janeiro, bound to Morahan, with coffee, jerked beef, flour, fustic and butter, and about 25,000 dollars in specie. As the brig sailed dull, and could ill spare hands to man her, I took out the money and set her on fire. I then run down the coast for Morahan, and cruised there a short time; from thence ran off Surinam. After cruising off that coast from the 5th to the 22d of February, without meeting a vessel, I stood for Demarara, with an intention, should I not be fortunate on that station, to run through the West Indies, on my way to the United States. But on the morning of the 24th, I discovered a brig to leeward, to which I gave chase; ran into quarter less four, and not having a pilot, was obliged to haul off—the fort at the entrance of Damarara river at this time bearing south west, distance about 2½ leagues. Previously to giving up the chase, I discovered a vessel at anchor without the bar, with English colours flying, apparently a brig of war. In beating round Corobano bank, in order to get at her, at half past 3 P. M. I discovered another sail on my weather quarter, edging down for us. At 4 20 minutes she hoisted English colours, at which time we discovered her to be a large man of war brig;—beat to quarters, and cleared ship for action; kept close by the wind, in order, if possible, to get the weather gage. At 5 10 minutes, finding I could weather the enemy, I hoisted American colours, and tacked. At 5 20 minutes, in passing each other, exchanged broadsides within half pistol shot. Observing the enemy in the act of wearing, I bore up, received his starboard broadside, ran him close on board on the starboard quarter, and kept up such a heavy and well directed fire, that in less than fifteen minutes he surrendered, being literally cut to pieces, and hoisted an ensign, union down, from his fore rigging, as a signal of distress. Shortly after, his main-mast went by the board:—despatched lieutenant Shubrick on board, who soon returned with her first lieutenant, who reported her to be his Britannic majesty's late brig *Peacock*, commanded by captain William Peake, who fell in the latter part of the action—that a number of her crew were killed and wounded, and that she was sinking fast, having then six feet of water in her hold:—despatched the boats immediately for the wounded, and brought both vessels to anchor. Such shot holes as could be got at, were then plugged; her guns thrown overboard, and every possible exertion used to keep her afloat, until the prisoners could be removed, by

ing and bailing, but without effect, and she unfortunately in five and a half fathoms waters, carrying down thirteen of crew, and three of my brave fellows, viz: John Hart, Joseph Sims, and Hannibal Boyd. Lieutenant Conner, midshipman, and the remainder of the *Hornet's* crew, employed in saving the prisoners, with difficulty saved themselves by jumping into a boat that was lying on her bows as she went down. Four of the thirteen mentioned, were so fortunate as to gain the boat, and were afterwards taken off by the boats. Previous to going down, four of her men took to her stern boat, which had much damaged during the action, which I hope reached the men in safety: but from the heavy sea running at the time, the bad state of the boat, and the difficulty of landing on the shore, I much fear they were lost. I have not been able to ascertain from her officers the exact number killed. Captain Peacock and four men were found dead on board. The master, one midshipman, carpenter, and captain's clerk, and twenty-nine seamen were wounded, most of them very severely, three of whom died of their wounds after being removed, and nine drowned. Our loss was trifling in comparison. John Place, killed; Samuel Adams and Joseph Dalrymple, slightly wounded; George Coffin and Lewis Todd, severely burnt by the explosion of a cartridge. Only nine survived only a few days. Our rigging and sails were much damaged, one shot through the fore-mast, and the bowsprit slightly damaged. Our hull received little or no damage. At the time the ship was brought to action, the *L'Espeigle*, (the brig mentioned above as being at anchor) mounting sixteen two and thirty pound carronades, and two long nines, lay about six miles in shore, and could plainly see the whole of the action. Apprehensive that she could not beat out to the assistance of her consort, such exertions were made by my officers and crew in repairing damages, &c. By 9 o'clock the boats were stowed, a new set of sails bent, and the ship completely ready for action. At 2 A. M. got under way, and stood by the wind to the northward and westward, on easy sail.

On mustering next morning, found we had 277 souls on board, including the crew of the American brig *Hunter*, of Portland, which was taken a few days before by the *Peacock*. And, as we had been on three-fourths allowance of provisions for some time, and had but five gallons of water on board, I reduced the allowance to three gallons a man, and determined to make the best of my way to the United States.

The *Peacock* was deservedly styled one of the finest vessels of her class in the British navy, probably about the tonnage of the *Hornet*. Her beam was greater by five inches; but her length not so great by four feet. She mounted sixteen twenty-four pound carronades, two long nines, one twelve pounder mounted on her top-gallant-forecastle, as a shifting gun, and one six pounder, and two swivels mounted aft. I find by her

quarter bill, that her crew consisted of 134 men, four of whom were absent in a prize.

The cool and determined conduct of my officers and crew during the action, and their almost unexampled exertions afterwards, entitle them to my warmest acknowledgments, and I beg leave most earnestly to recommend them to the notice of government.

By the indisposition of lieutenant Stewart, I was deprived of the services of an excellent officer: had he been able to stand the deck, I am confident his exertions would not have been surpassed by any one on board. I should be doing injustice to the merits of lieutenant Shubrick, and acting lieutenants Conner and Newton, were I not to recommend them particularly to your notice. Lieutenant Shubrick was in the actions with the *Guerriere* and *Java*. Captain Hull and commodore Bainbridge can bear testimony as to his coolness and good conduct on both occasions.

With the greatest respect, I remain, &c.

JAMES LAWRENCE

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

P. S. At the commencement of the action my sailing mast and seven men were absent in a prize, and lieutenant Stewart and six men on the sick list.

BRIGADE ORDER.

SACKETT'S HARBOR, April 25th, 1813.

When the debarkation shall take place on the enemy's shore, major Forsyth's light troops, formed in four platoons, shall be first landed. They will advance a small distance from the shore, and form the chain to cover the landing of the troops. They will not fire, unless they discover the approach of a body of the enemy, but will make prisoners of every person who may be passing, and send to the general. They will be followed by the regimental platoons of the first brigade, with two pieces of Brook's artillery, one on the right and one on the left flank, covered by their musketry, and the small detachments of riflemen, of the 15th and 16th infantry. Then will be landed the three platoons of the reserve of the first brigade, under major Swan; then major Eustis, with his train of artillery, covered by his own musketry; then colonel McClure's volunteers in four platoons, followed by the 21st regiment, in six platoons. When the troops shall move in column, either to meet the enemy or take a position, it will be in the following order, viz: 1st, Forsyth's riflemen, with proper front and flank guards; the regiments of the first brigade, with their pieces; then three platoons of reserve; major Eustis's train

lery; volunteer corps; twenty-first regiment; each corps; out proper flank-guards. When the enemy shall be dis- in front, the riflemen will form the chain, and maintain ound, until they have the signal (the preparative) or receive o retire, at which they will retreat with the greatest velo- d form equally on the two flanks of the regiments of the igade, and then renew their fire. The three reserve pla- f this line will form under the orders of major Swan, one l yards in the rear of the colours, ready to support any hich may show an unsteady countenance. Major Eustis train will form in the rear of this reserve, ready to act circumstances may dictate.

second line will be composed of the 21st infantry, in six s, flanked by colonel M'Clure's volunteers, equally divided, troops. The whole under the orders of colonel Ripley. expected that every corps will be mindful of the honour of *erican arms*, and the disgraces which have recently tarnish- arms; and endeavour, by a cool and determined discharge r duty, to support the one, and wipe off the other. The n in front will maintain their ground at all hazards, until l to retire, as will *every corps of the army*. With an as- e of being duly supported, should the commanding general prudent to withdraw the front line, he will give orders to y the heads of platoons, covered by the riflemen; and the line will advance by the heads of platoons, pass the inter- nd form the line; call in the light troops, and renew the : but the general may find it proper to bring up the *second* one or both flanks, to charge in columns, or perform a variety oubles which it would be impossible to foresee. But as a l rule, whatever may be the directions of line at the com- ment of the action, the corps will form as before directed. y then advance in line, it may be in parallel eschelons of as, or otherwise, as the ground or circumstances may dic-

man will load until ordered, except the light troops in front, within a short distance of the enemy, and then *charge bayo-* thus letting the enemy see, that we can meet them with wn weapons. Any man *firing, or quitting his post, without* , must be put to instant death, as an example may be neces- Platoon officers will pay the greatest attention to the cool- id aim of their men in the fire; their *regularity* and *dress-* the charge. The field officers will watch over the *conduct whole*. *Courage and bravery* in the field do not more dis- ash the soldier, than humanity after victory; and whatever oles the savage allies of our enemies may have given us, the d confidently hopes, that the blood of an unresisting or ng enemy, will never stain the weapons of the *soldiers of his* R.

The unoffending citizens of Canada are many of them our own countrymen, and the poor Canadians have been forced into the war. Their property, therefore, must be held sacred; and any *soldier* who shall so far neglect the honour of his profession as to be guilty of plundering the inhabitants, shall, if convicted, be punished with *death*. But the commanding general assures the troops, that should they capture a large quantity of *public stores*, he will use his best endeavours to procure them a reward from his government.

This order shall be read at the head of each corps, and every field officer shall carry a copy, in order that he may at any moment refer to it; and give explanations to his subordinates.

All those found in arms in the enemy's country, shall be treated as enemies; but those who are peaceably following the pursuits of their various vocations, friends—and their property respected.

By order of the brigadier general,
Z. M. PIKE.

CHARLES G. JONES,
assistant aid-de-camp.

UNITED STATES' SHIP MADISON,
at anchor off York, Upper Canada, April 28th, 1813.

SIR,

Agreeably to your instructions and arrangements with major general Dearborn, I took on board the squadron under my command, the general and suite, and about 1700 troops, and left Sackett's Harbor on the 25th instant for this place. We arrived here yesterday morning, and took a position about one mile south and westward of the enemy's principal fort, and as near the shore as we could, with safety to the vessels. The place fixed upon by the major general and myself for landing the troops, was the site of the old French fort Tarento.

The debarkation commenced about 8 o'clock A. M. and was completed about ten. The wind blowing heavy from the eastward, the boats fell to leeward of the position fixed upon, and were, in consequence, exposed to a galling fire of the enemy, who had taken a position in a thick wood near where the first troops landed; however, the cool intrepidity of the officers and men overcame every obstacle. Their attack upon the enemy was so vigorous, that he fled in every direction, leaving a great many of his killed and wounded upon the field. As soon as the troops were landed, I directed the schooners to take a position near the forts, in order that the attack on them by the army and navy might be simultaneous. The schooners were obliged to beat up to their position, which they did in a very handsome order, under a very heavy fire from the enemy's batteries, and took a position within

six hundred yards of their principal fort, and opened a cannonade upon the enemy, which did great execution, and much contributed to their final destruction. The troops, as landed, were formed under the immediate orders of their general Pike, who led in a most gallant manner the attack upon the forts, and after having carried two redoubts in their march to their principal works, the enemy (having previously fired a train) blew up his magazine, which in its effects upon our troops, was dreadful, having killed and wounded a great many, amongst the former, the ever to be lamented brigadier general who fell at the head of his column by a contusion received from a heavy stone from the magazine. His death at this time, is to be regretted, as he had the perfect confidence of the general; and his known activity, zeal and experience, his loss a national one.

Consequence of the fall of general Pike, the command of the troops devolved, for a time, upon colonel Pearce, who soon took possession of the town. About 2 P. M. the American flag was substituted for the British, and at about four our troops were in quiet possession of the town. As soon as general Dearborn learned the situation of general Pike, he landed, and assumed command. I have the honour of enclosing a copy of the declaration which was entered into, and approved by general Dearborn and myself.

The enemy set fire to some of his principal stores, containing quantities of naval and military stores, as well as a large quantity upon the stocks, nearly finished. The only vessel found was the Duke of Gloucester, undergoing repairs. The Prince of Wales left here on the 24th, for Kingston. We have not yet returned made of the naval and military stores; consequently we form no idea of the quantity, but have made arrangements to take all taken on board that we can receive; the rest will be destroyed.

We do regret the death of midshipmen Thompson and Hatfield and several seamen killed—the exact number I do not know, as the returns from the different vessels have not yet been received. From the judicious arrangements made by general Dearborn, I presume that the public stores will be disposed of, and that the troops will be ready to re-embark to-morrow, and proceed to execute other objects of the expedition the first fair wind. I do not speak in too much praise of the cool intrepidity of the officers and men generally, under my command, and I feel myself particularly indebted to the officers commanding vessels, for their zeal in seconding my views.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Isaac William Jones,
Secretary of the Navy.

HEAD QUARTERS, YORK, UPPER CANADA,
April 28th, 1813.

SIR,

After a detention of some days, by adverse winds, we arrived here yesterday morning, and at 8 o'clock commenced landing our troops, about three miles westward of the town, and one and a half from the enemy's works. The wind was high and in an unfavourable direction for our boats, which prevented the troops landing at a clear field, the ancient site of the French fort Taranto. The unfavourable wind prevented as many of the armed vessels from taking such positions as would as effectually cover our landing, as they otherwise would have done; but every thing that could be done was effected.

Our riflemen, under major Forsyth, first landed, under a heavy fire from Indians and other troops. General Sheaffe commanded 7 person. He had collected his whole force in the woods, near where the wind obliged our troops to land, consisting of about 700 regulars and militia, and 100 Indians. Major Forsyth was supported as promptly as possible with other troops; but the contest was sharp and severe for near half an hour. The enemy was repulsed by a far less number than their own; and as soon as general Pike landed with 7 or 800 men, and the remainder of the troops were pushing for the shore, the enemy retreated to their works; and as soon as the whole of the troops had landed and formed on the beach, ground intended for the first landing, they advanced through the thick wood to the open ground near the enemy's works, and after carrying one battery by assault, were moving on in columns towards the main works; when the head of the columns was within about sixty rods of the enemy, a tremendous explosion occurred from a large magazine prepared for the purpose, which discharged such immense quantities of stone, as to produce a most unfortunate effect on our troops. I have not yet been able to collect the returns of our killed and wounded, but our loss by the explosion, must, I fear, exceed 100; and among them, I have to lament the loss of the brave and excellent officer, brigadier general Pike, who received such a contusion from a large stone, as terminated his valuable life within a few hours. *His loss will be severely felt.*

Previous to the explosion, the enemy had retired into the town, excepting a party of regular troops, which did not retire early enough to avoid the shock; it is said that upwards of forty of them were destroyed. General Sheaffe moved off with the regular troops, and left directions with the commanding officer of the militia, to make the best terms he could. In the mean time, all further resistance on the part of the enemy ceased, and the outlines of a capitulation were agreed on. As soon as I was informed of general Pike's being wounded, I went on shore. I had been induced to confide the immediate command of the troops in action to general Pike, from a conviction that he fully expected it, and would be much mortified at being deprived of the honour,

be highly appreciated. Every movement was under my
 Our troops behaved with great firmness, and deserve much
 praise, especially those who were first engaged, under circum-
 stances that would have tried the firmness of veterans. Our loss in
 the morning, and in carrying the first battery, was not
 probably about fifty killed and wounded; among them, were
 a proportion of officers; and although the enemy had a de-
 advantage in point of numbers and position, at the com-
 ment, their loss was greater than ours, particularly in of-

was with the greatest exertion that the small vessels of the
 could work into the harbour against a gale of wind directly
 ; but as soon as they got in contact with the batteries, a
 ndous cannonade commenced from 24 and 32 pounders, and
 ept up without intermission, under a heavy fire from two
 ies, until the enemy's batteries were carried or blown up by
 pllosion, which undoubtedly had a powerful effect on the
 r. I am under the greatest obligations to commodore Chaun-
 r his able and indefatigable exertions in every possible man-
 at could give facility and effect to the expedition. He is
 ly estimable for deliberate sound judgment, bravery and in-
 r. The government could not have made a more fortunate
 ion for the important trust he holds. Unfortunately, the
 r's armed ship, the "Prince Regent," left this place for
 ton, four days before we arrived. A large ship on the stocks,
 r planked up, with a large store of naval stores, were set on
 y the enemy, soon after the explosion of the magazine.
 are no vessels fit for use in the harbour. A considerable
 ity of military stores and provisions remained. We shall
 ossess the means of transporting the prisoners from this
 and must, of course, leave them on parole. I hope we shall
 complete the necessary measures at this place, in the course
 s day, as to be able to sail to-morrow for Niagara, by which
 I shall send this by a small vessel, with notice to general
 of our approach.

I am sir, your obedient servant,
 H. DEARBORN.

John Armstrong,
 Secretary of War.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP MEIGS, May 5th, 1813.

I am sorry to inform you of another disaster to the Kentucky
 , not indeed bearing any comparison to that of the river
 in point of killed and wounded, but exceeding it as to the
 er of prisoners. I had the honour to inform you in my
 of the 28th instant, that the British troops destined to be-

siege this place were then in view.' On the succeeding night they broke ground upon the heights opposite, and on the following morning our batteries opened upon them and continued a partial firing throughout that and the following day. On the first of May the enemy returned it from a two gun and one mortar battery, and on the second from a third gun battery. On the night of the third they passed a part of their troops to this side of the river, and opened another gun and mortar battery within two hundred and fifty yards of our lines. They were soon however driven from that position, and obliged to take one at a more respectful distance.

On the first, second, and third instant, the fire was most incessant and tremendous. Five and a half and eight and a half inch shells, with twenty-four pound ball, fell in showers in our camp, and would have produced the most unfortunate effect, but from the great pains and labour which had been bestowed in the erection of traverses, which in a great degree shielded our camp from the former. For the latter there was no preventative but that of taking the batteries. About twelve o'clock last night an officer arrived in a boat from general Clay, to inform me of his approach, and that he would reach this place in about two hours. I immediately determined upon a general sally, and sent an officer to general Clay directing him to land eight hundred men some short distance above, to attack and carry the batteries, spike the cannon and destroy the artillery. The general was unfortunately delayed longer than he expected in passing the Rapids, and the detachment destined to make the attack did not reach the landing until near nine o'clock. This however did not prevent them from making the attempt, and never was any thing more completely successful. The four batteries were immediately taken possession of, and their defenders driven off, and the cannon spiked. Here the work of our men was done. But that confidence which always attends militia when successful, proved their ruin, although there was time sufficient to return to the boats before a reinforcement arrived to the enemy. They remained upon the grounds in spite of the repeated calls which we made across the river to bring them back, suffered themselves to be amused and drawn into the woods by some faint skirmishing, whilst the British troops and an immense body of Indians, were soon brought up. A severe action then took place. The British immediately interrupted the retreat of our men to the plain over the river, where they would have been under cover of our cannon; but about one hundred and fifty only, out of nearly eight hundred effectives, made their escape to the boats. Where the balance of general Clay's force made its appearance and attempted to land above the garrison, their flank was attacked by a large body of Indians. I immediately ordered out a detachment consisting of part of the 19th United States' regiment, about one hundred twelve months' volunteers, and some militia. They however succeeded in driving the enemy entirely off. Pursuant to the plan which I had formed, an attack was then

made upon the batteries on this side of the river, conducted by colonel Miller, of the 19th regiment, with part of his regiment, the aforesaid volunteers, and a few militia. This attack was also completely successful. The enemy were driven from their works, a number killed, and two British officers and forty-one privates brought into camp. This attack was intended to be simultaneous with that on the other side, and it was nearly so. Notwithstanding the severe loss we have sustained in the Kentucky militia, the events of the day have been honourable to the American arms. The detachment under colonel Miller suffered very little, and had the militia been contented with executing what they were ordered to do, every object which I had contemplated would have been accomplished.

I have only time to add that I am confident of my ability to defend this place until the expected large reinforcements arrive; and that I am, with great respect, &c.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

Honourable John Armstrong,
Secretary of War.

Extract of a letter from Stephen H. Moore, captain of the Baltimore volunteers, to his brother, dated

NIAGARA, May 5th, 1813.

"I last wrote you from the harbor, stating that I was then about to embark with my company, together with general Pike's brigade, for the purpose of making a descent on the Canada shore. I have to inform you now of the result, which has been victorious and glorious to the American arms, although peculiarly unfortunate to me. We arrived at the head of lake Ontario on Tuesday morning the 27th ultimo, and debarked the forces about a mile above York, the capital of Upper Canada. Here we were met on the beach by about five hundred British regulars and two hundred and fifty Indians. We contended with them warmly for about an hour, when we succeeded in driving them before us, and made good our landing, with a loss of some brave officers, and about forty men killed and wounded. We then formed immediately, moved up to York, and when arrived just at the opening of the main street, the enemy sprung a mine upon us, which destroyed about eighty of his own men, and killed and wounded about one hundred and thirty of our men. This horrible explosion has deprived me of my leg, and otherwise grievously wounded me. I was taken from the field, and carried on board the commodore's ship, where my leg was amputated, and I am now likely to recover. Two of my company were killed at the same time, and four or five more of my brave fellows were severely wounded, now out of danger. We have taken the capital of the enemy, and about a

million and a half worth of public stores and other property. We have killed and wounded about three hundred British and their savage allies, and have taken prisoners about seven hundred men. We have taken from them also several vessels of war which were found in the harbor, and destroyed a 32 gun frigate, then on the stocks.

"This is the severest blow the British have felt since the war, and is to them irremediable. It will teach them a lesson of American bravery, which they cannot soon forget. The conquest of Upper Canada is now no longer doubtful, as almost all the guns, munitions of war, and provisions, necessary to carry on the present campaign, were deposited at York, and have been taken by us. General Pike, however, the brave and gallant projector of this enterprize, fell in the very moment of complete victory, at the head of his column. We have suffered severely in loss of officers; two captains and fourteen lieutenants have been killed, and five captains and seven lieutenants wounded. My wound, they say, is a very good one, but it has maimed me for life. Lieutenant Irvine received a bayonet through his right shoulder, at the moment of stepping out of the boat, but is doing very well. Gill and Warner escaped unhurt. My company distinguished themselves gloriously, and were noticed for their determined spirit."

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP MEIGS, May 9th, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that the enemy having been several days making preparations for raising the siege of this post, accomplished this day the removal of their artillery from the opposite bank, and about 12 o'clock, left their encampment below, were soon embarked and out of sight. I have the honour to enclose you an agreement entered into between general Proctor and myself, for the discharge of the prisoners of the Kentucky militia in his possession, and for the exchange of the officers and men of the regular troops which were respectively possessed by us. My anxiety to get the Kentucky troops released as early as possible, induced me to agree to the dismissal of all the prisoners I had, although there was not as many of ours in general Proctor's possession. The surplusage is to be accounted for, and an equal number of ours released from their parole, whenever the government may think proper to direct it.

The two actions on this side the river on the 5th, were infinitely more important and more honourable to our arms, than I had at first conceived. In the sortie made upon the left flank, captain Waring's company of the 19th regiment, a detachment of twelve month's volunteers under major Alexander, and three companies of Kentucky militia under colonel Boswell, defeated at least double the number of Indians and British militia.

The sortie on the right was still more glorious ; the British batteries in that direction were defeated by the grenadier and light infantry companies of the 41st regiment, amounting to two hundred effectives, and two companies of militia, flanked by a host of Indians. The detachment sent to attack those, consisted of all the men of duty belonging to the companies of Croghan and Bradford, of the 17th regiment ; Langham's, Elliott's (late Graham's) and Waring's, of the 19th ; about eighty of major Alexander's volunteers, and a single company of Kentucky militia under captain Sebree ; amounting in the whole to not more than three hundred and forty. Yet the event of the action was not a moment doubtful, and had not the British troops been covered by their retreat by their allies, the whole of them would have been taken.

It is not possible for troops to behave better than ours did throughout ; all the officers exerted themselves to execute my orders, and the enemy, who had a full view of our operations from the opposite shore, declared that they had never seen so much work performed in so short a time.

To all the commandants of corps I feel particular obligations. These were colonel Miller of the 19th infantry, colonel Mills of the Ohio militia, major Stoddard of the artillery, major Ball of the dragoons, and major Johnson of the Kentucky militia. Captain Gratiot of the engineers, having been for a long time much indisposed, the task of fortifying this post devolved on captain Wood. It could not have been placed in better hands. Permitted me to recommend him to the President, and to assure you that any mark of his approbation bestowed on captain Wood, would be highly gratifying to the whole of the troops who witnessed his arduous exertions.

From major Hukill, acting inspector general, my aid-de-camp, major Graham, lieutenant O'Fallon, who has done the duty of assistant adjutant general in the absence of major Adams, and my volunteer aid-de-camp John Johnson, esq. I received the most useful assistance.

I have the honour to enclose you a list of the killed and wounded during the siege, and in the two sorties ; those of the latter were much greater than I had at first expected.

Want of sleep and exposure to the continued rains which have fallen almost every day for some time past, render me incapable of mentioning many interesting particulars ; amongst others the most extraordinary proposition of general Proctor's, on the subject of the Indians within our boundary : this shall form the subject of a communication to be made to-morrow or next day, and for which I will provide a safer conveyance than that which carries this. All the prisoners and deserters agree in saying, that the information given to major Stoddard, by Ryland, of the British having launched a sloop of war this spring, is incorrect, and the

most of them say, that the one which is now building, will not be launched for many weeks.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

Honourable John Armstrong,
Secretary of War.

P. S. Captain Price, of the regiment light artillery, and the twenty regulars, prisoners with general Proctor, were taken on the north-western side of the river, with the Kentucky militia. We had no prisoners taken on this side during the siege.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT MENUS, May 9th, 1813.

The information received by the general, and the movements of the enemy, indicating their having abandoned this post, the general congratulates his troops on having completely foiled their foes, and put a stop to that career of victory which has hitherto attended their arms. He cannot find words to express his sense of the good conduct of the troops of every description and every corps, as well in sustaining and returning the fire of the enemy, as for their assiduity and patience in performing those laborious duties which the occasion called for. Where merit was so general, indeed almost universal, it is difficult to discriminate. The general cannot, however, omit to mention the names of those whose situation gave them an opportunity of being more particularly useful. From the long illness of captain Gratiot, of the corps of engineers, the arduous and important duties of fortifying the camp devolved on captain Wood, of that corps. In assigning to him the first palm of merit, as far as relates to the transactions within the works, the general is convinced his decision will be awarded by every individual in the camp who witnessed his indefatigable exertions, his consummate skill in providing for the safety of every point, and in foiling every attempt of the enemy, and his undaunted bravery in the performance of his duty in the most exposed situations. An unfortunate wound in the commencement of the siege deprived the general, after that time, of the able services of major Stoddard, of the artillery, whose zeal and talents had been eminently useful. Captain Gratiot, in the remission of a severe illness, took charge of a battery, and managed it with ability and effect. Captain Cushing, of the artillery, and captain Hall, of the 17th infantry.

going duty with the former corps) were extremely active and
ive to their post. To colonel Miller and major Todd, of
th United States' infantry; majors Ball of the dragoons,
ck, and major Ritzer of the Ohio militia, and major Johnson

Kentucky militia, rendered the most important services.
ch of the above gentlemen, as well as to each captain,
ern, non-commissioned officer, and private of their respec-
ommands, the general gives his thanks and expresses his
est approbation; also to adjutant Brown, Mr. Peters, con-
of artillery; Mr. Lien, principal artificer; Mr. Timberlee,
serjeants Henderson, Tommes and Meldrum, who sever-
ad charge of batteries and block-houses. The battery man-
y serjeant Henderson was, as the enemy confessed, managed
eculiar efficacy and effect with respect to the sorties which
made on the 5th instant. The subsequent information
has been received from the prisoners, has given the gallant
which were engaged on those occasions additional claims
the gratitude of their general. It is ascertained that in
stances the enemy far outnumbered our troops. The
al gives his thanks to brigadier general Clay, for the promp-
with which the detachment of his brigade were landed,
e assiduity shown by him in forming them for the attack
left: to colonel Boswell and major Fletcher, for their
try and good conduct in leading them in the charge made
enemy, and to captains Dudley, Simons and Medcalf, the
erns, non-commissioned officers and privates, for the dis-
shed valor with which they defeated the enemy. The gene-
s, in the order of the 6th instant, expressed his sense of the
ct of the regular troops and volunteers, which were engaged
sorties on the left flank, but he omitted to mention captain
e's company of Kentucky militia, whose gallantry was not
used by that of any of the companies which fought by their

The Pittsburg blues, led by lieutenant M'Gee, in the ill-
f their gallant captain, sustained the reputation which they
quired at Mississineway. The Petersburg volunteers and
nant Drum's detachment, discovered equal intrepidity. To
detachments from the 17th and 19th United States' regiments,
their respective commanders, captains Croghan, Bradford,
am, Elliott, and Nering, the honourable task was assigned
rming the British batteries, defended by two hundred Bri-
renadiers and light infantry, flanked by an host of Indians
vo companies of Canadian militia. Colonel Miller speaks
highest terms of the captains before mentioned, and lieute-
Campbell, Gwynn, Lee, Kercheval and Rees; and of en-
Shep, Hawkins, Harrison, Mitchell, and Stockton. The
al requests colonel Miller, major Todd, and each of the
s above named, together with all the officers, non-commis-
officers and soldiers, who were engaged on the fifth instant,

to accept his thanks. The general is under the highest obligations to his staff for their conduct, as well in the action of the fifth as for the assistance which he received from them throughout the siege. Major Hukill, the acting inspector general, distinguished himself by his assiduity in forwarding the part of our works which was most necessary and which was most exposed to the fire of the enemy. From major Graham, his aid-de-camp, his volunteer aid-de-camp, J. Johnson, esq. and from lieutenant O'Fallon, acting assistant adjutant general, as well as from the deputy quarter-master, Mr. Eubank, he received the greatest assistance.

It rarely occurs that a general has to complain of the excessive ardour of his men, yet such appears always to be the case whenever the Kentucky militia are engaged. It is indeed the source of all their misfortunes. They appear to think that their valour can alone accomplish any thing. The general is led to make this remark from the conduct of captain Dudley's company of the — regiment, as he has understood that that gallant officer was obliged to turn his espartoon against his company to oblige them to desist from a further pursuit of the enemy, in compliance with an order from the general. Such temerity, although not so disgraceful, is scarcely less fatal than cowardice. And in the instance above, had it been persisted in, would have given a different result to the action, as the whole of the enemy's force which were placed near the batteries, would have been precipitated upon the rear of our detachment. The pursuit being stopped, allowed time for a new disposition under cover of our cannon, and the enemy's batteries were attacked and carried without difficulty.

JOHN O'FALLON,
Acting assist. Adj. Gen.

— — — — —
LOWER SANDUSKY, May 13th, 1813.

SIR,

Having ascertained that the enemy (Indians as well as British) had entirely abandoned the neighbourhood of the Rapids, I left the command of Camp Meigs with general Clay, and came here last night. It is with the greatest satisfaction I inform you, sir, that the loss of the Kentucky troops in killed, on the north side of the river, does not exceed fifty. On the 10th and 11th instant, I caused the ground which was the scene of action, and its environs, to be carefully examined, and after the most diligent search, forty-five bodies only of our men were discovered; amongst them was the leader of the detachment, colonel Dudley. No other officer of note fell in the action. I have strong reason to believe that a considerable number of the Kentuckians effected their retreat up the river to fort Winchester. General Proctor did not furnish me with a return of the prisoners in his possession,

though repeatedly promised. His retreat was as precipitate as could properly be, leaving a number of cannon ball, a new elegant sling carriage for cannon, and other valuable articles. The night before his departure, two persons that were employed on the British gun-boats (Americans by birth) deserted to us. The information they gave me was very interesting: they say that the Indians, of which there were from 1600 to 2000, left the British the day before their departure, in a high state of dissatisfaction, from the great loss they had sustained in the several engagements of the 5th, and the failure of the British in accomplishing their promise of taking the post at the Rapids. From the count given by these men, my opinion is confirmed of the great superiority of the enemy which were defeated by our troops in the two sallies made on the 5th inst. That led by colonel Miller did not exceed 350 men, and it is very certain that they defeated 200 British regulars, 150 militia, and 4 or 500 Indians. That American regulars (although they were raw recruits) and such men as compose the Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, and Petersburg (Va.) volunteers, should behave well is not to be wondered at; but that a company of militia should maintain its ground against four times its number, as did captain Seabee's, of the Kentucky, is truly astonishing. These brave fellows were at length, however, entirely surrounded by Indians, and would have been cut off; but for the gallantry of lieutenant Guynne, of the 19th regiment, who, with the aid of captain Elliott's company, charged the enemy, and rescued the Kentuckians. I enclose you a list of the killed and wounded during the whole siege;—it is considerably larger than supposed it would be, when I last wrote you—but it is satisfactory to know, that they did not bleed uselessly, but in the course of successful exertions. The return does not embrace those who fell on the north-western side of the Miami.

You will also receive, herewith, a monthly return of the troops at camp Meigs for the last month; the communication with the other posts being cut off, the returns were not received. A copy of general Clay's report to me, of the manner of his executing my order, for the attack on the enemy's batteries, is likewise forwarded, by which it will be seen that my intentions were perfectly understood, and the great facility with which they might have been executed, is apparent to every individual who witnessed the scene. Indeed the cannon might have been spiked, the carriages cut to pieces, the magazine destroyed, and the retreat effected to the boats, without the loss of a man, as none were killed in taking the batteries, so complete was the surprise.

An extensive open plain intervenes between the river and the hill, upon which the batteries of the enemy were placed; this plain was raked by four of our eighteen pounders, a twelve and a six. The enemy, even before their guns were spiked, could not have brought one to bear upon it. So perfectly secured was their

retreat, that the 150 men who came off, effected it without loss, and brought off some of the wounded, one of them on the backs of his comrades. The Indians followed them to the woods, but dared not enter into the plain.

I am unable to form a correct estimate of the enemy's force. The prisoners varied much in their accounts; those who made them least, stated the regulars at 560, and militia at 800, but the numbers of the Indians were, beyond comparison, greater than have ever been brought into the field before; numbers arrived after the siege commenced. I have caused their camps on the south-east side of the river, to be particularly examined, and the general opinion is, that there could not have been fewer on that side, than 1000 or 1200; they were, indeed, the efficient force of the enemy.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your favours, of the 14th, 18th, and 28th ultimo, and 5th instant.

I am sorry to inform you, that major Stoddard died the night before I left the Rapids, of a lock-jaw, produced by a slight wound, from a fragment of a shell, which struck him on the thigh. Several have died in this way, from their great and unavoidable exposure to the cold; but perhaps there were never so many instances of desperate wounds likely to do well.

The gallant captain Bradford will recover.

I shall go from here, to Upper Sandusky, and shall take my station at Delaware or Franklinton, until the troops are assembled. General Clay, who commands at the Rapids, is a man of capacity, and entirely to be relied on.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

The Hon. John Armstrong,
Secretary of War.

Killed 81,—wounded 189, in the siege of camp Meigs and the several sorties of the 5th of May, 1813.

CAMP AT FORT MEIGS, May 13th, 1813.

SIR,

On the 5th instant, about 8 o'clock, A. M. descending the Miami of the lake, about midway to the Rapids, with 1200 of the Kentucky troops in the eighteen flat bottomed boats, I was met by captain Hamilton and a subaltern, who delivered me, (as he said) the orders of major general Harrison, to the following effect:

"You must detach about 800 men from your brigade, who will land at a point I will show, about one or one and a half miles above the fort, and I will conduct them to the British batteries on the left bank of the river. They must take possession of the

enemy's cannon, spike them, cut down the carriages, and return to their boats."

Observing that the British force at their large batteries, was inconsiderable, but that their main force was at the old garrison, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles below, on the same side of the river; that the Indian forces were chiefly on the right bank of the river: "The balance of the men under your command, must land on the right bank, opposite to the first landing, and will fight their way through the Indians to the fort:" observing that the route thus to be taken, would be shown by a subaltern officer there, in company with captain Hamilton, who would land the perogue at the point on the right bank, at which the boats would land.

The order of descending the river in boats, was the same as the order of march in the line of battle, in solid column, each officer taking position according to his rank. Colonel Dudley, the eldest colonel, led the van, and in this order the river had been descended. As soon as captain Hamilton had delivered these orders, being in the thirteenth boat from the front, I directed him to proceed immediately to colonel Dudley, and order him to take the men in the twelve front boats, and execute general Harrison's orders on the left bank of the river; and to post his (captain Hamilton's) subaltern on the right bank to conduct myself with the men in the six boats to the fort. I ordered the five boats in the rear to fall in a line, and follow me. High winds and the rapidity of the current, drove four of the rear boats ashore, in the attempt to follow on according to order, where they remained a short time, sufficient, however, to detain them half, or three quarters of a mile to the rear. To land according to order, I kept close along the right bank, until opposite colonel Dudley's landing. There I found no guide left to conduct me to the fort, as captain Hamilton had promised. I then made an attempt to cross the river and join colonel Dudley, but from the rapid current on the falls, I was unable to land on the point with him. Being nearly half way across the river, and the waves running too high to risk the boats; then driving down the current sidewise—veered about the boat and rowed the best way we could to save our boat. My attempt to cross the river to colonel Dudley, occasioned all the boats, (I presume in the rear of me) and which were then out of hailing distance, to cross over and land with colonel Dudley. Having been defeated in landing on the left, we then endeavoured to effect one on the right, even without a guide: but before a landing could be effected, we received a brisk fire from the enemy on shore, which was returned and kept up on both sides. And I was in this unavoidable situation, compelled to make fort Meigs, with no other force than about 50 men on board, (the other boats being still in the rear) and to receive the enemy's fire, until we arrived under the protection of the fort. Colonel Boswell's command (except the men in my boat) having landed to join colonel Dudley, were, as I have been informed, ordered by captain

Hamilton immediately to embark and land on the right hand shore, about a mile above the fort, and prepare to fight his way through to the garrison.

The colonel embarked, landed, as he conceived, at the proper point, pursuant to captain Hamilton's order, and was forming his men in order of battle, when he was met by captain Shaw, and ordered to march into the garrison at open order, the safest route.

When my own boat landed, we were met by two men who took charge of the boat, as we understood, to bring her under the protection of the fort batteries. Believing our baggage to be thus made safe, we forbid our servants to carry any portion of it, but loaded them with cannon ball, which they bore to the fort. Our baggage was, however, taken by the Indians in a very short time after we left the boat. Upon receiving the orders of captain Hamilton, I asked if he had brought spikes to spike the enemy's cannon, to which he replied he had plenty.

I am, sir, respectfully, &c.

GREEN CLAY, *Brig. Gen.*

His excellency major general Harrison.

P. S. Captain Hamilton, on delivering the orders of general Harrison, observed, that the object of landing and marching a portion of the troops on the right bank, was to draw the attention of the Indians, and by thus engaging them, afford an opportunity to the garrison to make a sally, and by a circuitous route, surprise and carry the batteries and cannon of the enemy below the fort on the right bank.

BRIGADE ORDERS.

BRIGADE HEAD QUARTERS,

Camp, Four Mile Creek, May 26th, 1813.

Conformity to the general order of the 25th and 26th instant, the first brigade will embark at 3 o'clock to-morrow morning. The several regiments will hold themselves in readiness accordingly. The boats of the brigade will form in three lines succeeding colonel Scott's advance party. The 15th regiment, formed in column of battalion, the right in front, will precede. The 6th and 16th will successively follow in the same order. Colonel McClure's volunteers will flank the right of the brigade, and move accordingly. Four pieces of the light artillery will move in the rear of the 18th regiment, and four in the rear of the 16th regiment; the first four to form on the right of the brigade, the other to form on the left of the brigade. The troops will land in column, and form immediately in order of battle. Colonel Miller, of the 6th, on the right, major King, of the 15th, in the

entre, and colonel Pearce, of the 16th, on the left. Colonel McClure's volunteers on the right flank of the brigade. The commanding officers of regiments will carry the regimental standard in the boat in which they embark, and each boat its regimental camp colour. To guard the stores and camp equipage of each regiment, one commissioned officer, one non-commissioned officer, and a sufficient number of non-effectives, will be left.

The commanding officers of regiments will be responsible that the boats which have been assigned to them, are in perfect readiness to receive the troops by the time designated for embarkation.

The troops which compose the 1st brigade, have already once triumphed over the foe they have again to encounter. Their country expects much from them, and will not be disappointed. With their present numbers and accustomed bravery, the flag of the United States will once more wave over the territory of Canada.

JOHN P. BOYD,
Brig. Gen. Comd'g 1st Brigade.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE,
Upper Canada, May 27th, 1812.

SIR,

The light troops under the command of colonel Scott and major Forsyth, landed this morning at 9 o'clock. Major general Lewis's division, with colonel Porter's command of light artillery, supported them. General Boyd's brigade landed immediately after the light troops, and generals Winder and Chandler followed in quick succession. The landing was warmly and obstinately disputed by the British forces; but the coolness and intrepidity of our troops, soon compelled them to give ground in every direction. General Chandler with the reserve (composed of his brigade and colonel Macomb's artillery) covered the whole. Commodore Chauncey had made the most judicious arrangements for silencing the enemy's batteries near the point of landing. The army is under the greatest obligation to that able naval commander, for his indefatigable exertions, in co-operating in all its important movements, and especially in its operations this day. Our batteries succeeded in rendering fort George untenable; and when the enemy had been beaten from his position, and found it necessary to re-enter it, after firing a few guns, and setting fire to the magazines, which soon exploded, moved off rapidly in different routes. Our light troops pursued them several miles. The troops having been under arms from 1 o'clock in the morning, were too much exhausted for any further pursuit. We are now in possession of fort George and its immediate dependencies; to morrow we shall proceed further. The behaviour of our troops, both officers and men, entitle them to the highest

praise; and the difference of our loss with that of the enemy, when we consider the advantages his positions afforded him, is astonishing. We had seventeen killed and forty-five wounded. The enemy had ninety killed and one hundred and sixty wounded of the regular troops. We have taken one hundred prisoners exclusive of the wounded. Major Meyers of the 49th was wounded and taken prisoner. Of ours only one commissioned officer was killed, Lieutenant Hobart, of the light artillery. Inclosed is the report of major general Lewis.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. DEARBORN.

Gen. John Armstrong.

ON THE FIELD, 1 o'clock, May 27th, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

Fort George and its dependencies are ours. The enemy, beaten at all points, has blown up his magazines and retired. It is impossible at this moment to say any thing of individual gallantry. There was no man who did not perform his duty in a manner which did honour to himself and his country. Scott and Forsyth's commands, supported by Boyd's and Winder's brigades, sustained the brunt of the action.* Our loss is trifling, perhaps not more than twenty killed and thrice that number wounded. The enemy left in the hospital one hundred and twenty-four, and I sent several on board the fleet. We have also made about one hundred prisoners of the regular forces.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

MORGAN LEWIS.

Major general Dearborn.

BRIGADE ORDER.

NEWARK, May 28th, 1813.

The general commanding 1st brigade feels a peculiar satisfaction in congratulating the troops on their glorious achievements of yesterday. Their conduct was such as to entitle them to the thanks of their commander, and the gratitude of their country.

Colonel Miller of the 6th regiment deserves great applause for the steadiness and rapidity with which he supported the advance party under the gallant Scott; the 15th, under major King, impatient to share in the honour of the day, immediately seconded and formed under a most galling fire; the 16th, under colonel Pearce, urged their boats to the shore, and bore an honourable participation in the contest. The light artillery, under colonel Porter, merits the highest encomiums, for their indefati-

* Note. Winder's brigade was not in this action. The battle was won by Boyd's brigade and Scott and Forsyth's commands, before Winder was enabled to land.—Barr.

able exertions and persevering success in bringing up their ordnance. They surmounted every obstacle. Much was expected from colonel M'Clure's volunteers, and the general has not been disappointed: it will be his duty as well as inclination to make their claims known to the commander in chief. As all the troops behaved so well, it would be a difficult task to discriminate those who were pre-eminent; but the general cannot suppress his admiration of the fortitude of major King, who continued to lead his regiment through the severity of the contest, long after having received a painful and debilitating wound. The exertions of the officers and men who ascended the bank and formed amidst such a destructive fire, excited his admiration, and astonished their enemy's, and will convince their countrymen as well as foes, that valour will overcome every resistance. The general will find great satisfaction in obeying the order of the commander in chief, which required him to make a report of conspicuous merit, whether found in the commissioned officer or in the ranks, and they may be assured that their distinguished actions shall not pass without the proper encomium.

Although the general has not particularized discriminate merit, he may perhaps be excused in recording the intrepid conduct of his aid-de-camp, lieutenant Whiting, and brigade major captain Craffton. They have justified his expectations, and are entitled to his applause.

If there is any honour due to your brigadier general, it is his having had the command of such a gallant band of heroes.

By order of brigadier general Boyd.

H. WHITING, *Aid.*

SACKETT'S HARBOR, May 29th, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

We were attacked at the dawn of this day by a British regular force of, say at least, 900 men, most probably 1200. They made good their landing at Horse Island. The enemy's fleet consisted of two ships and four schooners and thirty large open boats. We are completely victorious. The enemy left a considerable number of killed and wounded on the field, among the number several officers of distinction. After having re-embarked they sent me a flag desiring to have their killed and wounded attended to. I made them satisfied upon that subject. Americans will be distinguished for humanity and bravery. Our loss is not numerous, but serious from the great worth of those who have fallen. Lieutenant colonel Mills was shot dead at the commencement of the action, and lieutenant colonel Bacchus, of the 1st regiment of light dragoons, nobly fell at the head of his regiment as victory was declaring for us. I will not presume to praise this regiment; their gallant conduct on this day merits much more than praise.

The new ship and commodore Chauncey's prize, the "Duke of Gloucester," are yet safe in Sackett's Harbor.

Sir George Prevost landed and commanded in person. Sir James Yeo commanded the enemy's fleet.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JACOB BROWN.

Major general Dearborn.

P. S. It is very probable we shall be again attacked, as sir George Prevost must feel very sore. We are however greatly reinforced from the country, and by the arrival of 450 regulars under colonel Tuttle, who arrived very shortly after the action was over, and I trust that you may rest satisfied that we shall not be disgraced.

FORT GEORGE, June 6th, 1813.

SIR,

I have received an express from the head of the lake this evening, with the intelligence that our troops were attacked at 2 o'clock this morning, by the whole British force and Indians; and by some strange fatality, though our loss was small and the enemy was completely routed and driven from the field, both brigadier generals Chandler and Winder were taken prisoners. They had advanced to ascertain the situation of a company of artillery, where the attack commenced. General Chandler had his horse shot under him and was bruised by the fall. General Vincent, their commander, is supposed to have been killed. Colonel Clark was mortally wounded, and fell into our hands, with sixty prisoners of the 49th. The command devolved on colonel Burn, who has retired to the Forty Mile Creek. If either of the general officers had remained in command, the enemy would have been pursued and cut up, or if colonel Burn had been an officer of infantry. The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners, must exceed two hundred and fifty. The enemy sent in a flag next morning with a request to bury their dead. Generals Lewis and Boyd set off immediately to join the advanced army. I never so severely felt the want of health as at present, at a time when my services might perhaps be most useful. I hope general Hampton will repair here as soon as possible.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. John Armstrong.

L'ORIENT, (FRANCE,) June 12th, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that the United States' brig Argus, has arrived here in a passage of 23 days, all well. On our

message fell in with (in pursuing our course) the British schooner, *Salamanca*, (formerly the *King of Rome*, of New York) of 250 tons, pierced for eighteen guns, mounting six, and manned with sixteen men. She was from Oporto, bound to New Foundland in ballast; captured and burnt her.

I shall immediately proceed to put in execution your orders as to our ulterior destination.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM H. ALLEN.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

NIAGARA, June 14th, 1813.

SIR,

You will perceive by the enclosed copy of orders marked 1, that general Dearborn, from indisposition, has resigned his command, not only of the Niagara army, but of the district. I have doubts whether he will ever again be fit for service. He has been repeatedly in a state of convalescence, but relapses on the least agitation of mind.

In my last I mentioned the unfortunate circumstance of the capture of our two brigadiers, Chandler and Winder. The particulars are detailed in the report of colonel Burn, which he gives from the best information he could collect. His corps lay a considerable distance from the scene of active operation, as you will perceive by the enclosed diagram, which is on a scale of about one hundred yards in the inch. The light corps spoken of, were captains Hindman's, Nicholas's, and Biddle's company of the 2d artillery, serving as infantry. These three gentlemen, and captains Archer and Towson, of the same regiment, and Leonard, of the light artillery, are soldiers who would honour any service. Their gallantry, and that of their companies, was equally conspicuous on this occasion as in the affair of the 27th ultimo. A view of general Chandler's encampment will be sufficient to show that his disaster was owing to its arrangements. Its centre being its weakest point, and that being discovered by the enemy in the evening, received the combined attack of the whole force, and his line was completely cut. The gallantry of the 5th, 25th, and part of the 23d, and light troops, saved the army. Of the 5th it is said, that when the day broke, not a man was missing—and that a part of the 23d, under major Armstrong, was found sustaining its left flank. Their fire was irresistible, and the enemy was compelled to give way. Could he have been pressed the next morning, his destruction was inevitable. He was dispersed in every direction, and even his commanding general was missing, without his hat or horse. I understand he was found the next morning almost famished, at a distance of four miles from the scene of action.

Lieutenant M'Chesney's gallantry recovered a piece of artillery, and prevented the capture of others. He merits promotion for it.

On the evening of the 6th of June, I received the order No. 4, and joined the army at 5 in the afternoon of the 7th. I found it at the Forty Mile Creek, ten miles in the rear of the ground on which it had been attacked, encamped on a plain of a mile in width, with its right flank on the lake, and its left on the creek which skirts the base of a perpendicular mountain of a considerable height. On my route I received No. 5 and 6, enclosed.

At 6 in the evening, the hostile fleet hove in sight, though its character could not be ascertained with precision. We lay on our arms all night. At dawn of day struck our tents, and descried the hostile squadron abreast of us, about a mile from the shore. Our boats which transported the principal part of our baggage and camp equipage lay on the beach; it was a dead calm, and about 6, the enemy towed in a large schooner, which opened her fire on our boats. As soon as she stood for the shore, her object being evident, I ordered down Archer's and Towson's companies, with four pieces of artillery, to resist her attempts. I, at the same time, sent captain Totten, of the engineers (a most valuable officer) to construct a temporary furnace for heating shot, which was prepared and in operation in less than 30 minutes. Her fire was returned with a vivacity and effect (excelled by no artillery in the universe) which soon compelled her to retire. A party of savages now made their appearance on the brow of the mountain, (which being perfectly bald, exhibited them to our view,) and commenced a fire on our camp. I ordered colonel Chrystie to dislodge them, who entered on the service with alacrity, but found himself anticipated by lieutenant Eldridge, the adjutant of his regiment, who, with a promptness and gallantry highly honourable to that young officer, had already gained the summit of the mountain, with a party of volunteers, and routed the barbarian allies of the defender of the Christian faith. This young man merits the notice of government.

These little affairs cost us not a man. Sir James Yeo, being disappointed of a tragedy, next determined, in true dramatic style, to amuse us with a farce. An officer, with a flag, was sent to me from his ship, advising me, that as I was invested with savages in my rear, a fleet in my front, and a powerful army on my flank, he, and the officers commanding his Britannic majesty's land forces, thought it their duty to demand a surrender of my army. I answered, that the message was too ridiculous to merit a reply.

No. 7 was delivered to me, about 6 this morning; between 7 and 8 o'clock, the four wagons we had, being loaded, first with the sick, and next with the ammunition, &c. the residue of camp equipage and baggage was put in boats, and a detachment of 200 men of the 6th regiment, detailed to proceed in them. Orders were prepared to be given them to defend the boats, and if assailed by any of the enemy's small vessels, to carry them by

boarding. By some irregularity, which I have not been able to discover, the boats put off without the detachments, induced probably by the stillness of the morning. When they had progressed about three miles, a breeze sprang up, and an armed schooner overhauled them; those who were enterprizing kept on and escaped, others ran to the shore and deserted their boats; we lost twelve of the number, principally containing the baggage of the officers and men.

At ten, I put the army in motion, on our return to this place. The savages and incorporated militia hung on our flanks and rear throughout the march, and picked up a few stragglers. On our retiring, the British army advanced, and now occupy the ground we left.

The enemy's fleet is constantly hovering on our coast, and interrupting our supplies. The night before last, being advised of their having chased into Eighteen Mile Creek, two vessels laden with hospital stores, &c. I detached at midnight, 75 men for their protection. The report of the day is (though not official) that they arrived too late for their purpose, and that the stores were lost.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORGAN LEWIS.

Honourable John Armstrong,
Secretary of War.

Report of killed, wounded and missing, in the action of the 6th of June, at Stoney Creek.

Killed,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
Wounded,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38
Missing,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	99
Total,								<u>154</u>

HALIFAX, June 15th, 1813.

SIR,

The unfortunate death of captain James Lawrence, and lieutenant Augustus C. Ludlow, has rendered it my duty to inform you of the capture of the late United States' frigate Chesapeake.

On Tuesday, June 1st, at 8 A. M. we unmoored ship, and at meridian got under weigh from President's Roads, with a light wind from the southward and westward, and proceeded on a cruise. A ship was then in sight in the offing, which had the appearance of a ship of war, and which, from information received from pilot-boats and craft, we believed to be the British frigate Shannon. We made sail in chase, and cleared ship for action. At half past 4 P. M. she hove to with her head to the southward and eastward. At 5 P. M. took in the royals and top-gallant sails, and at half

past 5, hauled the courses up. About 15 minutes before 6 P. M. the action commenced within pistol shot. The first broadside did great execution on both sides, damaged our rigging, killed, among others, Mr. White the sailing master, and wounded captain Lawrence. In about 12 minutes after the commencement of the action, we fell on board of the enemy, and immediately after, one of our arm chests on the quarter-deck was blown up by a hand-grenade thrown from the enemy's ship. In a few minutes, one of the captain's aids came on the gun-deck to inform me that the boarders were called. I immediately called the boarders away, and proceeded to the spar-deck, where I found that the enemy had succeeded in boarding us, and gained possession of our quarter-deck. I immediately gave orders to haul on board the fore-tack, for the purpose of shooting the ship clear of the other, and then made an attempt to re-gain the quarter-deck, but was wounded and thrown down on the gun-deck. I again made an effort to collect the boarders, but in the mean time the enemy had gained complete possession of the ship. On my being carried down in the cockpit, I there found captain Lawrence and lieutenant Ludlow, both mortally wounded; the former had been carried below, previously to the ship's being boarded; the latter was wounded in attempting to repel the boarders. Among those who fell early in the action, was Mr. Edward J. Ballard, the 4th lieutenant, and lieutenant James Broom, of marines.

I herein enclose you a return of the killed and wounded, by which you will perceive that every officer, upon whom the charge of the ship would devolve, was either killed or wounded, previously to her capture. The enemy report the loss of Mr. Watt, their first lieutenant, the purser, the captain's clerk, and 23 seamen killed; and captain Broke, a midshipman, and 56 seamen wounded.

The Shannon, had, in addition to her full complement, an officer and 16 men belonging to the Belle Poule, and a part of the crew belonging to the Tenedos.

I have the honour be, &c.

GEORGE BUDD.

The Hon. William Jones,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

Return of killed and wounded on board the Chesapeake, in her action with the Shannon.

Killed—Officers, - - -	10	Wounded—Officers, - - -	21
Seamen, - - -	26	Seamen, - - -	57
Marines, - - -	11	Marines, - - -	20
Total killed,	47	Total wounded,	98

SACKETT'S HARBOR, June 18th, 1813.

According to your orders of the 14th instant, I proceeded off the Isle, in the schooner Lady of the Lake. On the morning 16th fell in with and captured the English schooner Lady, from Kingston, bound to York, loaded with provisions and ammunition.

Enclosed is a list of one ensign, fifteen non-commissioned officers and privates, found on board, with six men attached to the

I have the honour to be, &c.

WOLCOTT CHAUNCEY.

Frederic Chauncey.

MONTREAL, June 18th, 1813.

I deem it my duty to embrace the earliest opportunity possible to give you a more detailed account of the affair of the 6th instant near Stony Creek, than I have before had it in my power to do. The morning of the 5th I arrived at Forty Mile Creek. The regiment under general Winder was then under marching for Stony Creek. After a short halt the whole marched to that place and arrived there between five and six o'clock, P. M. At that place a small picket of the enemy was posted, but retired on our approach. The advanced guard pursued, and soon fell in with a picket of about 100 strong, under colonel Williams. A fight ensued. I hastened to the main body. Williams retreated, but our advance pursued. The pursuit was continued rather than I could have wished, but returned to their proper position on the line of march, not far from sun-set. I had ordered the 14th, who were in the rear, to take a position for the night near the mouth of the creek, to cover the boats, (should they arrive) which would be on the route which I intended to pursue the next morning; and a favourable position presenting itself, I moved with the residue of the troops (except captain Archer's company of artillery, which encamped with the 13th and 14th) on to the place where we had halted, with an advanced picket from half a mile's quarters of a mile in front, with express orders for them to be at constantly a patrol. A right and left flank guard and a rear guard were also posted. I gave positive orders for the troops to keep their arms. Contrary to my orders fires were kindled; there are doubts whether this operated for or against us, as the fire of the 25th, which were in front, and by my orders had been abandoned, enabled us to see a small part of the enemy, the fires on our left enabled the enemy to see our line. On the whole, I think it operated against us. I did expect the enemy to attack us that night, if he intended to fight; but perhaps he was not expected by all. I had my horse confined near me,

and directed that the harness should not be taken from the artillery horses. I directed where and how the line should be formed in case of attack. About an hour before day-light on the morning of the 6th, the alarm was given. I was instantly up, and the 25th, which lay near me, was almost as instantly formed, as well as the 5th and 23d, which was on the left, under the immediate eye of general Winder. Owing to the neglect of the front picket, or some other cause, the British forces say that they were not hailed, or an alarm given, until they were within 300 yards of our line. The extreme darkness prevented us from seeing or knowing at what point they intended to attack us, until an attack was made upon our right. A well directed fire was opened upon them from the 25th, and from nearly the whole line. After a few minutes I heard several muskets in our rear, in the direction of the rear guard, and then expected that the enemy had gained our rear by some path unknown to us, and was about to attack us the rear. I instantly ordered colonel Milton, with the 5th, to form in our rear near the woods, to meet such circumstances which might take place, knowing that I could call him to any other point if necessary, at any moment. I had observed that the artillery was not covered, and directed general Winder to cause the 23d to be formed so far to the right, that their right should cover the artillery. At this moment I heard a new burst of fire from the enemy's left, on our right, and not able to see any thing which took place, I set out full speed towards the right, to take measures to prevent my right flank from being turned, which I expected was the object of the enemy. I had proceeded but a few yards before my horse fell under me, by which fall I received a serious injury. Here was a time when I have no recollection of what passed, but I presume it was not long. As soon as I recovered, I recollected what my object was, and made my way to the right, and gave major Smith such directions as I thought proper, to prevent his right from being turned by surprise. I was then returning toward the centre, and when near the artillery, heard men, who, by the noise, appeared to be in confusion, it being the point at which I expected the 23d to be formed; I expected it was that regiment.

I approached them, and as soon as I was near enough, I saw a body of men, who I thought to be the 23d, in the rear of the artillery, broken. I hobbled in amongst them, and began to rally them, and directed them to form; but I soon found my mistake it was the British 49th who had pushed forward to the head of their column, and gained the rear of the artillery. I was immediately disarmed, and conveyed down the column to its rear. It was not yet day, and the extreme darkness of the night, to which was added the smoke of the fire, put it totally out of our power to see the situation of the enemy. This was all that saved our columns from sure and total destruction, of which some of our officers are aware. After seeing the situation of the columns

assed, I did hope and expect that general Winder, on the first dawn of light, would see their situation, and bring colonel Milton with the 5th (whom I had still kept in reserve until I could have day-light to discern their situation) to attack this column, which I am sure he would have done to advantage; but, to my mortification, I soon learned that he had fallen into the same mistake with myself; and by endeavouring to learn what was taking place in the centre, he was also taken, as well as major Van De Water. To the extreme darkness of the night, the enemy's knowledge of his intended point of attack, and our not knowing at what point to expect him, must be attributed this partial success, and not to a want of strength or bravery in our troops, who generally behaved remarkably well under all circumstances; and however unfortunate the event, as it relates to myself, I only ask that all the circumstances may be taken into consideration, in making up your opinion upon the conduct of general Winder and myself in this affair, which I am sure you will do, and I flatter myself you will see no cause of censure. I regret that my degraded situation, and the rapidity with which we have been brought to this place, has put it out of my power to give you a detailed account of the affair earlier. I am now able to walk some with the aid of a cane, and hope I shall continue to recover.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN CHANDLER,

Brigadier General.

Major General Dearborn.

NAVY YARD, GOSPORT, June 21st, 1813.

IR,

On Saturday, at 11 P. M. captain Tarbell moved with the flotilla under his command, consisting of 15 gun-boats in two divisions; lieutenant John M. Gardner, 1st division, and lieutenant Robert Henley, the 2d, manned from the frigate; and 50 musketeers general Taylor ordered from Craney Island, and proceeded down the river; but adverse winds and squalls prevented his approaching the enemy until Sunday morning at 4 P. M. when the flotilla commenced a heavy galling fire on a frigate, at about three quarters of a mile distance, lying well up the roads, two other frigates lying in sight. At half past 4 a breeze sprung up from east north east, which enabled the two frigates to get under way, one a razee or very heavy ship, and the other a frigate, to come near into the action. The boats in consequence of their approach hauled off, though keeping up a well directed fire on the razee and other ship, which gave us several broadsides. The frigate first engaged, supposed to be the Junon, was certainly very severely handled. Had the calm continued one half hour, that frigate must have fallen into our hands or been destroyed. She

must have slipped her mooring so as to drop nearer the razee, who had all sails set coming up to her with the other frigate. The action continued one hour and a half with the three ships. Shortly after the action the razee got along side of the ship, and had her upon a deep careen in a little time with a number of boats and stages round her. I am satisfied considerable damage was done to her, for she was silenced some time, until the razee opened her fire, when she commenced again. Our loss is very trifling. Mr. Allison, master's mate on board number 139, was killed early in the action by an eighteen pound ball, which passed through him and lodged in the mast. Number 154 had a shot between wind and water. Number 67 had her franklin shot away, and several of them had some of their sweeps as well as their stauntions shot away; but two men slightly injured by the splinters from the sweeps. On the flood tide several ships of the line and frigates came into the roads, and we did expect an attack last night. There are now in the roads thirteen ships of the line and frigates, one brig and several tenders.

I cannot say too much of the officers and men on this occasion, for every man appeared to go into action with so much cheerfulness, apparently to do their duty, resolved to conquer. I had a better opportunity of discovering their actions than any one else, being in my boat the whole of the action.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN CASSIN.

The Secretary of the Navy.

ATTACK UPON CRANEY ISLAND.

NAVY YARD, GOSPORT, June 23d, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that on the 20th the enemy got under way, in all thirteen sail, and dropped up to the mouth of James River, one ship bearing a flag at the mizen. At 5 P. M. were discovered making great preparation with troops for landing, having a number of boats for the purpose. Finding Craney Island rather weak manned, captain Tarbell directed lieutenants Neale, Shubrick and Sanders, with 100 seamen on shore, at 11 A. M. to a small battery on the north west point of the island. Tuesday 22d, at the dawn, the enemy were discovered landing round the point of Nansemond River, said to be 4,000 troops; and at 8 A. M. the barges attempted to land in front of the island, out of reach of the shot from the gun-boats, when lieutenants Neale, Shubrick and Sanders, with the sailors; and lieutenant Brackenbridge, with the marines of the Constellation, 150 in number, opened the fire, which was so well directed, that the enemy were glad to get off, after sinking three of their largest boats. One of them, called the Centipede, admiral Warren's boat, fifty feet in length, carried 75

en, the greater part of whom were lost by her sinking. Twenty soldiers and sailors were saved, and the boats hauled up. I presume there were forty fell back in the rear of the island, and commenced throwing rockets from Mr. Wise's houses; when in-boat 67 threw a few shots over that way, they dispersed and went back.

We have had all day deserters from the army coming in; I have myself taken in 25, and 18 prisoners belonging to the Centepede.

The officers of the Constellation fired their 18 pounder more like riflemen than artillerists. I never saw such shooting, and seriously believe they saved the island. In the evening their boats came round the point of Nansemond, and at sun-set were seen returning to their ships full of men. At dusk they strewed the shore along with fires, in order to runaway by the light.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN CASSIN,

the honourable William Jones,
Secretary of the Navy.

AFFAIR AT BEAVER DAMS.

FORT GEORGE, June 25th, 1813.

SIR,

I have the mortification of informing you of an unfortunate and unaccountable event which occurred yesterday. On the 23d, evening, colonel Boerstler with 570 men, infantry, artillery, cavalry and riflemen, in due proportion, was ordered to march, by the way of Queenstown, to a place called the Beaver Dams, on the high ground, about eight or nine miles from Queenstown, to attack and disperse a body of the enemy collected there for the purpose of procuring provisions and harassing those inhabitants who are considered friendly to the United States; their force was, from the most direct information, composed of one company of the 104th regiment, above 80 strong; from 150 to 200 militia, and from 50 to 60 Indians. At 8 o'clock yesterday morning, when within about two miles of the Beaver Dams, our detachment was attacked from an ambuscade, but soon drove the enemy some distance into the woods, and then retired to a clear field, and sent an express for a reinforcement, saying he would maintain his position until reinforced. A reinforcement of 300 men, marched immediately, under the command of colonel Chrystie; but on arriving at Queenstown, colonel Chrystie received authentic information, that lieutenant colonel Boerstler, with his command, had surrendered to the enemy, and the reinforcement returned to camp. A man who belonged to a small corps of volunteer riflemen, came this morning, who states that the enemy surrounded our de-

achment in the woods, and towards 12 o'clock, commenced a general attack; that our troops fought more than two hours, until the artillery had expended the whole of its ammunition, and then surrendered, and at the time of the surrender, the informant made his escape. Why it should have been deemed proper to remain several hours in a position surrounded with woods, without either risking a decisive action, or effecting a retreat, remains to be accounted for, as well as the project of waiting for a reinforcement, from a distance of 15 or 16 miles.

No information has been received of the killed or wounded. The enemy's fleet has again arrived in our neighbourhood.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. DEARBORN.

The Secretary of War.

U. S. FLOTILLA, CAPE MAY, June 29th, 1813.

SIR,

Laying off Dennis's Creek this morning, I discovered that an enemy's sloop of war had chased a small vessel, and had taken her near the Overfalls. I immediately got under weigh and stood down the bay. The sloop of war stood so near the Overfalls that she grounded slightly on the outer ridge of Crow's Shoals. I thought proper to endeavour to bring him to action. I succeeded and got within three quarters of a mile, and anchored the boats (consisting of eight gun boats and two block sloops) in a line ahead. A heavy frigate had by this time anchored about a half mile further out. After a cannonade of one hour and forty-five minutes, in which the ships kept up a constant and heavy fire, heaving their shot from a half to three quarters of a mile over us, they doing us little or no damage, their shot seldom striking us, the sloop of war and frigate finding our shot to tell on their hulls, manned their boats, ten in number, (2 launches, the rest large barges and cutters) with from 30 to 40 men each, and despatched them after gun boat No. 121, sailing marter Shead, which had unfortunately fell a mile and a half out of the line, although it had been my positive and express orders to anchor at half cable length apart, and not further. From the strong ebb tide they succeeded in capturing her, after a gallant resistance, (for three times did No. 121 discharge her long gun, apparently full of canister, among the whole line of boats, when at a very short distance, which must have done execution, and not till after he was boarded did the colours come down) before any assistance could be given her: however, we got near enough to destroy three or four of their boats, and must have killed a vast number of men. It being a calm, they succeeded in getting her away, by sending all their boats ahead and towing her, but have paid dearly for their temerity; they must at least have had one-third of their men killed and

wounded. They put one shot through the foot of the Buffaloe's rib, and one through the under part of the bowsprit, and cut gun boat No. 125, sailing master L. Moleire's rigging in several places, and an eighteen pound shot struck her long gun and indented it several inches; but happy am I to say, that not a man was wounded in any of the boats, except the one captured, and have not yet learned their fate. I feel much indebted to lieutenant Mitchell, and officers commanding gun boats, for their spirited conduct in carrying into execution my orders; and if I may judge from the gallant resistance made by sailing master Shead, in engaging when surrounded by the boats of the enemy, that every officer and man of the flotilla will do their duty in all situations.

I have the honour to be, &c.

SAMUEL ANGUS,
Commanding U. S. Del. flotilla.

P. S. The action commenced at 7 minutes before 1 P. M. and ended at 37 minutes after 2 P. M.

U. S. FRIGATE ESSEX, PACIFIC OCEAN,
July 2d, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that on the 29th of April, in the latitude of 40 north, longitude 91 15 west, about 20 miles to the northward of the island of Albermarle, one of the Gallapagos, in the Pacific Ocean, I captured the British ship Montezuma; two others being in sight, close together, distant from us about 7 miles, which we were informed were the British letters of marque ships Policy and Georgiana; the first mounting 10 guns, 6 and 9 pounders; the other six 18 pounders, 4 swivels, and 6 long blunderbusses mounted on swivels. The wind being light and variable, and confiding greatly in the bravery and enterprise of my officers and men, and apprehensive of their escape from the prevalence of fogs in that climate, I directed the boats of this ship to be armed and manned, and divided into two divisions, placing the first under the command of lieutenant Downes, 1st lieutenant, in a whale boat, accompanied by midshipman Farragutt. The officers in command of boats under lieutenant Downes, were lieutenant S. D. M'Knight, in the 3d cutter, accompanied by midshipman W. H. Odenheimer, sailing master John P. Cowell, in the jolly boat, accompanied by midshipman H. W. Ogden, and midshipman George Isaacs, in the 2d cutter. The 2d division under the command of lieutenant Wilmer, 2d lieutenant in the pinnace, accompanied by midshipman Henry Gray, and master's mate James Terry; lieutenant Wilson and Mr. Shaw, purser, in the 1st cutter, and lieutenant Gamble, of the marines, in the gig.

Suitable signals were established, and each boat had her particular station pointed out for the attack, and every other previous arrangement was made to prevent confusion. The boats, seven in number, rowed off in admirable order. Guns were fired from the enemy to terrify them; they rowed up under the muzzles of the guns and took their stations for attacking the first ship, and no sooner was the American flag displayed by lieutenant Downes, as the signal for boarding, and the intention was discovered by the enemy, than the colours were struck, without a shot being fired; so much were they daunted by the intrepidity of our brave officers and men. They then left a crew on board the prize and took their stations for attacking the other vessel, when her flag was also struck, on the first call to surrender. Thus were two fine British ships, each pierced for 20 guns, worth near half a million of dollars, mounting between them 16 guns and manned with 55 men, well supplied with ammunition and small arms, surrendered, without the slightest resistance, to seven small open boats, with fifty men, armed only with muskets, pistols, boarding-axes, and cutlasses! Be assured, sir, that Britons have either learned to respect the courage of Americans, or they are not so courageous themselves as they would wish us to believe.

I have the honour to be yours, &c.

D. PORTER.

The Secretary of the Navy, at Washington:

U. S. FRIGATE ESSEX, AT SEA,
Pacific Ocean, July 2d, 1813.

SIR,

On the 23d March last, I sailed from ——— shaping my course to the northward, and on the 26th of the same month fell in with the Peruvian corsair ship *Nereyda*, mounting 15 guns. She had, a few days before, captured two American whale ships, the crews of which (amounting in number to twenty-four men) were then detained prisoners on board her; and they could assign no other motive for the capture, than that they were the allies of Great Britain, and as such should capture all American vessels they could fall in with; therefore, to prevent in future such vexatious proceedings, I threw all her armament into the sea, liberated the Americans, and dismissed the *Nereyda*. I then proceeded with all possible despatch for Lima, to intercept one of the detained vessels, which had parted with the *Nereyda* only three days before, and I was so fortunate as to arrive there and re-capture her on the 5th of April, at the moment she was entering the port. This vessel (the ship *Barclay*, captain Gideon Randall, of New Bedford) I took under my protection, and have had her with me ever since.

From Lima I proceeded to the Gallapagos Islands, where I captured the following British ships, viz :

Letters of Marque.

Montezuma,	270 tons,	21 men,	2 guns.
Policy,	275	26	10
Georgiana,	280	23	6
Atlantic,	351	24	8
Greenwich,	338	25	10

The Georgiana being reputed a very fast sailer, and apparently well calculated for a cruiser, I mounted 16 guns on her, and gave the command of her to that excellent officer, lieutenant John Downes, with a complement of 42 men ; appointing midshipman W. H. Hadaway acting lieutenant on board her, and sent her on a cruise. Lieutenant Downes joined me at Tumbez, near Guyaquil, on the coast of Peru, on the 24th June, after capturing 3 prizes, to wit :

Letters of Marque ships.

Hector,	270 tons,	25 men,	11 guns.
Catharine,	270	29	8
Rose,	220	21	8

The 1st had two men killed and six badly wounded in her rencontre with the Georgiana ; and the Rose was discharged (after being deprived of her armament) with all the prisoners captured by the Georgiana, as they amounted to nearly double her crew ; she was furnished with a passport to proceed to St. Helena.

My own prisoners I liberated on parole at Tumbez. I found by experience that the Georgiana did not deserve the character given of her sailing. I therefore shipped her officers and crew to the Atlantic, and mounted on her 20 guns, with a complement of 60 men, and appointed midshipman R. Dashiell acting sailing master on board of her. To this vessel I gave the name of the Essex Junior. I also fitted up the ship Greenwich, as a store-ship, and mounted on her 20 guns, placing her under the command of lieutenant Gamble, of the marines. On board her I have put all the provisions and stores of my other prizes, except a supply of three and a half months for each, and have by this means secured myself a full supply of every necessary article for seven months. I had hoped to dispose of my other prizes at Guyaquil : the governors in Peru, however, are excessively alarmed at my appearance on the coast, as my fleet amounts now to nine sail of vessels, all formidable in their appearance, and they would, if they dare, treat us with hostility little short of declared enemies.

I have given to Mr. John G. Cowell, sailing master, an appointment to act 3d lieutenant ; midshipman John S. Cowan to act 4th lieutenant, and midshipman Odenheimer as sailing master. I beg, sir, that the appointment of those officers, as well as of lieutenant S. D. M'Knight, who is acting second lieutenant, and those serving

on board the *Essex Junior*, may be confirmed by the department. I have given to Mr. M. W. Bostwick, my clerk, the appointment of acting midshipman ; not that he is desirous of coming forward in the navy in that line, but I hoped by this means to introduce him to the notice of the department, as I shall take the liberty to recommend him strongly as a suitable person to hold the appointment of purser. Doctors Richard R. Hoffman, and Alexander M. Montgomery, two gentlemen of great merit, who volunteered their services with me at the commencement of hostilities, have received acting appointments from me, the first as surgeon to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of doctor Miller ; the other as surgeon's mate. To the great care and attention of those gentlemen, may, in a considerable degree, be attributed the extraordinary health of the crew ; and as they are both desirous of joining the navy, I hope their appointments may be confirmed.

I have also appointed my marine officer and chaplain to the command of prizes. They all enter with cheerfulness into their new duties ; and if the expedition should not prove successful, it will not be, I am persuaded, owing to our want of activity or vigilance ; and of this you must be satisfied, as for the last eight months we have been constantly at sea, with the exception of 23 days, and yet, sir, we have enjoyed extraordinary health and spirits ; no symptom of the scurvy having yet appeared in the ship, nor have we, at this moment, more than two on the sick list ; and their diseases are more owing to the infirmities of old age than any other cause. Indeed, sir, when I compare my present situation with what it was when I doubled Cape Horn, I cannot but esteem myself fortunate in an extraordinary degree. There my ship was shattered by tempestuous weather, and destitute of every thing ; my officers and crew half starved, naked and worn out with fatigue. Now, sir, my ship is in prime order, abundantly supplied with every thing necessary for her. I have a noble ship for a consort of 20 guns, and well manned ; a store-ship of 20 guns well supplied with the best of every thing we may want, and prizes which would be worth in England two millions of dollars ; and what renders the comparison more pleasing, the enemy has furnished all. Excuse me, sir, for not making known my present intentions, as this letter may not reach you. It, however, may be satisfactory to you to know how I intend to dispose of my prizes ; let it suffice to say that I shall endeavor to [cypher.]

British letters of marque are numerous in these seas, and, were it not for my arrival, our whale fishers would have been much harrassed ; but they now find it necessary to keep together for mutual protection. I expect to be [cypher] but shall be [cypher.]

Subjoined is a list of deaths since I left the United States, and beg you will relieve the anxiety of my family, and all our friends, by communicating as much of this letter as you may think proper.

The times of my best men have expired : but their attachment to the ship, and their zeal for the service we are engaged on,

prevent all complaints on that account. It is not probable that you will hear from me for several months to come, unless some disaster happens; but, I beg leave to assure you, sir, that I shall not be idle; and I hope before my return to make the services of the *Essex* as important as those of any other ship. We may not be individually benefitted, but we shall do the enemy much injury, which will be a sufficient compensation to us for all the hardships and privations we must naturally experience, while cut off from all communication with the rest of the world, and are dependent on the precarious supplies the enemy may afford.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, yours, &c.

D. PORTER.

Hon. Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

List of deaths on board the Essex since my departure from the United States.

1812, December 3, Levi Holmes, seaman, palsy.

1813, January 24, Edward Sweeny, ordinary seaman, old age.

January 24, Samuel Groce, seaman, contusion of the brain, by a fall from the main yard.

March 1, Lewis Price, marine, consumption.

April, 4, James Shafford, gunner's mate, accidental gun shot—wound of the lungs.

May 25, Dr. Robert Miller, surgeon, disease of the liver.

May 26, Benjamin Geers, qr. gr. inflammation of the stomach.

June 29, John Rodgers, qr. gr. fall from the main yard.

WASHINGTON, July 30th, 1813.

SIR,

I consider myself bound to lay before you, what came under my knowledge, while on board the *Chesapeake*, as well as on board the *Shannon*.

After the enemy had completely possession of the ship, midshipmen Randolph and Flushman were ordered from the fore and main-top. In coming down the shrouds, lieutenant Faulkner, (the British officer) said to his men, *kill those damned rascals*. Then, and immediately, several muskets were discharged at them, but without effect. My station was in the mizen-top, where I had an opportunity of seeing their actions. I was looking on deck, when I saw one of the *Chesapeake's* men crawling along, attempting to get below, with one of his legs off. *One of the enemy stepped up to him with his cutlass, and immediately put an end to his existence.*

Lieutenant Faulkner looked up in the mizen-top; pointed at me,—said to his men, go up, three of you, and throw that damned yankee overboard. They immediately rushed up, seizing me by the collar; now, said they, you damned yankee, you shall swim for it, attempting to throw me overboard; but I got within the rigging, when one of them kicked me in the breast, which was the

cause of my falling; being stunned by the fall, I lay some time senseless, and *when I came to, I was cut over the head with a cutlass*, which nearly terminated my existence. Eleven of our midshipmen were confined in a small place, nine feet by six, with an old sail to lie on, and a guard at the door, until a day or two before our arrival at Halifax; and likewise eleven of us upon five rations, and some days only one meal. Our clothes were taken on board of the Shannon; lieutenant Wallis, the commanding officer on board, would not let us take our clothes below with us, but pledged his word and honour as an officer, we should receive our clothes. But we discovered next morning *that their midshipmen had on our clothes and side-arms*. We were conversing together respecting our clothes, one of their midshipmen overheard our conversation, and made report to the lieutenant commanding. He then sent word to us, that if we said any thing more about the clothes, he would put us in the forehold with the men. We expected to receive our clothes when we arrived in port; but I assure you, sir, nothing was ever restored. *Other rascally things occurred*, which our officers will, when they return, make known to the public, *disgraceful to a civilized nation*. If your request could have been made sooner, I should have felt gratified in making a fuller statement.

I have the honour to be, &c.
WILLIAM BERRY.

Hon. L. Condit, Washington.

GEORGETOWN, July 30th, 1813.

SIR,

Having perused a letter of yours to Mr. Berry, requesting information respecting the treatment of the American officers and seamen of the late Chesapeake, I consider myself bound, sir, to lay before you what came under my knowledge. My having been wounded and remaining on board the Chesapeake might not give me that scope for observation which others possessed; but I am sorry to say, *many things transpired disgraceful to a brave enemy*. Whilst undressing myself in the steerage, after the Americans were driven below or had surrendered, and after resistance had ceased, I believe entirely, several muskets and pistols were at once pointed down the hatchway, and discharged in the direction of the cock-pit, and as the steerage and cock-pit were filled with wounded, in all probability some of them were killed outright.

It was midshipman Hopewell, and not Livingston, who was so inhumanly treated, as described in the public prints. It has been the custom in our navy, to take the side-arms of officers, (prisoners) but to return them on leaving the ship. Ours were taken, worn, and never restored, together with what nautical instru-

ments they could lay their hands on. When spoken to by the American officers on the subject, the answer was, *such things were free plunder*. A day or two after the action, I was conversing with lieutenants Budd and Mr. Nichols, near the taffrail, respecting the engagement, when it was observed some of the Shannon's men were listening to our conversation. Immediately after, lieutenant Faulkner, the commanding officer, ordered sentinels to be placed at the mizen-mast. And said he to them, if you see any of the Chesapeake's officers abaft the mizen-mast, cut them down, if you see them conversing together cut them down without hesitation. It will be remembered that three officers who caused this order, were all severally wounded. We received no caution, and overheard it by accident. So great was the rage for plunder, that captain Lawrence, before his death, could not obtain a bottle of wine from his private stores, without a note from the doctor to the lieutenant commanding. I pass over the robbing of the midshipmen on board the Shannon, as it did not come under my immediate notice. If your request could have been made earlier, I should have felt gratified in making a fuller statement.

Yours respectfully,
WM. A. WEAVER,

The Hon. Lewis Condit, Washington.

HEAD QUARTERS, SENECA TOWNS,
August 4th, 1813

SIR,

In my letter of the 1st instant, I did myself the honour to inform you that one of my scouting parties had just returned from the lake shore, and had discovered the day before, the enemy in force near the mouth of the Sandusky bay. The party had not passed Lower Sandusky two hours before the advance, consisting of Indians, appeared before the fort, and in half an hour after a large detachment of British troops; and in the course of the night they commenced a cannonading against the fort with three six pounders and two howitzers. The latter from gun boats. The firing was partially answered by major Croghan, having a six pounder, the only piece of artillery.

The fire of the enemy was continued at intervals during the second instant, until about half after five P. M. when finding that their cannon made little impression upon the works, and having discovered my position, and here apprehending an attack, an attempt was made to carry the place by storm. Their troops were formed in two columns, lieutenant colonel Short headed the principal one composed of the light Battalion companies of the 41st regiment. This gallant officer conducted his men to the brink of the ditch under the most galling and destructive fire from the garrison,

and leaping into it, was followed by a considerable part of his own and the light company; at this moment a masked port hole was suddenly opened, and a six pounder with an half load of powder, and a double charge of leaden slugs at the distance of 30 feet poured destruction upon them, and killed or wounded nearly every man who had entered the ditch. In vain did the British officers exert themselves to lead on the balance of the column; it retired in disorder under a shower of shot from the fort, and sought safety in the adjoining woods. The other column, headed by the grenadiers, had also retired, after having suffered from the muskets of our men, to an adjacent ravine. In the course of the night the enemy, with the aid of their Indians, drew off the greater part of the wounded and dead, and embarking them in boats, descended the river with the utmost precipitation. In the course of the 2d instant, having heard the cannonading, I made several attempts to ascertain the force and situation of the enemy. Our scouts were unable to get near the fort from the Indians that surrounded it. Finding, however, that the enemy had only light artillery, and being well convinced that it could make little impression upon the works, and that any attempt to storm it would be resisted with effect, I waited for the arrival of 250 mounted volunteers, which on the evening before had left Upper Sandusky. But as soon as I was informed that the enemy were retreating, I set out with the dragoons to endeavour to overtake them, leaving generals M^r Arthur and Cass to follow with all the infantry (about 700) that could be spared from the protection of the stores and sick at this place. I found it impossible to come up with them. Upon my arrival at Sandusky, I was informed by the prisoners that the enemy's forces consisted of 490 regular troops and 500 of Dixon's Indians, commanded by general Proctor in person, and that Tecumseh, with about 2000 warriors, was somewhere in the swamps between this and Fort Meigs, expecting my advance or that of a convoy of provisions. As there was no prospect of doing any thing in front, and being apprehensive that Tecumseh might destroy the stores and small detachments in my rear; I sent orders to general Cass, who commanded the reserve, to fall back to this place, and to general M^r Arthur, with the front line, to follow and support him.

I remained at Sandusky until the parties that were sent out in every direction returned; not an enemy was to be seen.

I am sorry that I cannot transmit you major Croghan's official report.

He was to have sent it to me this morning. But I have just heard that he was so much exhausted by thirty-six hours of continued exertion as to be unable to make it. It will not be amongst the least of general Proctor's mortifications to find that he has been baffled by a youth who has just passed his twenty-first year. He is however a hero worthy of his gallant uncle (general William Clark) and I bless my good fortune in having first introduced him

missing shoot of a distinguished family to the notice of the government.

Captain Hunter of the 17th regiment, the second in command, conducted himself with great propriety, and never were a set of younger fellows than the subalterns, viz: lieutenants Johnson Baylor of the 17th, Anthony of the 24th, Meeks of the 7th, ensigns Ship and Duncan of the 17th.

The following account of the unworthy artifice and conduct of the enemy will excite your indignation. Major Chambers was sent by general Proctor, accompanied by colonel Elliott, to demand the surrender of the fort. They were met by ensign Ship. The major observed that general Proctor had a number of cannon, a large body of regular troops, and so many Indians whom it was impossible to control, and if the fort was taken as it must be, the whole of the garrison would be massacred. Mr. Ship answered that it was the determination of major Croghan, his officers and men, to defend the garrison or be buried in it, and that they might do their best. Colonel Elliott then addressed Mr. Ship, and said, "you are a fine young man, I pity your situation, for your father's sake surrender and prevent the dreadful slaughter that must follow resistance." Ship turned from him with indignation and was immediately taken hold of by an Indian, who attempted to wrest his sword from him. Elliott pretended to exert himself to release him, and expressed great anxiety to get him safe into the fort.

In a former letter I informed you, sir, that the post of Lower Muddy could not be defended against heavy cannon, and that I had ordered the commandant, if he could safely retire upon the chance of the enemy, to do so after having destroyed the fort, as there was nothing in it that could justify the risk of defending it, commanded as it is by a hill on the opposite side of the river, within range of cannon, and having on that side old and illy constructed block houses and dry friable pickets. The enemy ascending the bay and river with a fine breeze, gave major Croghan so little notice of their approach, that he could not execute the order for evacuating. Luckily they had no artillery but six pounders and a half inch howitzers.

General Proctor left Malden with the determination of storming Fort Meigs. His immense body of troops were divided into three commands, and must have amounted to at least 5000. Dixon commanded the Mackinaw and other northern tribes; Tecumseh of the Wabash, Illinois and St. Joseph; and Round Head, a bandot chief, the warriors of his own nation and those of the Shawanese, Chippeways, and Putawattamies of the Michigan territory. Upon seeing the formidable preparations to receive them at Fort Meigs, the idea of storming was abandoned, and the plan adopted of decoying the garrison out, or inducing me to come to their relief with a force inadequate to repel the attack of his numerous hordes of savages. Having waited several days for

the latter, and practising ineffectually several stratagems to accomplish the former, provisions began to be scarce and the Indians to be dissatisfied. The attack upon Sandusky was the dernier resort. The greater part of the Indians refused to accompany him and returned to the river Raisin. Tecumseh, with his command, remained in the neighbourhood of fort Meigs sending parties to all the posts upon Hull's road and those upon the Auglaize to search for cattle. Five hundred of the northern Indians under Dixon attended Proctor. I have sent a party to the lake to ascertain the direction that the enemy have taken. The scouts which have returned saw no signs of Indians later than those made in the night of the 2d instant, and a party has just arrived from Fort Meigs who make the same report. I think it probable that they have all gone off. If so, this mighty armament, from which so much was expected by the enemy, will return covered with disgrace and mortification. As captain Perry was nearly ready to sail from Erie when I last heard from him, I hope that the period will soon arrive when we shall transfer the *labouring* ~~our~~ to the enemy, and oblige him to encounter some of the labours and difficulties which we have undergone in waging a defensive warfare, and protecting our extensive frontier against a superior force. I have the honour to enclose you a copy of the first note received from major Croghan. It was written before day, and it has since been ascertained that of the enemy there remained in the ditch one lieutenant colonel (by brevet), one lieutenant and twenty-five privates, fourteen of them badly wounded. Every care has been taken of the latter and the officers buried with the honours due to their rank and their bravery. All the dead that were not in the ditch were taken off in the night by the Indians. It is impossible, from the circumstances of the attack, that they should have lost less than one hundred. Some of the prisoners think that it amounted to two hundred. A young gentleman, a private in the Petersburg volunteers of the name of Brown, assisted by five or six of that company, and of the Pittsburg blues, who were accidentally in the fort, managed the six pounder which produced such destruction in the ranks of the enemy.

I have the honour to be, &c.
WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

The Secretary of War.

N. B. Of our few wounded men there is but one that will not be well in less than six days.

LOWER SANDUSKY, August 5th, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that the combined forces of the enemy, amounting to at least 500 regulars and seven or eight hundred Indians, under the immediate command of general Proctor

its appearance before this place, early on Sunday evening and so soon as the general had made such disposition of his , as would cut off my retreat, should I be disposed to make I sent colonel Elliott, accompanied by major Chambers, flag to demand the surrender of the fort, as he was anxious to the effusion of blood, which he should probably not have power to do, should he be reduced to the necessity of the place by storm. My answer to the summons was, that determined to defend the place to the last extremity, and o force, however large, should induce me to surrender it. n as the flag had returned, a brisk fire was opened upon n the gun boats in the river, and from a 5½ inch howitzer on which was kept up with little intermission through the At an early hour the next morning, three *sixes* (which had laced during the night within 250 yards of the pickets) to play upon us, but with little effect. About 4 o'clock P. discovering that the fire from all his guns was concentrated t the north-western angle of the fort, I became confident is object was to make a breach, and attempt to storm the at that point. I therefore ordered out as many men as could loyed for the purpose of strengthening that front, which was ctually secured by means of bags of flour, sand, &c. e *picketing* suffered little or no injury. Notwithstanding the enemy, about 5 o'clock, having formed in close column, ing to assail our works at the expected point, at the same aking two feints at the front of captain Hunter's lines, the , which advanced against the north-western angle, consisting t 350 men, was so completely enveloped in smoke, as not to covered until it had approached within fifteen or twenty f the lines ; but the men being all at their posts and ready to it, commenced so heavy and galling a fire, as to throw the a little into confusion. Being quickly rallied, it advanced to ber works and began to leap into the ditch. Just at that mo- fire of grape was opened from our six pounder, (which en previously arranged so as to rake in that direction) together with the musketry, threw them into such confu- at they were compelled to retire precipitately to the During the assault, which lasted about half an hour, an in- fire was kept up by the enemy's artillery (which consisted sixes and a howitzer) but without effect. My whole loss the siege, was one killed and seven wounded slightly. The the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners, must exceed ndred and fifty ; one lieutenant colonel, a lieutenant and fifty nd file, were found in and about the ditch ; those of the re- er, who were not able to escape, were taken off during the y the Indians. Seventy stand of arms and several brace of have been collected near the works. About three in the ig the enemy sailed down the river, leaving behind them a :ontaining clothing and considerable military stores. Too

much praise cannot be bestowed on the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates under my command for their gallant and good conduct during the siege.

Yours, with respect,

G. CROGHAN.

Major 17th U. S. Infantry comdg. L.

Major Gen. Harrison, commanding N. W. army.

Correspondence between the Secretary of War and major general Wilkinson.

Submitted to the President by the Secretary of War, on the 23d July, and communicated to general Wilkinson on the 5th of August, 1813.

The time at which we have reason to expect an ascendancy on lake Ontario has arrived. If our hopes on that head be fulfilled, though but for a short period, we must avail ourselves of the circumstance, to give to the campaign a new and increased activity.

For this purpose our forces on the Ontario should be concentrated, because neither section of them, as they are now divided, is competent to any great object.

The point of concentration is more doubtful:

1st. If at Fort George, our utmost success can but give us the command of the peninsula, which, if general Harrison succeeds against Malden, will be of diminished interest, both to us and to the enemy: to us, because Malden will more completely cover our western frontier and control the savages than Forts George and Erie: to the enemy, because Malden lost, our inroad upon the peninsula, will but have the effect of shortening, not of dividing, the enemy's line of operations; in a word, success at this point will not give to the campaign a character of decisive advantage.

2d. If, on the other hand, we make Sackett's Harbor the point of concentration, Kingston may become the object of our attack, which, by the way, will but be returning to the original plan of campaign, prescribed to general Dearborn. This place is of much importance to the enemy, and will no doubt be defended by him with great obstinacy, and with all the resources which can be safely drawn from other points. That it may be taken by a joint application of our naval and military means, is no however to be questioned. The enclosed diagram will show the number and character of the enemy's defences. His batteries on No. 1 cannot be sustained but by his fleet. These carried, he is open to a descent at Nos. 2 and 3. If he divides his force between both, we oppose one-half of his strength to the whole of ours. If he concentrates at No. 2, we take No. 3, and command both the town and the shipping,

concentrates at No. 3, we occupy No. 2, and with nearly the same results.

Concomitant with this movement, another may be made on the north shore of Lake Champlain, indicating an intention of attacking the forts and their dependencies, and really attacking them, if we can reach Kingston, these posts have been materially weakened. Another and different operation, to which our means are more adapted, would be a movement from Sackett's Harbor to Malden on the St. Lawrence. At this place the river may be most easily crossed. The ground opposite to it is a narrow bluff, bounded by the river on one side, and a swamp of great extent on the other, difficult passage on the other. This gained and fortified, would command the water line from the head of the river to Ogdensburg, and lake St. Francis occupied with gun boats and barges, the army may march against Montreal in concert with general Hampton. The only natural difficulty to the execution of this plan, would be presented by the crossing of the Grand river which must be crossed; but at this season, though deep, it is believed to be fordable.

Under the preceding supposition it is respectfully submitted, that it will not be most advisable to make *Sackett's Harbor* the point of concentration, and leave to the commanding general the decision (to be determined by circumstances) between the two plans suggested under the 2d and 3d heads.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Read and adopted, July 23d, 1813.

WASHINGTON, August 6th, 1813.

I have examined the projects of the campaign, intended for the ensuing stages of it, on the side of Canada, which have come into my hands yesterday. The novelty of the subject to the public, and the pressure of time, will prevent the deliberate consideration of it which its importance merits; and therefore I shall restrict myself to a few brief observations touching the project of the first.

If we command lake Ontario (without which the project is inoperative), and our force be competent to carry Kingston, the operation of our troops should take place at Sackett's Harbor, and an attack be made as promptly as possible.

On the contrary, should our combined disposable force be incompetent to the certain and speedy reduction of Kingston,

it may be preferable to strengthen our force at Fort Mifflin, cut up the British force in that quarter, destroy the British establishments, and (should general Harrison fail in his march) detach a detachment to capture Malden.

While these operations are pending, a bold feint or provisional attack on Montreal, by major general Hampton, will certainly call sir George Provost to that place, and it is presumable, that seeing our movements directed towards Erie, he may carry his best troops with him from Kingston.

These suggestions spring from my desire to hazard as little as possible in the outset, and to secure infallibly whatever may be attempted, with the intention to increase our own confidence, to diminish that of the enemy, and to *popularise* the war.

After our operations on the peninsula have been closed, we may raze the works there under your provisions, leave our settlements on the strait in tranquillity, and like lightning must direct our whole force against Kingston; and having reduced that place, and captured the shipping, we may descend the stream, and form a junction with the column of general Hampton in the neighbourhood of Montreal, should the lateness of the season permit, by which all our movements, after the conquest of Upper Canada, must be governed.

To give general Hampton's movements a menacing aspect, and to enable him to profit by events, he should take with him a heavy train of battering cannon and mortar pieces, which will be found indispensable in the attack of Montreal; and to weaken that place, and to favour a protracted season, I would advise that a heavy column of militia or volunteers, if engaged for three months only, should be put in motion from the vicinity of lake Memphramagog, to descend the river St Francis, and take post on the right bank of lake St. Petre, with a battering train of travelling carriages, organized and equipt, either to keep post or retire, when the season or other circumstances should render expedient.

Before I close this letter, I will beg leave to call your attention to several specific points, on which I require information and authority, which I deem essential to the salutary discharge of the high and solemn trust about to devolve upon me.

1st. A copy of the instructions to major general Hampton, for my government in the correspondence to ensue between us.

2d. Shall I be allowed a private secretary, which is necessary, and of right belongs to the command on which I am about to enter?

3d. I require permission to take for my aids-de-camp such officers as are best fitted to discharge the important duties of the station.

4th. I ask authority (or is it understood that I possess it?) to supply every defect of the munitions of war, and transport by land or water by means of the authorized agents.

5th. I entreat that ample funds may be deposited in proper hands, to give effect to the department of intelligence, without which, the chief will find himself hood-winked.

6th. I trust no order, of whatever nature, will be passed to any officer under my command, but through my hands. This is not

only necessary to the regular conduct of the public service, but it is vitally essential to the preservation of sound subordination, and is conformable to the rules of service in all armies, in as much as he who is responsible for all, should have the controul of all.

7th. I hope I may be expressly authorized to detach from my command, all persons who may manifest a temper or disposition to excite discontents, to generate factions, or embitter the service. This is indispensable to put down seditious spirits, and to harmonize the corps.

8th Should we move against Kingston in the first instance, the withdrawal of our force from Fort George will enable the enemy to re-occupy that point, and for a brief period to harrass our frontier on that strait. May not the militia, or a body of volunteers, be called forth to relieve the regular troops at that place, and prevent discontents and complaints?

9th. For the maintenance of the necessary authority of the chief, it is hoped the secretary of war will decline and forbid all correspondence with his subordinate officers, except in cases of personal grievance.

10th. I beg to be advised of the means of communication between our military positions, and particularly from Sackett's Harbor to Burlington, which should be rapid and infallible.

11th. I ask authority to equip the whole of our horse artillery, and to mount the whole of our dragoons, because these arms will be found all-important in every combat which may ensue.

A serious impression of the dread responsibility which awaits me, and a correct sense of the public expectation which accompanies me, must be my apology for giving you so much trouble.

With great respect, &c. your obedient servant,

JAMES WILKINSON.

Honourable John Armstrong,
Secretary of War,

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 8th, 1813.

SIR,

I have given to your observations of the 6th instant all the consideration they so justly merit.

The main objection to any plan, which shall carry our operations wide of Kingston and westward of it, is, that in the event of its success, it leaves the strength of the enemy unbroken; it but wounds the *tail* of the lion, and of course, is not calculated to hasten the termination of the war, either by encreasing our own vigour, or by diminishing that of the enemy. Kingston is the great depot of his resources, and so long as he retains this and keeps open his communication with the sea, he will not want the means of multiplying his naval and other defences, and of reinforcing or renewing the war in the west. *Kingston*, therefore, as

well on grounds of policy as of military principle, presents the *first* and *great* object of the campaign.

There are two ways of approaching this : by *direct*, or *indirect*, attack : by breaking down the enemy's battalions and forcing his works ; or by seizing and obstructing the line of his communication, and thus drying up the sources by which he is nourished and maintained. Circumstances must govern in choosing between these different modes. Were our assembled land and naval forces competent to the object, a *direct* attack would no doubt be the shorter and better way ; but if, on the contrary, our strength be inferior, or hardly equal to that of the enemy, the *indirect* attack must be preferred. These considerations have suggested the third plan, to be found in my note of the 23d ultimo. To give execution to this, I would collect my force at the head of the St. Lawrence, make every demonstration of attacking Kingston, proceed rapidly down the river, seize the northern bank at the village of Hamilton, leave a corps to fortify and to hold it, march upon Montreal with the main body, effect there a junction with Hampton, and take a position which shall enable you to secure what you gain. On this plan the navy would perform its part by occupying the mouth of the river, and preventing a pursuit by water ; by clearing the river of the armed boats of the enemy ; by holding, with its own, the passage at Hamilton, and by giving support to that position. If the enemy pursues, it must be by land, without subsistence, (excepting what he carries on his back) and without artillery. If he remains stationary, his situation must soon become even more serious, as the country in which he is cannot long subsist him. It will then but remain for him to fight his way to Quebec, to perish in the attempt, or to lay down his arms. After this exposition, it is unnecessary to add, that in conducting the present campaign, you will make *Kingston* your *primary object*, and that you will *choose* (as circumstances may warrant) between a *direct* and *indirect* attack upon that post.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Maj. Gen. Wilkinson, comd'g district No. 9.

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 9th, 1813.

SIR,

In answer to that part of your letter of the 6th instant, which calls for information, &c. on certain enumerated points, I have the honour to state :

1st. That general Hampton's instructions go only to assemble and organize his division at Burlington. It is intended that he shall operate cotemporarily with you, and under your orders, in prosecution of the plan of campaign which has been given to you.

- 2d. The senior major general commanding the principal army is entitled to the services of a private secretary.
- 3d. The ordnance and other departments of supply within the district (No. 9.) are subject of course to your orders.
- 4th. The quarter master general of the army will supply the funds for secret service.
- 5th. All orders to subordinate officers pass from the war department to the adjutant general; to be communicated by him to the general commanding the district in which such subordinate officer may serve.
- 6th. No specific permission is necessary for removing factious or disorderly men. All such will properly become subjects of the confidential reports to be made by inspectors. To detach such men from one district to another, is only shifting the evil; the better way is to report them for *dismissal*.
- 7th. If the corps at fort George be recalled, the works should be razed or occupied by a force competent to hold it against an *assault*. There is a corps of militia and volunteers (to whom the Six Nation Indians have associated themselves) at Black Rock, which may be kept in service. They are commanded by general Porter and Mr. Parrish.
- 8th. The secretary of war will decline and forbid all improper communications, and particularly such as may bear any colour of insubordination.
- 9th. Besides the ordinary mode of communication by mail, expresses may be employed in extraordinary cases.
- 10th. The dragoons and light artillery corps shall be made efficient. Horses may be bought for both. An officer from each corps should be directed to superintend the purchases. Price (average) not to exceed 120 dollars.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG,

Ltj. Gen. Wilkinson, comdg. the N. Army.

SACKETT'S HARBOR, August 21st, 1813.

SIR,

I arrived here yesterday: my machinery is in motion, and have strong hopes of giving the change to sir George which will lead directly to the object of first importance.

Commodore Chauncey is in port here, and his antagonist, sir James Yeo, at Kingston. In the late interviews between these naval commanders, the first has zealously sought a combat, which the latter has cautiously avoided; the superiority on the lake heretofore remains still to be settled; but I have Chauncey's assurance for it, and place much confidence in his word; it is obvious, sir James's plan to decline a conflict; but on what ground I cannot determine.

Our schooner here will be equipt and manned by Wednesday, and I shall sail with the squadron for fort George probably the day after; I am endeavoring to draw sir George after me; but whether I succeed in this attempt or not, should our men and means answer report, and Heaven favour me, I will be in possession of Kingston, or below that place, on the 26th proximo.

Major general Hampton must not budge until every thing is matured in this quarter, and we have either got possession of Kingston or have cut its communication with Montreal, of which I shall give him seasonable advice, via Plattsburg, where I shall calculate on his arrival the 20th of the ensuing month, completely equipt for a forward movement. If he changes his position and shows his column west of the lake sooner, it may carry sir George to Montreal and produce precautions which might otherwise be neglected until too late for any salutary effect.

The militia called forth by governor Tompkins, of which by the bye you gave me no information, should not be arrayed before he hears from me at fort George, because the assembly of such a body would increase the alarm, and put all Canada in counter-motion, while incidents beyond the controul of man may intervene to procrastinate my movements and thus baffle the effects of the proposed co-operation on the side of Vermont: should a corps of militia be drawn from thence, no movement should be made by them, until general Hampton has crossed Champlain.

It would be highly interesting to the public service and extremely acceptable to me to see you at Niagara, from whence, should I find it practicable, it is my intention to commence my movement down the lake, about the 15th of the next month; the best possible disposition for the safety of that frontier, and for the security of the vast mass of ordnance and stores which I must leave there, may render your advice and authority indispensably necessary to avert clamors and prevent any obstruction to my prompt movement.

I am, sir, your obedient servant, &c.

JAMES WILKINSON.

Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

SACKETT'S HARBOR, August 26th, 1813.

SIR,

Chauncey will go out, he says, to-morrow or next day to seek sir James. I see the necessity of settling the point of *naval superiority* before we commit ourselves, and therefore, the decision cannot be had too soon. In the mean time the essential arrangements progress, and if the means can be mustered, they will ensure the end.

I fear Yeo will avoid a contest to spin out the campaign, and gain time for reinforcements, and the organization of militia;

but if he will not come out, we must blockade him. I go to Niagara at this moment our arrangements are matured here. Sir George has actually gone for the head of the lake with a reinforcement. To prevent his playing tricks with Boyd, I have sent him (Boyd) the letter of which you have a copy.

On Saturday 21st, one hundred and sixty regular troops assembled by Ogdensburg to Kingston, and on the 23d and 24th, they were followed by five hundred Highlanders in their kilts, who attracted much chief attention. Thus we see that this quarter attracts chief attention. All my efforts will be made to induce Sir George to draw after him a chief part of the garrison of Kingston, which must now be near five thousand strong. The situation of Proctor and the irruption of our Indians have gone far to excite these dispositions. Meet me at Niagara, if possible, and for Sir George's sake press on the recruits from Albany and the southward, I send me Wadsworth, Swift, Fenwick, and Izard. All things go well here, and thank God, the men are recovering rapidly. I hear not a word from Hampton. I hope he does not mean to take the stud; but if so, we can do without him, and he should be sent home.

Truly yours,
JAMES WILKINSON.

Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, SACKETT'S HARBOR,
September 6th, 1814.

GENERAL,

I arrived here yesterday. Nothing new, excepting that General Proctor has returned to Kingston. General Hampton will go through the campaign cordially and vigorously, but will resign at the end of it. He will be ready to move by the 20th, with an effective regular force of 4000, and a militia detachment of 1500, on the supposition that Sir George had decidedly taken his part, and had chosen the peninsula as his camp de bataille, I had ordered Hampton to move immediately against the Isle Aux Noix. Two thousand militia will be promptly assembled at Champion, twenty-four miles from this place, and on the route to the St. Lawrence. The place was selected, as offering two objects, and of course leaving his knightship to guess. To have pushed them directly to Ogdensburg, would not have had that advantage. A larger draft would have been difficult. Another view of the subject is, that this part of the plan cannot be confided to militia exclusively; they must be propped by a regular corps, otherwise the back door may not be sufficiently closed and barred.

The battle on the lake! Shall we have one? If Yeo fights and is beaten, all will be well. If he does not fight, the result may also be favourable.

Yours cordially,
JOHN ARMSTRONG.

General Wilkinson.

HEAD QUARTERS, UPPER SANDUSKY,
August 6th, 1815.

DEAR SIR,

Your excellency's of the 4th instant, was delivered to me yesterday morning, by colonel Brush. The exertions which you have made, and the promptitude with which your orders have been obeyed, to assemble the militia to repel the late invasion of the enemy, is truly astonishing, and reflects the highest honour on the state.

Believing, that in a formal interview, I could best explain to you the intentions of the government and my own views, I determined to come on to this place to see you. I have now the honour to repeat to you in this way, the result of my determination upon the employment of the militia, and most of the facts upon which my determination is founded. It has been the intention of government to form the army destined for operation, upon the lake Erie, exclusively of regular troops, if they could be raised; the number was limited to 7000. The deficiency of the regulars was to be made up from the militia. From all the information I at present possess, I am convinced that there will be a great deficiency in the contemplated number of troops, after the militia now in service, and whose term of service will not expire immediately, have been added to the regulars. I have therefore called on the governor of Kentucky, for 2000 effectives: with these, there will still be a defect of perhaps 1200 troops. Your excellency has stated, the men who have turned out on this occasion, have done it with the expectation that they would be effectually employed, and that, should they be sent home, there is no prospect of getting them to turn out, should it be hereafter required. To employ them all, is impossible. With my utmost exertions, the embarkation cannot be effected in a less time than 15 or 18 days.

Should I even determine to substitute them for the regular troops, which are expected, to keep so large a force in the field, even for a short period, would consume the means which are provided for the support of the campaign, and which are only calculated for the number of men above stated.

I would recommend, under these circumstances, to your excellency, a middle course, viz: to dismiss all the militia but two regiments of 10 companies, of 100 men each, and an usual proportion of field and platoon non-commissioned officers and musicians. That this corps be encamped at or near this place, until it is ascertained whether their service will be wanted. A short time will determine this question.

Permit me to request your excellency to give your countenance and support to the exertions which general M'Arthur will make to fill up the 26th regiment of 12 month's troops.

It appears that the venerable governor of Kentucky, is about to take command of the troops of that state; could your excellency

ency think proper to follow his example, I need not tell you how highly gratifying it would be to, dear sir, your friend,

WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

To his excellency Gov. Meigs.

ON BOARD THE SHIP GENERAL PIKE,
AT SACKETT'S HARBOR, August 18th, 1813.

SIR,

I arrived here this day with this ship, the Madison, Oneida, Governor Tompkins, Conquest, Ontario, Pert, and Lady of the Lake. The Fair American and Asp, I left at Niagara. Since I had the honour of addressing you last, I have been much distressed and mortified: distressed at a loss of a part of the force entrusted to my command, and mortified at not being able to bring the enemy to action. The following movements and transactions of the quadron, since the 6th instant, will give you the best ideas of the difficulties and mortifications that I have had to encounter.

On the 7th, at day-light, the enemy's fleet, consisting of two ships, two brigs, and two large schooners, were discovered bearing west north-west, distant about five or six miles, wind at west. At 5, weighed with the fleet and manouvred to gain the wind. At 9, having passed to the leeward of the enemy's line, and abreast of his van ship, (the Wolfe) hoisted our colours and fired few guns to ascertain whether we could reach him with our shot; finding they fell short, I wore and hauled upon a wind on the starboard tack; the rear of our schooners then about six miles stern. The enemy wore in succession and hauled upon a wind on the same tack, but soon finding that we should be able to weather him upon the next tack, he tacked and made all sail to the northward. As soon as our rear vessels could fetch his wake, tacked and made all sail in chase. In the afternoon the wind became very light, and towards night quite calm. The schooners used their sweeps all the afternoon, in order to close with the enemy, but without success. Late in the afternoon I made the signal of recall, and formed in close order; wind during the night from the westward, and after midnight squally; kept all hands at quarters, and beat to the windward, in hopes to gain the wind of the enemy. At 2 A. M. missed two of our schooners—at day-light discovered the missing schooners to be the Hamilton and Scourge. Soon after, spoke the Governor Tompkins, who informed me that the Hamilton and Scourge both overset and sunk in a heavy squall about 2 o'clock; and, distressing to relate, every soul perished, except 16. This fatal accident deprived me at once of the services of two valuable officers, lieutenant Winter and sailing master Osgood, and two of my best schooners, mounting together 19 guns. This accident giving decidedly to the enemy the superiority, I thought he would take advantage of it,

particularly as by a change of wind, he was again brought dead to windward of me; formed the line upon the larboard tack and hove to. Soon after 6 A. M. the enemy bore up and set studding sails, apparently with an intention to bring us to action. When he had approached us within about four miles, he brought to on starboard tack. I wore and brought to on same tack. Finding the enemy had no intention of bringing us to action, I edged away to gain the land, in order to have the advantage of the land breeze in the afternoon. It soon after fell calm, and I directed the schooners to sweep up and engage the enemy. About noon we got a light breeze from the eastward. I took the Oneida in tow, as she sails badly, and stood for the enemy. When the van of our schooners was within about one and a half or two miles of his rear, the wind shifted to the westward, which again brought him to windward; as soon as the breeze struck him, he bore up for the schooners, in order to cut them off before they could rejoin me; but with their sweeps, and the breeze soon reaching them also, they were soon in their station. The enemy finding himself foiled in his attempt upon the schooners, hauled his wind and hove to. It soon after became very squally, and the appearance of its continuing so during the night; and as we had been at quarters for nearly 40 hours, and being apprehensive of separating from some of the heavy sailing schooners in the squall, induced me to run in towards Niagara, and anchor outside the bar. General Boyd very handsomely offered any assistance in men that I might require. I received 150 soldiers and distributed them in different vessels, to assist in boarding, or repelling boarders, as circumstances might require. It blew very heavy in squalls during the night. Soon after day-light discovered the enemy's fleet bearing north; weighed and stood after him. The winds soon became light and variable, and before 12 o'clock, quite calm. At 5, fresh breezes from north, the enemy's fleet bearing north, distant about 4 or 5 leagues. Wore the fleet in succession, and hauled upon a wind on the larboard tack. At sun-down the enemy bore N. W. by N. on the starboard tack. The wind hauling to the westward, I stood to the northward all night, in order to gain the north shore. At day-light, tacked to the westward, the wind having changed to north north-west. Soon after, discovered the enemy's fleet bearing south-west; I took the Asp and the Madison, the Fair American in tow, and made all sail in chase. It was at this time we thought of realizing what we had been so long toiling for, but before 12 o'clock, the wind changed to west south-west, which brought the enemy to windward—tacked to the northward. At 3, the wind inclining to the northward, wore to the southward and westward, and made the signal for the fleet to make all sail. At 4, the enemy bore south south-west, bore up and steered for him. At 5, observed the enemy becalmed under the land, nearing him very fast, with a fine breeze from north north-west. At 6, formed the order of battle, within about four miles of the enemy; the

wind at this time very light. At 7, the wind changed to southwest, and a fresh breeze, which again placed the enemy to windward of me; tacked and hauled upon a wind on the larboard tack, under easy sail, the enemy standing after us. At 9, when within about two gun shot of our rear, he wore to the southward—I stood on to the northward under easy sail—the fleet formed in two lines, a part of the schooners forming the weather line, with orders to commence the fire upon the enemy as soon as their shot would take effect, and as the enemy reached them, to edge down upon the line to windward and pass through the intervals and form to leeward. At about half past 10, the enemy tacked and stood after us. At 11, the rear of our line opened his fire upon the enemy: in about 15 minutes, the fire became general from the weather line, which was returned from the enemy. At half past 11, the weather line bore up and passed to the leeward, except the Growler and Julia, which soon after tacked to the southward, which brought the enemy between them and me. Filled the main-top-sail and edged away two points to lead the enemy down, not only to engage him to more advantage, but to lead him from the Growler and Julia. He, however, kept his wind, until he completely separated those two vessels from the rest of the squadron, exchanged a few shot with his ship as he passed, without injury to us, and made sail after our 2 schooners. Tacked and stood after him. At 12 (midnight) finding that I must either separate from the rest of the squadron, or relinquish the hope of saving the two which had separated, I reluctantly gave up the pursuit, rejoined the squadron, then to the leeward, and formed the line on the starboard tack. The firing was continued between our 2 schooners, and the enemy's fleet until about 1 A. M. when, I presume, they were obliged to surrender to a force so much their superior; saw no more of the enemy that night: soon after daylight discovered them close in with the north shore, with one of our schooners in tow, the other not to be seen. I presume she may have been sunk. The enemy showed no disposition to come down upon us, although to windward, and blowing heavy from W. The schooners laboring very much, I ordered 2 of the dullest to run into Niagara and anchor. The gale increasing very much, and as I could not go into Niagara with this ship, I determined to run to Genesee bay, as a shelter for the small vessels, and with the expectation of being able to obtain provisions for the squadron, as we were all nearly out, the Madison and Oneida, having not a single day's on board when we arrived opposite Genesee bay. I found there was every prospect of the gale's continuing, and if it did, I could run to this place and provision the whole squadron with more certainty, and nearly in the same time that I could at Genesec, admitting that I could obtain provisions at that place. After bringing the breezes as far as Oswego, the wind became light, inclining to a calm, which prolonged our passage to this day. I shall provision the squadron for 5 weeks, and proceed up

the lake this evening, and when I return again I hope to be able to communicate more agreeable news than this communication contains.

The loss of the Growler and Julia, in the manner in which they have been lost, is mortifying in the extreme; and although their commanders disobeyed my positive orders, I am willing to believe that it arose from an error of judgment, and excess of zeal to do more than was required of them, thinking probably that the enemy intended to bring us to a general action, they thought by gaining the wind of him they would have it more in their power to annoy and injure him than they could by forming to leeward of our line. From what I have been able to discover of the movements of the enemy, he has no intention of engaging us, except he can get decidedly the advantage of wind and weather, and as his vessels in squadron sail better than our squadron, he can always avoid an action—unless I can gain the wind, and have sufficient daylight to bring him to action before dark. His object is, evidently, to harass us by night attacks, by which means he thinks to cut off our small dull sailing schooners in detail. Fortune has evidently favored him thus far. I hope that it will be my turn next, and although inferior in point of force, I feel very confident of success.

I have the honour to be, sir, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

UNITED STATES, FLOTILLA, NEW CASTLE,

August 17th, 1813.

SIR,

I have just received a letter from sailing-master Shead, respecting the capture of the gun-boat No. 121 (a copy of which I have the honor of inclosing to you.) I see from this the enemy had 7 killed and 12 wounded, 4 since dead. I am convinced they have deceived him, both as to the number of killed and wounded, as well as the number of men in the boats, which at the smallest calculation could not have been less than 250.

I have the honour to remain, &c.

SAMUEL ANGUS.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

(INCLOSURE.)

ON BOARD H. M. SLOOP MARTIN,

Off Rhode Island, August 6th, 1813.

SIR,

It is with the deepest regret that I announce to you the capture of the United States gun-boat No. 121, under my command, by the boats of the Junon frigate and Martin sloop of war, 8 in

number, 3 of which mounted 12 pound carronades, and carrying on all 150 men. At 10 minutes before meridian on the 27th of July, I received orders from you to form a line a head and to fire on the enemy, but finding myself drove away from the squadron by the wind dying away and a strong ebb tide, I remained sweeping and firing the 32 pounder. At the same time finding my shot did not reach, I placed all hands to the sweeps to endeavour to gain the squadron. At 20 minutes before 1 P. M. I commenced firing on the enemy's boats and sweeping at the same time; but finding I could gain nothing, I anchored to receive them as American tars have been accustomed to. The enemy then getting within grape reach, I commenced it, but unfortunately the rattle of the large gun gave way the 1st round; I again charged and got her to bear, which discharge did considerable damage, but tearing my gun carriage all to pieces. I loaded with the hope of getting her to bear again, but found it utterly impossible; the enemy now close on board, discharging volleys of shot from their carronades and musketry, I called the boarders and small arms men away to repel the enemy; they now surrounding us, poured in a heavy fire which we returned with as much promptness as our feeble numbers would admit; several of my men having now fell, our ensign halyards shot away, and seeing the superiority of the enemy's force in the act of boarding us in every quarter, they began to fire briskly, and I found it necessary for the preservation of those few valuable lives left, to surrender to seven times our number: the enemy boarding, loaded our decks with men; we were all driven below, and it was with the utmost difficulty that the officers could stay the revenge of the seamen, who seemed to thirst for blood and plunder, the last of which they had, by robbing us of every thing: we had none killed, but seven wounded, five slightly. The enemy's loss by us, was seven killed and twelve wounded, four of whom have since died. They have conquered me, but they have paid dearly for it, and I trust, sir, when you come to view the disadvantages that I laboured under, having been but seven days on board my boat, and scarcely time to station my men, and the misfortune of entirely disabling my gun, and the superiority of numbers to oppose me; you will be convinced that the flag I had the honour to wear, has not lost any of that national character which has ever been attached to it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM SHEAD, *Sailing Master.*

Lieut. Samuel Angus,
commanding U. S. Flotilla, Delaware.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, August 17th, 1813.

SIR,

In the last letter which I had the honour to address to you, I had to communicate the information that commodore Chauncey

had left this part of the lake; yesterday an express arrived from the 18 Mile Creek, stating that he was then off that place, in pursuit of the British fleet, which was likewise to be seen.

A body of volunteers, militia and Indians, under the command of brigadier general Porter, of the New York militia, having arrived at this place, and very impatient to engage the enemy, a plan was, this morning, concerted to cut off one of his pickets. About 300 volunteers and Indians under the command of major Chapin, was to effect this object, supported by 200 regulars under the command of major Cummings, of the 16th infantry. A heavy rain, and other untoward circumstances, defeated the primary object, but in a skirmish that ensued, in which the enemy were completely routed, our Indians captured 12 of the British Indians, and four whites. Many of the enemy's dead were left on the field, among whom is supposed to be the famous chief, Norton. Our loss was only two Indians, and a few slightly wounded. Those who participated in this contest, particularly the Indians, conducted with great bravery and activity. General Porter volunteered in the affair, and major Chapin evinced his accustomed zeal and courage. The regulars under major Cummings, as far as they were engaged, conducted well. The principal chiefs who led the warriors this day, were, Farmer's Brother, Red Jacket, Little Billy, Pollard, Black Snake, Johnson, Silver Heels, Captain Half-town, Major Henry O. Ball, (Cornplanter's son) and captain Cold, chief of Onondago, who was wounded. In a council which was held with them yesterday, they covenanted not to scalp or murder; and I am happy to say, that they treated the prisoners with humanity, and committed no wanton cruelties upon the dead.

The Canadian volunteers, under major Wilcox, were active and brave as usual.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN P. BOYD, *Brig. Gen. Comndg.*

Hon. John Armstrong.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, August 18th, 1813.

SIR,

Yesterday I had the honour to address you a letter, detailing the conduct of the Indians in a late skirmish. Their bravery and humanity were equally conspicuous. Already the quietness in which our pickets are suffered to remain, evinces the benefit arising from their assistance. Permit me to suggest the propriety of immediately depositing presents for them in the hands of Mr. Granger, of whose exertions, and those of Mr. Parrish, I must express my approbation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN P. BOYD, *Brig. Gen.*

Hon. John Armstrong.

tract of a letter from captain John H. Dent, commanding naval officer at Charleston, S. C. dated August 21st, 1813.

IR,

"I have the honour to inform you that the privateer schooner Decatur, of this port, arrived here yesterday, with his tannic majesty's schooner Dominico, her prize. She was captured on the 5th instant, after a most gallant and desperate action of one hour, and carried by boarding, having all her officers killed or wounded. She was one of the best equipped and manned vessels of her class I have ever seen. The Decatur mounted ten guns, and had a complement of 103 men at the commencement of the action, nineteen of whom were killed and wounded.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"JOHN H. DENT."

L. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, August 24th, 1813.

R,

I have the honour to report, that at day break this morning the enemy attacked us at all our pickets, which retired towards the camp, pursued by his advance guards. A skirmish ensued in the village, with little effect upon us; after which he retreated, not coming within reach of our cannon, but never within musket-shot of our entrenchments. One captain of the 49th and a few privates have been brought in prisoners. We lost two men and few wounded; the enemy left about fifteen dead on the different grounds. He is supposed to have brought his whole force into the field; but finding our position so strong, desisted from a general attack. Sir George Prevost was in person at the attack. His force is withdrawn out of our reach into his strong holds.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN P. BOYD, B. G. C.

n. J. Armstrong, Secretary of War.

CHARLESTON, (S C.) August 26th, 1813.

R,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that I received a letter press, last night, from major Jenkins, commanding the St. Helena militia, stating that the enemy's two brigs, the Calibre and Marybdis, got under way on Monday morning, with an intention of proceeding to sea, when the wind shifted to the eastward; and attempting to beat over the bar, one of them (supposed to be the Calibre) grounded on Cole Scarce Reef, and in a short time was bilged and became a complete wreck. The crew was taken up by the other, which now lies about five miles from Bay Point, waiting a wind to proceed to sea.

Major Jenkins states, that they landed twice at a plantation of Mr. Pope's, and took one of his large canoes off, with some provisions. It appears their object in entering Port Royal was principally to sound the bar, and roadstead, which they have effected, as their boats were seen on that service the whole time they were at anchor. The officer who delivered major Jenkins's letter further states, that the wreck had entirely gone to pieces, a great part drifted on shore, among which were her boats and the stolen canoe.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN H. DENT.

Honourable William Jones,
Secretary of the Navy.

Extract of a letter from General Ferdinand L. Claiborne, to General Flournoy, commanding the 7th Military District.

"CANTONMENT, MOUNT VERNON, September 3d, 1813.

"SIR,

"On the 31st ultimo, I had the honour to receive your letter of the 24th, with its enclosure, forwarded by express to me, then at Easley's station, near the Creek line, and about 85 miles above this, on the Tombigbee.

"Colonel Hawkins's communications for some time past have unfortunately had a tendency to lessen our apprehensions, and to beget a belief of our almost perfect security. My little, but inestimable corps, have felt the effects begotten by the doubts which existed as to the real intention of the Creeks. It probably prevented yourself, and certainly governor Holmes, from sending troops to this exposed part of the country. About the 23d ultimo, I received information that 1200 Indians were on the eve of entering the territory, with the intention to attack the upper posts in the Tombigbee, *that* commanded by colonel Carson in the fork of the Tombigbee and Alabama rivers, and the one on Tensaw commanded by major Beasley. The Indians from the Black Warrior were to attack the upper posts; and those from the Alabama, that on Tensaw. This information was immediately communicated to colonel Carson and major Beasley, and my arrangements made for the defence of the three places threatened, in the best manner of which the limited means I possessed would admit.

"With 80 men, I went myself to Easley's, and was joined by two detachments of volunteer militia under the command of colonel Haines, aid-de-camp to governor Holmes, and by a captain Cassity. The place was attacked at the time expected, and after several unsuccessful attempts to gain intelligence, my scouts fell in with 2 Choctaw Indians, from whose information I was induced to believe, that no attack would soon be made. In fact they seemed rather to insinuate that the enemy was rather intimidated, and

stated that the Chocktaws in the immediate neighbourhood, who had joined them, had, at the instance of Pooshemataha, (a medal chief) withdrawn from them, intending to remain neutral; and that they had removed and were removing from the scene of action to a more secure place for their women and children. This I ascertained to be the fact. Their towns were visited by captain Wells of dragoons, and found abandoned. Under these circumstances I left Easley's station, and, on my way to this post, learned that major Beasley had been attacked. I reached this place at twelve o'clock last night, having rode 70 miles since morning.

"The attack on major Beasley was made at about 11 o'clock, A. M. on the 30th ultimo. It was unexpected at the moment it occurred, but the whole garrison was immediately under arms. The front gate was open, and the enemy ran in great numbers to possess themselves of it. In the contest for the gate many fell on both sides: soon, however, the action became general, the enemy fighting on all sides in the open field, and as near the stockade as they could get. The port-holes were taken and retaken several times. A block-house was contended for by captain Jack, at the head of his brave riflemen, for the space of an hour after the enemy were in possession of a part of it, when finally they succeeded in driving this company into a house in the fort, and having stopped many of the port-holes with the ends of rails, possessed themselves of the walls. From the houses our troops made a gallant defence, but the enemy set fire to the roofs, and an attempt to extinguish the flames proved unsuccessful. The few who remained now attempted to retreat under the direction of captain Bailey of the militia, and ensign Chambliss of the rifle company, both of whom had been badly wounded. Previously to their retreat, they threw into the flames many of the guns of the dead men. Few of them succeeded in escaping. Both the officers are missing, and supposed to be dead. Nine of the volunteers and three of the volunteer militia have reached this, several of them wounded. A few citizens who fought in the stockade, but not enrolled in any company, also escaped, one of them leaving a wife and six children, who were probably burnt to death. Major Beasley fell gallantly fighting at the head of his command near the gate, at the commencement of the action. Captain Jack was killed about the close of the scene, having previously received two wounds. Captain Middleton also distinguished himself, having received four or five wounds before he fell. He was active and fought bravely from the commencement of the action until he died. Lieutenant S. M. Osborn, of Wilkinson county, after receiving two wounds, was taken into a house, but requested to die on the ground, that he might as long as possible see the men fight. The other officers fell nobly doing their duty; and the non-commissioned officers and privates deserve equally well. The action continued until five in the evening.

"Our loss is great: sixty-five, including officers and men, were killed belonging to the first regiment of Mississippi territory volunteers, and twenty-seven volunteer militia, officers included. Many respectable citizens, with numerous families, who had abandoned their farms for security, were also killed or burnt in the houses into which they had fled. The loss of the enemy must have been from 150 to 200 killed and wounded. Their force is supposed to have been from 5 to 700.

"At the mills of Messrs. J. and W. Pierce, about a mile from the post, is a small guard, commanded by lieutenant Montgomery, which were stationed previous to, and at the time of, the attack; but it is believed he abandoned his position in time to save his command. He has not yet been heard of, but I hope made good his retreat to Mobile.

"Lieutenant colonel Ross, whilst at Mobile, hearing of the fate, or *probable fate*, of our troops on Tensaw, ordered captain Blue, of the 7th United States' regiment, with 100 men, to this place, and he arrived about day-break this morning, and will here wait your orders. We are busily engaged in fitting this cantonment for defence, and will be prepared to give a good account of the enemy, should an opportunity offer. They will, however, not attack us until they unite all their forces; but when they do, you may rely on their being warmly received. It is my belief that they cannot bring a force against us which we will not be able to defeat; but we can do no more than defend ourselves in this place.

"I have not heard from colonel Carson. He has a good stockade, and a garrison of about 150 volunteers, and within 200 yards is a station, in which are many families, and about 50 fighting men. Should the Indians attack the colonel, he will certainly defeat them. Dent and Scott's companies are ordered from Easley's to St. Stephens, where are also the broken companies of Morrison and Foelckill. In the Chocktaw factory at St. Stephens, there is much public property. At this place we have the papers belonging to the land-office; the citizens having left them and fled to the different forts, and the enemy will enrich themselves with plunder. I have not a force which will enable me to guard this extensive frontier, and the country must rest upon governor Holmes, in part, for aid. I know that your situation will not admit of your drawing much, if any force, from Mobile and Mobile point, and that you have no disposable troops on the Mississippi. Manac, a half breed, who can be relied on, was at Pensacola about ten days ago. He says, that while he was there, three vessels with Spanish troops arrived.

"Judge Toulmin and a great many families have left this part of the country, and gone to Mobile. I fear many negroes will run off to the enemy; indeed they are already in possession of about 100 of them, and a large quantity of stock and other property.

“Six o'clock, P. M. An express this moment arrived from General Flournoy, with orders for the 3d United States' regiment march immediately.

“The volunteer cavalry are also under similar orders.”

UNITED STATES' SLOOP PRESIDENT,
Near Plattsburg, September 9th, 1813.

R,

I have the honour to inform you that I arrived here yesterday m near the lines, having sailed from Burlington on the 6th, th an intention to fall in with the enemy who were then near s place; having proceeded to within a short distance of the es, I received information that they were at anchor there. Soon er, they weighed and stood to the northward out of the lake; is if not acknowledging our ascendancy on the lake, evincing unwillingness (although they had the advantage of situation, ing to the narrowness of the channel in which their galleys ald work, when we should want room) to determine it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS MACDONOUGH.

n. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. BRIG NIAGARA, OFF THE WESTERN SISTERS,
Head of lake Erie, September 10th, 1813, 4 P. M.

R,

It has pleased the Almighty to give to the arms of the United ates a signal victory over their enemies on this lake. The Bri h squadron, consisting of two ships, two brigs, one schooner, d one sloop, have this moment surrendered to the force under y command, after a sharp conflict.

I have the honour to be, &c.

O. H. PERRY.

on. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. SCHOONER ARIEL, PUT-IN-BAY,
September 13th, 1813.

IR,

In my last I informed you that we had captured the enemy's leet on this lake. I have now the honour to give you the most mportant particulars of the action. On the morning of the 10th nstant, at sun-rise, they were discovered from Put-in-Bay, when lay at anchor with the squadron under my command. We got nder weigh, the wind light at south-west, and stood for them. At 0 A. M. the wind hauled to south-east and brought us to wind-ard; formed the line and bore up. At 15 minutes before 12, he enemy commenced firing; at five minutes before 12, the action omenced on our part. Finding their fire very destructive

owing to their long guns, and its being mostly directed at the Lawrence, I made sail, and directed the other vessels to follow, for the purpose of closing with the enemy. Every brace and bowline being soon shot away, she became unmanageable, notwithstanding the great exertions of the sailing master. In this situation, she sustained the action upwards of two hours within canister distance, until every gun was rendered useless, and the greater part of her crew either killed or wounded. Finding she could no longer annoy the enemy, I left her in charge of lieutenant Yarnall, who, I was convinced, from the bravery already displayed by him, would do what would comport with the honour of the flag. At half past two, the wind springing up, captain Elliot was enabled to bring his vessel, the Niagara, gallantly into close action. I immediately went on board of her, when he anticipated my wish by volunteering to bring the schooner which had been kept astern by the lightness of the wind, into close action. It was with unspeakable pain that I saw, soon after I got on board the Niagara, the flag of the Lawrence come down, although I was perfectly sensible that she had been defended to the last, and that to have continued to make a show of resistance would have been a wanton sacrifice of the remains of her brave crew. But the enemy was not able to take possession of her, and circumstances soon permitted her flag again to be hoisted. At 45 minutes past 2, the signal was made for "close action." The Niagara being very little injured, I determined to pass through the enemy's line, bore up and passed ahead of their two ships and a brig, giving a raking fire to them from the starboard guns, and to a large schooner and sloop, from the larboard side, at half pistol shot distance. The smaller vessels at this time having got within grape and canister distance, under the direction of captain Elliot, and keeping up a well directed fire, the two ships, a brig, and a schooner surrendered, a schooner and sloop making a vain attempt to escape.

Those officers and men who were immediately under my observation, evinced the greatest gallantry, and I have no doubt that all others conducted themselves as became American officers and seamen. Lieutenant Yarnall, first of the Lawrence, although several times wounded, refused to quit the deck. Midshipman Forrest (doing duty as lieutenant) and sailing master Taylor, were of great assistance to me. I have great pain in stating to you, the death of lieutenant Brook of the marines, and midshipman Laub, both of the Lawrence, and midshipman John Clarke of the Scorpion: they were valuable and promising officers. Mr. Hambleton, purser, who volunteered his services on deck, was severely wounded late in the action. Midshipmen Claxton and Swartout of the Lawrence, were severely wounded. On board the Niagara, lieutenants Smith and Edwards, and midshipman Webster (doing duty as sailing master) behaved in a very handsome manner. Captain Brevoort of the army, who acted as a volunteer in the capacity of a marine officer, on board that vessel,

excellent and brave officer, and with his musketry, did great
 tion. Lieutenant Turner, commanding the Caledonia,
 at that vessel into action in the most able manner, and is an
 that in all situations, may be relied on. The Ariel, lieuten-
 arker, and Scorpion, sailing master Champlin, were enabled
 early into action, and were of great service. Captain El-
 eaks in the highest terms of Mr. Magrath, purser, who had
 espatched in a boat on service, previous to my getting on
 the Niagara; and, being a seaman, since the action has ren-
 essential service in taking charge of one of the prizes. Of
 n Elliot, already so well known to the government, it would
 most superfluous to speak; in this action, he evinced his cha-
 stic bravery and judgment; and, since the close of the
 , has given me the most able and essential assistance.
 ve the honour to enclose you a return of the killed and
 ed, together with a statement of the relative force of the
 rons. The captain and first lieutenant of the Queen Char-
 and first lieutenant of the Detroit, were killed. Captain
 y, senior officer, and the commander of the Lady Prevost,
 ly wounded. Their loss in killed and wounded, I have not
 en able to ascertain; it must, however, have been very great.

Very respectfully, &c.

O. H. PERRY.

/m. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

Statement of the force of the British squadron.

o Detroit,	19 guns—1 on pivot and 2 howitzers.
en Charlotte, - - -	17 guns, 1 do.
ooner Lady Prevost, - -	13 do. 1 do.
g Hunter, - - - -	10 do. - -
op Little Belt, - - - -	3 do. - -
ooner Chippeway, - - -	1 do. and 2 swivels.

63 guns.

e—The Detroit is a new ship, very strongly built, and
 a long twenty-fours, eighteens, and twelves.

Statement of the force of the United States' squadron.

brig Lawrence, - - -	20 guns,
Niagara, - - - -	20 do.
Caledonia, - - - -	3 do.
ner Ariel, - - - -	4 do. (1 burst early in action)
Scorpion, - - - -	2 do.
Somers, - - - -	2 do. and 2 swivels
oop Trippe, - - - -	1 do.
ner Tygress, - - - -	1 do.
Porcupine, - - - -	1 do.

54 guns.

The exact number of the enemy's force, has not been ascertained, but I have good reason to believe that it exceeded ours, by nearly 100 men.

List of killed and wounded on board the United States' squadron, under command of O. H. Perry, esq. in the action of the 10th of September, 1813.

[Two days previous to the action, 57 men unfit for duty in the small vessels.]

On board the Lawrence,—Killed 22,—Wounded 61—Total 88

Niagara,	2	25	27
Caledonia,	0	3	3
Somers,	0	2	2
Ariel,	1	3	4
Trippe,	0	2	2
Scorpion,	2	0	2
	—	—	—
	27	96	123
	==	==	==

S. HAMBLETON, *Purser.*

O. H. PERRY, *Captain and Senior officer.*

UNITED STATES' SHIP GENERAL PIKE,
Off Duck Island, September 13th, 1813.

SIR,

On the 7th, at day-light, the enemy's fleet was discovered close in with Niagara river, wind from the southward ;—made the signal, weighed with the fleet (prepared for action) and stood out of the river after him ; he immediately made all sail to the northward. We made sail in chase, with our heavy schooners in tow, and have continued the chase all around the lake, night and day, until yesterday morning, when he succeeded in getting into Amherst bay, which is so little known to our pilots, and said to be full of shoals, that they are not willing to take me in there. I shall, however, (unless driven from my station by a gale of wind) endeavour to watch him so close, as to prevent his getting out upon the lake.

During our long chase we frequently got within from one to two miles of the enemy, but our heavy sailing schooners prevented our closing with him, until the 11th, off Genesee river ; we carried a breeze with us while he lay becalmed, to within about three fourths of a mile of him, when he took the breeze, and we had a running fight of three and a half hours, but by his superior sailing, he escaped me and run into Amherst bay yesterday morning. In the course of our chase, on the 11th, I got several broadsides from this ship upon the enemy, which must have done him considerable injury, as many of the shot were seen to strike him, and people

were observed over the side, plugging shot holes. A few shot struck our hull, and a little rigging was cut, but nothing of importance—not a man was hurt.

I was much disappointed that sir James refused to fight me, as he was so much superior in point of force, both in guns and men, having upwards of 20 guns more than we have, and heaves a greater weight of shot. This ship, the Madison, and the Sylph, have each of them a schooner constantly in tow, yet the others cannot sail as fast as the enemy's squadron, which gives him decidedly the advantage, and puts it in his power to engage me when and how he chooses.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

CANANDAIGUA, September 14th, 1813.

SIR,

A large number of the patriotic citizens of this and the adjacent towns, anxious to do their duty in a crisis so interesting to the nation in general, and to this part of the country in particular, have associated themselves to volunteer their services to the United States for the *residue* of the campaign *at least*.

In order to effectuate their intentions, however, it will be necessary that their movements should receive your approbation and sanction, and that they should be assured of, that the corps, whether a company, battalion, or (as is possible) a regiment, should be received, organized, and countenanced by your order and authority. The lateness of the season, and the anxiety of the members, induce us to request an early and authoritative reply, that the association may be equipped according to law, and be useful to their country this season. It may not be hardly decorous for us to say it, but we must observe, that the subscribers will prove to be obedient and brave soldiers.

In their behalf, I am, &c.

DANIEL RODMAN.

Major general Wilkinson,
or the officer commanding at Fort George.

U. S. NAVY YARD, PORTSMOUTH,
September 14th, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honour to forward to you, by the mail, the flags of the late British brig Boxer, which were nailed to her mast heads at the time she engaged, and was captured by the United States' brig Enterprize.

Great as the pleasure is that I derive from performing this part of my duty, I need not tell you how different my feelings would have been, could the gallant Burrows have had this honour!

He went into action most gallantly, and the difference of injury done the two vessels proves how nobly he fought.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC HULL.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

BLACK ROCK, September 17th, 1813.

SIR,

In consequence of encouragements from general Boyd, that a general and decisive movement was about to be made by the army, and that an additional force was desirable, we repaired to fort George about five weeks ago, with 500 men, consisting of volunteers, militia, and Indians. Most of us remained here for twelve or fourteen days, but our hopes not being realized, the men continually dispersed and went home, not however without expectations, again encouraged by generals Boyd and Williams, that we should be shortly called on again to aid in operations, which the people in this part of the country, so long harrassed by the calamities of war, feel so strong an interest in forwarding. Under similar expectations many of our friends in the interior have intimated to us their readiness to join with respectable reinforcements on the shortest notice : and we are informed that one company, about 70 strong, is actually on its march, and will arrive here to-day or to-morrow.

We are at this moment much at a loss how to act, and our difficulty is increased by the various rumours and conjectures circulated by the different officers daily arriving from head quarters, some of whom represent that no offensive operations are to be undertaken on this frontier, but that the regular army is immediately to be marched, either to the east to attack Kingston, or to the west to join general Harrison. Others state that an attack is to be made on the British forces in the vicinity of this place.

Under these circumstances, we are induced to inquire of you whether such a force as we have it in our power to raise is desired by you to effectuate your plans, and if so, in what numbers, and at what time? If your object be to sally out upon the enemy at fort George, we could bring you a respectable force. But, on the contrary, if you meditate an attack at some other point, and the withdrawal of the regular troops from fort George, and placing this frontier on the defensive only, by means of militia, we would observe that our prepared force is of such a character as could not be engaged in this service.

Upon the supposition that you intend to withdraw the regular troops from this frontier, we beg leave to submit a proposition for your consideration.

We believe we are not incorrect in saying that it would require nearly quite as great a force to defend this line of frontier against a given force of the enemy, as it would to attack and subdue that

enemy. Sir George Prevost has ordered the militia of the upper province to be called out en masse. They are to assemble on Saturday next. And if, after your departure, the enemy opposite here should take it in his head to retain all his regular force, and play off his skill against the inexperience of our militia, we might have occasion to fear a repetition of former scenes in the present war.

Our proposition (in case of your leaving this place) is, that we be permitted to raise, between this and the first of October, a volunteer force of from 1,000 to 1,200 men, exclusive of Indians. That we add to it as many of the militia stationed on the lines as may be willing to join us. That we be furnished with a small train (say 4 pieces) of field artillery, with experienced officers and men to fight them; and that with this force we be authorized to invade the enemy's country.

Should you think proper to confer such an authority on us, and direct that the volunteers shall be furnished with arms, ammunition, provisions, &c. and receive pay while in actual service, we pledge our lives that before the close of the season we will occupy the whole of the valuable and populous peninsula opposite this river, and either capture, destroy, or disperse all the enemy's force in this quarter.

You may perhaps make it convenient to send an answer by the bearer, captain Hall.

We are, sir, most respectfully, &c.

PETER B. PORTER,
CYRENIUS CHAPIN,
JOSEPH M. M'CLURE.

Major general Wilkinson,

FORT GEORGE, September 18th, 1813.

GENTLEMEN,

Your letter of yesterday which reached me last evening, gives you a claim to my acknowledgments, and to those of your country. But as I am altogether unauthorized by law or instruction to sanction your plan for the levy of a body of volunteers, and as your anticipations, propositions, and suggestions embrace a range and a character upon which I have neither right nor authority to deliberate, I have considered it my duty to transmit a copy of your letter to the secretary of war, now at Sackett's Harbor, by express, for his deliberation and decision.

I hope he may find it convenient and proper to meet your views, and have only to add, that you shall be advised of his answer without a moment's delay, after it may reach my hands.

With high consideration and respect,

JAMES WILKINSON.

To Peter B. Porter, major Cyrenius Chapin, and Joseph M. M'Clure

Extract of a letter from general Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated September 20th, 1813.

"I am well again, and that's a good thing, for I have been during my sickness somewhat of a *smell fungus*.

"Now indeed would be a fine time to slip into the St. Lawrence if Chauncey could keep sir James blockaded above Kingston, and command the river below at the same time, and our preparations were completely matured, but it is an herculean task to extract order from chaos. No time has or shall be lost on my part; but we cannot, when prepared at all points, controul the winds. It was last night only the transports from Oswego arrived; and if I am not hardly opposed by weather, I hope I shall have 1000 men afloat by the 26th, and complete my embarkations on the 30th, after which, until we reach Grenadier Island, I must look to our squadron and the heavens for safety.

"Chauncey tells me he is liable to be blown off from his station, and in such case sir James may slip out by him, but promises to follow him. It is material, to prevent the enemy from following and cutting our rear, that some competent force should take post on the St. Lawrence below Kingston; and I pray of you to make this arrangement with Chauncey. Before I left Sackett's Harbor, I ordered a dozen slip keel boats to carry 50 men each, and to row 30 oars, to be armed with a light cannon in their bow.

"This armament is to sweep the St. Lawrence of the enemy's gun boats, and to take post in advance when and wherever it may be advisable. I beg you, if necessary on your part, to give effect to this order.

"We have just received advice confirmatory of a naval combat on lake Erie, in which it is said Perry has taken the whole British squadron on the 10th instant, and brought the vessels into "Putney harbor at the islands"—his own vessel, the Lawrence, barely capable of being floated. The action lasted six hours. This will cancel your news from our commodore.

"The enclosed letter from general McClure breathes a good spirit, but he will not be up for several days. In the mean time I shall prepare his *orders*, to be ready to give him the command.

"A body of horse, a small one at that point where the fate of the island is to be decided by combat (for believe not that we shall get possession of Montreal without a battle) will be invaluable. Burn has been ordered hence sometime before my arrival, to recruit his cavalry and prepare them for action, and I shall order him by express to-morrow to incline by indirect dilatory marches towards Hamilton, there to look for further orders, somewhere about Antwerp or that quarter. From Denmark or Champion he is to advise the commanding officer at Sackett's Harbor of his movements.

"De Rottenberg is under the full belief that I mean to attack him, and I shall keep up the delusion as long as possible.

"The snail's pace of the reinforcements approaching this division, and, pardon me, their direction and route occasion me surprise. Of what avail will be the detachments under colonels Randolph and Coles, which are, I learn from Washington, on their march to this place, where they cannot, or will not arrive before the 15th proximo. If these detachments had been ordered by all the available water communications from Annapolis to be sent, they could have reached Sackett's Harbor in season, and a number of 800 men would have been found an important desideratum in our impending operations. Where also are the 1000 men reported to me by colonel Duane as being ready for march before we reached Philadelphia? I must hope near Sackett's Harbor. I put these questions to you that I may apprise you of facts, that you, with whom it rests, may apply the remedy, for I find we possess little military subordination or respect, and that a chief of an army is obeyed more from courtesy than principle or professional obligations.

"I send this by the privateer Fox to commodore Chauncey, with request that he accelerate its progress to you. This place neither stops a gap, extends our possessions, nor covers or protects a country; it is good for nought, but to command the ground it occupies, and therefore I shall dismantle and abandon it."



Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War, to general Wilkinson, dated

SACKETT'S HARBOR, September 22d, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL,

"Your letters of the 16th, 17th, and 18th instant, have been this moment received; I hasten to answer them. The main object must be prosecuted; Chauncey is not broken down; he cannot and will command the lake, and while he does so, our position at Fort George may be maintained. If the enemy's sick list amounts to one thousand four hundred out of three thousand, the enemy cannot undertake nothing with effect. In this view of the subject, agree with P. B. Porter's proposition, made in the following words, to wit: 'Our proposition (in case of your leaving this place) is, that we be permitted to raise, between this and the 1st of October, a volunteer force of from one thousand to one thousand two hundred men, exclusive of Indians; that we add to it as many of the militia stationed on the lines as may be willing to join us; that we be furnished with a small train (say four pieces of field artillery with experienced officers and men to fight them) and that with this force we be authorized to invade the enemy's country.' Rodman's corps may join Porter. Any volunteers you may have with the army, whose times are near expiring, and who are desirous of continuing in service, may do so also. We will cover

the whole by a requisition upon governor Tompkins for additional militia. The enemy's fleet have left the Chesapeake, I believe for Halifax, whence the land troops are to be sent into Canada another motive for quick movements.

"My last letters by Chauncey of the 18th or 19th, gave you all we yet know. Prevost has left Kingston, it is said for Quebec; more probably for Montreal.

"Yours faithfully and forever,

"JOHN ARMSTRONG."

Extract of a letter from major general Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated

"HEAD QUARTERS, BASS ISLAND, September 22d, 1813."

"The greater part of the troops are here with me, and the whole will, I believe, be up by twelve o'clock. I shall proceed as far as the Middle Sister in the course of the night and to-morrow, and in the following night get so near the enemy's coast as to land two or three miles below Malden by eight o'clock in the morning. These prospects may, however, be retarded by adverse winds. Commodore Perry gives me every assistance in his power."

HEAD QUARTERS, AMHERSTBURG,
September 23d, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that I landed the army under my command, about three miles below this place, at three o'clock this morning, without opposition, and took possession of the town in an hour after. General Proctor has retreated to Sandwich, with his regular troops and Indians, having previously burned the fort, navy yard, barracks, and public store houses—the two latter were very extensive, covering several acres of ground. I will pursue the enemy to-morrow, although there is a probability of overtaking him, as he has upwards of 1000 horses and we have not one in the army. I shall think myself fortunate to be able to collect a sufficiency to mount the general officer. It is supposed here, that general Proctor intends to establish himself upon the river French, forty miles from Malden.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM H. HARRIS

Secretary of War

U. S. SCHOONER ARIEL,
Put-in-Bay, September 24th, 1812.

SIR,

I have the honour to acquaint you that about 1200 troops were yesterday transported to a small island, distant about four leagues from Malden, notwithstanding it blew hard, with frequent squalls. This day, although the weather is not settled, the quadron will again take over as many more. We only wait for favourable weather to make a final move. I need not assure you, sir, that every possible exertion will be made by the officers and men under my command to assist the advance of the army; and it affords me great pleasure to have it in my power to say, that the utmost harmony prevails between the army and navy.

I have the honour to be, &c.

O. H. PERRY,

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

NASHVILLE, September 24th, 1813.

SIR,

You will forthwith call out, to rendezvous in the shortest practicable time, at Fayetteville, Lincoln county, 2000 of the militia and volunteers of your division, and march them to repel an approaching invasion and attack, to be made by the Creek Indians on the frontier of Madison county, M. T. and the frontier of this state; which information I have this moment received, by express, from captain M'Clellan, of the United States' army, commanding officer at fort Hampton, communicated under cover of a letter received from captain Braham, of Huntsville. The United States' contractor will, by your order, furnish provisions, and W. B. Lewis, esquire, assistant deputy quarter master, will furnish ammunition and other necessary supplies in his department. You will require the muster master, or inspector, colonel R. Hayes, to muster the troops into service. Delay is inadmissible. You will observe my order of the 14th August last.

Your obedient servant,

WILLIE BLOUNT.

Major general Andrew Jackson,
3d division Tennessee militia.

U. S. SHIP GENERAL PIKE, NIAGARA RIVER,
September 25th, 1813.

SIR,

After I had the honour of addressing you on the 15th, I continued to blockade the enemy until the 17th, when the wind blowing heavy from the westward, the enemy having run into Kingston, and knowing that he could not move from that place

before a change of wind, I took the opportunity of running into Sackett's Harbour.

I remained but a few hours at the Harbour and left it at daylight on the morning of the 18th, but did not arrive here until yesterday, owing to continual head winds, not having laid our course during the passage. On the 19th I saw the enemy's fleet near the False Ducks, but took no notice of him, as I wished him to follow me up the lake.

There is a report here, and generally believed, that captain Perry has captured the whole of the enemy's fleet on lake Erie. If this should prove true in all its details, (and God grant that it may) he has immortalized himself and not disappointed the high expectations formed of his talents and bravery.

I have learnt, from a source which can be depended upon, that we did the enemy much more injury, in our encounter on the 11th, than I had expected : I find that we killed captain Mulcaster, of the Royal George, and a number of his men, and did considerable injury to that ship, as well as several other vessels. It was truly unfortunate that we could not have brought the enemy to a general action on that day, as I am confident the victory would have been as complete as that upon lake Erie. I have, however, the consolation to know, that every exertion was used to bring him to close action. If we did not succeed, it was not our fault.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Hon. William Jones,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

GENERAL ORDERS

Of Debarkation, of March, and of Battle.

HEAD QUARTERS, ON BOARD THE U. S. SCHOONER ARIEL,
September 26th, 1813.

As it is the intention of the general to land the army on the enemy's coast, the following will be the order of debarkation, of march, and of battle :

The right wing of the army will be composed of the Kentucky volunteers, under the command of his excellency governor Shelby, acting as major general. The left wing, of the light corps of lieutenant colonel Ball, and the brigades of generals M'Arthur and Cass. The arrangement is made with a view to the localities of the ground, upon which the troops are to act, and the composition of the enemy's force, and is calculated, in marching up the lake or straight, to place our regular troops in the open ground on the lake, where they will probably be opposed by the British regulars, and the Kentucky volunteers in the woods, which it is pre-

sumed will be occupied by the enemy's militia and Indians. When the signal is given for putting to the shore, the corps of Lieutenant colonel Ball will precede the left wing: the regiment of volunteer riflemen the right wing: these corps will land with the utmost celerity, consistent with the preservation of good order, and as soon as landed, will seize the most favourable position for annoying the enemy and covering the disembarkation of the troops of the line. General Cass's brigade will follow colonel Ball's corps, and general Calmes the volunteer riflemen. The regiments will land and form in succession upon those which precede them. The right wing, with its left in front, displaying to the right; and the left wing with its right in front, displaying to the left. The brigades of generals King, Allen, and Caldwell, will form successively to the right of general Calmes. General M'Arthur and Childs's brigades will form the reserve. The general will command in person, the right brigades of generals Cass and Calmes, assisted by major general Henry. His excellency governor Shelby will have the immediate command of three brigades on the right, assisted by major general Desha. As soon as the troops are disembarked, the boats are to be immediately sent back to the fleet. It will be observed that the order of landing, here prescribed, is somewhat that of direct eschelons deployed into line upon the advanced corps of the right and left wing. It is the intention of the general, however, that all the troops which are provided with boats, should land in as quick succession as possible; and the general officers command towards the extremities of the line, are authorized to deviate from the arrangement to counteract any movement of the enemy, by landing any part of their commands, previously to the formation of the corps, which is herein directed to precede them. The corps of lieutenant colonel Ball, and the volunteer rifle regiment, will maintain the position they occupy on landing, until the troops of the line are formed to support them; they will then retire through the intervals of the line, or to the flanks, and form in the rear of the line.

A detachment of artillery, with a six, four, and three pounder and howitzer, will land with the advanced light corps; the rest of the artillery will be held in reserve, and landed at such point as major Wood may direct.

The point of landing for the reserve, under brigadier general M'Arthur, cannot now be designated; it will be made to support any point of the line which may require aid, or be formed on the flanks, as circumstances may render necessary. The arrangement for landing the troops, will be made entirely under the direction of an officer of the navy, whom commodore Perry has been so obliging as to offer for that purpose. The debarkation of the troops will be covered by the cannon of the vessels. The troops being landed, and the enemy driven off, or not opposing the landing, the army will change its front to the left, and form

in order of battle in the following manner. The two brigades of regular troops, and two of the volunteers, to be formed in two lines at right angles to the shore of the lake. General M'Arthur's brigade and Calmes to form the front line, and Cass's and Childs's the second line; the regular troops still on the left; that flank of both lines, resting on the shore,—the distance between the two lines will be 300 yards. The remaining three brigades of volunteers will be drawn up in a single line of two ranks, at right angles to the line of march, its head upon the right of the front line, forming a crotchet (*en potence*) with that line, and extending beyond the second line. The corps of lieutenant colonel Ball will form the advance of the left wing, at the distance of 300 yards, the regiment of rifle volunteers, the advance of the right wing, at the same distance.

Some light pieces of artillery will be placed in the road leading up the lake, and at such other points as major Wood may direct. When the order is given for marching, the first and second lines will advance by files from the heads of companies: in other words, these two lines will form two columns, marching by their flanks by companies at entire distances. The three brigades on the right flank will be faced to the left and marched forward—the head of this column still forming *en potence* with the front line. It is probable that the two brigades of the front line will extend from the lake, some distance into the woods, on the right flank, and it is desirable it should be so: but should it be otherwise, and the crotchet or angle be at any time on the open ground, his excellency governor Shelby will immediately prolong the front line to the right, by adding to it as many companies of the leading brigade of the flank column as will bring the angle, and consequently the flank column itself, completely within the woods. It is to be presumed that the enemy will make their attack upon the army on its march, that their regular troops will form their right upon the lake, their militia occupy the ground between the regulars and the woods, and the Indians the woods. The formation herein prescribed is intended to resist an arrangement of this kind. Should the general's conjecture on that subject prove correct, as it must be evident that the right of the enemy cannot be turned, and on that wing his best troops must be placed, it will be proper to refuse him our left, and direct our principal effort to uncover the flank of his regulars by driving off his militia. In the event supposed, therefore, it will be proper to bring up a part or the whole of general Cass's brigade, to assist the charge made by general Calmes, or that the former should change positions with the brigade of volunteers in the second line. Should the general think it safe to order the whole of Cass's brigade to the right, without replacing it with another, general Cass will march to the right, formed in oblique *eschelons* of companies. It will be the business of general M'Arthur, in the event of his wing being refused to watch the motions of the ene-

my, with the assistance of the artillery, to prevent his front line at least from interrupting the progress of our right. Should the enemy's militia be defeated, the brigade of ours in advance will immediately wheel upon the flank of the British regulars, and general M'Arthur will advance to attack them in front. In the mean time, his excellency governor Shelby can use the brigade in reserve of the second line to prolong the flank line from its front or left, or to reinforce any weak part of the line. In all cases where troops in advance are obliged to retire through those who are advancing to support them, it will be done by companies in files, which will retire through the intervals of the advancing line, and will immediately form in rear. The light troops will be particularly governed by this direction.

The disposition of the troops on the right flank is such as the commanding general thinks best calculated to resist an attack from Indians, which is only to be expected from that quarter. His excellency governor Shelby will, however, use his discretion in making any alteration which his experience and judgment may dictate. Lieutenant colonel Ball, lieutenant colonel Simral, and the general officers commanding on the flank line, are to send out small detachments in advance of the two former corps, and to the flank of the latter. Should they discover the enemy in force, immediately notice will be sent to the lines. The general commanding on the spot will immediately order the signals for forming in order of battle, which will be the beat "*to arms.*"

All signals will be immediately repeated by all the drums of the line—the signal for the whole to halt, is the retreat. Drums will be distributed along the heads of companies, and the taps occasionally given to regulate their march.

Lieutenant colonels Ball and Simral are to keep the general constantly advised of the discoveries made by the advanced parties. Where it shall become necessary for the corps of Ball and Simral to retire, they will form on the flank or in the rear of generals M'Arthur's and Calmes's brigades, and receive the orders of the brigadiers respectively.

Brigadier general Cass will designate such officers as he may deem proper, to assist captain Elliott, of the navy, in the arrangement of the troops. The general will be the signal for the whole to move. By command,

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Col. Adj. Gen.*

Truly copied from the original.

ROBERT BUTTLER, *A. Adj. Gen.*

NIAGARA, September 27th, 1813, 6 o'clock. A. M.

DEAR SIR,

I received, at eight o'clock last evening, your interesting letter of the 22d, and shall employ its authorizations to the best possible effect.

Fifteen hundred men were embarked with orders to sail the day before yesterday, but a strong easterly wind has made it impossible to move.

The whole force, say three thousand combatants, after deducting the garrisons of Fort George and Niagara, were ready for embarkation yesterday, and as the weather is serene at this moment, I hope the whole may be able to move at dusk this day: I say at dusk because I am desirous to keep my neighbours under a delusion as long as possible; they are perplexed as to my intentions, and will not be able to penetrate them before they have discovered the course of my flotilla.

I have authentic information from York the evening of the 24th instant. The brigade of the militia in the vicinity were required to assemble the 25th, and six hundred men of the 41st and 49th regiments, second battalion, were daily expected there on their route to this neighborhood: this is good; and still better, three spacious block houses are ordered by sir George to be erected at York.

But, sir, here is one drawback; the tantalizing sir James Yeo was in shore with his fleet on the evening of the 24th, (Friday) about twenty-eight miles east of York. Where he is now, we know not, for he has not since been heard of, and Chauncey is just sending out the Lady of the Lake and the Neptune to reconnoitre York and the coast in that quarter. What may be the views of the knight? to gasconade, to retard my movement, or to enable De Rottenberg to follow me? I am unable to divine; but will not be longer delayed, and, therefore, shall be twenty miles to the eastward before to-morrow morning, should the weather permit. If sir James can be discovered, Chauncey will seek him; otherwise he will sail with me to cover my left flank.

As we have not a moment to lose, I shall proceed directly to Grenadier Island, writing you and sending orders to the commanding officer by a despatch boat, en passant.

After all, we are so straitened for transport that we shall not find room for more than fifteen day's provisions; indeed, we have little more to spare from this position, and therefore, our sole dependence must be on the magazines at Sackett's Harbor, of which the contractor should be personally advised. Heaven protect you.

Truly yours,

JAMES WILKINSON.

Honourable John Armstrong,
Secretary of War.

U. S. SCHOONER ARIOL, MALDEN HARBOR,
September 27th, 1813, 5 P.M.

SIR,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that the army major general Harrison, have this moment marched into

without opposition, and that the squadron are now at anchor off **the** town.

I have the honour to be, &c.

O. H. PERRY.

The Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. FRIGATE PRESIDENT,
Newport, September 27th, 1813.

SIR,

Your having been informed of my leaving Boston on the 23d of April last, and of my departure from President Roads in company with the Congress, on the 30th of the same month; it now only remains for me to make you acquainted with my proceedings since the latter date.

In a few hours after getting to sea, the wind, which had been light from the westward, shifted to the south-east and obliged me to beat, consequently prevented our getting clear of the bay until the 3d of May, when, in the afternoon, while in chase of a British brig of war, near the shoal of George's Bank, we passed to windward of three sail, two of which, from their appearance and the information previously received, I judged to be the *La Hogue* 74, and *Nymph* frigate, and the third a merchant brig. After getting clear of George's Bank the wind veered to the north-eastward, and we continued along east-southerly, in the direction of the southern edge of the gulf stream until the 8th of May, in longitude 60 west, latitude 39 30 north, when I parted company with the Congress. After parting company I shaped a course as near as the wind would permit, to intercept the enemy's West India commerce passing to the southward of the Grand Bank. Not meeting with any thing in this direction except American vessels from Lisbon and Cadiz, I next pursued a route to the northward on a parallel with the eastern edge of the Grand Bank, so as to cross the tracks of his West India, Halifax, Quebec, and St. John's trade. In this route, experiencing constant thick fogs for a number of days, and not meeting any thing, after reaching the latitude of 48 north, I steered to the south-east towards the Azores, off which, in different directions, I continued until the 6th of June, without meeting a single enemy's vessel, or any others, except two Americans. At this time falling in with an American ship bound to Cadiz, and receiving information that she had, four days before, passed an enemy's convoy from the West Indies bound to England, I crowded sail to the north-east, and, although disappointed in falling in with the convoy, I nevertheless made four captures, between the 9th and 13th of June.

Being now in the latitude of 46 north, and longitude 28 west, I determined on going into the North Sea, and accordingly shaped a course that afforded a prospect of falling in with vessels bound to Newfoundland from St. George's channel, by the way of Cape

Clear, as well as others that might pass north about to the northward of Ireland. To my astonishment, however, in all this route I did not meet with a single vessel, until I made the Shetland Islands, and even off there, nothing but Danish vessels trading to England under British licenses. At the time I reached the Shetland Islands, a considerable portion of my provisions and water being expended, it became necessary to replenish these, previous to determining what course to pursue next; and I accordingly, for this purpose, put into North Bergen on the 27th of June; but, much to my surprise and disappointment, was not able to obtain any thing but water, there being an unusual scarcity of bread in every part of Norway, and, at the time, not more in Bergen than a bare sufficiency for its inhabitants for four or five weeks. This being the case, after replenishing my water, I departed on the 2d of July and stretched over towards the Orkney Islands, and from thence towards North Cape, for the purpose of intercepting a convoy of 25 or 30 sail, which it was said would leave Archangel about the middle of July, under the protection of two brigs or two sloops of war; and which was further confirmed by two vessels I captured on the 13th and 18th of the same month. In this object, however, the enemy had the good fortune to disappoint me, by a line of battle ship and a frigate making their appearance off the North Cape on the 19th of July, just as I was in momentary expectation of meeting the convoy. On first discovering the enemy's two ships of war, not being able, owing to the haziness of the weather, to ascertain their character with precision, I stood toward them, until making out what they were, I hauled by the wind on the opposite tack to avoid them; but owing to faint, variable winds, calms, and entire day-light, (the sun in that latitude, at that season, appearing at midnight several degrees above the horizon) they were enabled to continue the chase upwards of 80 hours; during which time, owing to different changes of the wind in their favour, they were brought quite as near to us as was desirable. At the time of meeting with the enemy's two ships, the privateer schooner *Scourge*, of New York, which I had fallen in with the day before, was in company; but their attention was so much engrossed by the *President* that they permitted the *Scourge* to escape without appearing to take any notice of her.

Being thus disappointed in meeting the convoy, and a still further portion of my provisions being expended, I determined to proceed to a more westerly station, and accordingly steered to gain the direction of the trade passing out of, and into, the Irish channel. In this position, between the 25th of July and the 2d of August, I made three captures, when, finding that the enemy had a superior force in that vicinity, I found it expedient to change my ground; and after taking a circuit round Ireland, and getting into the latitude of Cape Clear, steered for the banks of Newfoundland, near to which I made two more captures, and by the latter one found that the *Bellerophon* 74, and *Hyperion* frigate

were on the eastern part of the bank, and only a few miles to the westward of me ; I however did not fall in with them. From the eastern edge of the Grand Bank, to which I had beat all the way from the north-west coast of Ireland, (the wind having prevailed, without intermission, from the 1st of August to the middle of September from west to southwest) I steered for the United States, without seeing a single vessel of any kind until the 22d of the present month, being near the south shoal of Nantucket, I met with a Swedish brig and an American cartel (the Russian ship *Hoffnung*) from London, bound to New-Medford.

By this time my provisions, and particularly bread, was so nearly consumed as to make it indispensibly necessary that I should put into the first convenient port after gaining the requisite information of the disposition of the enemy's cruizers, as could enable me to steer clear of a superior force ; and this I was enabled to do in a manner which I shall communicate in another letter. On the 23d instant I captured his Britannic majesty's schooner *High Flyer*, (a tender to admiral Warren) with which vessel I now have to inform you of my arrival at this port.

Annexed is a list of vessels captured and destroyed, in which were made 271 prisoners. I have now, however, only 55 prisoners on board, having sent to England, on parole, 78 in the *Duke of Montrose* ; 76 in the Greenland ship, *Eliza Swan*, and 60 in the *barque Lion*, of Liverpool.

During my cruize, although I have not had it in my power to add any additional lustre to the character of our little navy, I have, nevertheless, rendered essential service to my country, I hope, by harrassing the enemy's commerce, and employing to his disadvantage, more than a dozen times, the force of a single frigate.

My officers and crew have experienced great privations since I left the United States, from being nearly 5 months at sea, and living the last three months of that time upon a scanty allowance of the roughest fare ; and it is with peculiar pleasure I acquaint you that they are all in better health than might be expected, although you may well suppose that their scanty allowance has not been of any advantage to their strength or appearance.

The *High Flyer* was commanded by lieutenant Hutchinson, second of the *St. Domingo*. She is a remarkable fine vessel of her class, sails very fast, and would make an excellent light cruizer, provided the government have occasion for a vessel of her description.

Just at the moment of closing my letter, a newspaper has been handed me containing captain Broke's challenge to my late gallant friend captain Lawrence, in which he mentions, with considerable *emphasis*, the pains he had taken to meet the President and Congress with the *Shannon* and *Tenedos*.

It is unnecessary at present to take further notice of captain Broke's observations than to say, if that was his disposition, his

conduct was so glaringly opposite as to authorize a very contrary belief. Relative to captain Broke I have only further to say, that I hope he has not been so severely wounded as to make it a *sufficient reason* to prevent his re-assuming the command of the Shannon at a future day.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN RODGERS.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

MAJOR GENERAL HARRISON'S PROCLAMATION.

The enemy having been driven from the territory of Michigan, and a part of the army under my command having taken possession of it; it becomes necessary that the civil government of the territory should be re-established, and the former officers renew the exercise of their authority. I have therefore thought proper to proclaim, that all appointments and commissions which have been derived from British officers are at an end; that the citizens of the territory are restored to all the rights and privileges which they enjoyed previously to the capitulation made by general Hull, on the 16th of August, 1812. Under the present circumstances, and until the will of the government be known, I have thought proper to direct that all persons, having civil offices in the territory of Michigan, at the period of the capitulation of Detroit, resume the exercise of their powers appertaining to their offices respectively. In the present dispersed state of its population, many officers are doubtless absent. In all cases, thus situated, the last incumbent who resigned the office will resume the exercise of its duties. The laws in force at the period abovementioned will be re-established, and continue in force until repealed by the proper authority.

Given at head quarters, the 29th day of September, 1813.

WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

By the general,

JOHN O'FALLON, *Aid-de-Camp*.

On the day of the debarkation of our troops into Canada, the following general order was issued.

HEAD QUARTERS, ON BOARD THE ARIEL,
September 29th, 1813.

GENERAL ORDER.

The General entreats his brave troops to remember that they are the sons of sires whose fame is immortal: that they are to fight for the rights of *their* insulted country, whilst their opponents combat for the unjust pretensions of a master.

Kentuckians—remember the river Raisin, but remember it only whilst the victory is suspended. The revenge of a soldier cannot be gratified upon a fallen enemy.

By command,

ROBERT BUTTLER, *A. Adj. Gen.*

Extract of a letter from general Harrison to the Department of War.

HEAD-QUARTERS, SANDWICH, U. C. 30th September, 1813.

"SIR,

"General Proctor has with him 475 regulars of the 41st and Newfoundland regiments; 60 of the 10th regiment of veterans; 45 dragoons; and from 600 to 1000 Indians. Some deserters who left him the night before last, give the latter as the number. The citizens of Detroit suppose the former to be correct.

"The Ottawas and Chippewas have withdrawn from the British, and have sent in three of their warriors to beg for peace, promising to agree to any terms that I shall prescribe. I have agreed to receive them upon condition of their giving hostages for their fidelity, and immediately joining us with all their warriors. The Wyandots, Miamies, and the band of Delawares, which had joined the enemy, are also desirous to be received upon the same terms.

The celebrated chief, Main Pock, is at the head of the hostile band on the Detroit side of the straight. Tecumseh heads that which remains with the British. The inhabitants of Detroit, who were in daily communication with them, make the former from 1000 to 1200. Their object in dividing their force was to make a night attack upon the part of the army which remained on this side, by a junction of their force some miles above.

"A detachment of the army, and some of the vessels of war, will set out for the reduction of Mackinac and St. Joseph's in a few days.

"I have honor to be, &c.

"WILLIAM H. HARRISON."

Honourable John Armstrong,
Secretary of War.

U. S. SHIP GENERAL PIKE, OFF NIAGARA,
October 1st, 1813.

SIR,

On the 26th ultimo it was reported to me, that the enemy's fleet was in York. I immediately despatched the Lady of the Lake to look into York, and ascertain the fact—she returned in the evening with the information that the enemy was in York bay.

I immediately prepared to weigh, but owing to a strong wind from north north-east, was not able to get out of the river before the evening of the 27th, and, owing to the extreme darkness of the night, a part of the squadron got separated, and did not join before next morning at 8 o'clock. On the 28th, the General Pike, Madison and Sylph, each took a schooner in tow, and made all sail for York. Soon after, discovered the enemy's fleet under weigh in York bay—shaped our course for him, and prepared for action; he perceiving our intention of engaging him in his position, tacked and stood out of the bay, wind at east. I formed the line an run down for his centre. When we had approached within about three miles, he made all sail to the southward. I wore in succession and stood on the same tack with him, edging down gradually in order to close. At 10 minutes past meridian, the enemy finding that we were closing fast with him, and that he must either risk an action or suffer his two rear vessels to be cut off, he tacked in succession, beginning at the van, hoisted his colors, and commenced a well directed fire at this ship, for the purpose of covering his rear, and attacking our rear as he passed to leeward: perceiving his intention, I was determined to disappoint him; therefore as soon as the Wolf (the leading ship) passed the centre of his line and abeam of us, I bore up in succession (preserving our line) for the enemy's centre; this manœuvre not only covered our rear, but hove him in confusion. He immediately bore away: we had, however, closed so near as to bring our guns to bear with effect, and in 20 minutes the main and mizen-top-masts, and main yard of the Wolf, were shot away; he immediately put before the wind, and set all sail upon his fore-mast. I made the signal for the fleet to make all sail; the enemy, however, keeping dead before the wind, was enabled to outsail most of our squadron. As it brought all the sail upon one mast, he did not feel the loss of his main and mizen-top-mast. I continued the chase until near 3 o'clock, during which time I was enabled in this ship (with the Asp in tow) to keep within point blank shot of the enemy, and sustained the whole of his fire during the chase. Captain Crane, in the Madison, and lieutenant Brown, in the Oneida, used every exertion to close with the enemy; but the Madison having a heavy schooner in tow, and the Oneida sailing very dull before the wind prevented those officers from closing near enough to do any execution with their carronades. The Governor Tompkins kept in her station, until her fore-mast was so badly wounded as to oblige her to shorten sail: lieutenant Finch, of the Madison, who commanded her for this cruise (owing to the indisposition of lieutenant Pettigrew) behaved with great gallantry, and is an officer of much promise. Captain Woolsey, in the Sylph, was kept astern by the Ontairo, which he had in tow, but did considerable execution with his heavy guns.

At fifteen minutes before 3 P. M. I very reluctantly relinquished the pursuit of a beaten enemy. The reasons that led to this deter-

nation were such as I flatter myself you will approve—they were these: at the time I gave up the chase, this ship was making so much water, that it required all our pumps to keep her free, owing to our receiving several shot so much below the water's edge, that we could not plug the holes from the outside) the Governor Tompkins with her fore-mast gone, and the squadron within about six miles of the head of the lake, blowing a gale of wind from east and increasing with a heavy sea on, and every appearance of the equinox. I considered that if I chased the enemy to his anchorage at the head of the lake, I should be obliged to anchor also, and although we might succeed in driving him on shore, the probability was that we should go on shore also; he amongst his friends, we amongst our enemies, and after the gale had abated, if he could succeed in getting off one or two vessels out of the two fleets, it would give him as completely the command of the lake as if he had 20 vessels. Moreover, he was covered at his anchorage by a part of his army, and several small batteries thrown up for the purpose. Therefore, if he could have rode out the gale, we should have been cut up by their shot from the shore: under all these circumstances, and taking into view the consequences resulting from the loss of our superiority on the lakes at this time, I without hesitation relinquished the opportunity then presenting itself of acquiring individual reputation at the expense of my country.

The loss sustained by this ship was considerable, owing to her being so long exposed to the fire of the enemy's fleet; but our most serious loss was occasioned by the bursting of one of our guns, which killed and wounded 22 men, and tore up the top-gallant fore-castle, which rendered the gun upon that deck useless. We had four other guns cracked in the muzzle, which rendered their use extremely doubtful. Our main top-gallant-mast was shot away in the early part of the action, and the bowsprit, fore and main-mast, wounded, rigging and sails much cut up, and a number of shot in our hull, several of which were between wind and water, and 27 men killed and wounded, including those by the bursting of the gun. The Madison received a few shot, but no person hurt on board. The Governor Tompkins lost her fore-mast and the Oneida her main-top-mast badly wounded. We have, however, repaired nearly all our damages, and are ready to meet the enemy. During our chase, one, if not two, of the enemy's small vessels, was completely in our power, if I could have been satisfied with so partial a victory: but I was so sure of the whole that I passed them unnoticed, by which means they finally escaped.

The gale continued until last night, but the wind still blows from the eastward. I thought it important to communicate with general Wilkinson, to ascertain when he meant to move with the army. I therefore ran off this place for that purpose; and he thinks that the public service will be promoted by my watching sir James

at the head of the lake, and if possible preventing his return to Kingston, while he proceeds with the army for Sackett's Harbor. I shall, therefore, proceed immediately in quest of the enemy.

I have great pleasure in acknowledging the assistance I received from captain Sinclair during our chase, in using his best exertions to bring this ship into close action. The other officers and men behaved to my perfect satisfaction, and were extremely anxious to close with the enemy, even singly, and if he ever gives us an opportunity for close action, they will show that they are not inferior to any of their countrymen.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY,

Hon. W. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

TO THE PATRIOTS OF THE WESTERN DISTRICT,

The period being at hand which is to decide the fate of the province of Upper Canada, and the command of the Niagara frontier having devolved on me; I think proper to invite the old and young patriots of the western district, to join my brigade in defence of their country and rights—any number not exceeding 1000 will be accepted and organized immediately on their arrival at Lewistown, and officered by the choice of their men.

As the movements of an army require secrecy, objects in view cannot be particularly developed; but those who feel disposed to distinguish themselves and render services to their country, may be assured that something efficient and decisive will be done. The term of service will be 2 months, if not sooner discharged; and every thing shall be done to render their situations as comfortable as possible. I wish none to volunteer who may have any constitutional objections to cross the Niagara river. One thousand four hundred of my brigade have already volunteered to cross the river, and go wherever they may be required; and 600 of them are now doing duty at Fort George. I flatter myself that no other consideration need be urged, than love of country, to excite the patriotism of the yeomanry of the western district.

Given at head quarters, Lewistown, October 2d, 1813.

GEORGE M'CLURE, Brig. General

Commanding Niagara frontier.

Extract of a letter from colonel Smith, of the rifle regiment, to colonel A. F. Nicholl, inspector general, dated

"LOWER SANDUSKY, October 2d, 1813.

"I have already collected 520 men of my regiment. The last accounts from the general, state, that he was in pursuit of Proctor,

who had evacuated Malden, a few hours before he landed. I fear he will make his escape. I leave here immediately for Portage, and probably for head quarters, to procure transports for my detachment."

WAR DEPARTMENT, October 4th, 1813.

SIR,

Understanding that the *defence* of the post committed to your charge, *may* render it proper to destroy the town of Newark, you are hereby directed to apprize its inhabitants of this circumstance, and to invite them to remove themselves and their effects to some place of greater safety.

I am, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brig. General M'Clure or officer commanding
at Fort George, Upper Canada.

HEAD QUARTERS, NEAR MORAVIAN TOWN,
on the River Thames, 80 miles from Detroit, October 5th, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you, that by the blessing of Providence, the army under my command has obtained a complete victory over the combined Indian and British forces under the command of general Proctor. I believe that nearly the whole of the enemy's regulars are taken or killed. Amongst the former are all the superior officers excepting general Proctor. My mounted men are now in pursuit of him. Our loss is very trifling. The brave colonel R. M. Johnson is the only officer whom I have heard of that is wounded, he badly, but I hope not dangerously.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

Hon. J. Armstrong, Secretary at War.

NEWPORT, October 5th, 1813.

SIR,

I have the pleasure to inform you of the capture of the British armed sloop "Dart," by the revenue-cutter of this place, last evening. She appeared off the harbor before sun-set; the captain of the cutter offered his services to go out. I put on board three sailing masters and about 20 men; she immediately made sail and laid aboard the Dart, and carried her by boarding; her first officer was killed; two of our own men were wounded slightly. The prisoners I send for your disposal.

Very respectfully, your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN NICHOLSON.

Com. John Rodgers, U. S. frigate President.

Extract of a letter from general M. Arthur to the Secretary of War.

“DETROIT, October 6th, 1813.

“You have no doubt been advised by the commanding general, that Malden and this place were abandoned by the enemy previous to the arrival of our army, and that all the public buildings, &c. were destroyed. On our arrival at Sandwich, my brigade was ordered across the river to disperse some Indians, who were pillaging the town, and to take possession of the place. Information was received that several thousand Indians had retired a small distance into the woods, with instructions to attack general Harrison’s army on its passage, for the purpose of retarding its progress; consequently my brigade was left to garrison this place.

“Since general Harrison’s departure, five nations of Indians, viz. the Ottaways, Chippeways, Pottawatamies, Miamies and Kickapoos, who were but a few miles back, have come in for peace, and I have agreed that hostilities should cease for the present on the following conditions: “They have agreed to take hold of the same tomahawk with us, and to strike all who are, or may be, enemies to the United States, whether British or Indians.” They are to bring in a number of their women and children, and leave them as hostages, whilst they accompany us to war. Some of them have already brought in their women, and are drawing rations.

“I have just received a note from general Harrison, advising that he had last evening overtaken general Proctor’s force, and had gained a complete victory; that all the principal officers, general Proctor excepted, were in his possession, which no doubt ends the war in this quarter.

“I have the honour to be, &c.

“DUNCAN M’ARTHUR, Brig. Gen. U. S. army.”

Extract of a letter from brigadier general M’Clure, to his excellency governor Tompkins, dated

“FORT GEORGE, HALF PAST 5 O’CLOCK, P. M.
October 6th, 1813.

“We have commenced offensive operations against the enemy. About 500 militia volunteers, and about 150 Indians, commanded by colonel Chapin, attacked the picket guard of the enemy, about a mile and a half from Fort George, and drove them in upon the main body, when the enemy opened a fire from several field pieces. Our men retired in good order into the fort, with the loss of one man killed and two or three wounded. The enemy’s loss was seven killed, many wounded, and four prisoners.

“In a short time the enemy appeared in considerable force within five hundred yards of the fort, at the edge of the woods. Chapin again sallied out with about 300 men and some Indians,

ommenced a brisk fire on the whole of the enemy's line, and drove them half a mile; but perceiving by the movements of the enemy that they would outflank us, I ordered 200 to reinforce him, and in two detachments to attack the enemy's flanks. We succeeded in driving the enemy into the woods, when night coming on put an end to the conflict. Our loss was trifling; I have not ascertained that of the enemy. Colonel Chapin is a brave man. Every officer and soldier did his duty."

U. S. SHIP GENERAL PIKE, SACKETT'S HARBOR,
October 6th, 1813.

SIR,

I have the pleasure to inform you that I arrived here this morning, with five of the enemy's vessels, which I fell in with, and captured, last evening, off the Ducks. These were part of seven sail which left York on Sunday with 234 troops on board, bound to Kingston. Of this fleet five were captured, one burnt, and one escaped. The prisoners, amounting to nearly 300, besides having upwards of 300 of our troops on board from Niagara, induced me to run into port for the purpose of landing both.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

UNITED STATES' SHIP GENERAL PIKE,
Sackett's Harbor, October 6th, 1813.

SIR,

As soon as the last of the flotilla with the troops, cleared the Niagara, I proceeded in quest of the enemy. On the 2d instant, at 10 A. M. discovered him steering a course for Niagara, with studding sails, and all sails set, wind from the south and westward; we made sail in chase, but as soon as we shot out, he took in studding sails, and hauled upon a wind to the westward, and made all sail from us; the wind being light all day, we made but little progress against the current, and at sun down, the enemy was off the Twenty Mile Creek, and had evidently gained considerably from us. During the night, the wind continued so light that we altered our position but very little, and at day-light, on the 3d, saw the enemy at anchor close in with the land, between the Twelve and Twenty Mile Creek; as soon as he saw us, he weighed and made all sail to the westward, wind from south to south-west, and squally. We made all sail in chase, and continued the chase the whole day, it blowing very heavy in squalls; at sun down, we could barely mark him out from the mast-head, when he appeared nearly up to the head of the lake; it continued squally with rain, and the night very dark; at day-light, on the 4th, hazy, could see nothing of the enemy—contin-

ned working up for the head of the lake; towards meridian became calm. I ordered the Lady of the Lake to sweep up Burlington bay, and ascertain whether the fleet was there; at past 9 P. M. she returned, with information that the fleet not there. Saw but two gun-boats. It struck me at once he had availed himself of the darkness of the preceding night and had either run for Kingston, or down the lake, for the purpose of intercepting the flotilla with the army; I therefore made all sail and shaped my course for the Ducks, with a view of intercepting him or his prizes, if he should have made any. The wind increased to a strong gale from the northward and westward, and continued during the whole day on the 5th;—we therefore made a great run, for at 1 P. M. we passed Long Point; at 3 discovered seven sail near the False Ducks; presuming them to be the fleet, made all sail in chase; at 4, made them out to be sloops and schooners. I made the signal for the Sylph and the Lady of the Lake, to cast off their tow, and chase north-east; soon after, perceiving the enemy separating on different tacks, I cast off the Governor Tompkins from this ship, gave the squadron in charge of captain Crane, and made all sail in chase; at 5, the enemy finding us to gain fast upon them, and one of his gun-vessels sailing much worse than the rest, he took the people out and set her on fire. At sun down, when opposite the Real Ducks, the Hamilton, (late Growler) Confiance (late Julia) and Mary Ann, struck to us. The Sylph soon after, brought down the Drummond, cutter rigged. The Lady Gore run into the Ducks, but the Sylph (which was left to watch her) took possession of her early the next morning. The Enterprize, a small schooner, is the only one that escaped, and she owed her safety to the darkness of the night.

Finding much difficulty in shifting the prisoners, owing to the smallness of our boats and a heavy sea, I determined to take the prizes in tow, and run for this place, and land the prisoners and troops that I had on board. On the 6th, the Lady of the Lake having towed one of the prizes in, I despatched her immediately to cruize between the Real and False Ducks. She returned the same afternoon, having discovered the enemy's squadron going into Kingston.

I have repaired the principal damages sustained by this ship in the action on the 28th ultimo, and have put in a new fore-mast into the Governor Tompkins. We are now ready, and waiting the movements of the army, which is contemplated will leave here on the 10th.

The vessels captured on the 5th, are gun vessels mounting from one to three guns each, with troops from the head of the lake (last from York) bound to Kingston. We learnt from the prisoners, that the enemy was very much cut up in their hulls and spars, and a great many men killed and wounded, particularly on board the Wolf and Royal George. I enclose, herewith, a list of

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e prisoners taken on the 5th [Already published, see "The
War" of the 19th ultimo.]

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

M. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. FRIGATE PRESIDENT, PAWTUCKET,
October 7th, 1815.

R,

Enclosed I have the honor of transmitting you a letter this
moment received from lieutenant Nicholson,—commanding the
m-boats at Newport, informing me of the capture of the private
armed sloop Dart.

With great respect, &c.

JOHN RODGERS.

M. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

HEAD QUARTERS, DETROIT, October 9th, 1815.

R,

In my last letter from Sandwich, of the 30th ultimo, I did
myself the honour to inform you, that I was preparing to pursue
the enemy the following day. From various causes, however,
I was unable to put the troops in motion until the morning of the
1st instant, and then to take with me only about 140 of the regu-
lar troops, Johnson's mounted regiment, and such of governor
Delby's volunteers as were fit for a rapid march, the whole
amounting to about 3500 men. To general M'Arthur, with about
100 effectives, the protection of this place, and the sick, was
committed. General Cass's brigade, and the corps of lieutenant
Colonel Ball, were left at Sandwich, with orders to follow me as
soon as the men received their knapsacks and blankets, which had
been left on an island in lake Erie.

The unavoidable delay at Sandwich was attended with no dis-
advantage to us. General Proctor had posted himself at Dalson's,
on the right bank of the river Thames (or French), fifty-six miles
from this place, where I was informed he intended to fortify and
receive me. He must have believed, however, that I had no dis-
position to follow him, or that he had secured my continuance here,
by the reports that were circulated that the Indians would attack
and destroy this place, upon the advance of the army; as he neglect-
ed the breaking up of the bridges until the night of the 2d instant.
On the night our army reached the river, which is 25 miles from
Sandwich, and is one of four streams crossing our route, over all
of which are bridges, and being deep and muddy, are unfordable
for a considerable distance into the country. The bridge here
was found entire, and, in the morning, I proceeded with Johnson's

regiment, to save, if possible, the others. At the second bridge, over a branch of the river Thames, we were fortunate enough to capture a lieutenant of dragoons and eleven privates, who had been sent by general Proctor to destroy them. From the prisoners I learned that the third bridge was broken up, and that the enemy had no certain information of our advance. The bridge, having been imperfectly destroyed, was soon repaired, and the army encamped at Drake's farm, four miles below Dalson's.

The river Thames, along the banks of which our route lay, is a fine deep stream, navigable for vessels of considerable burthen, after the passage of the bar at its mouth, over which there is six and a half feet water.

The baggage of the army was brought from Detroit in boats, protected by three gun-boats, which commodore Perry had furnished for the purpose, as well as to cover the passage of the army over the Thames itself, on the mouth of its tributary streams; the banks being low and the country generally open (prairies), as high as Dalson's, these vessels were well calculated for the purpose. Above Dalson's, however, the character of the river and adjacent country, is considerably changed. The former, though still deep, is very narrow, and its banks high and woody. The commodore and myself, therefore, agreed upon the propriety of leaving the boats under a guard of 150 infantry, and I determined to trust to fortune, and the bravery of my troops, to effect the passage of the river. Below a place called Chatham, and four miles above Dalson's, is the third fordable branch of the Thames. The bridge over its mouth had been taken up by the Indians, as well as at M'Gregor's mills, one mile above. Several hundred of the Indians remained to dispute our passage, and, upon the arrival of the advanced guard, commenced a heavy fire from the opposite bank of the creek, as well as that of the river. Believing that the whole force of the enemy was there, I halted the army, formed in order of battle, and brought up our two six pounders to cover the party that were ordered to repair the bridge, and cross the troops. Colonel Johnson's mounted regiment, being upon the right of the army, had seized the remains of the bridge at the mills, under a heavy fire from the Indians. Our loss, upon this occasion, was two killed and three or four wounded; that of the enemy was ascertained to be considerably greater. A house near the bridge, containing a very considerable number of muskets, had been set on fire, but it was extinguished by our troops, and the arms saved. At the first farm above the bridge, we found one of the enemy's vessels on fire, loaded with arms and ordnance stores, and learned that they were a few miles a head of us, still on the right bank of the river, with the great body of the Indians. At Bowles's farm, four miles from the bridge, we halted for the night, found two other vessels, and a large distillery, filled with ordnance and other valuable stores, to an immense amount, in flames. It was impossible to put out the fire; two

twenty-four pounders, with their carriages, were taken, and a large quantity of ball and shells of various sizes. The army was put in motion early on the morning of the 5th. I pushed on, in advance, with the mounted regiment, and requested governor Shelby to follow, as expeditiously as possible, with the infantry. The governor's zeal, and that of his men, enabled them to keep up with the cavalry, and by 9 o'clock, we were at Arnold's mills, having taken, in the course of the morning, two gun-boats and several batteaux, loaded with provisions and ammunition.

A rapid, at the river at Arnold's mills, affords the only fording to be met with for a very considerable distance; but, upon examination, it was found too deep for the infantry. Having, however, fortunately taken two or three boats, and some canoes, on the spot, and obliging the horsemen to take a footman behind each, the whole were safely crossed by 12 o'clock. Eight miles from the crossing, we passed a farm, where a part of the British troops had encamped the night before, under the command of colonel Warburton. The detachment with general Proctor had arrived the day before, at the Moravian towns, four miles higher up. Being now certainly near the enemy, I directed the advance of Johnson's regiment to accelerate their march, for the purpose of procuring intelligence. The officer commanding it, in a short time, sent to inform me, that his progress was stopped by the enemy, who were formed across our line of march. One of the enemy's wagoners, being also taken prisoner, from the information received from him, and my own observation, assisted by some of my officers, I soon ascertained enough of their position, and order of battle, to determine that which it was proper for me to adopt.

I have the honour herewith to enclose you my general order of the 27th ultimo, prescribing the order of march and of battle when the whole army should act together. But as the number and description of the troops had been essentially changed, since the issuing of the order, it became necessary to make a corresponding alteration in their disposition. From the place where our army was last halted, to the Moravian towns, a distance of about three and a half miles, the road passes through a beech forest without any clearing, and for the first two miles near to the bank of the river. At from two to three hundred yards from the river a swamp extends parallel to it, throughout the whole distance. The intermediate ground is dry, and although the trees are tolerably thick, it is in many places clear of underbrush. Across this strip of land, its left *appayed* upon the river, supported by artillery placed in the wood, their right in the swamp covered by the whole of their Indian force, the British troops were drawn up.

The troops at my disposal consisted of about one hundred and twenty regulars of the 27th regiment, five brigades of Kentucky volunteer militia infantry under his excellency governor Shelby,

averaging less than five hundred men, and colonel Johnson's regiment of mounted infantry, making in the whole an aggregate of something above 3000. No disposition of an army opposed to an Indian force can be safe, unless it is secured on the flanks and in the rear. I had therefore no difficulty in arranging the infantry conformably to my general order of battle. General Trotter's brigade of 500 men formed the front line, his right upon the road and his left upon the swamp. General King's brigade a second line, 150 yards in the rear of Trotter's, and Childs's brigade, as a corps of reserve, in the rear of it. These three brigades formed the command of major general Henry; the whole of general Desha's division, consisting of two brigades, were for *en potence* upon the left of Trotter.

While I was engaged in forming the infantry, I had directed colonel Johnson's regiment, which was still in front, to be formed in two lines opposite to the enemy, and, upon the advance of the infantry, to take ground to the left, and forming upon that flank, to endeavour to turn the right of the Indians. A moment's reflection, however, convinced me, that from the thickness of the woods and swampiness of the ground, they would be unable to do any thing on horseback, and there was no time to dismount them and place their horses in security; I therefore determined to refuse my left to the Indians, and to break the British lines at once by a charge of the mounted infantry; the measure was not sanctioned by any thing that I had seen or heard of, but I was fully convinced that it would succeed. The American back-woodsmen ride better in the woods than any other people. A musket or rifle is no impediment to them, being accustomed to carry them on horseback from their earliest youth. I was persuaded, too, that the enemy would be quite unprepared for the shock, and that they could not resist it. Conformably to this idea, I directed the regiment to be drawn up in close column, with its right at the distance of fifty yards from the road, (that it might be, in some measure, protected by the trees from the artillery) its left upon the swamp, and to charge, at full speed, as soon as the enemy delivered their fire. The few regular troops of the 27th regiment, under the command of their colonel (Paul), occupied, in column of sections of four, the small space between the road and the river, for the purpose of seizing the enemy's artillery, and some ten or twelve friendly Indians were directed to move under the bank. The *crotchet*, formed by the front line and general Desha's division, was an important point. At that place, the venerable governor of Kentucky was posted, who, at the age of sixty-six, preserves all the vigour of youth, the ardent zeal which distinguished him in the revolutionary war, and the undiminished bravery which he manifested at King's Mountain. With my aids-de-camp, the acting assistant adjutant general captain Butler, my gallant friend commodore Perry, who did me the honour to serve as my volunteer aid-de-camp, and brigadier general Oak,

ho having no command, tendered me his assistance, I placed myself at the head of the front line of infantry, to direct the movements of the cavalry and give them the necessary support. The army had moved on this order but a short distance, when the mounted men received the fire of the British line, and were ordered to charge; the horses in the front of the column recoiled on the fire; another was given by the enemy, and our column,

length getting in motion, broke through the enemy with irresistible force. In one minute, the contest in front was over. The British officers, seeing no hopes of reducing their disordered ranks to order, and our mounted men wheeling upon them and pouring in a destructive fire, immediately surrendered. It is certain that three only of our troops were wounded in this charge. Upon the left, however, the contest was more severe with the Indians. Colonel Johnson, who commanded on that flank of his regiment, received a most galling fire from them, which was returned with great effect. The Indians still further to the right advanced and fell in with our front line of infantry, near its junction with Desha's division, and, for a moment, made an impression on it. His excellency governor Shelby, however, brought up a regiment to its support, and the enemy, receiving a severe fire in front, and a part of Johnson's regiment having gained their rear, retreated with precipitation. Their loss was very considerable in the action, and many were killed in their retreat.

I can give no satisfactory information of the number of Indians that were in the action, but they must have been considerably upwards of one thousand. From the documents in my possession, (general Proctor's official letters, all of which were taken) and from the information of respectable inhabitants of this territory, the Indians kept in pay by the British, were much more numerous than has been generally supposed. In a letter to general De Rottenburg, of the 27th instant, general Proctor speaks of having prevailed upon most of the Indians to accompany him. Of these it is certain that fifty or sixty Wyandot warriors abandoned him.*

The number of our troops was certainly greater than that of the enemy, but when it is recollected, that they had chosen a position that effectually secured their flank, which it was impossible for us to turn, and that we could not present to them a line more extended than their own, it will not be considered arrogant to claim for my troops the palm of superior bravery.

In communicating to the President through you, sir, my opinion of the conduct of the officers who served under my command, I am at a loss how to mention that of governor Shelby, being convinced that no eulogium of mine can reach his merits. The

* A British officer, of high rank, assured one of my aids-de-camp, that on the day of our landing, general Proctor had, at his disposal, upwards of three thousand Indian warriors, but asserted that the greatest part had left him previous to the action.

governor of an independent state, greatly my superior in years in experience and in military character, he placed himself under my command, and was not more remarkable for his zeal and activity, than for his promptitude and cheerfulness with which he obeyed my orders. The major generals Henry and Desha, the brigadiers Allen, Caldwell, King, Childs and Trotter, all the Kentucky volunteers, manifested great zeal and activity. governor Shelby's staff, his adjutant general, colonel Walker, rendered great service, as did his aids-de-camp general Adair, majors Barry and Crittenden. The military skill of the former was of great service to us, and the activity of the two latter gentlemen could not be surpassed. Illness deprived me of the aid of my adjutant general colonel Gaines, who was left at Sandwick. His duties were, however, ably performed by the acting assistant adjutant general, captain Buttler. My aids-de-camp, lieutenant O'Fallon and captain Todd, of the line, and my volunteer aids John Speed Smith and John Chambers, esquires, have rendered me the most important services from the opening of the campaign. I have already stated that general Cass and commodore Perry assisted me in forming the troops for the action. The former is an officer of the highest merit, and the appearance of the brave commodore cheered and animated every breast.

It would be useless, sir, after stating the circumstances of the action, to pass encomiums upon colonel Johnson and his regiment. Veterans could not have manifested more firmness. The colonel's numerous wounds prove that he was in the post of danger. Lieutenant colonel James Johnson, and the majors Payne and Thompson were equally active though more fortunate. Major Wood of the engineers, already distinguished by his conduct at Fort Meigs, attended the army with two six pounders. Having no use for them in the action, he joined in the pursuit of the enemy, and with major Payne of the mounted regiment, two of my aids-de-camp, Todd and Chambers, and three privates, continued it for several miles after the rest of the troops had halted, and made many prisoners.

I left the army before an official return of the prisoners, or that of the killed and wounded, was made out. It was however ascertained that the former amounts to 601 regulars, including 2 officers. Our loss is 7 killed and 22 wounded, 5 of which have since died. Of the British troops 12 were killed and 22 wounded. The Indians suffered most—33 of them having been found upon the ground, besides those killed on the retreat.

On the day of the action, six pieces of brass artillery were taken, and two iron 24 pounders the day before. Several others were discovered in the river, and can be easily procured. Of brass pieces, three are the trophies of our revolutionary war, were taken at Saratoga and York, and surrendered by general Hull. The number of small arms taken by us and destroyed by the enemy, must amount to upwards of 5000; most of

had been ours and taken by the enemy at the surrender of Detroit, at the river Raisin, and at colonel Dudley's defeat. I believe that the enemy retain no other military trophy of their victories than the standard of the 4th regiment; they were not magnanimous enough to bring that of the 41st regiment into the field, or it would have been taken.

You have been informed, sir, of the conduct of the troops under my command in action; it gives me great pleasure to inform you, that they merit also the approbation of their country for their conduct, in submitting to the greatest privations with the utmost cheerfulness.

The infantry were entirely without tents, and for several days the whole army subsisted upon fresh beef, without bread or salt.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

General John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

P. S. General Proctor escaped by the fleetness of his horses, escorted by 40 dragoons and a number of mounted Indians.

HEAD QUARTERS, DETROIT, October 11th, 1813.

DEAR GOVERNOR,

You will have heard before this reaches you, that I was fortunate enough to overtake general Proctor, and his tawny allies, and to give them a complete drubbing. I have 601 prisoners of the British regulars, officers included, among which there are two colonels.

Nothing but infatuation could have governed general Proctor's conduct. The day that I landed below Malden, he had at his disposal upwards of 3000 Indian warriors: his regular force, reinforced by the militia of the district, would have made his number nearly equal to my aggregate, which, on the day of landing, did not exceed 4500. The papers have greatly exaggerated the number of militia from Kentucky: those which embarked with me at Portage, did not amount to 3000 rank and file; and several hundred of them were left in the islands.

The Indians were extremely desirous of fighting us at Malden. I enclose you Tecumseh's speech to Proctor; it is at once an evidence of the talents of the former, and the greater defect of him in the latter. His inferior officers say, that his conduct has been a series of continued blunders. He manifested, indeed, some judgment in the choice of his field of battle, as he was so posted that I could not turn him, and could only oppose a line of equal extent to his. However, the contest was not for a moment doubtful. The greater part of his Indians were *in the air*, according to the Persian military phraseology) and his regulars broken and made prisoners by a single charge of mounted infan-

try. We took upon the ground, or near it, a fine brass field train of artillery. Several of the pieces are trophies of the revolution, taken at Saratoga and York, and surrendered by general Hull. The number of small arms and military stores, taken by us, or destroyed by the enemy, is immense. My force in action, of all descriptions, was short of 2500.

I am preparing an expedition to Michilimackinac, and another to Long Point, to destroy at the latter a depot of provisions.

I shall send orders to general Gano, by this conveyance. It is probable that the greater part of his troops may be dismissed in a short time. The Indians in this neighbourhood, are submitting at discretion.

I am your friend,

WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

His excellency Gov. Meigs.

(INCLOSURE.)

SPEECH OF TECUMSEH

In the name of the Indian chiefs and warriors, to major general Proctor, as the representative of their great Father, the king.

FATHER—Listen to your children! You have them now all before you. The war before^{*} this, our British father gave the hatchet to his red children, when our old chiefs were alive. They are now dead. In that war, our father was thrown on his back by the Americans, and our father took them by the hand without our knowledge;† and we are afraid that our father will do so again at this time. Summer before last, when I came forward with my red brethren, and was ready to take up the hatchet in favour of our British father, we were told not to be in a hurry—that he had not yet determined to fight the Americans.

Listen!—When war was declared, our father stood up and gave us the tomahawk, and told us that he was now ready to strike the Americans; that he wanted our assistance; and that he would certainly get us our lands back, which the Americans had taken from us.

Listen!—You told us *that* time, to bring forward our families to this place; and we did so, and you promised to take care of them, and that they should want for nothing, while the men would go and fight the enemy; that we need not trouble ourselves about the enemy's garrisons; that we knew nothing about them; and that our father would attend to that part of the business. You also told your red children that you would take good care of their garrison here, which made our hearts glad.

* The revolutionary war.

† The British made peace without any stipulation for their Indian allies.

Listen!—When we were last to the Rapids, it is true we gave you assistance. It is hard to fight people who live like ground
gs.*

Listen Father!—Our fleet has gone out—we know they have
ight—we have heard the great guns, but know nothing of what
s happened to our father with one arm.† Our troops have gone
e way, and we are very much astonished to see our father tying
every thing and preparing to run away the other, without let-
; his red children know what his intentions are. You always
d us to remain here, and take care of our lands—it made our
arts glad to hear that was your wish. Our great father, the
ig, is the head, and you represent him. You always told us,
at you would never draw your foot off British ground; but now,
her, we see you are drawing back, and we are sorry to see our
ther doing so, without seeing the enemy. We must compare
r father's conduct to a fat animal, *that carries its tail upon its
ck, but when affrighted, it drops it between its legs, and runs*
.

Listen Father!—The Americans have not yet defeated us by
ad; neither are we sure that they have done so by water: *we
=refore wish to remain here, and fight our enemy, should they
=ake their appearance.* If they defeat us, we will then retreat
Ch our father.

At the battle of the Rapids, last war, the Americans certainly
eated us; and when we retreated to our father's fort‡ at that
=ce, the gates were shut against us. We were afraid that it
=uld now be the case, but instead of that, we see our British
=her preparing to march out of his garrison.

Father!—You have got the arms and ammunition which the
=at father sent for his red children. If you have any idea of
=ing away, give them to us, and you may go and welcome, for us.
=r lives are in the hands of the Great Spirit—we are determined
=defend our lands, and if it is his will, we wish to leave our
=nes upon them.

Amherstburg, September 18th, 1813.

FORT GEORGE, October 11th, 1813, 7 o'clock P. M.

IR,

Within the last five minutes, I have had the honour to receive
our despatch by "the Lady of the Lake."

The enemy has treated me with neglect. He continued in his
d positions until Saturday last (the 9th) when he took up his

* During the siege of Fort Meigs, the troops covered themselves from the
=ny's fire, by throwing up traverses and ditches of earth.

† Commodore Barclay.

‡ Fort Miami, near Wayne's battle ground.

retreat on Burlington heights, and has *abandoned this whole peninsula*. Two causes are assigned for this precipitate movement; the succour of Proctor, who is reported to have been entirely defeated, if not taken; the other, the safety of Kingston, endangered by your movement. We have had from the enemy many deserters, most of whom concur in the latter supposition. The British burnt every thing in store in this neighbourhood, 3000 blankets, many hundred stands of arms, also the blankets in the men's packs, and every article of clothing not in actual use.

They are supposed to have reached Burlington heights last evening, from the rate of their march the night before. I have information of their having passed "the 40," by several inhabitants who have come down. They add to what was stated by the deserters, that two officers of the 41st had joined general Vincent from Proctor's army, with the information that Proctor was defeated eighteen miles this side of Malden. I cannot get particulars.

From the same sources of intelligence, it appears that the 49th, a part of the 100th, and the voltigeurs, moved from this neighbourhood the day after our flotilla left this, the 3d instant, but with what destination is not certainly known. It was first reported (I mean in the British camp) that these regiments had marched to support Proctor, who, it is said, wrote that he would be compelled to surrender if not supported. I am pretty sure, however, that they are gone below. The movement of our army, *below*, seems to have been known in the British lines as early as the 3d instant, together with the immediate objects in view; hence I have no difficulty in concluding, that all the movements of the enemy will concentrate at Kingston.

Chapin, who has been commissioned a lieutenant colonel, marched late last evening up the lake, with about 100 volunteers under his command, and was followed this morning by generals M'Clure and Porter, with about 1000 men, Indians and militia included. There is no danger of their coming up with the enemy, or they would be in great danger of a total annihilation.

Vincent took hence with him, about 1000 or 1,100 regulars. Many of the militia left this with the avowed design of plunder; but I fear from reports that the British have left the miserable inhabitants without any thing, to be ravished. I expect general M'Clure back to-morrow evening, as he only took with him supplies for two days; he will probably go as far as "the 20." On the 8th Chapin went out with a small party and attacked one of the enemy's pickets, which brought on a skirmish in which many of colonel Swift's regiment participated. After a great waste of ammunition, the parties retired to their respective camps with little loss on either side; we made and lost a prisoner, had two Indians killed, and two other men wounded. We have the enemy had five men wounded.

I had this morning made an arrangement, on application of general M'Clure, to be relieved in the command of this post on the morning of the 13th instant, with an intention of taking up my line of march for Sackett's Harbor, according to the discretion allowed me in the instructions I had the honour to receive from you at this place. My situation has become truly insupportable: without the possibility of an attack at this post, and without the possibility of reaching you time enough to share in the glory of impending operations below; I am nevertheless, flattered with the assurance that transport will be forwarded for my removal, and to favor that intention, I propose taking up my line of march on the morning of the 13th for the mouth of Genessee river, and there await the arrival of the vessels you are good enough to promise me. By this movement, captain Mix thinks with me, that I shall hasten my arrival at Sackett's Harbor 5 possibly 10 days. Captain Camp has a sufficient number of wagons to take me thither; I can easily make that place by the evening of the 15th. I hope I shall have your approbation, and every thing is arranged with brigadier M'Clure.

Knowing your wishes respecting the invalids or subjects for discharge, and fearing that water transport might not be had till the season was too far advanced for their removal, I have ventured to send lieutenant Archer (paymaster of the 20th who was left here without orders,) on command to Greenbush, with 100 men of this description. It was a measure approved of by doctor Mann, and I hope not contrary to your wishes and intentions. Doctor Hugo, surgeon's mate of the 14th (also left here without orders) accompanied the detachment. The quarter master's department furnished 8 wagons on my requisition.

The sick list of the garrison is much reduced since your departure, (I have the honor to enclose my morning report) and Doctor Mann has discharged many patients from his hospital: I also enclose you his last report. Those marked "subjects for discharge" are part of the number sent off to Greenbush. Doctor Mann and captain Camp have concluded to remove the general hospital to "the eleven mile Creek" near Buffalo, the barracks at which place will be sufficient for the reception of the whole of the sick, with some trifling repairs.

From the morning report enclosed, you will find 794 the "total," &c. present of the regulars of this garrison, including officers, &c. Transport will be necessary for about 850 persons. I wish also to take with me four iron 6's, one 5½ inch howitzer, and two caissons, the whole on field carriages. This train will form no impediment in my march to the mouth of Genessee river, as I have horses belonging to the regiment, sufficient to draw it. If it meet your approbation, I can send the horses thence to Sackett's Harbor by land.

I have, by working almost night and day, greatly improved the defences of this post, and nearly filled up the idea of the engineer,

I flatter myself that I have also improved the garrison in discipline. I must apologize for the haste in which this is written, but captain Mix proposes to sail immediately, and I fear to detain him a moment. I think I shall certainly be at the mouth of Genessee by the 15th instant.

I have the honour to be, &c.

W. SCOTT, Col. Comd.

Major general Wilkinson.

Extract of a letter from colonel Clark, to brigadier general Parker.

CAMP, CHAZY-LANDING, October 15th, 1813 —

It is with great pleasure I can inform you of a successful attack upon the enemy at Massequoi bay, on the morning of the 12th instant. At this time I had only the riflemen with me, the artillery moving slow and the militia protecting their rear. We proceeded to the village (Massequoi) and arrived within 15 rods of the enemy before we were discovered. We found them drawn up under major Powell, in a manner that would have annoyed us much had we attacked them by water, but wholly unprepared to defend themselves on the land side; they commenced a fire on the left flank, but in ten minutes after the first attack they laid down their arms and surrendered themselves prisoners of war.

Understanding that a force of 200 men, under colonel Lock, was marching to attack us, I despatched captain Finch, with his company, to reconnoitre them and ascertain their course. He proceeded with such promptness and ability as to surprise and capture the advanced guard, consisting of cavalry, excepting one man who escaped, and, giving the information, the enemy retreated.

The prisoners were then put on board our boats and sent to Burlington.

Our whole force engaged was 102—the number of prisoners taken is 101, their killed 9, and wounded 14.

I am, sir, with great respect, &c.

ISAAC CLARK.

Brig. gen. Parker, commanding at
Burlington, Vt.

ADDRESS

To the inhabitants of the Upper Province of Canada.

Brigadier general M'Clure, commanding on the Niagara frontier, finds the Upper Province deserted by the British army and abandoned by its government. In the peculiar situation of the

inhabitants, it is essential to their security that some regulations should be established for their government, while the American army has the power of enforcing them. The general regrets to say, that illegal, unauthorized, and forbidden pillage has been committed by a few, who are lost to all honour, and insensible of the obligations of a soldier. To arrest such practices, to afford all the protection in his power, and to ensure safety to the property and persons of the inhabitants, who are now under his controul, the general has issued this address.

The employment of the Indians has been a source of extreme regret to the general. But finding them called out by the government of the United States, and expecting to attack an army who had long employed them in scenes of atrocity and outrage, at which humanity shudders, he was driven to the only alternative left him, of using the same weapon against our enemies which they had used against ourselves; that the British army had abandoned their encampments and fled before the American force, does not weaken the necessity which he was under of employing the Indians before he knew the enemy had absconded. At the same time, it is due to them to say, that the Indians have conducted themselves far better than could have been expected, if the example of British officers and British savages be a criterion. Not a single individual has been scalped or tomahawked by them, no prisoner of war has been burnt, the dead have not been thrown into the public highways, women and children have not been massacred, nor has private property been destroyed, except in cases where the former conduct of the owners required exemplary retaliation. The property which they have plundered, has, in cases where it was possible, been restored by the inhabitants of the United States; and when the necessity for their employment ceased to exist, the Indians were sent to the American side of the river, beyond the reach of temptation, to wait until circumstances justified another call upon them. The relation of these acts is due to the honour of our government, to the reputation of the general, and to the merits of the Indians. From it, also, the inhabitants of Canada may learn *what* they may expect from American forbearance and clemency.

To insure that forbearance, the inhabitants have an easy duty to perform; let them be perfectly neutral, let them abstain from communications with the British army and remain at home, quietly pursuing their avocations. Those who conduct differently will incur the penalties of rigorous martial law. The character of our free republican government, and the nature of our institutions, will justify your expectation of security and protection. All civil magistrates will continue to exercise the functions of their offices *merely* as conservators of the peace. As far as they are able, they will preserve order and quiet among the inhabitants. The existing laws of the province, so far as they regard the public peace, and not interfering with the regulations of the army, will

be considered in force until other measures are taken. The magistrates are particularly required to give information at head quarters of all violence committed by American troops on citizens, unless they are authorized by a written order. The general enjoins the inhabitants to submit to their magistrates, and those who refuse obedience must be reported to head quarters. The brigadier general invites all the inhabitants who are disposed to be peaceable, orderly, and neutral, to return to their homes and their business. He cannot promise complete security, but he engages, as far as his power extends, to protect the innocent, the unfortunate and the distressed.

GEO. MCCLURE,
Commanding Niagara Frontier.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, Oct. 16th, 1813.

A PROCLAMATION BY GENERAL HARRISON.

An armistice having been concluded between the United States and the tribes of Indians called Miamies, Pattawatanies, Ecl River, Weas, Ottoways, Chippeways and Wyandots, to continue until the pleasure of the government of the former shall be known—I do hereby make known the same to all whom it may concern. This armistice is preparatory to a general council to be held with these different tribes, and until its termination they have been permitted to retire to their hunting grounds, and there to remain unmolested, if they behave themselves peaceably.

They have surrendered into our hands hostages from each tribe, and have agreed immediately to restore all our prisoners in their possession, and to unite with us in the chastisement of any Indians, who may commit any aggression upon our frontiers. Under these circumstances, I exhort all citizens living upon the frontiers to respect the terms of said armistice, and neither to engage in nor countenance any expedition against their persons or property: leaving to the government, with whom the consultation has left it, to pursue such course, with respect to the Indians, as they may think most compatible with sound policy and the best interests of the country.

Done at Detroit, this 16th October, 1813.

WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

October 18th, 1813.

SIR,

The fortune of war having placed the private property of the officers and several families of the right division of the British army in Upper Canada, in your power; as also letters, papers,

d vouchers of the greatest consequence to individuals, without ing of any to the cause of the captors ; I do myself the honour of plying to you in their behalf, hoping that agreeably to the custom of war, you will avail yourself of this favourable opportunity alleviate private feelings, by causing the said property and documents to be restored. I must also intreat that every consideration in your power be shown for private families, not of the day. I trust that with the same view you will permit the bearer of to ascertain the fate of individuals, and that you will facilitate the retreat of any families that may unfortunately have been interrupted in the attempt.

I have the honour to be, &c.

HENRY PROCTOR,

Maj. gen. in his B. Majesty's service.

J. Gen. W. H. Harrison,
commanding U. S. Army.

Extracts of a letter from General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated

"GRENADIER ISLAND, October 28th, 1813.

"I send you this by an extra aid-de-camp, captain Nourse, relieve the anxiety to which you must be subject, in the impending eventful moment."

"The extent of the injuries to our craft, the clothing and arms of the men, and to our provisions on the passage from Sackett's Harbor to this place, greatly exceeded our apprehensions, and has subjected us to the necessity of furnishing a supply of clothing, and of making repairs and equipments to our flotilla generally. In fact, all our hopes have been very nearly blasted ; but thanks to the same Providence which placed us in jeopardy, we are surmounting our difficulties, and, God willing, I shall pass Prescott on the night of the 1st or 2d proximo, if some unforeseen obstacle does not present to forbid me. I shall expect to hear from you at Morrisville, where Colonel Swift is to meet me, and guard against chance shots, I wish wagons would be held in readiness to receive our powder and field ammunition, at a suitable distance above Prescott."

"I keep up the delusion here ; and the enemy, about sixteen hundred strong, exclusive of five hundred militia, are in daily expectation of a visit at Kingston, yet they have taken post, I understand, at Cornwall and the Coteau de Lac. No matter : once I reach Prescott, and our bayonets and sabres shall remove all impediments."

"The inexorable winds and rains continue to oppose and embarrass our movements ; but I am seizing on every moment's interval to slip into the St. Lawrence corps and detachments, as

they can be got ready. Our rendezvous will be in Bush creek, about twenty miles below, and nearly opposite to Gananoqui, which position menaces a descent on the opposite shore. I shall sail from that position at 4 o'clock of the morning, and will pass Prescott about the same time the ensuing morning."

"We have had such a fluctuation of sick and well, between this place and Sackett's Harbor, that it is impossible to say in what force we shall move; but I calculate on 6000 combatants, exclusive of Scott and Randolph,* neither of whom will, I fear, be up in season, notwithstanding all my arrangements and exertions to accelerate their march: they are both under provisional orders from Ogdensburg."

WAR DEPARTMENT, DENMARK,
October 30th, 9 o'clock P. M.

DEAR GENERAL,

I this moment received your despatch by captain Nourse. I rejoice that your difficulties are so far surmounted, as to enable you to say, with assurance, when you will pass Prescott. I should have met you there; but bad roads, worse weather, and a considerable degree of illness, admonished me against receding further from a point where my engagements call me, about the 1st proximo. The resolution of treading back my steps, was taken at Antwerp, and communicated in a letter from that place, by major Lush. I wrote a single line to you to-day, giving the fortunate issue of Harrison's business, and his arrival at Fort George with McArthur's brigade. If Vincent be within the peninsula, Harrison will root him out. It remains with you to sweep the rest of the line before you. Montreal taken, what are Prescott and Kingston? Give Hampton timely notice of your approach, and of the place and hour of junction.

Yours sincerely,
JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General Wilkinson,

Extracts of a letter from general Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated

"GRENADIER ISLAND, November 1st, 1813.

"You will perceive from the duplicate under cover (letter of the 28th of October) what were my calculations four days since: but the winds, and waves, and rains, still prevail, and we have made several fruitless attempts to turn Stony Point, one of them at great peril to 3,000 men, whom I seasonably remanded to the harbor, without the loss of a life. Our sick, one hundred and ninety-six in number, have not fared as well: they were embarked in stout, comfortable vessels, and sailed, the day before

* Scott and Randolph both joined.

erday morning, for Sackett's Harbor, but they were driven on by a storm, which continued with unremitting violence all night; and as no exertion could relieve them, I anticipated the loss of the whole; but the tempest having abated, and the wind blowing from south-west to north-east, boats were sent out yesterday morning, and doctor Bull reports the loss of three men only. Every means of transport will be provided to-morrow, and these unfortunate men will be sent to the hospital at Sackett's Harbor." Brigadier Brown, with his brigade, the light artillery, the men, the volunteers, the gunboats, Bissel's regiment, and a company of M'Comb's, are, I expect, safe at French creek, with the artillery and ordnance stores. These corps have made the transport of the arms of the lake under circumstances of great danger, though fortunately without the loss of a life, but at the expense of many boats."

I shall wait one day longer, and if the passage should still continue impracticable to the troops, I will land them on the opposite shore, march them across the country to the St. Lawrence, and send the empty boats round to a given rendezvous."

As major general Hampton is under your orders, permit me to suggest to you what is worthy of reflection: whether he should occupy a position, and wait the arrival of my command near the confluence of the St. Lawrence and Grand river, or whether he should move down the St. Lawrence, and menace Chambly? If strong enough to meet sir George, the latter will be the preferable plan, because it will have the effect to divide the enemy's force; otherwise he should adopt the first idea, hazard nothing, and strengthen my hands."

The enclosed copy of a memorandum from colonel Swift will show you what he is about, I flatter myself, to your satisfaction. The sole unpleasant circumstance before me, is our total ignorance of the preparations of sir George, and what we may expect to meet on the island. I fear no consequences; but it must be painful to lead more than six thousand men to battle hoodwinked; yet all my efforts to procure intelligence from Montreal have been fruitless."

H. Q. FOUR CORNERS, November 1st, 1813.

On the morning of the 21st ultimo the army commenced its movement down the Chateaugay, for the purpose of placing itself in a situation which would enable it to fulfil its part of the projected combined operations on the St. Lawrence.

A extensive wood of eleven or twelve miles in front, block-up with felled timber, and covered by the Indians and light troops of the enemy, was a serious impediment to the arduous task of opening a road for the artillery and stores. Brigadier gen-

eral Izard, with the light troops and one regiment of the line, was detached early in the morning to turn these impediments in flank, and to seize on the more open country below, while the army, preceded by a strong working party, advanced on a more circuitous but practicable route for a road. The measure, as will be seen by the report of brigadier general Izard, which I have the honour to inclose, completely succeeded, and the main body of the army reached the advanced position on the evening of the 22d. The 23d and 24th were employed in completing the road and getting up the artillery and stores.

I had arranged, at my departure, under the direction of major Parker, a line of communication as far up the St. Lawrence as Ogdensburg, for the purpose of hastening to me the earliest notice of the progress of our army down. I had surmounted twenty four miles of the most difficult part of the route, and had in advance of me seven miles of open country, but at the end of that distance commenced a wood of some miles in extent, which had been formed into an entire abatis and filled by a succession of wooden breast works, the rearmost of which were supplied with ordnance. In front of these defences were placed the Indian force and light corps of the enemy, and in the rear all of his disposable force. As the extent of this force depended upon his sense of danger on the St. Lawrence, it was a cause of regret that all communication from yourself or major Parker seemed to be at an end. As it was, however, believed that the enemy was hourly adding to his strength in this position, if free from the apprehension of danger from above, an effort was judged necessary to dislodge him, and if it succeeded, we should be in possession of a position which we could hold as long as any doubts remained of what was passing above, and of the real part to be assigned us.

Our guides assured us of a shoal and practicable fording place opposite the lower flank of the enemy's defences, and that the wood on the opposite side of the river, a distance of seven or eight miles, was practicable for the passage of the troops. Colonel Purdy with the light corps, and a strong body of infantry of the line, was detached at an early hour of the night of the 25th to gain this ford by the morning, and to commence his attack in rear, and that was to be the signal for the army to fall on in front, and it was believed the pass might be carried before the enemy's distant troops could be brought forward to its support.

I had returned to my quarters from Purdy's column about 9 o'clock at night, where I found a Mr. Baldwin, of the quarter master general's department, who put into my hands an open paper containing instructions to him from the quarter master general, respecting the building of huts for the army in the Chateaugay, below the line. This paper sunk my hopes, and raised serious doubts of receiving that efficacious support which had been anticipated. I would have recalled the column, but it was in motion, and the darkness of the night rendered it impracticable.

I could only go forward. The army was put in motion on the morning of the 26th, leaving its baggage, &c. on the ground of encampment.

On advancing near the enemy, it was found that the column on the opposite side was not as far advanced as had been anticipated. The guides had missed it, and finally failed in finding the ford. We could not communicate with it, but only awaited the attack below. About 2 o'clock the firing commenced, and our troops advanced rapidly to the attack. The enemy's light troops commenced a sharp fire, but brigadier general Izard advanced with his brigade, drove him every where behind his defences and silenced the fire in his front. This brigade would have pushed forward as far as courage, skill and perseverance could have carried it ; but on advancing it was found that the firing had commenced on the opposite side, and the ford had not been gained.

The enemy retired behind his defences, but a renewal of his attack was expected, and the troops remained some time in their position to meet it. The troops on the opposite side were excessively fatigued. The enterprise had failed in its main point, and colonel Purdy was ordered to withdraw his column to a shoal four or five miles above, and cross over. The day was spent, and general Izard was ordered to withdraw his brigade to a position three miles in the rear, to which place the baggage had been ordered forward.

The slowness and order with which general Izard retired with his brigade, could but have inspired the enemy with respect. They presumed not to venture a shot at him during his movement ; but the unguardedness of some part of Purdy's command exposed him to a rear attack from the Indians, which was repeated after dark, and exposed him to some loss. These attacks were always repelled, and must have cost the enemy as many lives as we lost. Our entire loss of killed, wounded and missing, does not exceed 75. In its new position within three miles of the enemy's post, the army encamped on the night of the 26th, and remained until 2 o'clock of the 28th. All the deserters, of whom there were four, having concurred in the information that sir George Prevost, with three other general officers, had arrived with the whole of his disposable force, and lay in the rear of these defences, and a letter from major Parker (by express received on the evening of the 26th) having informed me that no movements of our army down the St. Lawrence had been heard of at Ogdensburg, and for some distance above ; the following questions were submitted to commanding officers of brigades, regiments, and corps, and the heads of the general staff, in a council convened for the purpose :

Is it advisable, under existing circumstances, to renew the attack on the enemy's position, and if not, what position is it advisable for the army to take, until it can receive advices of the advance of the grand army down the St. Lawrence ?" The opinion of the council was expressed in the following words :

"It is the unanimous opinion of this council, that it is necessary, for the preservation of this army and the fulfilment of the ostensible views of the government, that we immediately return by orderly marches to such a position (Chateaugay) as will secure our communications with the United States, either to retire into winter quarters, or to be ready to strike below." In pursuance of this opinion, the army has returned by slow marches to this place, and now awaits the orders of the government. Its condition will be stated by the bearer, colonel King, who can give you, upon every point, more full and perfect information, than could be contained in a written detail.

I have the honour to be, &c.

W. HAMPTON.

Honourable John Armstrong,
Secretary of War.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, November 3d, 1812

SIR,

Lieutenant Le Breton, an officer in your service, arrived at Detroit on the 15th ultimo, bearing a flag and a letter to me from general Proctor, requesting humane treatment for the prisoners in my possession, and the restoration of private property and papers. This letter was directed to me at the Moravian towns; and as the subject was not of the importance to authorize the lieutenant's pursuing me to Detroit, I was somewhat surprised at his doing so. It did not appear to me proper to permit him to return in that way, and as I was on the point of setting out for this frontier by water, I conceived that that mode of conveyance would be full as agreeable to him, and would enable him to meet general Proctor as expeditiously as by the land route. I regret that the badness of the weather, and other causes which he will explain, have detained him until this time.

Understanding that you are the senior officer, I have determined to address my answer to you. With respect to the subject of general Proctor's letter, those which I have the honour to enclose to you from the British officers, who were taken on the 5th ultimo, to their friends, and the report of Mr. Le Breton, will satisfy you that no indulgence which humanity could claim in their favour, or the usages of war sanction, has been withheld. The disposition of the property taken on the field of action, or near it, was left to the commanding officer at Detroit. The instructions given to that gentleman, and the well known generosity of his character, will insure to the claimants the utmost justice and liberality in his decisions. In making this statement, I wish it, however, to be distinctly understood, that my conduct, with regard to the prisoners and property taken, has been dictated solely by motives of humanity, and not by a belief that it could be claimed upon the score of reciprocity of treatment towards the American prisoners

who had fallen into the hands of general Proctor. The unhappy description of persons who have escaped from the tomahawk of the savages in the employment of the British government, who fought under the immediate orders of *that officer*, have suffered all the indignities and deprivations which human nature is capable of supporting. There is no single instance that I have heard of, in which the property of the officers has been respected. But I am far from believing that the conduct of general Proctor has been thought an example worthy of imitation by the greater part of the British officers; and in the character of general Vincent, I have a pledge that he will unite his exertions with mine, to soften as much as possible the fate of those whom the fortune of war may reciprocally place in our power.

But, sir, there is another subject upon which I wish an explicit declaration. Will the Indians who still adhere to the cause of his Britannic majesty, be suffered to continue that horrible species of warfare which they have heretofore practiced against our troops, and those still more horrible depredations upon the peaceable inhabitants of our frontiers? I have sufficient evidence to show that even the latter have not always been perpetrated by small parties of vagrant Indians, acting at a distance from the British army. Some of the most atrocious instances have occurred under the eyes of the British commander and the head of the Indian department. I shall pass by the tragedy of the river Raisin, and that equally well known which was acted on the Miami river, after the defeat of colonel Dudley, and select three other instances of savage barbarity committed under the auspices of general Proctor: In the beginning of June, a small party of Indians, conducted by an Ottawa chief, who I believe is now with the British army under your command, left Malden in bark canoes, in which they coasted lake Erie to the mouth of Portage river; the canoes were taken across the Portage to the Sandusky bay, over which the party proceeded to the mouth of Cold creek, and from thence by land to the settlements upon that river, where they captured three families, consisting of one man twelve women and children. After taking the prisoners some distance, one of the women was discovered to be unable to keep up with them, in consequence of her advanced state of pregnancy. She was immediately tomahawked, stript naked, her womb ripped open, and the child taken out. Three or four of the children were successively butchered as they discovered their inability to keep up with the party. Upon the arrival of the Indians at Malden, two or three of the prisoners were ransomed by colonel Elliott, and the others by the citizens of Detroit, where they remained until they were taken off by their friends upon the recovery of that place by our army. I have been informed that the *savage chief* received from colonel Elliott a *reprimand* for his cruelty.

On the 29th or 30th of the same month, a large party of Indians were sent from Malden on a war expedition to Lower Sandusky!

At a farm house, near that place, they murdered the whole family consisting of a man, his wife, son and daughter.

During the last attack upon Fort Meigs by general Proctor's party headed by a Seneca, and intimate friend of Tecumseh, was sent to endeavour to detach from our interest the Shawanese of Wapockanata. In their way hither they murdered several men and one woman, who was working in her cornfield.

I have selected, sir, the above from a long list of similar instances of barbarity, which the history of the last fifteen months could furnish; because they were perpetrated, if not in the view of the British commander, by parties who came immediately from his camp and returned to it; who even received their daily support from the king's stores, and who, in fact, (as the documents in my possession will show) form part of his army.

To retaliate then upon the subjects of the king would have been justifiable by the laws of war and the usages of the most civilized nations. To do so has been amply in my power. The tide of fortune has changed in our favour, and an extensive and flourishing province opened to our arms. Nor have instruments of vengeance been wanting. The savages who sued to us for mercy would gladly have shown their claims to it, by re-acting upon Thames the bloody scenes of Sandusky and Cold creek. A single sign of approbation would have been sufficient to pour upon the subjects of the king their whole fury. The future conduct of the British officers will determine the correctness of mine in withholding it. If the savages should be again let loose upon our settlements, I shall with justice be accused of having sacrificed the interests and honour of my country, and the lives of our fellow-citizens to feelings of false and mistaken humanity. You are a soldier, sir, and as I sincerely believe, possess all the honourable sentiments which ought always to be found in men who follow the profession of arms. Use then, I pray you, your authority and influence to stop that dreadful effusion of innocent blood, which proceeds from the employment of those savage monsters, whose aid (as must now be discovered) is so little to be depended upon when it is most wanted, and which can have so trifling an effect upon the issue of the war. The effect of their barbarities will not be confined to the present generation. Ages yet to come will feel the deep rooted hatred and enmity which they must produce between the two nations.

I deprecate most sincerely the dreadful alternative which will be offered to me should they be continued; but I solemnly declare, that if the Indians that remain under the influence of the British government, are suffered to commit any depredations upon the citizens within the district that is committed to my protection, I will remove the restrictions which have hitherto been imposed upon those who have offered their services to the United States, and direct them to carry on the war in their own way. I have never heard of a single excuse for the employment of the savages by your government.

ernment, unless we can credit the story of some British officer having dared to assert, that "as we employed the *Kentuckians*, you had right to make use of the *Indians*." If such injurious sentiments have really prevailed, to the prejudice of a brave, well-informed, and virtuous people, it will be removed by the representations of our officers who were lately taken on the river Thames. They will inform you, sir, that so far from offering any violence to the persons of their prisoners, *these savages* would not permit a word to escape them which was calculated to wound or insult their feelings, and this too, with the sufferings of their friends and relatives, at the river Raisin and Miami, fresh upon their recollection. I pledge myself for the truth of the above statements in relation to the murders committed by the Indians.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

Major general Vincent.

VICTORY OVER THE CREEKS.

CAMP AT TEN ISLANDS, November 4th, 1813.

SIR,

I had the honour, yesterday, of transmitting you a short account of an engagement that took place between a detachment of about 900 men from my brigade, with the enemy at Tallushatches town; the particulars whereof, I beg herein to recite you. Pursuant to your order of the 2d, I detailed from my brigade of cavalry and mounted riflemen, 900 men and officers, and proceeding directly to the Tallushatches towns, crossed Coosy river at the Fish Dam ford, three or four miles above this place. I arrived within one and a half miles of the town (distant from this place south-east, eight miles) on the morning of the 3d, at which place I divided my detachment into two columns, the right composed of the cavalry commanded by colonel Allcorn, to cross over a large creek that lay between us and the towns: the left column was of the mounted riflemen, under the command of colonel Cannon, with whom I marched myself. Colonel Allcorn was ordered to march up on the right, and encircle one half of the town, and at the same time the left would form a half circle on the left, and unite the head of the columns in front of the town: all of which was performed as I could wish. When I arrived within half a mile of the town, the drums of the enemy began to beat, mingled with their savage yells, preparing for action. It was after sun-rise an hour, when the action was brought on by captain Hammond and lieutenant Patterson's companies, who had gone on within the circle of alignment, for the purpose of drawing out the enemy from their buildings, which had the most happy effect. As soon as captain Hammond exhibited his front in view of the town, (which stood in open woodland) and gave a few scattering shot, the enemy formed and made a violent charge on him; he

gave way as they advanced, until they met our right column, which gave them a general fire, and then charged; this changed the direction of the charge completely; the enemy retreated firing, until they got around, and in their buildings, where they made all the resistance that an overpowered soldier could do; they fought as long as one existed, but their destruction was very soon completed; our men rushed up to the doors of the houses, and in a few minutes killed the last warrior of them; the enemy fought with savage fury, and met death with all its horrors, without shrinking or complaining: not one asked to be spared, but fought as long as they could stand or sit. In consequence of their flying to their houses and mixing with the families, our men, in killing the males, without intention killed and wounded a few of the squaws and children, which was regretted by every officer and soldier of the detachment, but which could not be avoided.

The number of the enemy killed, was 186 that were counted, and a number of others that were killed in the weeds not found. I think the calculation a reasonable one, to say 200 of them were killed, and 84 prisoners, of women and children, were taken; not one of the warriors escaped to carry the news, a circumstance unknown heretofore.

We lost five men killed, and 41 wounded, none mortally, the greater part slightly, a number with arrows: this appears to form a very principal part of the enemy's arms for warfare, every man having a bow with a bundle of arrows, which is used after the first fire with the gun, until a leisure time for loading offers.

It is with pleasure I say, that our men acted with deliberation and firmness; notwithstanding our numbers were superior to that of the enemy, it was a circumstance to us unknown, and from the parade of the enemy, we had every reason to suppose them our equals in number: but there appeared no visible traces of alarm in any, but on the contrary, all appeared cool and determined, and no doubt when they face a foe of their own, or superior number, they will show the same courage as on this occasion.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN COFFEE,

Brig. Gen. of Cavalry and riflemen.

Major general Andrew Jackson.

SACKETT'S HARBOR, November 6th, 1811.

SIR,

As I have reason to believe that the Royal George, Prince Regent, and Duke of Gloucester, have gone up the lake, with troops to reinforce Fort George; and as I have to believe that other troops are waiting at Kingston for their return, destined for the same port, I have determined to proceed with the force I have ready, in quest of the enemy. My present intention is, to take a position on the Canada shore, near some small islands,

alled the "False Ducks," where the enemy are obliged to pass, and where I will wait their return to Kingston. If I should succeed in my enterprise (which I have but little doubt of) I shall make an attack upon Kingston, for the purpose of destroying the mills and public stores at that station.

I shall proceed for my station this evening, or to-morrow morning, with the following vessels, to wit: brig Oneida, and schooners Hamilton, Governor Tompkins, Conquest, Growler, Julia and Pert; mounting altogether 40 guns, of different calibres, and 430 men, including marines.

With this force I hope to give a good account of the enemy, although he is more than double our force in guns and men. His consists of the following vessels, as nearly as I can ascertain, to wit: the ship Royal George, 26 guns, 260 men; ship Earl Moira, 18 guns, 200 men; Schooners Prince Regent, 18 guns, 150 men; Duke of Gloucester, 14 guns, 80 men; Governor Simcoe, 12 guns, 70 men; Seneca, 4 guns, 40 men; making a grand total of 108 guns, and 890 men.

The officers and men, under my command, are all extremely anxious to meet the enemy. We cannot command success, but we will endeavour to deserve it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

The Hon. Paul Hamilton, &c.

PROCLAMATION.

The following proclamation to the inhabitants of Canada, was issued by general Wilkinson, on his passage down the St. Lawrence.

JAMES WILKINSON,

Major general, and commander in chief of an expedition against the Canadas, to the inhabitants thereof:

The army of the United States, which I have the honour to command, invades these provinces to conquer, not to destroy; to subdue the forces of his Britannic majesty, not to war against his unoffending subjects;—those, therefore, among you, who remain quiet at home, should victory incline to the American standard, shall be protected in their persons and property. But those who are found in arms, must necessarily be treated as avowed enemies.

To menace is unjust—to seduce dishonourable—yet it is just and humane to place these alternatives before you.

Done at the head quarters of the army of the United States, this 6th day of November, 1813, near Ogdensburg, on the river St. Lawrence.

JAMES WILKINSON.

By the general's command,

N. PINKNEY, *Major and aid-de-camp.*

HEAD QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, 7 MILES ABOVE OGDENSBURG,
November 6th, 1813, (in the evening.)

SIR,

I address you at the special instance of the Secretary of war, who, by bad roads, worse weather, and ill health, was diverted from meeting me near this place, and determined to tread back his steps to Washington from Antwerp on the 29th ultimo.

I am destined to, and determined on, the attack of Montreal, if not prevented by some act of God; and to give security to the enterprise, the division under your command must co-operate with the corps under my immediate orders. The point of rendezvous is the circumstance of greatest interest to the issue of this operation, and the distance which separates us, and my ignorance of the practicability of the direct or devious roads or routes by which you must march, makes it necessary that your own judgment should determine the point. To assist you in forming the soundest determination, and to take the most prompt and effectual measures, I can only inform you of my intentions and situation in one or two respects of first importance. I shall pass Prescott to night, because the stage of the season will not allow me three days to take it; shall cross the cavalry at Hamilton, which will not require a day; I shall then press forward and break down every obstruction to the confluence of this river with Grand river, there to cross to the Isle Perrot, and with my scows to bridge the narrow inner channel, and thus obtain foothold on Montreal Island, at about 20 miles from the city: after which our artillery, bayonets, and swords, must secure our triumph, or provide us honourable graves.

Inclosed you have a memorandum of field and battering train pretty well found in mixed ammunition, which may enable you to dismiss your own; but we are deficient in loose powder and musket cartridges, and therefore hope you may be abundantly found.

On the subject of provisions I wish I could give as favourable information; our whole stock of bread may be computed at about fifteen days, and our meat at twenty. In speaking on this subject to the Secretary of War, he informed me ample magazines were laid upon Lake Champlain, and therefore I must request of you to order forward two or three months' supply by the safest route in a direction to the proposed scene of action. I have submitted the state of our provisions to my general officers, who unanimously agree that it should not prevent the progress of the expedition; and they also agree in opinion, that if you are not in force to face the enemy, you should meet us at St. Regis or its vicinity.

I shall expect to hear from, if not see you, at that place on the 9th or 10 instant.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JAMES WILKINSON.

Major General Hampton.

NEW YORK, November 7th, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you of the re-capture of the American schooner Sparrow, of Baltimore, from New-Orleans bound to this port, laden with sugar and lead. On the 3d the enemy's ship Plantagenet, chased the said vessel on shore near Long Branch, six miles distant from where the flotilla is stationed, and took possession of her with about 100 men. A detachment from the flotilla marched against them, attacked them, drove them from on board the vessel, and took possession under the fire of the enemy's ship and barges. In the affair we lost one man; the enemy's loss must have been considerable, as many have been seen to fall. The whole cargo, together with sails, rigging, &c. have been saved, vessel bilged.

I have honour to be, &c.

J. LEWIS.

Secretary of the Navy.

HEAD QUARTERS, FOUR CORNERS, November 8th 1813.

SIR,

I had the honour to receive, at a late hour last evening, by colonel King, your communication of the 6th, and was deeply impressed with the sense of responsibility it imposed, of deciding upon the means of our co-operation. The idea suggested as the opinion of your officers, of effecting the junction at St. Regis, was most pleasing, as being the most immediate, until I came to the disclosure of the amount of your supplies of provision. Colonel Atkinson will explain the reasons that would have rendered it impossible for me to have brought more than each man could have carried on his back; and when I reflected that in throwing myself upon your scanty means, I should be weakening you in your most vulnerable point, I did not hesitate to adopt the opinion, after consulting the general and principal officers, that by throwing myself back on my main depot, when all the means of transportation had gone, and falling upon the enemy's flank, and straining every effort to open a communication from Plattsburg to Coghawaga, or any point you may indicate on the St. Lawrence, I should more effectually contribute to your success, than by the junction at St. Regis. The way is in many places blockaded and abatted, and the road impracticable for wheel carriages during winter, but by the employment of pack horses, if I am not overpowered, I hope to be able to prevent your starving. I have ascertained and witnessed the plan of the enemy is to burn and consume every thing in our advance. My troops and other means will be described to you by colonel Atkinson. Besides the rawness and sickness, they have endured fatigues equal to a winter campaign, in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited and fallen off; but upon this subject, I must refer you to colonel Atkinson.

With these means, what can be accomplished by human exertion, I will attempt. With a mind devoted to the general objects of the campaign,

I have the honour to be, &c.

W. HAMPTON.

His excellency maj. gen. James Wilkinson.

HEAD QUARTERS, BURLINGTON HEIGHTS,
November 10th, 1813.

SIR,

Lieutenant Le Breton having delivered your letter of the 3d instant, I have directed captain Merritt, of the Provincial dragoons, to proceed with a flag to fort George, as the bearer of this acknowledgment of your obliging communication.

The account given of the British officers, whom the fortune of war has lately placed at the disposal of the United States, is such as cannot fail affording very consoling reflections to this army and their anxious friends.

Though you must be sensible there are several points in your letter, respecting which it is wholly beyond my power to afford you the satisfaction of an "explicit declaration," yet, be assured, sir, I shall never feel the smallest degree of hesitation in joining you in any pledge, that it will ever be my anxious wish and endeavour to alleviate as much as possible the fate of those who may fall into my power by the chances of war.

Believe me, sir, I deprecate as strongly as yourself, the perpetration of acts of cruelty committed under any pretext; and shall lament equally with yourself that any state of things should produce them. No efforts of mine will be ever wanting to diminish the evils of a state of warfare, as far as may be consistent with the duties which are due to my king and country.

The Indians, when acting in conjunction with the troops under my command, have been invariably exhorted to mercy, and have never been deaf to my anxious entreaties on this interesting subject.

I shall not fail to transmit the original of your letter to the Lower Province, for the consideration of his excellency the commander of the forces.

I feel particularly anxious to be made acquainted with your instructions relative to the disposal of the gallant and truly unfortunate captain Barclay, whose wounds, I lament to hear, are such as to preclude all hope of his being ever again able to resume the honourable duties of his station. Under these circumstances I am induced to rely on your liberality and generous interference to obtain a release or parole, that he may be allowed the indulgence of immediately proceeding to the Lower Province.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN VINCENT

Major general, British Army

His excellency maj. general Harrison

By his Excellency,

MARTIN CHITTENDEN, Esq. .

*Governor, captain general, and commander in chief in and over
the state of Vermont.*

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas it appears, that the third brigade of the 3d division of militia of this state; has been ordered from our frontiers to the defence of a neighbouring state; and whereas it further appears, to the extreme regret of the captain general, that a part of the militia of said brigade have been placed under the command, and at the disposal of, an officer of the United States, out of the jurisdiction or controul of the executive of this state, and have been actually marched to the defence of a sister state, fully competent to all the purposes of self-defence, whereby an extensive section of our own frontier is left, in a measure, unprotected, and the peaceable, good citizens thereof are put in great jeopardy, and exposed to the retaliatory incursions and ravages of an exasperated enemy; and whereas disturbances of a very serious nature are believed to exist, in consequence of a portion of the militia having been thus ordered out of the state:

Therefore—to the end that these great evils may be provided against, and as far as may be, prevented for the future:

Be it known, that such portion of the militia of said 3d division as may be now doing duty in the state of New York, or elsewhere, beyond the limits of this state, both officers and men, are hereby ordered and directed, by the captain general and commander in chief of the militia of the state of Vermont, forthwith to return to the respective places of their usual residence, within the territorial limits of said brigade, and there to hold themselves in constant readiness to act in obedience to the orders of brigadier general Jacob Davis, who is appointed, by the legislature of this state, to the command of said brigade.

And the said brigadier general Jacob Davis is hereby ordered and directed, forthwith, to see that the militia of his said brigade be completely armed and equipped, as the law directs, and held in constant readiness to march on the shortest notice, to the defence of the frontiers: and, in case of actual invasion, without further orders, to march with his said brigade, to act, either in co-operation with the troops of the United States, or separately, as circumstances may require, in repelling the enemy from our territory, and in protecting the good citizens of this state from the ravages of hostile incursions.

And in case of an event, so seriously to be deprecated, it is hoped and expected that every citizen, without distinction of party, will fly at once to the nearest post of danger, and that the only rallying word be—"our country."

Feeling, as the captain general does, the weight of responsibility which rests upon him, with regard to the constitutional duties of the militia, and the sacred rights of our citizens to protection from this great class of the community, so essentially necessary in all free countries: at a moment too, when they are so eminently exposed to the dangers of hostile incursions and domestic difficulties, he cannot conscientiously discharge the trust reposed in him by the voice of his fellow citizens, and by the constitutions of this state and the United States, without an unequivocal declaration, that, in his opinion, the military strength and resources of this state must be reserved for its own defence and protection, *exclusively*; excepting in cases provided for by the constitution of the United States; and then, under orders derived *only* from the commander in chief.

Given under my hand at Montpelier, this 10th day of November, in the year of our Lord 1813, and of the independence of the United States, the 38th.

MARTIN CHITTENDEN.

By his excellency's command,

SAMUEL SWIFT, *Secretary.*

ANSWER

To Governor Chittenden's Proclamation.

To his Excellency

MARTIN CHITTENDEN, Esq.

Governor, Captain General, and commander in chief in and over the State of Vermont.

SIR,

A most novel and extraordinary proclamation from your excellency, "ordering and directing such portion of the militia of the third brigade in the third division of the militia of Vermont, now doing duty in the state of New York, both officers and men, forthwith to return to the respective places of their usual residence," has just been communicated to the undersigned officers of said brigade. A measure so unexampled, requires that we should state to your excellency, the reasons which induce us absolutely and positively to refuse obedience to the order contained in your excellency's proclamation. With due deference to your excellency's opinion, we humbly conceive, that when we are ordered into the service of the United States, it becomes our duty, when required, to march to the defence of any section of the union. We are not of that class who believe that our duties, as citizens or soldiers, are circumscribed within the narrow limits of the town or state in which we reside; but that we are under a para-

mount obligation to our common country, to the great confederacy of the states. We further conceive, that while we are in actual service, your excellency's power over us, as governor of the state of Vermont, is suspended.

If it is true, as your excellency states, that "we are out of the jurisdiction or controul of the executive of Vermont," we would ask from whence your excellency derives the *right*, or presumes to exercise the *power* of ordering us to return from the service in which we are now engaged? If we were *legally* ordered into the service of the United States, your excellency must be sensible that you have no authority to order us out of that service. If we were *illegally* ordered into service, our continuance in it is either voluntary or compulsory. If voluntary, it gives no one a right to remonstrate or complain; if compulsory, we can appeal to the laws of our country for redress against those who illegally restrain us of our liberty. In *either* case, we cannot perceive the right your excellency has to interfere in the business. Viewing the subject in this light, we conceive it our duty to declare unequivocally to your excellency, that we shall not obey your excellency's order for returning; but shall continue in the service of our country, until we are legally and honourably discharged. An invitation or order to desert the standard of our country, will never be obeyed by us, although it proceeds from the governor and captain general of Vermont.

Perhaps it is proper, that we should content ourselves with merely giving your excellency the reasons which prevail upon us to disregard your proclamation; but we are impressed with the belief, that our duty to ourselves, to the soldiers under our command, and to the public, requires that we should expose to the world, the motives which produced, and the objects which were intended to be accomplished by such an extraordinary proclamation. We shall take the liberty to state to your excellency plainly, our sentiments on this subject. We consider your proclamation as a gross insult to the officers and soldiers in service, inasmuch as it implies that they are so *ignorant* of their rights, as to believe you have authority to command them in their present situation, or so *abandoned* as to follow your insidious advice. We cannot regard your proclamation in any other light, than as an unwarrantable stretch of executive authority, issued from the worst of motives, to effect the basest purposes. It is, in our opinion, a renewed instance of that spirit of disorganization and anarchy which is carried on by a faction, to overwhelm our country with ruin and disgrace. We cannot perceive what other object your excellency could have in view, than to embarrass the operations of the army, to excite mutiny and sedition among the soldiers, and to induce them to desert, that they might forfeit the wages to which they are entitled for their patriotic services.

We have, however, the satisfaction to inform your excellency, that although your proclamations have been distributed among the

soldiers, by your agent delegated for that purpose, they have failed to produce the intended effect—and although it may appear *incredible* to your excellency, *even soldiers* have discernment sufficient to perceive, that the proclamation of a governor, when issued out of the line of his duty, is a harmless, inoffensive and nugatory document—they regard it with mingled emotions of pity and contempt for its author, and as a striking monument of his folly.

Before we conclude, we feel ourselves, in justice to your excellency, bound to declare, that a knowledge of your excellency's character induces us to believe, that the folly and infamy of the proclamation to which your excellency has *put your signature*, is not wholly to be ascribed to your excellency, but chiefly to the evil advisers, with whom we believe your excellency is unhappily encompassed.

We are, with due respect, &c.

Luther Dixon, *lieutenant colonel*; Elijah Dee, *junr. major*; Josiah Grout, *major*; Charles Bennet, *captain*; Jesse Post, *captain*; Elijah W. Wood, *captain*; Elijah Birge, *captain*; Martin D. Follet, *captain*; Amasa Mansfield, *captain*; T. H. Campbell, *lieutenant*; G. O. Dixon, *lieutenant*; Francis Northway, *lieutenant*; Joshua Brush, *lieutenant*; Daniel Dodge, *ensign*; Sanford Gadcomb, *captain*; James Fullington, *quarter master*; Shepherd Beals, *lieutenant*; John Fassett, *surgeon*; Seth Clark, *junr. surgeon's mate*; Thomas Waterman, *captain*; Benjamin Follet, *lieutenant*; Hira Hill, *surgeon's mate*.

CAMP STROTHER, NEAR TEN ISLANDS OF COOSA,
November 11th, 1813.

SIR,

I am just returned from an excursion which I took a few days ago, and hasten to acquaint you with the result.

Late on the evening of the 7th instant, a runner arrived from the friendly party, in Lashley's fort, (Talledega) distant about 30 miles below us, with the information that the hostile Creeks, in great force, had encamped near the place, and were preparing to destroy it; and earnestly entreated that I would lose no time in affording them relief. Urged by their situation, as well as by a wish to meet the enemy so soon as an opportunity would offer, I determined upon commencing my march thither with all my disposable force in the course of the night; and immediately despatched an express to general White, advising him of my intended movement, and urged him to hasten to this encampment by a forced march, in order to protect it in my absence. I had repeatedly written the general to form a junction with me as speedily as practicable, and a few days before had received his assurance, that on the 7th he would join me. I commenced crossing the

river at the Ten Islands, leaving behind me my baggage wagons and whatever might retard my progress; and encamped that night within six miles of the fort I had set out to relieve. At midnight I had received, by an Indian runner, a letter from general White, informing me that he had received my order, but that he had altered his course, and was on his march backwards to join major general Cocke, near the mouth of Chatuga. I will not now remark upon the strangeness of this manouvre; but it was now too late to change my plan, or make any new arrangements; and between 3 and 4 o'clock, I re-commenced my march to meet the enemy, who were encamped within a quarter of a mile of the fort. At sun-rise we came within half a mile of them, and having formed my men, I moved on in battle order. The infantry were in three lines—the militia on the left, and the volunteers on the right. The cavalry formed the two extreme wings, and were ordered to advance in a *curve*, keeping their rear connected with the advance of their infantry lines, and enclose the enemy in a circle. The advanced guard whom I sent forward to bring on the engagement, met the attack of the enemy with great intrepidity; and having poured upon them four or five very galling rounds, fell back as they had been previously ordered, to the main army. The enemy pursued, and the front line was now ordered to advance and meet him; but owing to some misunderstanding, a few companies of militia, who composed a part of it, commenced a retreat. At this moment a corps of cavalry, commanded by lieutenant colonel Dyer, which I had kept as a reserve, was ordered to dismount, and fill up the vacancy occasioned by the retreat. This order was executed with a great deal of promptitude and effect. The militia, seeing this, speedily rallied; and the fire became general along the front line, and on that part of the wings which was contiguous. The enemy, unable to stand it, began to retreat; but were met at every turn, and repulsed in every direction. The right wing chased them with a most destructive fire to the mountains, a distance of about three miles—and had I not been compelled by the *faux pas* of the militia in the outset of the battle, to dismount my reserve, I believe not a man of them would have escaped. The victory however was very decisive—290 of the enemy were left dead—and there can be no doubt but many more were killed who were not found. Wherever they ran they left behind them traces of blood; and it is believed that very few will return to their villages in as sound a condition as they left them. I was compelled to return to this place to protect the sick and wounded, and get my baggage on.

In the engagement we lost 15 killed and 85 wounded—2 of them have since died. All the officers acted with the utmost bravery, and so did all the privates except that part of the militia who retreated at the commencement of the battle—and they hastened to atone for their error. Taking the whole together, they have

realized the high expectations I had formed of them, and have fairly entitled themselves to the gratitude of their country.

ANDREW JACKSON

His excellency Willie Blount, Nashville.

CAMP, NEAR CORNWALL, November 12th, 181

SIR,

I have the honour to report to you, that yesterday, while the rear division of the army, consisting of detachments from the 1st, 3d, and 4th brigades, and placed under my command to protect the flotilla from the enemy, that hung on our rear, was under arms in order to move, agreeably to your orders, down the bank of the St. Lawrence, a report was brought to me from the rear guard, that a body of about 200 British and Indians had advanced into the woods that skirted our rear. General Swartwout, with the 4th brigade, was immediately ordered to dislodge them; general Covington, with the 3d brigade, at the same time, directed to be within supporting distance. General Swartwout dashed into the woods, and with the 21st infantry, (a part of his brigade) after a short skirmish, drove them back to the position of their main body. Here he was joined by general Covington. The enemy had judiciously chosen his ground among the ravines, which every where intersected the extensive plain, and discharged a heavy and galling fire upon our advanced columns. No opposition or obstacle, however, checked their ardour. The enemy retired for more than a mile before their resolute and repeated charges. During this time, the detachment of the 1st brigade under colonel Coles, whose greater distance from the scene of action retarded its arrival, rapidly entered the field. Being directed to attack the enemy's left flank, this movement was promptly and bravely executed amid a shower of musketry and shrapnell shells. The fight now became more stationary, until the brigade first engaged, having expended all their ammunition, were directed to retire to a more defensible position to wait for a re-supply. This movement disconnected the line as to render it expedient for the first brigade likewise to retire. It should be remarked, that the artillery, excepting two pieces under captain Irvine, attached to the rear division, which from the nature of the ground, and the circuitous route they had to take, were likewise much retarded in their arrival, did not reach the ground until the line, for want of ammunition, had already begun to fall back. When they were arranged, in doing which I was assisted by the skill of colonel Swift, of the engineers, their fire was sure and destructive. When the artillery was finally directed to retire, having to cross a deep, and excepting in one place, (to artillery) impassable ravine, one piece was unfortunately lost. The fall of its gallant commander, lieutenant Smith, and most of his men, may account for the

accident. In the death of this young man, the army has lost one of its most promising officers.

The squadron of the 2d regiment of dragoons, under major Woodford, was early on the field, and much exposed to the enemy's fire, but the nature of the ground, and the position of his line, did not admit of those successful charges, which their discipline and ardour, under more favourable circumstances, are calculated to make. The reserve, under colonel Upham* and major Malcolm, did not arrive from the boats in time to participate in but a small part of the action; but the activity and zeal they displayed while engaged, evinced the benefit that might have been derived from their earlier assistance.

The whole of the line was now re-formed on the borders of those woods from which the enemy had first been driven; when, night coming on and the storm returning, and conceiving that the object you had in view, which was to beat back the enemy that would retard our junction with the main body below, to have been accomplished, the troops were directed to return to the ground near the flotilla; which movement was executed in good order, and without molestation from the enemy.

I cannot close my representation of this battle, without indulging in a few remarks upon those officers, whose conduct will give a character to the conflict of this day. General Covington, whose readiness to enter the field was an earnest of his subsequent activity, received a mortal wound, while leading his men on to a successful charge. His troops still feeling the effects of his gallant example, continued to advance long after their brave commander had fallen. His fate will perpetuate the memory of the plain which has been crimsoned by his blood. Colonel Preston was severely wounded, while nobly fighting at the head of his regiment. The universal sympathy which is excited by the honourable misfortune of this amiable officer, attests the estimation which is entertained of his talents as a soldier, and his virtues as a man. Major Cumming, with whose military merits and exertions I have long been acquainted, met with a similar fate while leading to a charge, and undiscouraged by the wound continued to advance, until loss of blood obliged him to retire. Many platoon officers received disabling or slight wounds in the honourable discharge of their duty, a report of whose names and merits I have directed the several chiefs of brigades to make to me, in order that I may transmit it to you. It is with great satisfaction I acknowledge my warmest approbation of the gallantry and zeal which was constantly displayed throughout this eventful day, by brigadier general Swartwout, and colonel Coles, who commanded the detachment of the 1st brigade.

After the fall of general Covington, colonel Pierce, on whom the command of the 3d brigade devolved, conducted with

* Colonel Upham was not in this action. His boat had shoved off and was ten miles from the scene of action when the battle commenced. It was major Malcolm who headed the reserve and decided the conflict.

Permit me now to add, sir, that though the result of this action was not so brilliant and decisive as I could have wished, and the first stages of it seemed to promise, yet when it is recollected that the troops had long been exposed to hard privations and fatigues, to inclement storms from which they could have no shelter; that the enemy were superior to us in numbers, and greatly superior in position, and supported by 7 or 8 heavy gun boats; that the action being unexpected, was necessarily commenced without much concert; that we were, by unavoidable circumstances, long deprived of our artillery; and that the action was warmly and obstinately contested for more than three hours, during which there were but a few short cessations of musketry and cannon; when all these circumstances are recollected, perhaps this day may be thought to have added some reputation to the American arms. And if, on this occasion, you shall believe me to have done my duty, and accomplished any one of your purposes, I shall be satisfied.

men all these children may be thought to have added to my arms. And if, on this occasion, you shall be satisfied.

Allow me to adjoin my regret, which is felt in common with army, that the severity of your indisposition deprived us of your presence on this occasion. The adjutant general has been directed to furnish a report of the killed, wounded, and the casualties.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN P. BOYD, Brig. Gen. Comd.

Major general Wilkinson.

HEAD QUARTERS, NEAR CORNWALL, (U. S.)
November 12th

HEAD QUARTERS, NELL
SIR, I this day had the honour to receive your letter o
instant, by colonel Atkinson, and want language to ex

sorrow for your determination not to join the division under your command with the troops under my immediate orders.

As such resolution defeats the grand objects of the campaign in this quarter, which, before the receipt of your letter, were thought to be completely within our power, no suspicion being entertained that you would decline the junction directed, it will oblige us to take post at French Mills, on Salmon river, or in their vicinity, for the winter.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JAMES WILKINSON.

Major general Hampton.

Extract from the general order of general Wilkinson, of November 13th, 1813.

"The troops are to embark without loss of time; yet are not to be hurried in leaving the Canadian shore, from whence the commander in chief is compelled to retire by the extraordinary, unexampled, and, it appears, unwarrantable conduct of major general Hampton, in refusing to join this army with a division of 4,000 men under his command, agreeably to positive orders from the commander in chief, and as he has been assured by the Secretary of War, of explicit instructions from the war department.

"Thus deprived of a large portion of his promised force, the commander in chief feels himself bound by a sense of regard to this meritorious corps, and of sacred duty to the United States, to spare the lives of brave men, and not to hazard the character or interest of the nation, by an unequal conflict. He, with lively regret and the deepest mortification, suspends the attack on Montreal. But he assures the army that it is not abandoned."

HEAD QUARTERS, NEWARK, November 15th, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

Being ordered to return to the westward, you will be pleased to resume the command which you received previous to my arrival at this place.

The orders which you heretofore have received will govern you. It will be necessary that you keep a vigilant eye over the distressed part of the inhabitants, and I recommend that you make use of the zeal, activity, and local knowledge which colonel Willcocks certainly possesses to counteract the machinations of our enemy, and ensure the confidence of our friends, among the inhabitants. It will, however, I am persuaded, be your wish, as it is your duty, to guard the latter as much as possible from oppression.

The volunteers which were lately called out will be retained as long as you consider their services necessary; the drafted militia, until further orders are received from the Secretary of War.

There can be little doubt of its being the intention of the enemy to send the greater part of the troops, which they have at Burlington and York, to Kingston, and to make York the right of their line. They may, however, have a small command at Burlington, and those may be so securely posted as to render them safe from any desultory expedition you may set on foot; but it is desirable to have any supplies which they may have collected in the neighborhood destroyed; and should the success below be not such as to promise possession of the whole of the Upper Province, may be destroyed.

Captains Leonard and Reed, or either of them, are appointed to muster your troops, when and where you think proper.

In closing this communication, I should not do justice to my feelings, if I were not to acknowledge the zeal and talents with which you have managed your command. Your conduct appears to me to have been extremely judicious and proper throughout, and your troops exhibit a state of improvement and subordination which is at once honourable to your officers and themselves.

I am, &c.

WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

Brigadier general George M'Clure.



HEAD QUARTERS, FRENCH MILLS, ADJOINING THE PROVINCE
OF LOWER CANADA, November 16th, 1812.

SIR,

I beg leave to refer you to the journal which accompanies this letter, for the particulars of the movements of the corps under my command, down the St. Lawrence, and will endeavour to exert my enfeebled mind to detail to you the more striking and important incidents which have ensued my departure from Grenadier Island, at the foot of Lake Ontario, on the 3d instant.

The corps of the enemy from Kingston, which followed me, hung on my rear, and in concert with a heavy galley, and a few gun-boats, seemed determined to retard my progress. I was strongly tempted to halt, turn about, and put an end to his teasing; but, alas! I was confined to my bed: major general Lewis was too ill for any active exertion; and above all, I did not dare suffer myself to be diverted a single day from the prosecution of the views of government. I had written major general Hampton on the 6th instant by his adjutant general colonel King, and had ordered him to form a junction with me on the St. Lawrence, which I expected would take place on the 9th or 10th. It would have been unpardonable had I lost sight of this object a moment, as I deemed it of vital importance to the issue of the campaign.

The enemy deserve credit for their zeal and intelligence, which the active universal hostility of the male inhabitants of the country enable them to employ to the greatest advantage. Thus, while menaced by a respectable force in rear, the coast was lined

musketry in front, at every critical pass of the river, which obliged me to march a detachment, and this impeded my progress.

In the evening of the 9th instant, the army halted a few miles above the head of the Longue Saut. In the morning of the 10th, an inclosed order was issued. General Brown marched accordingly to order, and about noon we were apprized, by the report of artillery, that he was engaged some distance below us. At the same time the enemy were observed in our rear, and their bay and gun-boats approached our flotilla, and opened a fire on which obliged me to order a battery of 18 pounders to be landed, and a shot from it compelled the vessels of the enemy to retire, together with their troops, after some firing between the landed parties. But by this time, in consequence of disembarking and re-embarking the heavy guns, the day was so far advanced, that our pilots did not dare enter the Saut, (8 miles a condensed rapid) and therefore we fell down about two miles and remained there for the night. Early the next morning every thing was in readiness for motion; but having received no intelligence from General Brown, I was still delayed, as sound caution prescribed I should learn the result of his affair, before I committed the flotilla to the Saut. At half past 10 o'clock A. M. an officer of dragoons arrived with a letter in which the general informed me he had defeated the enemy, and would reach the foot of the Saut early in the day. Orders were immediately given for the flotilla to sail, at which instant the enemy's gun-boats appeared, and began to pour shot among us. Information was brought me at the same time, from brigadier general Boyd, that the enemy's troops were marching in column. I immediately sent orders to him to attack them; this report was soon contradicted. Their gun boats however continued to scratch us, and a variety of reports of their movements and countermovements were brought to me in succession; which convinced me of their determination to hazard an attack, when it could be done to the greatest advantage, and therefore I determined to anticipate them. Directions were accordingly sent, by that distinguished officer colonel Swift, of the engineers, to brigadier general Boyd, to throw the detachment of his command, assigned to him in the order of the preceding day, which composed of men of his own, Covington's and Swartwout's regiments, into 3 columns, to march upon the enemy, out-flank them if possible, and take their artillery. The action soon afterwards commenced with the advanced body of the enemy, and became extremely sharp and galling, and, with occasional pauses, was continued with great vivacity, in open space and fair combat, for upwards of two and a half hours; the adverse lines alternately holding and advancing. It is impossible to say with accuracy what was our number on the field, because it consisted of indefinite detachments taken from the boats, to render safe the passage of the Saut. Brigadier generals Covington and Swartwout volun-

tarily took part in the action, at the head of detachments from the respective brigades, and exhibited the same courage that was displayed by brigadier general Boyd, who happened to be the senior officer on the ground. Our force engaged might have reached 16 or 1,700 men, but certainly did not exceed 1,800; that of the enemy was estimated at from 1,200 to 2,000, but did not probably amount to more than 15 or 1,600, consisting, as I am informed, detachments from the 49th, 84th, and 104th regiments of the line with three companies of the Voltigeur and Glengary corps, and the militia of the country, who are not included in the estimate.

It would be presumptuous in me to attempt to give you a detailed account of this affair, which certainly reflects high honour on the valour of the American soldier, as no example can be produced of undisciplined men, with inexperienced officers, braving a fire of two hours and a half, without quitting the field or yielding to their antagonists. But, sir, the information I now give you is derived from officers of my confidence, who took active parts in this conflict; for though I was enabled to order the attack, it was my hard fortune not to be able to lead the troops I commanded. The disease with which I was assailed on the 2d of September, on my journey to Fort George, having, with a few short intervals of convalescence, preyed on me ever since, and at the moment of this action I was confined to my bed and emaciated almost to a skeleton, unable to sit on my horse, or to move ten paces without assistance.

I must, however, be pardoned for trespassing on your time a few remarks in relation to the affair. The objects of the British and American commanders were precisely opposed; the last being bound, by the instructions of his government and most solemn obligations of duty, to precipitate his descent of the St. Lawrence by every practicable means; because this being effected, one of the greatest difficulties opposed to the American army would be surmounted; and the first, by duties equally imperious, to retard, and, if possible, prevent such descent. He is to be accounted victorious who effected his purpose! The British commander having failed to gain either of his objects, can lay no claim to the honours of the day. The battle fluctuated, and triumph seemed, at different times, inclined to the contending corps. The front of the enemy was at first forced back more than a mile, and, though they never regained the ground thus lost, their stand was permanent, and their charges resolute. Amidst these charges, and near the close of the contest, we lost a field piece by the fall of the officer who was serving it with the same coolness as if he had been at a parade of review. This was lieutenant Smith, of the light artillery, who in point of merit stood at the head of his grade. The enemy having halted, and our troops being again formed in battalion, front to front, and the firing ceased on both sides, we resumed our position on the bank of the river, and the infantry being much fatigued, the whole were re-embarked, and proceeded

ed down the river without further annoyance from the enemy or their gun-boats, while the dragoons, with five pieces of artillery, marched down the Canada shore without molestation.

It is due to his rank, to his worth, and his services, that I should make particular mention of brigadier general Covington, who received a mortal wound directly through the body, while animating his men and leading them to the charge. He fell, where he fought, at the head of his men, and survived but two days.

The next morning the flotilla passed through the Saut, and joined that excellent officer, brigadier general Brown, at Bardonia's, near Cornwall, where he had been instructed to take post and wait my arrival, and where I confidently expected to hear of major general Hampton's arrival on the opposite shore. But immediately after I halted, colonel Atkinson, the inspector general of the division under major general Hampton, waited on me with a letter from that officer, in which, to my unspeakable mortification and surprise, he declined the junction ordered, and informed me he was marching towards lake Champlain, by way of co-operating in the proposed attack on Montreal. This letter, together with a copy of that to which it is an answer, were immediately submitted to a council of war, composed of my general officers and the colonel commanding the elite, the chief engineer and the adjutant general, who unanimously gave it as their opinion, that "the attack on Montreal should be abandoned for the present season, and the army near Cornwall should be immediately crossed to the American shore for taking up winter quarters, and that this place afforded an eligible position for such quarters."

I acquiesced in these opinions, not from the shortness of the stock of provisions, (which had been reduced by the acts of God) because that of our meat had been increased 5 days, and our bread had been reduced only two days, and because we could, in case of extremity, had lived on the enemy; but because the loss of the division under major general Hampton, weakened my force too sensibly to justify the attempt. In all my measures and movements of moment, I have taken the opinions of my general officers, which have been in accord with my own.

I remained on the Canada shore until the next day, without seeing or hearing from the "powerful force" of the enemy in our neighborhood, and the same day reached this position with the artillery and infantry. The dragoons have been ordered to Utica and its vicinity, and I expect are 50 or 60 miles on the march.

You have under cover a summary abstract of the killed and wounded in the affair of the 11th instant, which shall soon be followed by a particular return, in which a just regard will be paid to individual merits. The dead rest in honour, and the wounded bled for their country and deserve its gratitude.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JAMES WILKINSON.

To the Secretary of War.

Return of the killed and wounded of a detachment of the army of the United States descending the St. Lawrence river, under the command of major general James Wilkinson, in an action fought at Williamsburgh, in Upper Canada, on the 11th of Nov. 1813.

KILLED—Subalterns, 3; sergeants, 7; corporals, 3; musician, 1; privates, 83: Total, 102. **WOUNDED**—Brigadier general, assistant adjutant general, 1; aid-de-camp, 1; colonel, 1; major, captains, 5; subalterns, 6; sergeants, 9; corporals, 13; musician, 1; privates, 193: Total, 237. Total, killed and wounded, 339.

Names of the Commissioned Officers Killed and Wounded.

KILLED—Lieutenant William W. Smith, of the light artillery; David Hunter, 12th infantry; Edward Olmstead, 16th, *ditto*. **WOUNDED**—Brigadier general Leonard Covington, mortally, since dead; major Talbot Chambers, assistant adjutant general, slightly; major Darby Noon, aid-de-camp to brigadier general Swartwout, slightly; colonel James P. Preston, of the 23d infantry, severely, his right thigh fractured; major William Cummings, 8th regiment, severely; captain Edmund Foster, 9th *ditto*, slightly; captain David S. Townsend, *do. do.* severely; captain Mordecai Myers, 13th *do. do.*; captain John Campbell, *do. do.* slightly; captain John P. Murdock, 25th *do. do.*; lieutenant William S. Heaton, 11th *do.* severely; lieutenant John Williams, 13th *do.* slightly; lieutenant John Lynch,* 14th *do.* severely; lieutenant Peter Pelham,* 21st *do. do.*; lieutenant James D. Brown, 25th *do.* slightly; lieutenant Archibald E. Crary, *do. do.* severely, in the skirmish the day before the action.

ADJ. GEN'S. OFFICE, H. Q. Military district No. 9, French Mills, Nov. 1813.

T. B. WALBACK, *Adj. Gen.*

N. B. Colonel Preston commanded the 13th regiment of infantry during the action; and major Cummings did duty with the 16th regiment infantry in the action.

Extract of a letter from general Wilkinson, to the Secretary of War, dated

"FRENCH MILLS, November 17th, 1813.

"After what has passed between us, you can perhaps conceive my amazement and chagrin at the conduct of major general Hampton. The game was in view, and, had he performed the junction directed, would have been ours in eight or ten days. But he chose to recede, in order to co-operate, and my dawning hopes, and the hopes and honour of the army were blasted."

*Taken prisoners.

COLONEL PURDY'S REPORT

*To major general Wilkinson, of the action at Chataugay, &c
transmitted by the general to the Secretary of War.*

I arrived at Cumberland head September 16th, 1813, and on the 18th took command of the 4th regiment of infantry, stationed at that place. The army, consisting of about 4000 men, was composed principally of recruits who had been but a short time in the service, and had not been exercised with that rigid discipline so essentially necessary to constitute the soldier. They had indeed been taught various evolutions, but a spirit of subordination was foreign to their views. On the 19th, orders issued for the whole army, except a squadron of horse and the artillery embarked, in batteaux. The army got under weigh, preceded by the light corps, and flanked on the right by the navy, and arrived at Chesy at 12 o'clock at night, lay on their arms, embarked again soon after sun-rise the next morning, proceeded down the lake as far as Champlain, and up Champlain river the distance of four miles, where we landed, and immediately marched to Odletown. The light corps who preceded the other troops some hours, surprised and defeated a guard of the enemy at that place. We remained at Odletown until the middle of the next day, during which time a want of system in the management of the army was readily discovered by every military man, that led to apprehensions for the safety of the troops, should the enemy oppose with any considerable force. The army returned to Champlain on the 21st, the 22d to Chesy, and the day following commenced the route to Chataugay. The whole of this march, a distance of more than 70 miles, was very disagreeable: the officers were not permitted to take with them the necessaries, much less the conveniences of life, and were compelled to abandon clothing and other things essentially necessary to preserve the body in health. We forbore complaint, enduring every privation, presuming the commanding officer had sufficient reasons for his conduct, and concluding it was pro bono publico. The scene has passed, and time sufficient has elapsed to have discovered those reasons, had they existed. None have been found: on the contrary, circumstances have demonstrated that it was a useless and unnecessary sacrifice of both public and private property. The army remained at Chataugay 26 days, and on the 21st October commenced an excursion into the enemy's country. The first brigade followed the course of the Chataugay river to Spear's, the distance of 18 miles and upwards, and there met the second brigade, which had taken a nearer and more convenient route. The march was very fatiguing, equalled only by another that soon followed. Credit is due to both the officers and soldiers for their orderly conduct, patience and perseverance, in surmounting the incredible obstacles the enemy threw in their way. On the 25th, a difficult fatiguing expedition was planned, and the execution of it assigned to the first brigade, which had

for some time previous, and still remained, under my command. The design was to cut off the retreat of a body of the enemy supposed to be encamped on the banks of the Chataugay, 6 miles distance. With this intention the first brigade was ordered across the river at night, marched silently down, and re-cross at a distance of two miles below the enemy, and attack them in rear, giving a concerted signal, while the second brigade moved down the river in front. We commenced the march at sun-down, and by sunrise the next morning had gained only 6 miles. Here we were discovered by the enemy and fired on from the opposite side of the river. During that night we were repeatedly misled by the guides, who knew nothing of the country, having never been that way, and at the time we were attacked, they had led us into a thick cedar growth or swamp on the banks of the river and immediately opposite the enemy's position, and knew not how to extricate us. *Incredible as it may appear, general Hampton entrusted nearly one half of his army, and those his best troops, to the guidance of men, each of whom repeatedly assured him that they were not acquainted with the country, and were not competent to direct such an expedition.*

At the same time general Hampton told me he had a man by the name of Smith, who had a perfect knowledge of the country, and whom he promised to send me, but which he neglected to do. The defeat of the expedition was the consequence of this neglect of the major general. About 2 o'clock, while receiving an order from colonel King, adjutant general, upon the opposite side of the river, to march back 4 miles and there ford the river and join the second brigade, the enemy made a furious attack on the column by a great discharge of musketry, accompanied by the yells of the savages. Unfortunately, the word "retreat," was heard, which for a short time spread confusion among the several corps. A sufficient number, however, remained firm, and the enemy was soon compelled to retire. Towards sun-down I sent general Hampton a request, that a regiment might be ordered down to cover my landing on the opposite side of the river; *but judge my surprise, on receiving intelligence that he had retreated, with the second brigade, nearly three miles.* Thus was I deserted without the smallest guard to cover my landing. To what cause shall it be attributed, that the general ordered a retreat, and that too at the moment when the presence of the second brigade was required, or could be useful, as soon afterwards he declared "he should be willing to compound with the first brigade for 500 men." The wounded had previously been conveyed across on rafts, which made a removal of my brigade to that side absolutely necessary for their protection. An attempt was accordingly made, and a floating bridge soon constructed of old logs, *fixed* on the margin of the river. The enemy discovering our disposition, commenced firing from the opposite side, and killed several while crossing. Major Snelling, with about 100 men, effected a

landing, and joined the main body. The remainder of my force, exhausted by the excessive exertions of the preceding night, and weary with the fatigues of the day, not having had a moment either for rest or refreshment, were compelled to endure the privation of sleep another night. We retired two or three miles and took a position. At about 12 o'clock the enemy came up and made an attack upon us, but were soon routed. The men at this time were formed and lying on the ground they were to occupy, in case of an attack, and were ordered to, and did, immediately rise, seize their arms, and remain under them the residue of the night. An excessively heavy rain prevented the firing both of the enemy and ourselves, except occasionally a single gun from the former. Our troops were ordered not to fire, but in case of a repetition of attack to charge bayonets—this was accordingly done. The enemy charged several times, and as often were put to flight. It is observable in this place, that so greatly were the men overpowered by fatigue, though in a situation every way dangerous, and in which they had every reason to believe they should be sallied upon by the enemy every moment, many were unable to conquer their disposition to sleep, and it was not in the power of the officers to keep them awake. It was on the morning of this last attack, that the general expressed his apprehensions for the first brigade, and made the declaration above quoted. The next morning we crossed the river and joined general Hampton; on the 28th the army retreated 4 miles, and on the 30th and 31st marched back to Chataugay. The troops at the times of the attack were not in a situation to endure further fatigue—and it is an indubitable fact, that many of them were so debilitated they were unable to proceed with the brigade on its march from the place of its last attack, and actually did not reach the main body until the day after the brigade had joined it, and some not even until the army had reached the Four Corners of Chataugay.

Never to my knowledge, during our march into Canada, and while we remained at the Four Corners, a term of twenty-six days, did general Hampton ever send off a scouting or reconnoitring party (except in one or two cases at Spear's in Canada, when he detached a few dragoons for this duty); nor did he, from the time we commenced our march from Cumberland Head to our arrival at Plattsburgh, ever order a front flank, or rear guard, to be kept up, though a great part of the time we were in situations that evidently required it. True it is, these guards were occasionally sent out, not, however, by his order, but by the orders of the officers commanding brigades.

By a general order, dated Chataugay, November 5th, the general says he has paid the first attention to the sick, and has granted them indulgences which created murmurings on the part of some officers at their posts. It is only necessary here to observe, that every officer of the army can testify that the sick were very much neglected, as far as regards comfortable quarters and transporta-

tion, and that they were strewed along the roads through which we marched, without care or attendance; and it is presumable that many have died in consequence of this, who might have been saved to themselves, if not to the service. The general, indeed, at the time this order was issued, which was after our return to the Four Corners, did order transportation for the sick to Burlington, but this is the only instance to my knowledge.

The commissary's department is worthy of notice. My order for provision was not sufficient; nor could I obtain any but by special license of general Hampton. The commissary of issues has been constantly in the habit of selling the livers, &c. of the beeves to officers; and though I represented this to general Hampton as unusual and improper, he refused to take any other notice of it than saying, "the commissary is accountable for all parts of the beef, even to a pound or ounce of tallow:" nor did he take any notice of another piece of misconduct of the commissary, that of acting in the capacity of sutler, but sanctioned it by purchasing of him.

The common practices with general Hampton, of arresting officers and releasing them without the knowledge or consent of the officers by whom they were arrested, (the case of lieutenant Morris, of the 33d regiment, who was arrested by me on the charge of cowardice and misconduct before the enemy, on the 26th October, 1813, the time of the skirmish with the enemy at Ormstown, or Chataugay river, being an instance); of refusing to arrest officers whom I reported to him as having deserted their posts in time of action; of daily issuing orders and countermanding them; and of interfering in an improper manner with subordinate commands of the army, as a reference to the orders issued by him will show, mark very strongly the capriciousness of his conduct and the total want of steadiness in his intentions.

Such has been the general's conduct on some occasions, that I have, in common with other officers, been induced to believe that he was under the influence of a too free use of spirituous liquors.

I must, in justice to general Hampton, say, that the expedition he planned, and which I have called "difficult and fatiguing," did, at the time it was suggested to me by him, meet my full approbation, and that I have since no reason for changing my opinion of its practicability or usefulness, but I must also say that it required competent guides, and these (as I said before) he promised to furnish me, but did not.

I am of opinion no officer that has served under major general Hampton, on the late campaign, can, or will, contradict this statement.

ROBERT PURDY, Col. 4th Inf.

A true copy,

R. H. M'PHERSON,
Captain & Secretary

TREATMENT

of American Prisoners in Quebec.

Extract of a letter from captain M'Donough, commanding the United States' naval force on lake Champlain, to the Secretary of Navy, dated

"PLATTSBURG BAY, November 23d, 1813.

Accompanying this is the voluntary statement of Abraham Walter, who was pilot of one of the sloops taken last summer, and made his escape from Quebec; and after a severe journey, he lays, reported himself to me yesterday."

Statement of Abraham Walter, pilot of the United States' sloop Growler, on lake Champlain, viz.

of New York, }
of Onondaga County, } ss.

Abraham Walter, formerly pilot of the sloop of war Growler, on lake Champlain, being duly sworn, deposes and saith, that he was employed on board that sloop when it was taken by the British in June last; that after the sloops Growler and Eagle were captured, the prisoners, both officers and sailors, were taken to Quebec, where they were immediately confined on board a prison-ship; there they were examined by a public officer or ex-aminer, and about eight or ten of the prisoners declared to be American subjects; these were immediately separated from the rest, and taken on board a man of war and sent to England, to be tried as prisoners of war. One of these was known to be a native of New Hampshire by captain Herrick, of the New Hampshire volunteers, and was also a prisoner, and who had known him from his infancy. Several of the rest were declared by others of their acquaintance to be native citizens of the United States. These representations were unavailing with the British officers who commanded, and they were torn thus from their companions to defend themselves against the charge of treason in England. The residue were still confined in their prison ships, in a situation more disagreeable than can well be imagined.

At a time after, a number of British vessels were wishing to proceed to Halifax, the crews of which had mostly been pressed out of the service to fight the American forces on the upper lakes, and seamen were wanted to supply their places. Governor Prevost sent an order to general Glasgow, who then commanded there, directing him to proceed on board the prison-ship and to induce the prisoners to volunteer to man their fleet for Halifax; and in case they refused to comply, to force them on board for that purpose. The order was made; but the American prisoners, considering the measure unjustifiable towards their own government, refused to volunteer, and were accordingly forced on board the vessels by a British press-gang, where this deponent understood they had

quarters assigned them, and were compelled to assist in navigating British vessels to Halifax, and afterwards to England, as the deponent has since been informed : and further, that not one man who was a prisoner there was exempted from this proceed-

And this deponent further saith, that in the beginning of the present month of November, an order was received in conformity to the prince regent's proclamation, to seize 46 American officers and non-commissioned officers, who were then prisoners of war, and to imprison them, to be kept in close confinement, agreeably to the tenor of that proclamation. Prisoners to that number, most of whom were officers there on their parole, many of them in a delicate state of health, were immediately put under arrest, and marched guarded to the public prison, and immured, for what fate is to him unknown. Among those destined for close imprisonment, are lieutenant Smith, then in a declining state of health, and Dr. James Wood, a citizen of Champlain, who was taken from his home while he was in the employment of the revenue, but, as this deponent believes, no way connected with the army. They were imprisoned on the 5th of November instant.

This deponent further saith, that the enemy has uniformly at that place treated American prisoners, both officers and privates, with extreme rigor ; that some time since an American midshipman and two masters' mates, merely for having proceeded on a party of pleasure, about half a mile beyond the limits assigned them, were seized and put into prison, and kept in irons, till the general imprisonment of officers and non-commissioned officers, as above related, took place. And this deponent further saith, that all that was allowed for the American prisoners on board the prison-ship, was daily one pound of old wormy bread, which the inhabitants declared had been twice to the West Indies, and condemned for spoiled bread, and one half pound of exceedingly bad meat, which in almost any other situation would be absolutely not eatable ; no liquors ; no soap to prevent themselves from becoming lousy ; no candles and none of the other comforts of life ; and that it was the opinion of all the prisoners that many of them had actually starved to death, not being able to eat the provisions ; and further, that immediately on the prince regent's proclamation being received, colonel Gardner, the American agent there, who had been occupied in paying off the sick and privates of the land service, was immediately notified by governor Prevost, to consider himself confined to the same limits which were assigned for the officers at Beaufort ; and when this deponent left that place, he was compelled to remain with general Winchester and others, and was not permitted to visit the prisoners who were in distress on board the prison-ships, nor to visit the town to negotiate his bills for the relief of the officers, and had already been obliged to share what little private money he had with him among them for their temporary relief. This deponent further saith, that he started from the neighborhood of Quebec, and came by the way of ~~Down~~ in-

Vermont, and arrived at this place two days since; and further
 Ehis deponent saith not.

ABRAHAM WALTER.

Sworn before me, this 23d day of November, 1813.

HENRY DELENY,

*One of the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas, in and
 for the county of Clinton.*

THIRD VICTORY OVER THE CREEKS.

FORT ARMSTRONG, November 24th, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL,

In mine of the 19th instant, by major Outlaw, I promised you a more detailed report, respecting the detachment ordered by you to the Hillabee Towns, in the Creek nation. In compliance with that promise, I have now the honour to state, that under your order of the 11th instant, I immediately marched with the mounted infantry under the immediate command of colonel Burch, the cavalry under the command of major Porter, and a few of the Cherokee Indians, under the command of colonel Morgan, with very short rations for four days only. We continued our march to Little Oakfuskie, when we fell in with and captured five hostile Creek warriors, supposed to be spies. Finding no other Indians at that place, we burned the town, which consisted of thirty houses. We then proceeded to a town called Genalga, and burned the same, consisting of ninety-three houses; thence we proceeded to Nitty Choptoa, consisting of about twenty-five houses, which I considered it most prudent not to destroy, as it might possibly be of use at some future period. From thence we marched to the Hillabee Town, consisting of about twenty houses, adjoining which was Grayson's farm. Previous to our arrival at that place, I was advised that a party of the hostile Creeks was assembled there. Having marched within six or eight miles of it on the evening of the 7th, I dismounted a part of the force under my command, and sent them under the command of colonel Burch, with the Cherokees under the command of colonel Morgan in advance, to surround the town in the night, and make the attack at daylight on the 18th. Owing to the darkness of the night, the town was not reached until after day-light; but so complete was the surprise, that we succeeded in surrounding the town, and killing and capturing almost (if not entirely) the whole of the hostile Creeks assembled there, consisting of about 316, of which number about 60 warriors were killed on the spot, and the remainder made prisoners. Before the close of the engagement, my whole force was up and ready for action, had it become necessary; but owing to the want of knowledge on the part of the Indians of our approach, they were entirely killed and taken before they could prepare for any effort.

tual defence. We lost not one drop of blood in accomplishing this enterprise. We destroyed this village, and, in obedience to your orders, commenced our march for this post, which were unable to reach until yesterday. I estimate the distance from this to Grayson's farm, at about 100 miles. The ground over which we travelled is so rough and hilly, as to render a passage very difficult. Many defiles it was impossible to pass in safety, without the greatest precaution. For a part of the time, the weather was so very wet, being encumbered with prisoners, and the troops and their horses having to subsist in a very great degree upon such supplies as we could procure in the nation, rendered our march more tardy than it otherwise would have been.

The troops under my command have visited the heart of that section of the Creek nation, where the Red Sticks were first distributed.

In justice to this gallant band, I am proud to state, that the whole of the officers and men under the command of colonel Burch, performed their duty cheerfully and without complaint: that from the cool, orderly and prompt manner in which major Porter and the cavalry under his command, formed and conducted themselves in every case of alarm, I had the highest confidence in them; colonel Morgan and the Cherokees under his command, gave undeniable evidence that they merit the employ of their government. In short, sir, the whole detachment under my command, conducted in such a manner as to enable me to assure you that they are capable of performing any thing to which the same number of men are equal.

It gives me pleasure to add, that Mr. M'Corry, who acted as my aid in this expedition, rendered services that to me were indispensable, to his country very useful, and to himself highly honourable.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JAMES WHITE, *Brigadier general*.

Major general John Cocke.

Extract of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated

"FRENCH MILLS, November 24th, 1813.

"I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 15th instant from Albany, and hope my despatches have reached you which left this on the 17th.

"With respect to the unfortunate issue of the campaign, I disclaim the shadow of blame, because I know I have done my duty, and more than my duty, and so do those with whom I have acted. To general Hampton's outrage of every principle of sub-

ordination and discipline may be ascribed the failure of the expedition ; and that I have not yet arrested him must be attributed to my respect for you, and my desire that the arrest should proceed from the highest authority ; for if this act be suffered to pass unnoticed and unpunished, it will establish a precedent to justify disobedience and subvert those obligations of blind obedience, on which the efficiency of military institutions exclusively depend.

“ After our losses by deaths, desertions, and discharges since we left Sackett’s Harbor, I think we shall not be able to show you more than 6000 men at this point, exclusive of the dragoons who have been ordered to Greenbush and Pittsfield for convenience and economy.”

FOURTH VICTORY OVER THE CREEKS.

CAMP, WEST CHATAHOUCHE, December 4th, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honour to communicate to your excellency an account of an action fought on the 29th ultimo on the Talapoosie river, between part of the force under my command, and a large body of the Creek Indians.

Having received information that a number of the hostile Indians were assembled at Autossee, a town on the southern bank of the Talapoosie, about 18 miles from the Hickory Ground, and 20 above the junction of that river with the Coosa, I proceeded to its attack with 950 of the Georgia militia, accompanied by between 3 and 400 friendly Indians. Having encamped within nine or ten miles of the point of destination the preceding evening, we resumed the march a few minutes before one on the morning of the 29th, and at half past six, were formed for action in front of the town.

Booth’s battalion composed the right column, and marched from its centre. Watson’s battalion composed the left, and marched from its right. Adams’s rifle company and Meriwether’s under lieutenant Hendon, were on the flanks. Captain Thomas’s artillery marched in front of the right column in the road.

It was my intention to have completely surrounded the enemy by *appaying* the right wing of my force on Canleebee creek, at the mouth of which I was informed the town stood, and resting the left on the river bank below the town, but to our surprise, as the day dawned, we perceived a second town about 500 yards below that which we had first viewed and were preparing to attack. The plan was immediately changed : three companies of infantry on the left were wheeled into echelon, and advanced to the lower town accompanied by Meriwether’s rifle company and two troops of light dragoons under the command of captains Irwin and Steele.

The residue of the force approached the upper town, and the battle soon became general. The Indians presented themselves at every point, and fought with the desperate bravery of real fanatics. The well directed fire, however, of the artillery, added to the charge of the bayonet, soon forced them to take refuge in the out houses, thickets and copses in rear of the town; many it is believed concealed themselves in caves, previously formed for the purpose of secure retreat in the high bluff of the river, which was thickly covered with reed and brush wood. The Indians of the friendly party, who accompanied us on the expedition, were divided into four companies, and placed under the command of leaders of their selection. They were, by engagement entered into the day previous, to have crossed the river above the town and been posted on the opposite shore during the action, for the purpose of firing on such of the enemy as might attempt to escape, or keep in check any reinforcement which might probably be thrown in from the neighboring town; but owing to the difficulty of the ford and the coldness of the weather, and the lateness of the hour, this arrangement failed, and their leaders were directed to cross Canleebee creek and occupy that flank, to prevent escapes from the Tallassee town. Some time after the action commenced, our red friends thronged in disorder in the rear of our lines. The Cowetaws under M'Intosh, and Tookaubatchians under Mad Dog's son, fell in on our flanks, and fought with an intrepidity worthy of any troops.

At 9 o'clock the enemy was completely driven from the plain and the houses of both towns wrapped in flames. As we were then 60 miles from any depot of provisions, and our five day rations pretty much reduced, in the heart of an enemy's country, which in a few moments could have poured from its numerous towns hosts of the fiercest warriors, as soon as the dead and wounded were properly disposed of, I ordered the place to be abandoned, and the troops to commence their march to Chatahouchie.

It is difficult to determine the strength of the enemy; but from the information of some of the chiefs, which it is said can be relied on, there were assembled at Autossee warriors from eight towns, for its defence, it being their beloved ground, on which they proclaimed no white man could approach without inevitable destruction. It is difficult to give a precise account of the loss of the enemy; but from the number which were lying scattered over the field, together with those destroyed in the towns, and the many slain on the bank of the river, which respectable officers affirm they saw lying in heaps at the water's edge, where they had been precipitated by their surviving friends, their loss in killed, independent of their wounded, must have been at least 200, (among whom were the Autossee and Tallassee kings) and from the circumstance of their making no efforts to molest our return, probably greater. The number of buildings burnt, some of a superior

order for the dwellings of savages, and filled with valuable articles, supposed to be 400.

Adjutant general Newman rendered important services during the action, by his cool and deliberate courage. My aid, major Crawford, discharged with promptitude the duties of a brave and meritorious officer. Major Pace, who acted as field aid, also distinguished himself; both these gentlemen had their horses shot under them, and the latter lost his. Doctor Williamson, hospital surgeon, and doctor Clopton, were prompt and attentive in the discharge of their duty towards the wounded during the action.

Major Freeman, at the head of Irwin's troop of cavalry, and part of Steele's, made a furious and successful charge upon a body of Indians, sabred several and completely defeated them: captain Thomas and his company, captain Adams and lieutenant London's rifle companies killed a great many Indians, and deserve particular praise. Captain Barton's company was in the hottest of the battle, and fought like soldiers. Captain Myrick, captain Little, captain King, captain Broadnax, captain Cleveland, captain Joseph T. Cunningham, and captain Lee, with their companies, distinguished themselves. Brigadier general Shackelford was of great service in bringing the troops into action; and adjutant Broadnax, and major Montgomery, who acted as assistant adjutant, showed great activity and courage. Major Booth used his best endeavors in bringing his battalion to action, and major Watson's battalion acted with considerable spirit. Irwin's, Patterson's, and Steele's troops of cavalry, whenever an opportunity presented, charged with success. Lieutenant Strong had his horse shot and narrowly escaped, and quarter master Fennell displayed the greatest heroism, and miraculously escaped, though badly wounded, after having his horse shot from under him. The topographical engineer was vigilant in his endeavours to render service.

The troops deserve the highest praise for their fortitude in enduring hunger, cold, and fatigue, without a murmur, having marched 120 miles in 7 days.

The friendly Indians lost several killed and wounded, the number not exactly known. Captain Barton, an active and intelligent officer, (the bearer of these despatches) can more particularly explain to your excellency the conduct, movements, and operations of the army.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN FLOYD, B. G.

Major general Pinckney.

Killed and wounded in the action on the 29th of November, 1813.

Total killed, 11; wounded, 54.

Extract of a letter from brigadier general Izard to major general Wilkinson, dated

"PLATTSBURG, December 6th, 1813.

"There is an unavoidable delay in the returns of the regiments of this division, proceeding from the extreme inexperience of the officers of all grades, now with them ; almost every efficient officer is either sick, or was furloughed by major general Hampton at the moment of his own departure : those that remain are barely enough to perform the routine of duty in this cantonment."

Extract of a letter from general Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated

MALONE, December 8th, 1813.

"The unavoidable delay of the express (as no reliance can be placed in the mail from this place) enables me to send you the copy of a letter from general Izard, dated the 6th instant, which exhibits additional expositions of the pernicious and unwarrantable conduct of major general Hampton. I will not charge this man with traitorous designs, but I apprehend, in any other government, a military officer who first defeated the object of a campaign by disobedience of orders, and then, without authority, furloughed all the efficient officers of the division he commanded on a national frontier, in the vicinity of an enemy, would incur heavy penalties."

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT NIAGARA, December 12th, 1813.

Captain Leonard will, as soon as possible, have a proportion of hand grenades in the different block houses, and give directions to the officers of the infantry where they should be posted with their men, in case of an attack ; and should they not be able to maintain the outworks, to repair to the block and mess houses ; and have every thing arranged in such a manner as though he expected an immediate attack.

Much is expected of captain Leonard, from his long experience and knowledge of duty ; and the general feels confident he will be well supported by lieutenant Loomas, of the artillery, as well as the officers of the infantry.

By order of brigadier general George M'Clure.

DONALD FRASER,

Lieutenant 15th U. S. Inf. & Vol. A. de Camp.

ADDRESS OF GENERAL M'CLURE.

To the inhabitants of Niagara, Genesee and Chataugay.

The present crisis is truly alarming. The enemy are preparing to invade your frontier, and let their savages loose upon your families and property. It is now in your power to avoid that evil, by repairing to Lewistown, Schlosser and Buffalo. Every man who is able to bear arms is not only invited but required to repair to the above rallying points, for a few days, until a detachment of militia arrives. The enemy are now laying waste their own country; every man who does not take up arms, or who are disposed to remain neutral, are inhumanly butchered, their property plundered, and their buildings destroyed. Information has just been received that six or eight of their most respectable inhabitants, between Queenston and Fort George, have fallen victims to their barbarity. Every man in the province is required to take up arms, and he that refuses is wantonly butchered. What then, fellow citizens, have you to expect from such an enemy, should they invade your frontier? Think of the consequences; be not lulled into a belief, that because you reside a few miles from the river, that you are secure: No, fellow citizens, the place to meet them is on the beach. Then you will have it in your power to chastise them; but should they be suffered to penetrate into the interior with their savages, the scene will be horrid!

If, then, you love your country and are determined to defend its rights; if you love your families, and are determined to protect them; if you value your property, and are determined to preserve it, you will fly to arms and hasten to meet the enemy, should they dare to set foot on our shores.

Since the above was prepared, I have received intelligence from a credible inhabitant from Canada, (who has just escaped from thence) that the enemy are concentrating all their forces and boats at Fort George, and have fixed upon to-morrow night for attacking, Fort Niagara; and should they succeed, they will lay waste our whole frontier. In that case, our supply of arms, which are deposited at Fort Niagara, will be cut off. Therefore all who have arms, accoutrements or ammunition, will do well to bring them, and all who have horses will come mounted.

GEORGE M'CLURE,

Brigadier general commanding Niagara frontier.

HEAD QUARTERS, BUFFALO, December 18th, 1813.

Extract of a letter from commodore Stephen Decatur to the Secretary of the Navy.

NEW LONDON, December 20th, 1813.

"Some few nights since, the weather promised an opportunity for this squadron to get to sea, and it was said on shore that we

intended to make the attempt. In the course of the evening two blue lights were burnt on both the points at the harbour's mouth as signals to the enemy, and there is not a doubt, but that they have, by signals and otherwise, instantaneous information of our movements. Great but unsuccessful exertions have been made to detect those who communicate with the enemy by signal. The editor of the New London Gazette, to alarm them, and in a hope to prevent the repetition of these signals, stated in that newspaper, that they had been observed, and ventured to denounce those who had made them in animated and indignant terms. The consequence is, that he has incurred the express censure of some of his neighbours. Notwithstanding these signals have been repeated and have been seen by twenty persons at least in this squadron, there are men in New London who have the hardihood to affect to disbelieve it, and the effrontery to avow their disbelief.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"STEPHEN DECATUR."

Monourable William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

HEAD QUARTERS, BUFFALO, December 22d, 1813.

SIR,

I regret to be under the necessity of announcing to you the mortifying intelligence of the loss of Fort Niagara. On the morning of the 19th instant, about four o'clock, the enemy crossed the river at the Five Mile Meadows in great force, consisting of regulars and Indians, who made their way undiscovered to the garrison, which, from the most correct information I can collect, was completely surprised. Our men were nearly all asleep in their tents; the enemy rushed in and commenced a most horrible slaughter. Such as escaped the fury of the first onset, retired to the old messhouse, where they kept up a destructive fire on the enemy, until a want of ammunition compelled them to surrender. Although our force was very inferior and comparatively small indeed, I am induced to think that the disaster is not attributable to *any want of troops*, but to *gross neglect* in the *commanding officer of the fort*, captain Leonard, in not preparing, being ready, and looking out for the expected attack.

I have not been able to ascertain correctly the number of killed and wounded. About twenty regulars have escaped out of the fort, some badly wounded. Lieutenant Peck, 24th regiment, is killed, and it is said three others. You will perceive, sir, by the enclosed general orders, that I apprehended an attack, and made the necessary arrangements to meet it, but have reason to believe, from information received by those who have made their escape, that the commandant did not in any respect comply with these orders.

On the same morning a detachment of militia, under major Bennet, stationed at Lewiston Heights, was attacked by a party of savages: but the major and his little corps, by making a desperate charge, effected their retreat after being surrounded by several hundred, with the loss of six or eight, who doubtless were killed; among whom were two sons of captain Jones, Indian interpreter. The villages of Youngstown, Lewiston, Manchester, and the Indian Tuscarora village, were reduced to ashes, and the inoffensive inhabitants who could not escape, were, without regard to age or sex, *inhumanly butchered* by savages headed by BRITISH officers *painted*. A British officer who is taken prisoner avows that many small children were murdered by their Indians. Major Mallory, who was stationed at Schlosser, with about forty Canadian volunteers, advanced to Lewiston Heights, and compelled the advanced guard of the enemy to fall back to the foot of the mountain. The major is a meritorious officer; he fought the enemy two days, and contended every inch of ground to the Tonawanta creek. In these actions lieutenant Lowe of the 23d regiment United States army, and eight of the Canadian volunteers were killed. I had myself, three days previous to the attack on the Niagara, left it with a view of providing for the defence of this place, Black Rock, and the other villages on this frontier. I came here without troops, and have called out the militia of Genesee, Niagara, and Chataugay counties *en masse*.

This place was then thought to be in most imminent danger, as well as the shipping, but I have no doubt is now perfectly secure. Volunteers are coming in, in great numbers; they are, however, a species of troops that cannot be expected to continue in service for a long time. In a few days one thousand detached militia, lately drafted, will be on.

I have the honour to be, &c.

GEORGE M'CLURE,
Brigadier general commanding.

Honourable John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

HEAD QUARTERS, NIAGARA FRONTIER,
December 30th, 1813.

SIR,

I have only time to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant, and to add that this frontier is wholly desolate. The British crossed over, supported by a strong party of Indians, at a little before daylight this morning, near Black Rock. They were met by the militia under my command with spirit; but overpowered by numbers and discipline of the enemy, the militia gave way and fled on every side; every attempt to rally them was ineffectual. The enemy's purpose was obtained, and the flourishing village of BUFFALO LAID IN RUINS. The Niagara prospect of uniting our forces, of driving the enemy from Bur-

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this line should be at foot of page 290.

frontier now lies open and naked to our enemies. Your judgment will direct you what is most proper in this emergency. I am exhausted with fatigue and must defer particulars till to-morrow. Many valuable lives are lost.

I have the honour to be, &c.

A. HALL, *Major general.*

Governor Tompkins.

GENERAL M'CLURE TO THE PUBLIC.

GENESEE, NEW YORK, January 1st, 1814.

The late descent of the enemy on our frontier, and the horrid outrages committed on our defenceless inhabitants by the British allies, being laid to my misconduct as commanding officer of the American forces on the frontier, and although my conduct has been approved by the Secretary of War, the commander in chief of this state, and by general Harrison, before his departure, still I deem it a duty which I owe to my own reputation, in order to put a stop to the evil reports which are propagated against me, without knowing my orders, or the means which I had in my power to execute them, to give a brief statement of my most prominent acts since I have had the honour of so important a command. On my arrival at Fort George, and previous to the departure of general Wilkinson with his army from that post, I suggested to the general the necessity of marching out against the enemy at Cross Roads and Four Mile Creek; that his army, with the addition of my militia, were sufficient to take or destroy all the British forces in that neighbourhood, which would leave nothing more for the militia to do than to protect and keep in order the inhabitants of that part of the province, as otherwise our frontier would be liable to be invaded. This proposition, however, was not agreed to, as the general's instructions were of a different nature. The general left with me colonel Scott and 800 regulars, who were to remain until I considered my force sufficient to hold the fort without them, when they were to march to Sackett's Harbour.

About the 12th of October, the British army commenced their retreat towards the head of the lake. I issued orders for my militia to pursue, which was promptly obeyed. We advanced as far as the Twelve Mile Creek, and within a short distance of the enemy's rear guard, when colonel Scott sent an express, requesting me to return, and said that he would abandon the fort next day, and march with his troops for Sackett's Harbour; and at the same time detained my provisions and ammunition wagons, which compelled me to abandon the further pursuit of the enemy, and induced them to make a stand on the heights of Burlington. I was then left with about 1000 effective militia in Fort George, and 250 Indians, a force not more than sufficient to garrison the post. On the arrival of general Harrison's army, I was elated with the

ington, taking possession of that post, and giving peace to the Upper Province and our frontier. We were prepared to march in 24 hours, when the arrival of commodore Chauncey with orders for that excellent officer, general Harrison, to repair immediately with his army to Sackett's Harbour, frustrated it. I remonstrated against his going off, as will be seen in a correspondence between the general and myself; but in vain. By this movement all my expectations were blasted, and I foresaw the consequences, unless a reinforcement was immediately sent on to supply the place of the drafted militia whose term of service would shortly expire. I considered my force, which had become ungovernable, as then insufficient to go against the enemy. The object of the last expedition to the Twenty Mile Creek, is fully explained in the general order which I issued on my return. For six weeks before the militia were discharged, I wrote, and continued writing, to the Secretary of War, the necessity of sending on a detachment of militia or regular troops; that I found it impossible to retain the militia in service one day beyond their term; I also stated, from the best information, the enemy's forces. I offered a bounty of two dollars per month, for one or two months, but without effect. Some few of colonel Bloom's regiment took the bounty, and *immediately disappeared*, and I was compelled to grant a discharge to the militia and volunteers, which left me about 60 effective regulars of the 24th United States infantry, under captain Rogers, to garrison Fort George. I summoned a council of the officers, and put the question—"Is the fort tenable with the present number of men?" They unanimously gave it as their opinion, that it would be madness in the extreme to pretend to hold it, and recommended its evacuation immediately, as the enemy's advance was then within eight miles. I accordingly gave orders for all the arms, ammunition and public stores, of every description, to be sent across the river, which was principally effected (though the enemy advanced so rapidly that ten of my men were made prisoners) and ordered the town of Newark to be burnt. This act, however distressing to the inhabitants and my feelings, was by order of the Secretary of War, and I believe at the same time proper. The inhabitants had twelve hours notice to remove their effects, and such as chose to come across the river were provided with all the necessaries of life. I left captain Leonard in the command of Fort Niagara, with about 160 effective regulars, and pointed out verbally, and particularly in a general order, how he should prepare for an attack, which would certainly take place. I stationed colonel Grieves's artillerists, consisting of about twenty men, with two pieces of artillery, at Lewiston, under the command of major Bennet, and made them a present of 400 dollars for volunteering their services three weeks; but before that place was attacked they *nearly all deserted*, except the officers, who bravely defended themselves, and cut their way through the savages. The Canadian volunteers,

about 40 in number, under major Mallory, an officer of great merit, I stationed at Schlosser, and went myself to Buffalo to provide for the safety of that place, and Black Rock, which I trust is out of danger, having called out the militia of Niagara *en masse*.

The public are now in possession of some of the leading facts which have governed my conduct in the discharge of the trust assigned me, and I appeal to the candour of every dispassionate man to determine with what justice my feelings as a citizen, and pride as a soldier, have been wounded, and my character aspersed. If insubordination to the orders of superiors are justifiable, I may have failed in my defence. If to have suppressed the risings of mutiny is reprehensible, then also am I not justified. If to have enforced the disciplinary laws of a camp is a proceeding unwarranted, then have I been in error. But, fellow citizens, I do not think so meanly of you as to credit the monstrous supposition, that you will deliberately advocate such strange hypothesis. Your prejudices against me have been the result of feelings misled by the acts of my enemies, and not the result of your sober judgment, operating upon facts and principles. Those facts are now before you. On those facts judge me in your candour, and I will abide your decision.

GEORGE MCCLURE.

Captain Shaler, of the privateer governor Tompkins, to his agents in New York, dated

AT SEA, January 1st, 1814.

Two days after despatching the Nereid I took a whaler, from London, bound for the South seas; but she being of no value I took out such stores, &c. as I could stow; and being much lumbered with prisoners and baggage, I put them on board and ordered her for Falmouth.

The chasing this ship had taken me some distance off my ground, and, owing to calms, I could not regain it until the 25th ultimo, when at sun-rise three sail were discovered ahead, and we made sail in chase. The wind being light, we came slowly up with them. On a nearer approach they proved to be two ships and a brig. One of the ships had all the appearance of a large transport; and from their manœuvres, they appeared to have concerted measures for a mutual defence; and the large ship appeared prepared to take the bulk of an action. Boats were seen passing to and from her; she had boarding nettings almost up to her tops; she also had her topmast studding sail booms out, with the sails at their ends, ready for a running fight. Her ports appeared to be pointed, and she had something on deck resembling a merchantman's boat; and, after all, what the deuce do you think she was? Why have a little patience and I will tell you.

At 3 P. M. a sudden squall struck us from the northward, and the ship not yet having received it, before I could get in our lights, and almost before I could turn round, I was under the guns, of a transport, but of a LARGE FRIGATE, and not more than a third of a mile from her. I immediately hauled down English colors, which I previously had up, set three American ensigns, trimmed our sails by the wind, and commenced a brisk fire from our little battery; but this was returned with woeful effect. Her first broad side killed two men, and wounded six others, two of whom severely, one since dead. It also blew up one of my salt boxes, with two nine pound cartridges. This communicated fire to a number of pistols, and three tube boxes that were lying on the companion way; all of which exploded, and one of the tubes penetrated through a small crevice under the companion leaf, and found their way to the cabin floor; but that being wet, and the fire screen broken up, no further accident took place.

This, together with the tremendous fire from the frigate, I assisted you, made warm work on the Tompkins's quarter deck; but thanks to her heels, and the exertions of my brave officers and crew, I have still the command of her. When she opened her fire upon me, it was about half past three. I was then a little off her beam. To have attempted to tack, in a hard squall, would at least have exposed me to a raking fire; and to have attempted it and miss would have been attended with the inevitable loss of the schooner. I therefore thought it most prudent to make her fire on the tack on which I was; and this I was obliged to from the position which I have mentioned until I passed her bow; she all the while standing on with me, and almost as ourselves; and such a tune as was played round my ears, I assure you, I never wish to hear again in the same key. At 4 her shot began to fall short of us; at half past four, the wind changed away, and the enemy still holding it, his shot again began to reach us; got out sweeps, and turned all hands to. I also drew over all the lumber from the deck, and about 2000 weight of shot from the after hold. From about 5, A. M. all his shot fell short of us. At about 25 minutes after 5, the enemy hove about, and I was glad to get so well clear of one of the most quarrelsome companions that I ever met with. After the first broadside from the frigate, no shot struck the hull of the Tompkins; but the schooner was literally in a foam all around her. The moment before the squall struck us, I told Mr. Farnum that she was too heavy for us, and he went forward with a glass to take another look; when the squall took the schooner as if by magic, and was up with her before we could get in our light sails.

My officers conducted themselves in a way that would have done honour to a more permanent service: Mr. Farnum, first lieutenant, conducted himself with his usual vigor. Mr. Acheson,

sailing master, performed his part in the style of a brave and accomplished seaman. Messrs. Miller and Dodd, second and third lieutenants, were not so immediately under my eye; but the precision and promptitude with which all my orders were executed, is sufficient proof that they are to be relied on. Mr. Thomas, boatswain, and Mr. Caswell, master's mate, were particularly active, and deserve encouragement.

The name of one of my poor fellows, who was killed, ought to be registered on the book of fame, and remembered with reverence as long as bravery is considered a virtue. He was a black man, named *John Johnson*. A 24 pound shot struck him in the hip, and took away all the lower part of his body. In this state the poor brave fellow lay on deck, and several times exclaimed to his shipmates, "*Fire away my boys!—No haul a color down.*" The other was also a black man by the name of *John Davis*, and was struck in much the same way. He fell near me, and several times requested to be thrown overboard, saying, "*He was only in the way of others.*" Whilst America has such tars, she has little to fear from the tyrants of Europe.

From the circumstance of her shot being 24 pounders, (which I assure you is the case, as we have *felt* and *weighed* them) I am of opinion it was the *Laurel*, a new frigate which I had information of. A gentleman whom I took, told me she was in the fleet; that she was built and manned on purpose to cope with our frigates; and that if she got sight of me, she would certainly take me, as she was the fastest sailer he ever saw. Enclosed you have a list of the killed and wounded. In every thing else we are in good order and high spirits.

Yours respectfully,
NATHANIEL SHALER.

Killed 2. Wounded 6; one of whom since dead.

PORT CLAIBORNE, EAST BANK OF ALABAMA,
85 miles above Fort Stoddert, January 1st, 1814.

SIR,

On the 13th ultimo, I marched a detachment from this post with the view of destroying the towns of the inimical Creek Indians on the Alabama, above the mouth of the Cahaba. After having marched about 80 miles, from the best information I could obtain I was within thirty miles of a town, newly erected on ground called Holy, occupied by a large body of the enemy, under the command of Weatherford, the half breed chief, who was one of those who commanded the Indians that destroyed the garrison of Mims, in August last, and who has committed many depredations on the frontier inhabitants. I immediately caused a stockade to be erected for the security of the heavy baggage and sick.

the morning of the 22d the troops resumed their line of march chiefly through woods, without a track to guide them. When near the town, on the morning of the 23d, my disposition for attack was made. The troops advanced in three columns. With the centre column I advanced myself, ordering Lester's guards and Wells's troop of dragoons to act as a corps of reserve. About noon the right column, composed of twelve months' volunteers, commanded by colonel Joseph Carson, came in view of the town called Eccanachaca (or Holy Ground), and was immediately rigorously attacked by the enemy, who were apprized of our approach, and had chosen their field of action.

Before the centre, commanded by lieutenant colonel Russell, with a part of the 3d regiment of United States' infantry and mounted militia riflemen, or the left column, which was composed of militia and a party of Choctaws, under Pushamuttaha, commanded by major Smoot, of militia, who were ordered to charge, could come generally into action, the enemy were repulsed, and were flying in all directions, many of them casting away their arms. Thirty of the enemy were killed, and, judging from every appearance, many were wounded. The loss on our part was one corporal killed, and one ensign, two sergeants, one corporal and two privates wounded.

A pursuit was immediately ordered; but from the nature of the country, nothing was effected. The town was nearly surrounded by swamps and deep ravines, which rendered our approach difficult, and facilitated the escape of the enemy. In the town we found a large quantity of provision and immense property of various kinds, which the enemy, flying precipitately, were obliged to leave behind, and which, together with two hundred houses, were destroyed. They had barely time to remove their women and children across the Alabama, which runs near where the town stood. The next day was occupied in destroying a town, consisting of sixty houses, eight miles higher up the river, and in taking and destroying the enemy's boats. At the town last destroyed was killed three Indians of some distinction. The town first destroyed was built since the commencement of hostilities, and was established as a place of security for the inhabitants of several villages. The leader Weatherford, Francis, and the Choctaw Siquistur's son, who were principal prophets, resided here. Three Shawanese were among the slain.

Colonel Carson, of the volunteers, lieutenant colonel Russell, of the 3d regiment United States' infantry, and major Smoot, of the militia, greatly distinguished themselves. The activity and zeal of the assistant deputy quarter master general, captain Wert, and my brigade major, Kennedy, merit the approbation of government. I was much indebted to my aid-de-camp, lieutenant Calvit, of volunteers, to lieutenant Robeson, of the 3d regiment, and major Galler, of militia, who acted as my aids on that day, for the

promptness and ability with which they performed their several duties. The officers of the different corps behaved handsomely, and are entitled to distinction. Courage animated every countenance, and each vied with the other in rendering service.

I have taken the liberty of communicating to you directly, in consequence of the distant station of the general commanding the district, and also for the purpose of forwarding to you the enclosed original document which was found in the house of Weatherford. It shows particularly the conduct of the Spaniards towards the American government. The third regiment has returned to this place, and volunteers are on the march to mount Vernon, near fort Stoddert, for the purpose of being paid off and discharged, their terms of service having generally expired.

I have the honour to be, &c.

FERD. L. CLAIBORNE,

Brig. Gen. of Volunteers.

Honourable John Armstrong.

CAMP DEFIANCE, 48 MILES WEST OF CHATAHOUCHEE,

January 27th, 1814.

SIR,

I have the honour to acquaint your excellency, that this morning at twenty minutes past five o'clock, a very large body of hostile Indians, made a desperate attack on the army under my command. They stole upon the sentinels, fired upon them, and with great impetuosity rushed upon our lines; in twenty minutes the action became general, and our front, right and left flanks were closely pressed; but the brave and gallant conduct of the field and line officers, and the firmness of the men, repelled them at every point.

The steady firmness and incessant fire of captain Thomas's artillery, and captain Adams's riflemen, preserved our front line: both of these companies suffered greatly. The enemy rushed within fifty yards of the artillery, and captain Broadnax, who commanded one of the picket guards, maintained his post with great bravery until the enemy gained his rear, and then cut his way through them to the army. On this occasion Timpoachie Barnuel, a half-breed, at the head of the Uchies, distinguished himself and contributed to the retreat of the picket guard; the other friendly Indians took refuge within our lines and remained inactive, with the exception of a few who joined our ranks. So soon as it became light enough to distinguish objects, I ordered majors Watson's and Freeman's battalions to wheel up at right angles with majors Booth's and Cleveland's battalions, (who formed right wing,) to prepare for the charge. Captain Duke Hamilton's cavalry (who had reached me but the day before,) was ordered to form in the rear of the right wing to act as circumstances

ould dictate: the order for the charge was promptly obeyed, and the enemy fled in every direction before the bayonet. The signal was given for the charge of the cavalry who pursued, and killed fifteen of the enemy who left thirty-seven dead on the field: from the effusion of blood and the number of head-dresses and ar-dubs found in various directions, their loss must have been considerable, independent of the wounded. I directed the friend-

Indians, with Meriwether's and Ford's rifle companies, accompanied by captain Hamilton's troop, to pursue them through Calie Swamp, where they were trailed by their blood, but succeeded in overtaking but one of their wounded.

Colonel Newman received three balls in the commencement of the action, which deprived me of the services of that gallant and useful officer. The assistant adjutant general Narden, was indistinguishable in the discharge of his duty, and rendered important services: his horse was wounded under him. The whole of the staff was prompt, and discharged their duty with courage and alacrity; their vigilance, the intrepidity of the officers, and the valour of the men, meet my approbation, and deserve the praise of their country. I have to regret the death of many of my brave fellows, who have found honourable graves in the voluntary support of their country. My aid-de-camp, in executing my orders, had his horse killed under him. General Lee and major Pace, who acted as additional aids, rendered me essential service with honour to themselves and usefulness to the cause in which they were embarked. Four wagon and several other horses were killed, and two of the artillery horses wounded. While I deplore the loss sustained on this occasion, I have the consolation to know that the men which I have the honour to command have done their duty. I herewith transmit you a list of the killed and wound.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN FLOYD, *Brigadier General.*

Major general Pinckney.

January 28th, 1814.

SIR,

The patriotism that brought you into the field at your advanced age, which prompted you on with me to face the enemy in the late excursion to the Talapoosie river, the example of order, and your admonition to strict subordination throughout the lines, and, lastly, the bravery you displayed in the battle of Enotochopco, in re-crossing the creek, entering the pursuit, exposing your person, and thereby saving the life of lieutenant Moss, and killing the Indian, entitle you to the thanks of your general and the approbation of your country. Not having it in my power to move forward until the troops from East and West Tennessee arrive, I mean the 1500 ordered for six months' service, under the requisition of the Secretary of War, and the late order of general

Pinckney, with colonel Williams's regiment, and such other auxiliary troops, as may be permitted by the orders of the governor of the state) I have to request that you will forthwith repair to East Tennessee, and use your best exertions in hurrying those troops to this point at the earliest possible day. The character of the state, by the retrograde of the troops, and the failure having in the field such troops as were required by the Secretary of War, had like to have been tarnished. The public service has been much retarded thereby and much injured, and the public expense much enhanced. It is alone from the exertions of men of influence, that those evils can be cured, the public service promoted, and the objects of the campaign brought to a speedy and successful issue, whereby the high standing of the patriotism of the state of Tennessee may be regained, which had like to have been buried by the conduct of miscreants whose sole object is popular views and self aggrandizement. You have been with me—you have been a faithful observer of the passing scenes, and do know that these *would be patriots*, these *town meeting boasters*, these men who will not act themselves, but find fault with every thing, have been *destroying the true interests of their country*, the cause we are engaged in, and every thing valuable to freemen to insure the cause of our country, when it came in contact with their own *individual views*, and their own *private aggrandizement*. The eyes of the faithful and experienced patriot, one whose country's good it has in common with his fellow-citizens, has seen and felt these growing evils. You are one amongst this number, in whose exertions I have confidence, and in whose patriotism I rely, and who has experience, and sees things as they really exist, and will, with the true patriotism of an American, aid the present campaign to a speedy and successful issue. I therefore repeat, that I wish you to repair to East Tennessee and use your utmost in sending on the troops and sufficient supplies of provisions with them, with which that country abundantly abounds, and which have from some unknown and strange cause been withheld from me. Your experience and patriotism are a sure pledge to me that your best exertions will be used to promote the present campaign.

Receive, sir, my best wishes, and believe me to be respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON, *Maj. Gen. Comd.*

Colonel William Cocke.

HEAD QUARTERS FORT STROTHER, January 29th, 1864.

SIR,

I had the honour of informing you in a letter of the 31st inst. forwarded by Mr. McCandless (express) of an excursion I contemplated making still further in the enemy's country with the new

volunteers from Tennessee. I had ordered those troops to form a junction with me on the 10th instant, but they did not arrive until the 14th. Their number, including officers, was about 800; and on the 15th, I marched them across the river to graze their horses. On the next day I followed with the remainder of my force, consisting of the artillery company with one six-pounder, one company of infantry of 48 men, two companies of spies, commanded by captains Gordon and Russell, of about 30 men each, and a company of volunteer officers, headed by general Coffee, who had been abandoned by his men, and who still remained in the field awaiting the order of the government; making my force, exclusive of Indians, 930.

The motives which induced me to penetrate still further into the enemy's country, with this force, were many and urgent. The term of service of the new raised volunteers was short, and a considerable part of it was expired; they were expensive to the government, and were full of ardor to meet the enemy. The ill effects of keeping soldiers of this description long stationary and idle, I had been made to feel but too sensibly already: other causes concurred to make such a movement not only justifiable but absolutely necessary. I had received a letter from captain M^cAlpin, of the 5th instant, who commanded at Fort Armstrong, in the absence of colonel Snodgrass, informing me that 14 or 15 towns of the enemy, situated on the waters of the Talapoosie, were about uniting their forces, and attacking that place, which had been left in a very feeble state of defence. You had in your letter of the 24th ult. informed me that general Floyd was about to make a movement to the Talapoosie, near its junction with the Coossee; and in the same letter had recommended temporary excursions against such of the enemy's towns or settlements as might be within striking distance, as well to prevent my men from becoming discontented as to harass the enemy. Your ideas corresponded exactly with my own, and I was happy in the opportunity of keeping my men engaged distressing the enemy, and at the same time making a diversion to facilitate the operations of general Floyd.

Determined by these and other considerations, I took up the line of march on the 17th instant, and on the night of the 18th encamped at Talledega Fort, where I was joined by between two and three hundred friendly Indians; sixty-five of which were Cherokees, the balance Creeks. Here I received your letter of the 9th instant, stating that general Floyd was expected to make a movement from Cowetau the next day, and that in ten days thereafter he would establish a firm position at Tuckabachee; and also a letter from colonel Snodgrass, who had returned to Fort Armstrong, informing me that an attack was intended to be soon made on that fort, by 900 of the enemy. If I could have hesitated before, I could now hesitate no longer. I resolved to lose no time in meeting this force, which was understood to have been collect-

ed from New Yorcau, Oakfuskee, and Ufauley towns, and were concentrated in a bend of the Talapoosie, near the mouth of a creek called Emuckfau, and on an island below New Yorcau.

On the morning of the 20th, your letter of the 10th instant, forwarded by M'Candless, reached me at the Hillibee Creek, and that night I encamped at Enotochopco, a small Hillibee village about twelve miles from Emuckfau. Here I began to perceive very plainly how little knowledge my spies had of the country, of the situation of the enemy, or of the distance I was from them. The insubordination of the new troops, and the want of skill in most of their officers, also became more and more apparent. But their ardor to meet the enemy was not diminished; and I had a sure reliance upon the guards, and the company of old volunteer officers, and upon the spies, in all about 125. My wishes and my duty remained united, and I was determined to effect, if possible, the objects for which the excursion had been principally undertaken.

On the morning of the 21st, I marched from Enotochapco as direct as I could for the bend of the Talapoosie, and about two o'clock P. M. my spies having discovered two of the enemy, endeavored to overtake them, but failed. In the evening I fell in upon a large trail, which led to a new road, much beaten and lately travelled. Knowing that I must have arrived within the neighbourhood of a strong force, and it being late in the day, I determined to encamp, and reconnoitre the country in the night. I chose the best site the country would admit, encamped in a hollow square, sent out my spies and pickets, doubled my sentinels, and made the necessary arrangements before dark, for a night attack. About ten o'clock at night, one of the pickets fired at three of the enemy, and killed one, but he was not found until the next day. At 11 o'clock the spies whom I had sent out returned with information, that there was a large encampment of Indians at the distance of about three miles, who from their whooping and dancing seemed to be apprised of our approach. One of these spies, an Indian in whom I had great confidence, assured me that they were carrying off their women and children, and that the warriors would either make their escape or attack me before day. Being prepared at all points, nothing remained to be done but to await their approach, if they meditated an attack, or to be in readiness, if they did not, to pursue and attack them at day-light. While we were in this state of readiness, the enemy, about six o'clock in the morning, commenced a vigorous attack on my left flank, which was vigorously met: the action continued to rage on my left flank, and on the left of my rear for about half an hour. The brave general Coffee, with colonel Sitler, the adjutant general, and colonel Carroll, the inspector general, the moment the firing commenced, mounted their horses and repaired to the line, encouraging and animating the men to the performance of their duty. So soon as it became light enough to pursue, the left wing

having sustained the heat of the action, and being somewhat weakened, was reinforced by captain Ferrill's company of infantry, and was ordered and led on to the charge by general Coffee, who was well supported by colonel Higgins and the inspector general, and by all the officers and privates who composed that line. The enemy was completely routed at every point, and the friendly Indians joining in the pursuit, they were chased about two miles with considerable slaughter.

The chase being over, I immediately detached general Coffee with 400 men and all the Indian force to burn their encampment; but it was said by some to be fortified. I ordered him in that event not to attack it, until the artillery could be sent forward to reduce it. On viewing the encampment and its strength, the general thought it most prudent to return to my encampment and guard the artillery thither. The wisdom of this step was soon discovered; in half an hour after his return to camp, a considerable portion of the enemy made its appearance on my right flank, and commenced a brisk fire on a party of men who had been on picket guard the night before, and were then in search of the Indians they had fired upon, some of whom they believe have been killed. General Coffee immediately requested me to let him take 200 men and turn their left flank, which I accordingly ordered; but through some mistake, which I did not then observe, not more than 54 followed him, among whom were the old volunteer officers. With these, however, he immediately commenced an attack on the left flank of the enemy; at which time I ordered 200 of the friendly Indians to fall in upon the right flank of the enemy and co-operate with the general. This order was promptly obeyed, and in the moment of its execution, what I expected was realized. The enemy had intended the attack on the right as a feint, and, expecting to divert all my attention thither, meant to attack me again with their main force on the left flank, which they had hoped to find weakened and in disorder.—They were disappointed. I had ordered the left flank to remain firm to its place, and the moment the alarm gun was heard in that quarter, I repaired thither, and ordered captain Ferrill, part of my reserve, to support it. The whole line met the approach of the enemy with astonishing intrepidity, and having given a few fires, they forthwith charged with great vigor. The effect was immediate and inevitable. The enemy fled with precipitation, and were pursued to a considerable distance by the left flank and the friendly Indians, with a galling and destructive fire. Colonel Carroll, who ordered the charge, led on the pursuit, and colonel Higgins and his regiment again distinguished themselves.

In the mean time general Coffee was contending with a superior force of the enemy. The Indians, who I had ordered to his support, and who had set out for this purpose, hearing the fire on the left, had returned to that quarter, and when the enemy were routed there, entered into the chase. That being now over, I

forthwith ordered Jim Fife, who was one of the principal commanders of the friendly Creeks, with 100 of his warriors, to execute my first order. As soon as he reached general Coffee, the charge was made and the enemy routed: they were pursued about three miles, and 45 of them slain, who were found. General Coffee was wounded in the body, and his aid-de-camp, A. Donaldson, killed, together with three others. Having brought in and buried the dead, and dressed the wounded, I ordered my camp to be fortified, to be the better prepared to repel any attack which might be made in the night; determined to commence a return march to Fort Strother the following day.

Many causes concurred to make such a measure necessary, as I had not set out prepared, or with a view to make a permanent establishment. I considered it worse than useless to advance and destroy an empty encampment. I had, indeed, hoped to have met the enemy there, but having met and beaten them a little sooner, I did not think it necessary or prudent to proceed any further: not necessary, because I had accomplished all I could expect to effect by marching to their encampment; and because, if it was proper to contend with and weaken their forces still further, this object would be more certainly attained by commencing a return, which, having to them the appearance of a retreat, would inspire them to pursue me. Not prudent, because of the number of my wounded, of the reinforcements from below which the enemy might be expected to receive; of the starving condition of my horses, they having had neither corn nor cane for two days and nights; of the scarcity of supplies for my men, the Indians who met me at Talladega, having drawn none, and being wholly destitute; and because, if the enemy pursued me, as it was likely they would, the diversion in favour of general Floyd would be the more complete and effectual. Influenced by these considerations I commenced my return march at half past ten, on the 23d, and was fortunate enough to reach Enotochopco before night, having passed without interruption a dangerous defile, occasioned by a hurricane. I again fortified my camp, and having another defile to pass in the morning, across a deep creek, and between two hills, which I had viewed with attention as I passed on, and where I expected I might be attacked, I determined to pass it at another point, and gave directions to my guide and fatigue men accordingly. My expectation of an attack in the morning was increased by the signs of the night, and with it my caution. Before I moved the wounded from the interior of my camp, I had my front and rear guards formed, as well as my right and left columns, and moved off my centre in regular order, leading down a handsome ridge to Enotochopco creek, at a point where it was clear of reed, except immediately on its margin. I had previously issued a general order, pointing out the manner in which the men should be formed in the event of an attack on the front or rear;

or on the flanks, and had particularly cautioned the officers to halt and form accordingly, the instant the word should be given.

The front guard had crossed with part of the flank columns, the wounded were over, and the artillery in the act of entering the creek, when an alarm gun was heard in the rear. I heard it without surprise, and even with pleasure; calculating with the utmost confidence on the firmness of my troops, from the manner in which I had seen them act on the 22d. I had placed colonel Carroll at the head of the centre column of the rear guard; its right column was commanded by colonel Perkins, and its left by colonel Stump. Having chosen the ground, I expected there to have entirely cut off the enemy by wheeling the right and left columns on their pivot, re-crossing the creek above and below, and falling in upon their flanks and rear. But to my astonishment and mortification, when the word was given by colonel Carroll to halt and form, and a few guns had been fired, I beheld the right and left columns of the rear guard precipitately give way. This shameful retreat was disastrous in the extreme; it drew along with it the greatest part of the centre column, leaving not more than 25 men, who being formed by colonel Carroll, maintained their ground as long as it was possible to maintain it, and it brought consternation and confusion into the centre of the army, a consternation which was not easily removed, and a confusion which could not soon be restored to order. There was then left to repulse the enemy, the few who remained of the rear guard, the artillery company and captain Russell's company of spies. They, however, realized and exceeded my highest expectations. Lieutenant Armstrong, who commanded the artillery company in the absence of captain Deadrick (confined by sickness), ordered them to form and advanced to the top of the hill, whilst he and a few others dragged up the six pounder. Never was more bravery displayed than on this occasion. Amidst the most galling fire from the enemy, more than ten times their number, they ascended the hill and maintained their position, until their piece was hauled up, when, having levelled it, they poured upon the enemy a fire of grape, re-loaded and fired again, charged and repulsed them.

The most deliberate bravery was displayed by Constantine Perkins and Craven Jackson of the artillery, acting as gunners. In the hurry of the moment in separating the gun from the limbers, the rammer and picker of the cannon were left tied to the limber: no sooner was this discovered, than Jackson, amidst the galling fire of the enemy, pulled out the ramrod of his musket, and used it as a picker; primed with a cartridge and fired the cannon. Perkins having pulled off his bayonet, used his musket as a rammer, drove down the cartridge; and Jackson, using his former plan, again discharged her. The brave lieutenant Armstrong, just after the first fire of the cannon, with captain Hamilton, of East Tennessee, Bradford and McGavock, all fell, the lieutenant exclaiming as he lay, "*my brave fellows, some of you*

may fall, but you must save the cannon." About this time, a number crossed the creek and entered into the chase. The brave captain Gordon of the spies, who rushed from the front, endeavored to turn the left flank of the enemy, in which he partially succeeded, and colonel Carroll, colonel Higgins and captains Elliot and Pipkins pursued the enemy for more than two miles, who fled in consternation, throwing away their packs, and leaving twenty-six of their warriors dead on the field. This last defeat was decisive, and we were no more disturbed by their yells. I should do injustice to my feelings if I omitted to mention that the venerable judge Cocke, at the age of sixty-five, entered into the engagement, continued the pursuit of the enemy with youthful ardor, and saved the life of a fellow soldier by killing his savage antagonist.

Our loss in this affair was killed and wounded; among the former was the brave captain Hamilton, of East Tennessee, who had, with his aged father and two others of his company, after the period of his engagement had expired, volunteered his services for this excursion, and attached himself to the artillery company. No man ever fought more bravely or fell more gloriously; and by his side fell with equal bravery and glory, Bird Evans of the same company. Captain Quarles, who commanded the centre column of the rear guard, preferring death to abandoning his post, having taken a firm stand in which he was followed by twenty-five of his men, received a wound in his head of which he has since died.

In these several engagements our loss was twenty killed and seventy-five wounded, four of whom have since died. The loss of the enemy cannot be accurately ascertained; one hundred and eighty-nine of their warriors were found dead; but this must fall considerably short of the number really killed. Their wounded can only be guessed at.

Had it not been for the unfortunate retreat of the rear guard in the affair of the 24th instant, I think I could safely have said that no army of militia ever acted with more cool and deliberate bravery. Undisciplined and inexperienced as they were, their conduct in the several engagements of the 22d could not have been surpassed by regulars. No men ever met the approach of an enemy with more intrepidity, or repulsed them with more energy. On the 24th, after the retreat of the rear guard, they seemed to have lost all collectedness, and were more difficult to be restored to order than any troops I had ever seen. But this was no doubt owing in a great measure, or altogether, to that very retreat, and ought rather to be ascribed to the want of conduct in many of their officers than to any cowardice in the men, who on every occasion have manifested a willingness to perform their duty so far as they knew it.

All the effects which were designed to be produced by this excursion, it is believed have been produced. If an attack was

meditated against fort Armstrong, that has been prevented. If general Floyd is operating on the east side of the Talapoosie, as I suppose him to be, a most fortunate diversion has been made in his favour. The number of the enemy has been diminished, and the confidence they may have derived from the delays I have been made to experience, has been destroyed. Discontent has been kept out of my army, while the troops who have been exposed to it, have been beneficially employed. The enemy's country has been explored, and a road cut to the point where they will be concentrated when they shall be driven from the country below. But, in a report of this kind, and to you who will immediately perceive them, it is not necessary to state the happy consequences which may be expected to result from this excursion. Unless I am greatly mistaken, it will be found to have hastened the termination of the Creek war, more effectually than any measure I could have taken with the troops under my command.

I am, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON,

Maj. Gen. Tennessee Volunteers.

Major general Thomas Pinckney.

CHARLESTON, January 31st, 1814.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that yesterday morning, about 4 o'clock, I received information express from Stono, that the United States' schooner Alligator had been the evening before chased in by an enemy's squadron, and attacked in the night by a detachment of boats. I immediately repaired to the place, and ordered two barges round, and a detachment of seamen overland, from the Nonsuch, to her assistance. About 8 A. M. I got on board the Alligator, then some distance up the river. I received the following information from sailing master Bassett, her commander; that he sailed on Saturday morning from the river of North Edisto, for Charleston. Soon after leaving the bar, discovered an enemy's squadron, consisting of a frigate, a heavy brig, and a hermaphrodite, which gave chase to him—wind light from the south-west; he found that the frigate would cut him off from Charleston, and in the evening run into the river and hove to; the enemy then close off the bar; and from their manouvres was of opinion they intended to send in their boats. He stood up the river about two miles, and anchored, prepared for action. About a quarter before 8 P. M. the moon very bright, discovered six of the enemy's boats shove off from under the marsh abreast him, and within pistol shot (having under cover of the marsh, with muffled oars, approached this near without discovery), he immediately gave them a broadside, which was returned;

cut his cable and made sail, when the action continued for 30 minutes, close on board ; soon after making way, the pilot was unfortunately mortally wounded, and the schooner grounded ; at this time their 2 largest barges were disabled, and about musket shot distance astern, when they retreated and have not since been seen. The Alligator's rigging and sails, from the topsail yard down, are literally cut to pieces, and but few shot in her hull, two men killed and two wounded, one severely, and the pilot (Mr. Hatch, a very respectable master of a vessel in this port, having a large family depending entirely on his exertions for support) mortally wounded. Great credit is due to sailing master Bassett, his officers and crew, for defeating a force so greatly superior in numbers, as there could not have been less than 140 men opposed to forty. The enemy, by the information received from the inhabitants immediately on the river, must have suffered severely, as there was great confusion on board them while retreating, and the largest boat appeared to be so much injured as to require the assistance of the others. I left the schooner last night in Wappoo Cut, and she will be here as soon as the weather will permit. When I receive Mr. Bassett's official report, I shall do myself the honour to forward it, for your further information.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. H. DENT.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

Extracts of letters from general Floyd to general Pinckney.

CAMP NEAR FORT HALL, February 2d, 1814.

"SIR,

"I arrived with the army at this place yesterday. I apprised you in my last of the necessity of falling back. The arrival of twelve wagons in the evening, the prospect of reinforcements, and the handsome terms in which you have been pleased to approbate the conduct of the army in the late affair with the enemy, I flatter myself will contribute to the accomplishment of my labors to preserve the honour and reputation of the army. I now entertain a gleam of hope that things will end well. No means on my part have or will be neglected to effect so desirable an object. Reasoning, seasoned with threats of the consequences, and the direful effects which followed the improper conduct of the New York militia, have been represented in strong terms ; nor have I omitted to remind them of their pledges to the government to brave dangers, encounter toil and endure privation—to risk life and fortune in support of the common cause. You may rest assured that I shall employ all the means in my power to promote the public interest.

Since my report of the battle of the 27th, I am well assured, that seven of the enemy's slain have been found in one grave in Olabee swamp, and five others in an adjacent one. Accept acknowledgments for the terms in which you have been pleased to appraise my conduct—my endeavours to continue to it it will be unremitting."

"February 3d, 1814.

I am informed that the enemy are in possession of our works Camp Defiance, on their way to attack us, which in all probability they will attempt to night. We are well prepared, and I give a good account of them, if they attempt the execution of their designs, I this morning sent off the most of our wounded and sick."

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT STROTHER, February 17th, 1814.

Your two letters of the 8th and 14th instant, have been received but from the continued hurry of business with which I am surrounded, I have not had time to answer them until now. The importance of the service you have rendered, and the interest you have taken in forwarding my views and the objects of the campaign, command my sincere thanks. I hope I will continue to aid in procuring the means and transporting supplies to this place: the active exertions of a patriot of *sixty years of age, will certainly stimulate the youthful soldier in his duty*; such examples have become necessary; *I find those who talk most of war and make the greatest bustle about our in-d rights at home, are the last to step forward in vindication of the rights.* Patriotism is an appendage which such men wear as a coquette does a fine ribband, merely for show, and to be laid aside or applied as necessity may require.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON,

Major general commanding.

Wm. Cocke.

UNITED STATES FRIGATE PRESIDENT,
SANDY HOOK BAY, February 19th, 1814.

I have to acquaint you that I arrived at my present anchorage last evening at 5 o'clock, after a cruise of seventy-five days, and now have the honour to detail to you the particulars in pursuance to your directions, I sailed from Providence the 12th of December; and although I expected to have run the gauntlet

through the enemy's squadron, that was reported to be cruising between Block Island and Gayhead for the purpose of intercepting the President, I had the good luck to avoid them. The day after leaving Providence, I re-captured the American schooner Comet, of, and bound to, New York, with a cargo of cotton from Savannah, which had been captured by the *Ramilies* and *Loire*, and in their possession about 48 hours. In a few hours after recapturing the Comet, a sail was discovered to the eastward, which I felt inclined to avoid, from the circumstance of the weather being hazy, and knowing that I was in the neighbourhood of an enemy's squadron. From an advantage of wind, she was enabled, however to gain our lee beam at a distance of three or four miles, owing to which I was induced to shorten sail, with the intention of offering her battle in the morning, should nothing else be in sight, and she not be a ship of the line. The weather becoming more obscure at 2 o'clock, prevented our seeing her until day-light, when she stood from us to the north east, although the President was hove to, to let her come up. From this date until the 25th, we did not see a single sail, except the *Recovery* (a brig belonging and bound to Penobscot, from St. Bartholomew, in ballast) until after reaching the longitude of 35, and latitude 19, being carried that far eastward by a severe S. W. gale, accompanied by such a heavy sea, as to render heaving to impracticable without infinite risk, when two large sail were discovered standing to the northward, and to which I gave chase, believing, as well from the situation in which they were first discovered, as the manifest disposition they afterwards showed to avoid a separation, that one was a frigate and the other an Indiaman under her convoy; in this I was mistaken, for on a nearer approach I could discover the headmost was a frigate with seven ports abaft her gangway, and the other a ship of equal or little inferior force. On discovering their decided superiority, and supposing them to be enemy's ships, I endeavored, during the succeeding night, to separate them by steering different courses, and occasionally shewing a light, but was unable to succeed, for the headmost was at one time so near that she fired a shot over us, whilst her consort was but a few hundred yards astern of her. I now directed our course to be altered, made sail, and continued the remainder of the night to shew them light occasionally, but to no effect, as at day-light they were discovered to be in a situation to unite their force. After this I shaped a course to reach a position to windward of Barbadoes, on a parallel of longitude with Cayenne, and did not meet another vessel till the 30th, when falling in with a Portuguese brig, and receiving information that she had been boarded 36 hours before by two British store ships, bound to the West Indies with 300 troops on board, I crowded sail to the westward in the hope of overtaking them; in this I was again disappointed, and after a pursuit of four days, hauled further southward to gain the latitude of Barbadoes; and in that situation, on the 5th of

January captured the British merchant ship *Wanderer*, of 7 guns and 16 men, from London bound to Jamaica, partly loaded with plantation stores, and after taking from her such light articles as were of most value, sunk her. In the same position, on the 7th, I fell in with the British merchant ship *Prince George*, in the character of a cartel with prisoners, which, with 4 other British vessels, had been captured by two French 44 gun frigates, the *Medusa* and *Nymph*, the same ships I had fallen in with 14 days before. On board of the *Prince George* I sent the prisoners captured in the *Wanderer* to Barbadoes, on parole. On the 9th of January, while still to windward of Barbadoes, I captured the ship *Edward*, of 6 guns and 8 men, from London bound to Lagaira, in ballast—which vessel I also sunk. Having learned from the master of the *Edward* as well as the *Wanderer* and *Prince George*, that they had been separated in the Bay of Biscay from their convoy, consisting of the *Queen* 74, two frigates, and two sloops of war, I was induced, owing to a belief that the convoy was still to the eastward, to remain to windward of Barbadoes until the 16th January, when finding they must have passed, I changed my ground and ran off Cayenne, and from thence down the coast of Surinam, Berbice and Demarara, though between Tobago and Grenada, thence through the Caribbean sea, along the southeast side of Porto Rico, through the Mona passage, down the north side of Jamaica, and other leeward islands, without meeting a single vessel of the enemy, or any other than four Spanish droppers and one Swedish ship, until I got near the Manilla reef; near which, after capturing and sinking the British schooner *Jonathan*, loaded with rum and dry goods (the most valuable part of which I took on board) I hauled over for the Florida shore and struck soundings off St. Augustine, and from thence run on soundings as far as Charleston, passing within 4 or 5 miles of Columbia island, and as near to Savannah as the weather and depth of water would allow, without meeting a single vessel except a Spanish ship from the Havanna bound to Spain, but steering for Savannah in consequence of having sprung a leak.

Arriving off Charleston, (which was on the 11th instant,) I stretched close in with the Bar, and made the private signal of the day to two schooners lying in Rebellion Roads, and which, from their appearance, I believed to be public vessels. After remaining all day off the Bar, with colours hoisted, and the before-mentioned signal displayed, without being able to communicate with the schooners, I stood to the northward, and at seven o'clock the next morning, discovered and chased a ship to the southward, which, after pursuing eight or nine miles, led me to a second sail, (a brig under her topsails, with her top-gallant masts hoisted, and her flying gib-boom rigged in), and from thence to the discovery of a third sail, represented from the mast-head to be a large frigate; on discovering the third sail, added to the manœuvres of the first and second, I was induced to believe them part of an ene-

my's squadron, and accordingly hauled up and stood for the former to ascertain her character; and after making her from the deck perceived she was a frigate as reported. I now shortened sail believing that towards night I might be able to cut off the ship (which was either a small frigate or large sloop of war,) and bring from the third or largest sail, at this time nine or ten miles windward; in this, however, I was not able to effect my purpose, owing to the weather-sail (between sun-set and dark) bearing down for the others. Judging now from their manœuvres, that after dark they would chase, I stood to the eastward, under short sail; believing that in the morning I might find them in some disorder; at day-light, however, owing to the haziness of the weather, they were not to be seen; consequently, I wore and stood back to the westward to make them again, and in a few minutes discovered two, one on the lee, the other on the weather bow, to which I gave chase, but after chasing them about half an hour, the weather becoming more clear, and two large ships suddenly making their appearance, one on the weather and the other on the lee beam, I changed my course to the eastward, when the four immediately crowded sail in pursuit; but owing to the weather, assisted by the enemy's manner of chasing, I was enabled to get clear of them without difficulty in a few hours. From this I pursued a course on soundings (except in doubling Cape Hatteras) to eighteen fathom water off the Delaware, where, in a fog, I fell in with a large vessel apparently a man of war. Shortened sail to topsails and cleared ship for action, but she suddenly disappearing, and in a few minutes she, or some other vessel near, being heard to fire signal guns, I stood on to the northward, from a belief I was near another squadron. From the Delaware I saw nothing until I made Sandy Hook, when I again fell in with another of the enemy's squadrons, and by some unaccountable cause was permitted to enter the bay, although in the presence of a decidedly superior force, after having been obliged to remain outside seven hours and a half waiting for the tide.

I am, &c.

JOHN RODGERS.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

BRITISH VERACITY.

Surgeon Amos A. Evans to the Public.

BOSTON, March, 1814.

Having lately seen in the British Naval Chronicle, for March last, a publication signed Thomas Cook Jones, surgeon of his Britannic majesty's late ship Java: in which accusations of ill treatment towards the British wounded prisoners, whilst on board the United States' frigate Constitution, under the command of

Commodore Bainbridge, are brought forward ; I conceive it my duty, lest silence should be construed into an acknowledgement of its correctness, to expose some of the falsehoods composing that statement. After introducing himself with considerable egotism, and much parade of professional skill, he makes the following observations :

“ Their (the British wounded) removal to the *Constitution*, the deprivations they there experienced as to food, and the repeated disturbances they suffered by being carried below, and kept there for several hours, three different times, on the report of an enemy heaving in sight : when these, I say, are considered, and the results contrasted with those of the American wounded, four of whom who lost their limbs died when I was on board, were laid in cots, placed in the most healthy parts of the ship, provided with every little luxury from competent and attentive nurses, and not allowed to be removed, when ours were thrust into the hold with the other prisoners, the hatches at once shutting out light and fresh air, and this too in the latitude of St. Salvador, the recovery of our seamen appears as miraculous as it proved happy ; and truly evinced both resignation and courage in patiently submitting, without a complaint, to the cruelties of their situation, and firmly contending with every obstacle which chance or oppression could present or inflict. The Americans seemed very desirous not to allow any of our officers to witness the nature of their wounded, or compute their numbers. I ordered one of my assistants, Mr. Caponi, to attend, when their assistant went round, and he enumerated forty-six who were unable to stir from their cots, independent of those who had received what they called “ *slight hurts*.” Commodore Bainbridge was severely wounded in the right thigh, and four of their amputations perished under my inspection.

“ I have noticed these facts, that your readers may be convinced of the falsity of their official despatches, and to authorize their being received with some degree of scepticism.

“ I sent my assistant, with most of the wounded men, in the evening, and remained myself in the *Java*, till within a few minutes of her being set on fire : one poor fellow only remained, who had received a musket ball, which entered the right orbit and remained imbedded in the brain : he was in *articulo mortis*, and I begged the American lieutenant to let me stay with him undisturbed for a few minutes, as I expected his immediate dissolution.

“ This Yankee son of humanity proposed assisting him into eternity ; I instantly dragged him into the boat, and he expired along side the *Constitution*,”

It is not true that there was any distinction made between the British and American wounded : they were slung promiscuously together on the *gun deck*, and every thing which humanity could dictate that the ship afforded, was provided for their comfort and

convenience. This ship was cleared for action *but once* during the time they were on board ; that was when the Hornet hove in sight and as soon as her character could be ascertained, all the wounded, British and American, were brought on the gun deck together. Captain Lambert and Mr Waldo, were the only two persons removed to the BIRTH DECK on this occasion ; the former was left to the last moment, from principles of delicacy as well as humanity. Every exertion was made to land the prisoners at St. Salvador as soon as possible, that they might be "provided with every little luxury from competent and attentive nurses," that our men of course could not receive on board.

It is equally false that we had forty-six men wounded. "*Slight hurts,*" and all others included, there were *twenty-five only*. Why request his assistant to attend for the purpose of counting them, when doctor Jones himself, or any other officer on board, could have enumerated them, if he chose, an hundred times a day ? The doctor says *four* of our amputations perished under his own inspection. We had but five amputations altogether ; four of them are now receiving pensions from their country, and may be seen almost any day about the Navy Yard at Charlestown ; and the fifth died of a malignant fever, north of the equator *one month after the action*. It is a fact, susceptible of the clearest and most positive proof, that not *one of our men died* during the time the doctor was on board the Constitution, nor until some time after we left St Salvador.

"This Yankee son of humanity proposed assisting him into eternity," &c. No man who knows lieutenant Hoffman, will hesitate to pronounce doctor Jones an infamous calumniator. He (lieutenant Hoffman) is as remarkable for goodness of heart, for humane and tender feelings, for gentlemanly and correct conduct, as doctor Jones now is for his capacity to assert base and unqualified falsehoods. Lieutenant (then midshipman) German, who was present when this man was removed from the Java, and whose word no one will question, asserts that no such observation was made ; on the contrary, that he, (Mr. G.) by the orders of lieutenant Hoffman, repeatedly solicited doctor Jones to visit the man then spoken of, and endeavor, if possible, to relieve him ; but that he neglected even to see him, until they were ready to leave the ship, when he was removed into the boat at the doctor's request. If the doctor's charge had been founded in truth, would he not have reported lieutenant Hoffman immediately on his arrival at the Constitution ? The ward room officers of the Constitution will recollect to have heard doctor Jones frequently spoken of during the cruize as an inhuman monster for his conduct to this same unfortunate sailor.

I leave the punishment due his presumption for calling in question "*official despatches,*" (after having fabricated himself a tissue of assertions, without even a coloring of truth) to the

officer of the Constitution, who may have the good fortune of an opportunity of taking him by the nose.

When the officers of the Java left the Constitution at St. Salvador, they expressed the warmest gratitude for the humane and generous treatment they had experienced; nor was this contemptible hypocrite sparing of his acknowledgments on that occasion. After having suffered every thing from the officers of the Constitution "*oppression could inflict*," why come forward and offer thanks for kind and handsome treatment? [See letters of general Hislop and others.]

To complete the climax of false assertions relative to that account, one of the lieutenants of the Java, in a letter to the editor of the Naval Chronicle for June, asserts, that I am "*an Irishman by birth, and was lately an assistant surgeon in the British Navy!*" The truth is, I was born in the state of Maryland, and had never been on the ocean, except in the service of my country. I pledge myself to substantiate, by the most respectable testimony, should it be necessary, every thing that I have here stated.

I challenge the British to give a *solitary instance*, where they have given a faithful and candid relation of the result of their actions with us, since the declaration of the present war. They have, of late, established for themselves, a kind of national character, that, I trust, none will envy them the possession of; they have proved that although they may not *always* be able to conquer in battle, they can prevaricate, defame or mistake with as much ease as any nation on earth.

AMOS A. EVANS,

Surgeon of the United States frigate Constitution.

DETROIT, March 7th, 1814.

SIR,

By lieutenant Shannon, of the 27th regiment of the United States' infantry, I have the honour of informing you, that a detachment of the troops under my command, led by captain Holmes of the 24th regiment of United States infantry, have obtained a signal victory over the enemy.

The affair took place on the 4th instant, about 100 miles from this place, on the river de French. Our force, consisted of no more than 160 rangers and mounted infantry. The enemy, from their own acknowledgment, had about 240. The fine light company of Royal Scots, is totally destroyed; they led the attack most gallantly, and their commander fell within ten paces of our front line. The light company of the 89th has also suffered severely, one officer of that company fell, one is a prisoner, and another is said to be badly wounded. In killed, wounded, and prisoners, the enemy lost about 80, whilst on our part there were

but four killed and four wounded. This great disparity in the loss on each side, is to be attributed to the very judicious position occupied by captain Holmes, who compelled the enemy to attack him at great disadvantage ; this, even more than his gallantry, merited the laurel.

Captain Holmes has just returned, and will furnish a detailed account of the expedition, which shall immediately be transmitted to you.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. BUTLER,

Lieutenant colonel commanding at Detroit.

Major general Harrison.

Enemy's forces as stated by the prisoners :

Royal Scots, 101 ; 89th Regiment, 45 ; Militia, 50 ; Indians, 40 to 60—total, 236.

P. S. We took 100 head of cattle also from the enemy, intended for Long Point or Burlington.

FORT COVINGTON, March 10th, 1814.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit in writing, that the expedition sent under my command against the enemy's posts, by your special orders of the 21st ultimo, had the good fortune, on the 4th instant, to meet and subdue a force, double its own, fresh from the barracks, and led by a distinguished officer.

I had been compelled to leave the artillery by the invincible difficulties of the route from Point au Plait to the Round O. No wheel carriage of any kind had ever attempted it before, and none will ever pass it until the brush and fallen timber are cut away, and the swamp cause-wayed or drained. After joining captain Gill, I began the march for Fort Talbot, but was soon convinced of its being impossible to reach the post, in time to secure any force which might be there or adjacent. This conviction, united with the information, that the enemy had a force at Delaware, upon the Thames, that I should be expected at Fort Talbot, and consequently, that a previous descent upon Delaware might deceive the foe, and lead him to expose me some point, in defending others he might think menaced, and coupled with the possibility that hearing of captain Gill's march to the Round O, by McGregor's militia, whom he had pursued, a detachment had descended the Thames to intercept him, determined to exercise the discretion allowed by the order, and to strike at once upon the river.

On the 3d instant, when only fifteen miles from Delaware, we received information that the enemy had left Delaware with the intention of descending the river, and that we should probably

meet him in one hour; that his force consisted of a light company from the Royal Scots, mustering for duty 120 men; a light company of the 89th regiment of foot (efficiency not known,) Caldwell's Indians and McGregor's militia, amounting in all to about 300 men. My command originally had not exceeded 180 rank and file. Hunger, cold and fatigue, had brought on disease, and though none died, all were exceedingly depressed, and sixteen had been ordered home, as unable to continue the march. I resolved therefore to avoid the conflict on equal grounds, and immediately retreated five miles, for the sake of a good position on the western bank of the Twenty Mile Creek, leaving captain Gill with twenty rangers to cover the rear, and to watch the enemy's motions. We had encamped but a few minutes, when captain Gill joined, after exchanging shots with the enemy's advance, in vainly attempting to reconnoitre his force. The Twenty Mile Creek runs from north to south, through a deep and wide ravine, and of course is flanked east and west by lofty heights. My camp was formed upon the western heights. The enemy's on the opposite. During the night of the 3d all was quiet. At sun-rise on the 4th, the enemy appeared thinly upon the opposite heights, fired upon us without effect, and vanished. After waiting some time for their re-appearance, lieutenant Knox of the rangers was sent to reconnoitre. On his return he reported that the enemy had retreated with the utmost precipitation, leaving his baggage scattered upon the road, and that his trail and fires made him out not more than seventy men. Mortified at the supposition of having retrograded from this diminutive force, I instantly commenced the pursuit, with the design of attacking Delaware before the opening of another day. We had not, however, proceeded beyond five miles, when captain Lee, commanding the advance, discovered the enemy in considerable force, arranging himself for battle. The symptoms of fear and flight were now easily traced to the purpose of seducing me from the heights, and so far the plan succeeded. But the enemy failed to improve the advantage. If he had thrown his chief force across the ravine above the road, and occupied our camp when relinquished, thus obstructing my communication to the rear, I should have been driven upon Delaware against a superior force, since found to be stationed there, or forced to take the wilderness for Fort Talbot, without forage or provisions. Heaven averted this calamity. We soon regained the position at Twenty Mile Creek, and though the rangers were greatly disheartened by the retreat, and to a man insisted upon not fighting the enemy, we decided to exhibit on that spot, the scene of death or victory. I was induced to adopt the order of the *hollow square* to prevent the necessity of evolution, which I knew all the troops are incompetent to perform in action. The detachments of the 24th and 28th infantry occupied the brow of the heights. The detachment from the garrison of Detroit, formed the north front of the square, the rangers the west, and the militia

the south. Our horses and baggage stood in the centre; the enemy threw his militia and Indians across the ravine above the road and commenced the action with savage yells, and bugles sounding from the north, west and south. His regulars at the same time charged down the road from the opposite heights, crossed the bridge and charged up the heights we occupied, within twenty steps of the American line, and against the most destructive fire. But his front section was soon shot to pieces. Those who followed were much thinned and wounded. His officers were soon cut down, and his antagonists continued to evince a degree of animation, that bespoke at once their boldness and security. He therefore abandoned the charge, and took cover in the woods at diffused order, between fifteen, twenty, and thirty paces of our line, and placed all hopes upon his ammunition.

Our regulars being uncovered, were ordered to kneel, that the brow of the heights might partly screen them from the enemy's view. The firing increased on both sides with great vivacity; but the crisis was over. I knew the enemy dare not uncover, and of course that no second charge would be attempted. On the north, west and south front, the firing had been sustained with much coolness, and with considerable loss to the foe. Our troops on those fronts being protected by logs hastily thrown together, and the enemy not charging, both the rifle and the musket were aimed at leisure, perhaps always told. The enemy at last became persuaded, that providence had sealed the fortune of the day. His cover on the east front was insufficient; for as he had charged in column of sections, and therefore, when dispersing on either side of the road, was unable to extend his flanks, and as our regulars presented an extended front from the beginning, it is evident that a common sized tree could not protect even one man, much less the squads that often stood and breathed their last together; and yet upon his regulars the enemy relied for victory. In concert, therefore, and favoured by the shades of twilight, he commenced a general retreat, after one hour's close and gallant conflict.

I did not pursue for the following reasons. First, we had triumphed against numbers and discipline, and were therefore under no obligation of honour to incur additional hazard. Second, in these requisites (numbers and discipline) the enemy were still superior, and the night would have ensured success to an ambuscade. Third, the enemy's bugle sounded *the close* upon the opposite heights. If then we had pursued, we must have passed over to him, as he did to us, because the creek could be passed on horseback at no other point, and the troops being fatigued and frost-bitten, and their shoes cut to pieces by the frozen ground, it was not possible to pursue on foot. It follows that the attempt to pursue would have given the enemy the same advantage that produced the defeat,

Our loss in killed and wounded, amounted to a non-commissioned officer and six privates, but the blood of between 80 and 90 brave Englishmen, and among them four officers, avenged their fall. The commander, captain Barden of the 89th, is supposed to have been killed at an early stage of the contest. The whole American force in action, consisted of 150 rank and file, of whom 70 were militia, including rangers. The enemy's regulars alone, were from 150 to 180 strong, and his militia and Indians fought upon three fronts of our square.

I am much indebted to all my regular officers, and trust their names will be mentioned to the army and to the War Department. Without intending a discrimination, it must be acknowledged, that the exertions of lieutenants Kouns and Henry of the 28th, and Jackson and Potter of the 24th, were most conspicuous, because fortune had opposed them to the main strength of the foe. Captain Lee of the Michigan dragoons, was of great assistance before the action, at the head of the advance and spies, and my warmest thanks are due to acting sailing master Darling, of the United States' schooner Somers, who had volunteered to command the artillery. Ensign Heard of the 28th, acting as volunteer adjutant, merits my acknowledgments, and especially for his zeal in defending my opinion against a final retreat, when others permitted their hopes to sink beneath the pressure of the moment.

The enemy's wounded and prisoners were treated with the utmost humanity. Though some of our men were marching in thin stocking feet, they were not permitted to take a shoe even from the dead.

I have the honour to be, &c.

A. H. HOLMES, *Capt, 24th Inf.*

Lieutenant colonel Butler.

UNITED STATES' SHIP UNITED STATES, NEW LONDON,
March 18th, 1814.

SIR,

I have the honour to forward to you enclosed, a despatch received by me from captain Capel, the commanding officer of the British squadron before this port, written in reply to an application of mine, for the release of an American seaman, detained against his will on board the frigate Statira.

Hiram Thayer, born in the town of Greenwich, in the county of Hampshire, and commonwealth of Massachusetts, was impressed into the naval service of Great Britain, in the month of August, 1803, and detained ever since. About six years ago, when the Statira was put in commission, he was transferred to her, and has been constantly on board her to this day. I am informed, and in fact it was stated by captain Stackpole to lieutenant Hamilton, who was charged with the flag, that the late general Lyman, our

consul at London, made application to the Lords Commissioners for the discharge of Thayer, but they were not satisfied with the evidence of his nativity.

John Thayer, the father of Hiram, assures me, that the certificate of the select-men, the town clerk, and the minister of Greenwich, were forwarded some time ago to Mr. Mitchel, the resident agent for American prisoners of war at Halifax, but does not know the reason why he was not released then. The son has written to his father, and informed him that on his representing to captain Stackpole, that he was an American citizen, and would not fight against his country, that captain Stackpole told him "if they fell in with an American man of war, and he did not do his duty, he should be tied to the mast and shot like a dog."

On Monday the 14th instant, John Thayer requested me to allow him a flag to go off to the enemy and ask for the release of his son. This I granted at once, and addressed a note to captain Capel, stating that I felt persuaded that the application of the father, furnished as he was with conclusive evidence of the nativity and the identity of his son, would induce an immediate order for his discharge. The reply is enclosed. The son decried his father at a distance in the boat, and told the first lieutenant of the Statira that it was his father, and I understand that the feelings manifested by the old man on receiving the hand of his son, proved, beyond all other evidence, the property he had in him. There was no doubt left on the mind of a single British officer of Hiram Thayer's being an American citizen; and yet he is detained, not as a prisoner of war, but compelled, under the most cruel threats, to serve the enemies of his country.

Thayer has so recommended himself by his sobriety, industry and seamanship, as to be appointed a boatswain's mate, and is now serving in that capacity in the Statira: and he says there is due to him from the British government about two hundred and fifty pounds sterling. He has also assured his father, that he has always refused to receive any bounty or advance, lest it might afford some pretext for denying him his discharge whenever a proper application should be made for it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

STEPHEN DECATUR.

Honourable W. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

SIXTH AND SEVENTH DISTRICTS, FORT HAWKINS.

April 2d, 1864.

SIR,

I have the honour of enclosing to your excellency the special account of a decisive victory over the hostile Creek Indians, achieved by the military talents and enterprize of general son, supported by the distinguished valor and good conduct

the gallant troops under his command. While the sigh of humanity will escape for this profuse effusion of human blood, which results from the savage principle of our enemy, neither to give nor accept quarter, and while every American will deeply lament the loss of our meritorious fellow soldiers who have fallen in this contest, we have ample cause of gratitude to the giver of all victory for thus continuing his protection to our women and children, who would otherwise be exposed to the indiscriminate havoc of the tomahawk and all the horrors of savage warfare.

I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS PINCKNEY,

Mag. Gen. U. S. army.

His excellency Gov. Early.

(INCLOSURE.)

ON THE BATTLE GROUND, IN THE BEND OF THE TALAPOOSIE,
March 28th, 1814.

SIR,

I feel particularly happy in being able to communicate to you the fortunate eventuation of my expedition to Talapoosie. I reached the head near Emucfau (called by the whites Horse Shoe) about 10 o'clock on the forenoon of yesterday, where I found the strength of the neighboring towns collected; expecting our approach, they had gathered in from Oakfuskee, Oakehoga, New Yorcau, Hillibeas, the Fish Pond, and Eufalee towns, to the number it is said of 1000. It is difficult to conceive a situation more eligible for defence than the one they had chosen, or one rendered more secure by the skill with which they had erected their breastwork. It was from 5 to 8 feet high, and extended across the point in such a direction, as that a force approaching it would be exposed to a double fire, while they lay in perfect security behind. A cannon planted at one extremity could have raked it to no advantage.

Determined to exterminate them, I detached general Coffee with the mounted, and nearly the whole of the Indian force, early on the morning of yesterday, to cross the river about two miles below their encampment, and to surround the bend in such a manner, as that none of them should escape by attempting to cross the river. With the infantry I proceeded slowly and in order along the point of land which led to the front of their breastwork; having planted my cannon, (one six and one three pounder) on an eminence at the distance of 150 to 200 yards from it, I opened a very brisk fire, playing upon the enemy with the muskets and rifles whenever they shewed themselves beyond it; this was kept up, with short interruptions, for about two hours, when a part of the Indian force and captain Russell's, and lieutenant Bean's companies of spies, who had accompanied general Coffee, crossed over in canoes to the extremity of the bend, and set fire

to a few of the buildings which were there situated ; they then advanced with great gallantry towards the breastwork, and commenced a spirited fire upon the enemy behind it. Finding that this force, notwithstanding the bravery thus displayed, was wholly insufficient to dislodge them, and that general Coffee had entirely secured the opposite bank of the river, I now determined to take their works by storm. The men by whom this was to be effected had been waiting with impatience to receive the order, and hailed it with acclamation. The spirit which animated them was a sure augury of the success which was to follow. The history of warfare I think furnishes few instances of a more brilliant attack ; the regulars led on by their intrepid and skillful commander, colonel Williams, and by the gallant major Montgomery, soon gained possession of the works in the midst of a most tremendous fire from behind them, and the militia of the venerable general Doherty's brigade accompanied them in the charge with a vivacity and firmness which would have done honour to regulars. The enemy was completely routed. *Five hundred and fifty-seven* were left dead on the peninsula, and a great number were killed by the horsemen in attempting to cross the river. It is believed that not more than *twenty* have escaped.

The fighting continued with some severity about five hours, but we continued to destroy many of them, who had concealed themselves under the banks of the river, until we were prevented by the night. This morning we killed sixteen who had been concealed. We took about 250 prisoners, all women and children except two or three. Our loss is 106 wounded, and 25 killed. Major Mcintosh, the Cowetau, who joined my army with a part of his tribe, greatly distinguished himself. When I get a leisure hour I will send you a more detailed account.

According to my original purpose, I commenced my return march to Fort Williams to-day, and shall, if I find sufficient supplies there, hasten to the Hickory ground. The power of the Creeks is I think forever broken.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Maj. Gen.*

Major general Thomas Pinckney.

After the battle of the Horse Shoe general Jackson made the following address to the army, March 28th, 1814.

SOLDIERS,

You have entitled yourselves to the gratitude of your country and your general. The expedition, from which you have returned, has, by your good conduct, been rendered prosperous beyond any example in the history of our warfare : it has been deemed the character of your state, and of that description of troops, of which the greater part of you are.

You have, within a few days, opened your way to the Tallapoosie, and destroyed a confederacy of the enemy, ferocious by nature, and grown insolent from impunity. Relying on their numbers, the security of their situation, and the assurances of their prophets, they derided our approach, and already exulted, in anticipation of the victory they expected to obtain. But they were ignorant of the influence of government on the human powers, nor knew what brave men, and civilized, could effect. By their yells, they hoped to frighten us, and with their wooden fortifications to oppose us. Stupid mortals! their yells but designated their situation the more certainly; whilst their walls became a snare for their own destruction. So will it ever be when presumption and ignorance contend against bravery and prudence.

The fiends of the Tallapoosie will no longer murder our women and children, or disturb the quiet of our borders. Their midnight flambeaux will no more illumine their council-house, or shine upon the victim of their infernal orgies. In their places, a new generation will arise, who will know their duty better. The weapons of warfare will be exchanged for utensils of husbandry; and the wilderness, which now withers in sterility, and mourns the desolation which overspreads her, will blossom as the rose, and become the nursery of the arts. But before this happy day can arrive, other chastisements remain to be inflicted. It is indeed lamentable, that the path to peace should lead through blood, and over the bodies of the slain: but it is a dispensation of Providence, to inflict partial evils that good may be produced.

Our enemies are not sufficiently humbled; they do not sue for peace. A collection of them awaits our approach, and remain to be dispersed. Buried in ignorance, and seduced by their prophets, they have the weakness to believe they will still be able to make a stand against us. They must be undeceived, and made to atone for their obstinacy and their crimes, by still further suffering. The hopes which have so long deluded them, must be driven from their last refuge. They must be made to know that their prophets are impostors, and that our strength is mighty, and will prevail. Then, and not till then, may we expect to make with them a peace that shall be lasting.

Extract of a letter from general Jackson to governor Blount.

March 28th, 1814.

"I took up the line of march on the morning of the 24th instant, and having opened a passage of 52 miles over the ridges which divide the waters of the two rivers, I reached the bend of the Tallapoosie three miles beyond where I had the engagement of the 22d January, and at the southern extremity of New Yorcau on

the morning of the 27th. This bend resembles in its curvature that of a horse shoe, and is thence called by that name among the whites. Nature furnishes few situations as eligible for defence; and *barbarians have never rendered one more secure by art*. Across the neck of land which leads into it from the north, they have had erected a breast-work of the greatest compactness and strength, from five to eight feet high, and prepared with double rows of port holes very artfully arranged. The figure of this wall manifested no less skill in the projectors of it, than its construction: an army could not approach it, without being exposed to a double and cross fire from the enemy, who lay in perfect security behind it. The area of this peninsula, thus bounded by breast-works, includes, I conjecture, 80 or 100 acres.

"Having maintained for a few minutes a very obstinate conflict, muzzle to muzzle, through the port holes, *in which many of the enemy's balls were welded to the bayonets of our muskets*, our troops succeeded in gaining the opposite side of the works. The event could no longer be doubtful. The enemy, although many of them fought to the last with that kind of bravery which desperation inspires, were at length routed and cut to pieces. The whole margin of the river which surrounded the peninsula, was strewn with the slain.

"Among the dead was found their famous prophet *Monahoo*, shot in the mouth by a grapeshot, as if Heaven designed to chastise his impostures by an appropriate punishment. Two other prophets were also killed; leaving no others, as I learn, on the Talapoosie. Our loss was 26 white men killed and 106 wounded, Cherokees 18 killed and 36 wounded. Friendly Creeks 5 killed and 11 wounded.

"The loss of colonel Williams's regiment of regulars is 17 killed and 55 wounded, two of whom have since died. Amongst the former were major Montgomery, lieutenant Somerville, and lieutenant Moulton, who fell in the charge made on the works. No men ever acted more gallantly or fell more gloriously.

"Of the artillery company commanded by captain Parish, 11 were wounded, one of whom, Samuel Garner, has since died. Lieutenants Allen and Ridgely were both wounded. The whole company acted with its usual gallantry. Captain Bradford of the 17th United States' infantry, who acted as chief engineer, and superintended the firing of the cannon, has entitled himself, by his good conduct, to my warmest thanks.

"To say all in a word, the whole army who achieved this fortunate victory, have merited, by their good conduct, the gratitude of their country. So far as I saw or could learn, there was not an officer or soldier who did not perform his duty with the utmost fidelity. The conduct of the militia on this occasion has gone far towards redeeming the character of that description of troops. They have been as orderly in their encampments, and on their line of march, as they have been signally brave in the day of battle.

In a few days I shall take up the line of march for the *Hickory ground*; and have every thing to hope from such troops."

The following extract from the life of general Jackson, by his aid, John Reid, brevet major, United States' army, portrays the difficulties which surrounded the general prior to the battle of Tohopeka or the Horse Shoe.

" Nothing was wanted now, to put the troops in motion, and actively to prosecute the war, but necessary supplies. Remonstrance, entreaty, and threats, had long since been used, and exhausted. Every mean had been resorted to, to impress on the minds of the contractors the necessity of urging forward, in faithful discharge of their duty; but the same indifference and neglect were still persisted in. To ward off the effects of such great evils,—evils which he foresaw would again eventuate in discontent and revolt, Jackson resolved to pursue a different course, and no longer depend on persons who had so frequently disappointed him. He accordingly despatched messengers to the nearest settlements, with directions to purchase provisions at whatever price they could be procured. This course, to these incumbents on the nation, afforded an argument much stronger than any to which he had before resorted. Thus assailed in a way they had not before thought of, by being held and made liable for the amount of the purchases, they exerted themselves in discharge of a duty they had hitherto shamefully neglected. Every expedient had been tried, to urge them to a compliance with the obligations they were under to their government; until present, none had proved effectual. In one of his letters, about this time, the general remarks: ' I have no doubt, but a combination has been formed, to starve us out, and defeat the objects of the campaign; but McGee ought to have recollected that he had disappointed and starved my army once; and now in return, it shall be amply provided for, at his expense. At this point, he was to have delivered the rations, and whatever they may cost, at this place, he will be required to pay; any price that will ensure their delivery, I have directed to be given.' The supplying an army by contractors, he had often objected to, as highly exceptionable and dangerous. His monitor, on this subject, was his own experience. Disappointment, mutiny, and abandonment by his troops, when in the full career of success, and an unnecessarily protracted campaign, were among the evils already experienced, and which he wished, if possible, to be in future avoided.

" Under these and other circumstances which seemed to involve much more serious consequences, the general had but little repose or quietness; every thing was working in opposition to his wishes. The East Tennessee brigade, under the command of

Doherty, having been instructed to halt, until adequate supplies should be received at head quarters, had already manifested many symptoms of revolt, and was with much difficulty restrained from returning immediately home. Added to their own discontents, and unwillingness to remain in service, much pains had been taken by a personage high in authority, to scatter dissension amongst them, and to persuade them, that they had been improperly called out, and without sufficient authority ;—that the draft was illegal, and that they were under no necessity to serve. Arguments like these, urged by a man of standing, were well calculated to answer the end desired ; what the governing motive was, that gave rise to a course of conduct so strange, is difficult to be imagined ; none was ever avowed, and certainly none can be given, that will account for it satisfactorily. On the morning that general Doherty was about to proceed to head quarters, he was astonished to find a beating up for volunteers, to abandon his camp and return home. Notwithstanding all his efforts to prevent it, one hundred and eighty deserted. His surprise was still greater, on learning, that a captain from Carter county, had been instructed by *major general Cocke*, that in the event of his marching back any number of the troops, *he* would take upon himself to discharge them, on their return to Knoxville. Before this, *Cocke* had been at the camp of Doherty, and had, by different means, attempted to excite mutiny and disaffection among the troops. As a reason for being unwilling to go with them in command, he stated, that they would be placed in a situation which he disliked to mention, and one which his feelings would not enable him to witness : that they were going out to be placed under the command of general Jackson, who would impose on them the severest trials, and where they would have to encounter every privation and suffering. He represented, that at head quarters there was not a sufficiency of provisions on hand to last five days ; nor was there a probability that there would be any change of circumstances for the better ;—that should they once be placed in the power of Jackson, he would, with the regular force under his command, compel them to serve as long as he pleased. Expressions like these, to men who had never before been in the field, and coming from one who had already been employed in a respectable command, were well calculated to produce serious impressions. Doherty, who was a brigadier in the first division, was at a loss to know how he should proceed with his own *major general*, who had obtruded himself into his camp, and was endeavoring to *excite a revolt* ; he accordingly despatched an express to head quarters, to give information of what was passing. The messenger arrived, and, in return, received an order from general Jackson to Doherty, commanding him, peremptorily, to seize, and send under guard to Fort Strother, every officer, without regard to his rank, who should be found, in any manner, attempting to excite his army to mutiny. General Cocke, perhaps appre-

hending what was going on, had retired before this order arrived, and thus escaped the punishment due to so aggravated an offence."

PROVINCE OF LOWER CANADA,

Odell Town, March 31st, 1814.

SIR,

We have had an affair with the enemy, in which our troops have given him another test of firmness and valour.

Pursuant to the designs communicated to you in my last, and to accomplish *your* views if in my power, I entered Canada yesterday morning, and was met by the enemy near this place, about eleven o'clock, whom we forced at every point of attack on the route to La Cole, distant from hence one league, and from St. John's six. We reached the former post about three o'clock, and found there a strong corps in possession of a spacious lofty stone mill, of which I had received some information. An eighteen pounder had been ordered forward to effect the destruction of this building, but it broke down, and after being repaired, the only road of approach through a deep forest was reported to be impracticable to a gun of such weight. An opinion prevailed at the same time with the chief engineer, major Totten, founded on intelligence previously received, and several of the best informed officers, that an iron twelve would suffice to make a breach; but after a fair and tedious experiment at 300 yards distance only, it was discovered our battery could make no impression.

Brigadier generals Smith and Bissell, covered our guns, and brigadier general Macomb, with a select corps, formed the reserve. The enemy had been reported, from a source considered strictly confidential, to 2500 strong, and his first attack of my right favoured the report, from the use he made of congreve rockets and other indications of deliberate preparation; the corps, therefore, were held in high order to receive his combined attack. Yet believing in the efficacy of our battery, dispositions had been made to intercept the enemy, should he evacuate the post, and to give it the utmost effect, we were obliged to take ground near the margin of the field, which encompassed the mill. During the cannonade, which was returned with vivacity by the enemy's gallies (I presume) several sorties and desperate charges were made from the mill upon our battery, which were repulsed with incredible coolness by the covering corps, at the expense of some blood and some lives on both sides; it is reported to me, that in the last charge, a captain of grenadiers and fifteen men fell together, but I cannot vouch for the fact. Finding all our attempts to make a breach unsuccessful, I withdrew the battery, called in my detachments, and having removed our dead and wounded, and every thing else, fell back to this place about six o'clock.

Where a military corps appears to be universally animated by the same sensibilities, where the only competition is for danger and glory, individual distinctions seem improper, except in extraordinary cases, such as the conduct of the officers who commanded our battery yesterday. Captain M'Pherson, of the light artillery, (my military secretary, impelled by the noble spirit which marks his whole character,) asked permission to take part in the operations of the day with his proper arm; he was indulged, and being first for command, took charge of the pieces which followed the advance and formed our battery, in which he was seconded by lieutenants Larrabee and Sheldon. On opening his fire he seemed inclined to the opinion he could make an impression on the work, but he soon received a wound under the chin, which he tied up with his handkerchief, and continued at his piece, until a second shot, which broke his thigh, brought him to the earth. Larrabee had kept his station, until shot through the lungs, and Sheldon kept up the fire until ordered to retire. The conduct of these gentlemen has, from the nature of their duties, been so conspicuously gallant, as to attract the admiration of their brethren in arms, and should (I humbly conceive) be distinguished by the executive. I have sent forward my wounded, who can bear the movement to Plattsburg or Burlington, and those who cannot, will be provided for at Champlain. I would hold this position until I received further orders, were it not for the difficulty of transporting our provisions, and the impossibility to cover the troops; but I shall not retire further than Champlain, which will place us twenty-five miles from St. John's, and forty-two from Montreal.

I cannot close this letter without confessing my obligations to my general and field officers, and to my general staff of every grade, for the able and prompt support I received from them. So small an affair does not merit so tedious a detail, but it warrants the remark, that it will produce a degree of self confidence, of reciprocal trust, of harmony and friendly attachments in this corps, highly beneficial to this service. It is a lesson of command to the officers, and of obedience to the soldiers, worth a whole year's drill of empty parades. The returns of killed and wounded, have not yet been furnished, but they will not exceed 80 or 90, including a captain and four subalterns, and this shall be forwarded to-morrow or next day. For the information of their friends, you have at foot the names of the wounded officers.

With great respect, &c.

JAMES WILKINSON

Officers wounded:

Captain M'Pherson, lieutenant Larrabee, light artillery;
 lieutenant Green, 11th infantry; lieutenant Parker, 14th
 lieutenant Kerr, rifle regiment.

RUTLEDGE, April 6th, 1814.

SIR,

The limited means I set out with to procure provisions for the troops under your command, and the transportation thereof, would in almost every other country have proved ineffectual. The contractors, the quarter master and the citizens concerned with me, have all done their duty, and it is with much pleasure that I now announce to you, that the waters have risen, and the boats are descending the rivers Holstein, Frenchbroad, and Tennessee, so that we shall be able to land from three to five thousand barrels of bread stuff, from thirty to fifty thousand weight of bacon and other necessary supplies at Fort Deposit, within eight or ten days, in addition to what you now have, which will more than realize your best expectations. It is a high gratification for me to assure you that the best exertions to aid me in all things necessary, have been cheerfully afforded by my fellow citizens in all parts of the state, as well as in the county of Madison, in the Mississippi territory. May glory and conquest still attend you.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM COCKE.

Major general Andrew Jackson.

CAMP, AT THE JUNCTION OF THE COOSEE & TALAPOOSIE,

April 18th, 1814.

SIR,

I am happy to inform you that the campaign is drawing to a prosperous close. We have scoured the Coossee and Talapoosie, and the intervening country. A part of the enemy on the latter river, made their escape across it just before our arrival, and are flying in consternation towards Pensacola. Many of those on the Coossee and the neighbouring country, have come in and surrendered unconditionally; and others are on their way, and hourly arriving, to submit in the same way. We will overtake those who have fled, and make them sensible there is no more safety in flight than in resistance.

Many of the negroes who were taken at fort Mimms, have been delivered up, and one white woman (Polly Jones), with her two children. They will be properly taken care of. The Talapoosie king has been arrested, and is here in confinement. The Tostahatchee king of the Hickory ground tribe, has delivered himself up. Weatherford has been with me, and I did not confine him. He will be with me again in a few days. Peter M'Quin has been taken, but escaped; he must be taken again. Hillishagee, their great prophet, has also absconded; but he will be found. They were the instigators of the war, and such is their situation.

The advance of the eastern division formed a junction with me at the Hallawellee, on the 15th, and accompanied me to fort Decatur, opposite Tuckabatchee, and the rest will arrive in a few days, except what will be left for the retention of the posts. Major general Pinckney will join the army at this place to-morrow or next day. The business of the campaign will not, I presume, require that I or my troops should remain here much longer. General Pinckney and colonel Hawkins, who is now with me, have been appointed to make the treaty.

I am, sir, very respectfully, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Maj. Gen.*

His excellency Willie Blount,
Governor of Tennessee.

UNITED STATES' SHIP GENERAL PIKE,

Sackett's Harbour, April 27th, 1814.

SIR,

The night of the 25th instant, two of our guard boats fell in with three of the enemy's boats in this bay. Lieutenant Dudley, (the officer of the guard) hailed and was answered, "guard boats;" this, however, not being satisfactory, he repeated the hail, but was not answered; finding that strange boats were endeavouring to cut him off from the shore, he fired upon them; the enemy, laying upon their oars for a short time, pulled in towards Bull Rock Point, without returning the fire. Lieutenant Dudley returned to the fleet, and got a reinforcement of boats; but nothing more was seen of the enemy that night. Yesterday morning, I directed both shores of Shermont Bay to be examined, to see whether the enemy had not secreted himself in some of the small Creeks. Nothing, however, was discovered, but six barrels of powder, found in the water near the shore, where our guard boats fired on the enemy; these barrels were all slung in such a manner, that one man could take two across his shoulders and carry them; each barrel had a hole bored in the head of about an inch diameter, with a wooden plug in it; these barrels of powder were evidently fitted for the purpose of blowing our large ship up, if the enemy could have got in undiscovered, by placing them under the ship's bottom, and putting a piece of slow match or port-fire in the hole in the head, which would burn a sufficient time to allow the parties to escape before the fire would communicate to the powder; this also accounts for the enemy not returning the fire of our boats, for having so much powder in, he was apprehensive of accident, which no doubt induced him to heave it overboard, to be prepared to return the fire if he was pursued.

It would have been impossible for the enemy to have succeeded, even if he had eluded our guard boats (which there are two of; for, independent of all the approaches by water being covered

by booms, the Madison is moored across the large ship's stern within twenty yards, and her guns loaded with canister and bags of musket balls, to rake under the bottom if necessary. A lieutenant, two midshipmen and ten men, are on watch under the ship's bottom every night, besides a marine guard outside of her. With all these precautions, I think that it would be impossible for an enemy to land near the ship yard unobserved. However, after this discovery of the enemy's intentions, we shall redouble our vigilance and exertions to preserve our fleet to meet the enemy fairly upon the Lake.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Honourable W. Jones.

UNITED STATES' SHIP ADAMS, April 29th, 1814.

SIR,

Having passed the enemy in Lynhaven, on the night of the 18th of January last, I steered to the southward of Bermuda, and crossed the Atlantic, between 28 and 32 degrees, north latitude. On the 29th January, captured an English schooner from Malaga to Halifax, with a cargo of wine, oil and fruit, which we burnt, as we likewise did another schooner from Newfoundland to Grenada, with a cargo of fish and oil, captured on the 9th February.

On the 4th March, captured a small sloop boat under Cape Mount, on the coast of Africa, with a little rice and Camwood on board; twenty leagues east of Cape Palmas, we captured on the 11th March, the brig Roebuck, of London, with a small quantity of ivory, a quantity of palm oil, and various other articles. After destroying her armament and cargo, we paroled our prisoners, and gave them the brig as a cartel to Sierra Leone. After a long chase on the 25th March, the last four hours of which was in thick weather, we captured the English India ship Woodbridge, with a cargo of rice and dye-woods, but had scarcely taken possession of her, when the weather cleared up, and we discovered a fleet of 25 sail immediately to windward of us, and two ships of war standing for us; we were compelled to abandon the prize with precipitation, and attend to our own safety, till 11 A. M. the next day, when they gave over the chase and returned to the fleet. I inclose the paroles signed by the prisoners.

I have the honour to be, &c.

C. MORRIS.

Honourable William Jones,

UNITED STATES' SLOOP PEACOCK, AT SEA,
Latitude 27, 47, longitude 89, April 29th, 1814.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you, that we have this morning captured, after an action of 42 minutes, his majesty's brig Epervier.

vier, captain Wales, rating and mounting 18 thirty-two pound caronades, with 128 men, of whom 8 were killed and 15 wounded, according to the best information we could obtain. Among the latter is her first lieutenant, who has lost an arm, and received a severe splinter wound on the hip. Not a man in the Peacock was killed, and only two wounded, neither dangerously so. The fate of the Epervier would have been determined in much less time, but for the circumstance of our fore yard being totally disabled by two round shot in the starboard quarter from her first broadside, which entirely deprived us of the use of our fore and fore-top sails and compelled us to keep the ship large throughout the remainder of the action. This, with a few top-mast and top-gallant back stays cut away, a few shot through our sails, is the only injury the Peacock has sustained. Not a round shot touched our hull; our masts and spars are as sound as ever. When the enemy struck he had five feet water in his hold, his main top-mast was over the side, his main boom shot away, his fore-mast cut nearly in two and tottering, his fore rigging and stays shot away, his bowsprit badly wounded, and forty-five shot holes in his hull, twenty of which were within a foot of his water line. By great exertion we got her in sailing order just as dark came on.

In fifteen minutes after the enemy struck, the Peacock was ready for another action, in every respect but her fore yard, which was sent down, finished and had the foresail set again in forty five minutes: such was the spirit and activity of our gallant crew. The Epervier had under her convoy an English hermaphrodite brig, a Russian and a Spanish ship, which all hauled their wind and stood to the east north-east. I had determined upon pursuing the former, but found that it would not answer to leave our prize in her then crippled state, and the more particularly so, as we found she had in 120,000 dollars in specie, which we soon transferred to this sloop. Every officer, seaman and marine did his duty, which is the highest compliment I can pay them.

I am, respectfully,

L. WARRINGTON.

Honourable William Jones.

SAVANNAH, May 1st, 1814.

SIR,

I have the honour of informing you of my arrival here in late his Britannic majesty's brig Epervier, of eighteen 32 pound caronades, captain Wales, captured by the sloop Peacock, captain Warrington, on Friday morning, the 29th ultimo, off cape Carna-veral, after an action of forty-two minutes, in which time she was much cut up in hull, spars, rigging and sails, with upwards of five feet water in her hold, having the advantage of the weather gage

She has lost 8 killed and 15 wounded, among the latter her first lieutenant, who has lost his arm. I am happy to say the Peacock received no material injury: her fore yard and two men slightly wounded; she received not one shot in her hull. The brig had upwards of one hundred thousand dollars on board.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN B. NICOLSON.

Honourable William Jones.

UNITED STATES' SHIP GENERAL PIKE, SACKETT'S HARBOR,

May 1st, 1814.

SIR,

I am happy to have it in my power to inform you, that the United States' ship "Superior" was launched this morning, without accident. The Superior is an uncommon beautiful, well-built ship, something larger than the President, and could mount 64 guns, if it was thought advisable to put as many upon her. This ship has been built in the short space of eighty days, and when it is taken into view, that two brigs of 500 tons each, have also been built, rigged, and completely fitted for service, since the first of February, it will be acknowledged, that the mechanics employed on this station have done their duty.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Honourable William Jones.

UNITED STATES' SLOOP PEACOCK, May 5th, 1814.

SIR,

As my letter of yesterday was too late for the mail, I address you again in the performance of a duty which is pleasing and gratifying to me in a high degree, and is but doing justice to the merits of the deserving officers under my command, of whom I have hitherto refrained from speaking, as I considered it most correct to make it a subject of a particular communication.

To the unwearied and indefatigable attention of first lieutenant Nicolson in organizing and training the crew, the success of this action is in a great measure to be attributed. I have confided greatly in him, and have never found my confidence misplaced. For judgment, coolness, and decision in times of difficulty, few can surpass him. This is the second action in which he has been engaged this war, and in both he has been successful. His great pride is to earn a commander's commission, by fighting for, instead of heiring it.

From second lieutenant Henley, and lieutenant Voorhees (acting third, who has also twice been successfully engaged) I received every assistance that zeal, ardor and experience could afford. The fire from their two divisions was terrible, and directed with

the greatest precision and coolness. In sailing master Percival, whose great wish and pride is to obtain a lieutenant's commission, and whose unremitting and constant attention to duty, added to his professional knowledge, entitle him to it in my opinion, I found an able as well as willing assistant. He handled the ship as if he had been working her into a roadstead. Mr. David Cole, acting carpenter, I have also found such an able and valuable man in his occupation, that I must request, in the most earnest manner, that he may receive a warrant: for I feel confident that to his uncommon exertions, we, in a great measure, owe the getting our prize into port. From 11 A. M. to 6 P. M. he was over her side stopping shot holes, on a grating, and when the ordinary resources failed of success, his skill soon supplied him with efficient ones. Mr. Philip Myers, master's mate, has also conducted himself in such a manner as to warrant my recommendation of him as a master. He is a seaman, navigator, and officer; his family in New York is respectable, and he would prove an acquisition to the service. My clerk, Mr. John S. Townsend, is anxious to obtain, through my means, a midshipman's warrant, and has taken pains to qualify himself for it, by volunteering and constantly performing a midshipman's duty. Indeed I have but little use for a clerk, and he is as great a proficient as any of the young midshipmen, the whole of whom behaved in a manner that was pleasing to me, and must be gratifying to you, as it gives an earnest of what they will make in time; three only have been to sea before, and one only in a man of war; yet they are as much at home, and as much disposed to exert themselves, as any officer of the ship. Lieutenant Nicolson speaks in high terms of the conduct of Messrs. Greeves and Rodgers (midshipmen) who were in the prize with him.

I have the honour to be, &c.

L. WARRINGTON.

Honourable William Jones.

Extract of a letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy.

UNITED STATES' SHIP GENERAL PIKE, SACKETT'S HARBOR,
May 7th, 1861.

"I received a letter from captain Woolsey last evening, dated at 6 o'clock P. M. on the 5th instant. The enemy had been cannonading Oswego about three hours when the express came away, without doing any injury. He had been twice repulsed in his attempt to land, and the officers and men in high spirits, and expected to be able to hold out until reinforcements arrived. Colonel Mitchell and captain Woolsey are both excellent officers, and I may say, without disparagement to any other corps, that the 3d regiment of artillery is one of the best disciplined companies."

army, and is remarkable for the great number of scientific and correct officers in it—we therefore may expect a most gallant defence of Oswego. If the enemy has succeeded in taking the place, he has paid dearly for it. The attack, I presume, was renewed yesterday morning, as the guns we heard distinctly at this place from morning until about 2 P. M. when the firing ceased.”

UNITED STATES' SHIP GENERAL PIKE, SACKETT'S HARBOR,
May 7th, 5 o'clock P. M. 1814.

SIR,

The enemy's fleet passed in sight about an hour since, at a great distance, and standing for Kingston. We have several vague reports, that the enemy landed from 1500 to 3000 men, and that they carried the fort at Oswego by storm and put the garrison to the sword; others, that the garrison, with captain Woolsey and seamen, surrendered, and that the enemy was marching to the falls. All these reports are unquestionably much exaggerated, and if it should turn out that Oswego has been taken, it will be found that the troops and seamen did their duty, and that the enemy has paid dearly for the place.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Honourable W. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, SACKETT'S HARBOR, May 12th, 1814.

Major general Brown has the satisfaction of announcing to the troops of his division, that the detachment under the command of lieutenant colonel Mitchell, of the corps of artillery, have, by their gallant and military conduct on the 5th and 6th instant, gained a name in arms worthy of the nation they serve and the cause they support. For nearly two days they maintained an unequal contest against ten times their numbers, and but yielded their post when the interest of their country made that measure necessary.

The companies composing this gallant detachment were Boyle's, Romaine's, McIntire's, and Pierce's, of the heavy artillery, and a few seamen under the command of lieutenant Pearce of the navy—in all, less than *three hundred men*. The enemy's force by land and water exceeded *three thousand*.

HEAD QUARTERS, SACKETT'S HARBOR,
May 12th, 1814

SIR.

Enclosed is an abstract from the report of lieutenant colonel Mitchell, of the affair at Oswego. Being well satisfied with the

manner in which the colonel executed my orders, and with the evidence given of steady discipline and gallant conduct on the part of the troops, I have noticed them in the general order, a copy of which is enclosed.

The enemy's object was the naval and military stores deposited at the falls, 10 miles in the rear of the fort. These were protected. The stores at the fort and village were not important.

I am, &c.

JACOB BROWN, *maj. gen.*

Mon. Secretary at War.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MITCHELL'S REPORT.

I informed you of my arrival at fort Oswego on the 30th ultimo. This post being but occasionally and not recently occupied by regular troops, was in a bad state of defence. Of cannon we had but five old guns, three of which had lost their trunnions—what could be done in the way of repair was effected—new platforms were laid, the gun carriages put in order, and decayed pickets replaced. On the fifth instant the British naval force, consisting of 4 large ships, 3 brigs and a number of gun and other boats, were descried at revellie beating about 7 miles from the fort. Information was immediately given to captain Woolsey of the navy, (who was at Oswego village) and to the neighboring militia. It being doubtful on what side of the river the enemy would attempt to land, and my force (290 effectives) being too small to bear division, I ordered the tents to be pitched on the village side, while I occupied the other with my whole force. It is probable that this artifice had its effect and determined the enemy to attack where, from appearances, they expected the least opposition. About one o'clock the fleet approached. Fifteen boats, large and crowded with troops, at a given signal, moved slowly to the shore. These were preceded by gun boats sent to rake the woods and cover the landing, while the larger vessels opened a fire upon the fort. Captain Boyle, and lieutenant Legate, (so soon as the debarking boats got within range of our shot) opened upon them a very successful fire from the shore battery, and compelled them twice to retire. They at length returned to the ships, and the whole stood off from the shore, for better anchorage. One of the enemy's boats, which had been deserted, was taken up by us, and some others by the militia. The first mentioned was sixty feet long, and carried thirty-six oars and three sails, and could accommodate 150 men. She had received a ball through her bow, and was nearly filled with water.

Picket guards were stationed at different points, and were on our arms during the night.

At day break on the 6th the fleet appeared, bearing up under easy sail. The Wolfe, &c. took a position directly against the fort and batteries, and for 3 hours kept up a heavy fire of grape, &c. Finding that the enemy had effected a landing, I withdrew my small disposable force into the rear of the fort, and with two companies, (Romaine's and Melvin's) met their advancing columns, while the other companies engaged the flanks of the enemy. Lieutenant Pierce of the navy and some seamen, joined in the attack, and fought with their characteristic bravery. We maintained our ground about 30 minutes, and as long as consisted with my farther duty of defending the public stores deposited at the falls, which no doubt formed the principal object of the expedition on the part of the enemy. Nor was this movement made precipitately. I halted within 400 yards of the fort. Captain Romaine's company formed the rear guard, and, remaining with it, I marched to this place in good order, destroying the bridges in my rear. The enemy landed 600 of De Watteville's regiment, 600 marines, two companies of the Glengary corps, and 350 seamen.

General Drummond and commodore Yeo were the land and naval commanders. They burned the old barracks and evacuated the fort about 3 o'clock in the morning of the 7th.

Our loss in killed, is 6; in wounded 38—and in missing 25. That of the enemy is much greater. Deserters, and citizens of ours taken prisoners and afterwards released, state their killed at 64 and wounded in proportion—among them are several land and navy officers of merit.

I cannot close this despatch without speaking of the dead and the living of my detachment. Lieutenant Blaney, a young man of much promise, was unfortunately killed. His conduct in the action was highly meritorious. Captain Boyle and lieutenant Legate merit my highest approbation, and indeed I want language to express my admiration of their gallant conduct. The subalterns M'Comb, Ansart, King, Robb, Earl, M'Clintock and Newkirk, performed well their several parts.

It would be injustice were I not to acknowledge and report the zeal and patriotism evinced by the militia, who arrived at a short notice, and were anxious to be useful.

Extract of a letter from captain Macdonough to the Secretary of the Navy

“VERGENNES, May 14th, 1814.

“I have the honour to inform you, that an engagement between our battery at the mouth of Otter Creek, and eight of the enemy's galleys, with a bomb-vessel, has terminated by the retreat of the enemy, who it is supposed came with an intention of blockading us.

"The battery, commanded by captain Thornton of the artillery, who was gallantly assisted by lieutenant Cassen of the navy, received but little injury, although a number of shells were thrown, and many lodged in the parapet.

"Colonel Davis was advantageously posted to receive the enemy in the event of his landing, which we had reason to expect, as his new brig, with several other gallies, and four other sloops, were within two and a half miles of the point, on which the battery stands, during the action, which lasted one hour and a half, when they all stood off, and were seen passing Burlington for the northward. Every exertion was made to get the vessels down to the creek, which, however, we could not effect until the enemy had withdrawn. Our whole force is now at the creek's mouth, with the exception of the schooner, and she will be down also in the course of four or five days."

Extract of a letter from captain Macdonough to the Secretary of the Navy.

"VERGENNES, May 18th, 1814

"I omitted stating in my letter of the 14th, that the enemy had two fine row-boats shot adrift from their gallies in the action with the battery, which, in their precipitate retreat, were left, and picked up by us.

"I have since learned, that in other parts of the lake they were much cut up by the militia. Two of their gallies, in passing up a small river, on the New York side, had nearly all their men killed and wounded."

NEW YORK, May 29th, 1814

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you, that on the 19th, I discovered the enemy in pursuit of a brig under American colours, standing for Sandy Hook. I ordered a detachment of eleven gun-boats to proceed to sea, and pass between the chase and the enemy, by which means to bring him to action, and give opportunity to the chase to escape, all which was effected; the enemy, after receiving my fire, bore away, and the brig in question, entering the harbour, proved to be the brig Regent from France, with a very valuable cargo.

And on Monday the 23d, I engaged the enemy before New London, and opened a passage for forty sail of coasting vessels; the action lasted three hours, in which the Flotilla suffered very little; No. 6 received a shot under water, and others through the sails: we have reason to believe, that the enemy suffered very great injury, as he appeared unwilling to renew the action the

following morning; my object was accomplished, which was to force a passage for the convoy. There are before New London, three seventy-fours, four frigates, and several small vessels, the latter doing great injury from their disguised character, and superior sailing.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. LEWIS.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

UNITED STATES' SHIP SUPERIOR, SACKETT'S HARBOR,
June 2d, 1814.

SIR,

Finding it a most difficult task to transport our heavy guns on by land, I determined to get them to Stony Creek by water, when we should have only about three miles, land carriage, to transport them to Henderson's Harbor, from which we could bring them to this place by water. I directed captain Woolsey to send all the stores, except the heavy guns, up to Forth Bay, and to place the guns in boats ready to move up or down the river, but to be ready to start at a moment's notice for Sandy Creek, whenever the coast is clear of the enemy's gun-boats, which hovered about the creeks in Mexico Bay. On the evening of the 28th, captain Woolsey, started from Oswego with eighteen boats, containing all our heavy guns, twelve cables, and a quantity of shot. Major Appling, of the rifle corps, accompanied the boats with about 130 riflemen. I had also engaged 130 Indians to traverse the shore, for the purpose of protecting the boats if chased on shore, or into any of the creeks. Captain Woolsey proceeded unmolested to Sandy Creek, where he arrived about noon on Sunday the 29th, with one boat missing, containing one cable and two twenty-four-pounders. As soon as I received information of the arrival of the boats at Sandy Creek, the general, at my request, despatched two pieces of artillery, and captain Harris's company of dragoons. Yesterday morning, I ordered captain Smith with about 220 marines to Sandy Creek, and general Gaines very politely offered an additional force of about 300 artillery and infantry, under the command of that excellent officer, colonel Mitchell, to the same place; but before this force could reach the creek, the enemy was discovered in chase of our look-out boats, and entered the creek a little after day-light; they landed and reconnoitered the shore: a part of their force marched up on each side of the creek, while their gun-boats ascended cautiously, occasionally firing into the woods. Major Appling disposed of his force in the most judicious manner, and permitted the enemy to approach within a few yards of his ambuscade, when the riflemen and Indians opened a most destructive fire up on the enemy, which obliged them to surrender in about ten minutes, with the loss of a number of killed and wounded, and seven boats taken,

mounting six, eight, twenty-four, eighteen, and twelve pounders, with some smaller guns.

The number of officers and men which the enemy entered the creek with, were about 200, but the number killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, I am still ignorant of, as no return has been made to me; amongst the prisoners, however, are two post captains, four lieutenants, and two lieutenants of the marines.

The conduct of major Appling, and the troops under his command, has been highly honourable, and they are entitled to warm acknowledgments for the zeal and ability with which they have defended the guns and stores for this station.

I have made arrangements for transporting the guns from Sandy Creek by land, which is about sixteen miles. I hope to have them all here before the 10th.

I inclose herewith for your information, captain Woolsey's report of his proceedings.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

(INCLOSURE.)

SACKETT'S HARBOR, June 1st, 1814

SIR,

I have already had the honour to inform you of the affair at Sandy Creek on the 30th ultimo, but for want of time at that juncture, I had it not in my power to give you the particulars, and as the most of my communication since measures were adopted for a push from Oswego Falls to Sandy Creek, with the naval stores, have been made in great haste, I avail myself of a leisure moment to make a report in detail of my proceedings since that period. On the 17th I despatched Mr. Huginan to Mexico, to hire a number of ox-teams, and to engage a quantity of forage, &c. I also sent orders to Oswego Falls to have an additional number of large wheels made for transporting the guns and cables back across the portage, and caused reports to be circulated in every direction that I had received your orders to send all the naval stores to Oneida lake, with all possible expedition. On the morning of the 28th, when these reports were well in circulation, and when (as I have since heard from good authority) they had been detailed to sir James, I had the honour to receive per express your communication of the 27th, vesting in me discretionary powers. I immediately despatched Mr. Dixon in the long gig to reconnoitre the coast. I went with my officers to the falls, to run the boats down over the rapids. At sun-set we arrived at Oswego with the boats (19 in number) loaded in all with 21 long thirty-two pounders, 19 twenty-four pounders, 3 forty-two ditto (carronades) and 10 cables, besides some light articles, and distributed in the batteaux a guard of about 150 riflemen, under command of major Appling. Mr.

Dixon having returned with a report of the coast being clear, we set off at dark and arrived at Big Salmon river about sun-rise on the 29th, with the loss of one boat having on board 2 twenty-four pounders and one cable. I cannot account for her having separated from us, as every possible exertion was made to keep the brigade as compact as possible.

At Big Salmon we met the *Oneidas*, whom I had despatched the day previous, under the command of lieutenant Hill, of the rifle regiment. As soon as they had taken up their line of march along the shore of Big Sandy creek, I started with all the boats and arrived at noon at our place of destination about two miles up the creek. In this laborious and hazardous duty, I feel much indebted to major Appling, his officers, and men, for their exertions, having assisted my officers and seamen in rowing the boats without a moment's rest, twelve hours, and about half the time enveloped in darkness and deluged with rain; also, to some of the principal inhabitants of Oswego, who volunteered their services as pilots. At 2 A. M. on the 30th, I received your letter of the 29th, 6 P. M. per express, and agreeably to the order contained therein, sent lieutenant Pierce to look out as far as Stony Point. About 2 o'clock he returned, having been pursued by a gun boat and three barges. The best possible disposition was made of the riflemen and Indians, about half a mile below our boats. About 8 A. M. a cannonading at long shot was commenced by the enemy, and believing, as I did, that no attempt would be made to land with their small force, I ordered lieutenant Pierce to proceed in erecting sheers and making preparations to unload the boats; and, as all the teams had retrograded in consequence of the cannonading, I sent in pursuit of them to return. About 9 o'clock captain Harris, with a squadron of dragoons, and captain Melvin, with a company of light artillery and two six pounders, arrived. Captain Harris, the commanding officer, agreed with me that this reinforcement should halt, as the troops best calculated for a bush fight were already on the ground, where they could act to the greatest advantage, and that the enemy, seeing a large reinforcement arrive, would most probably retreat. About 10, the enemy having landed and pushed up the creek with three gun-boats, three cutters, and one gig; the riflemen, under that excellent officer, major Appling, rose from their concealment, and after a smart fire of about ten minutes, succeeded in capturing all the boats and their crews, without one having escaped.

At about 5 P. M. after having buried with the honours of war, Mr. Hoare, a British midshipman, killed in the action, I was relieved by captain Ridgely, whom you did me the honour to send to Sandy Creek for that purpose. All the prisoners, except the wounded, having been removed, and expecting another attack at night, I remained to assist captain Ridgely in that event: but yesterday morning, seeing nothing in the offing, I availed myself of my relief, and returned to this place. In performing, to the

best of my abilities, the duties for which I was ordered to Oswego Falls, I have great satisfaction in acknowledging the unremitting exertions of lieutenant Pierce, sailing-master Vaughan, and midshipmen Mackey, Hart, and Caton; also to major Appling, his officers and men, for their kind assistance in the same duty.

The report of killed, wounded, and prisoners, and also the number and description of the captured boats, has been already remitted by captain Ridgely and myself.

I have the honour to be, &c.

M. F. WOOLSEY.

Commodore Isaac Chauncey,
commanding U. S. forces on the Lakes.

Extract of a letter from commodore Barney to the Secretary of the Navy.

"ST. LEONARD'S CREEK, June 11th, 1814.

"SIR,

"My last was on the 9th instant. On the evening of the 9th, the enemy moved up with twenty barges, having received more force from the 74, at the mouth of the Patuxent. I met them, and after a short action drove them until dark, and returned to my anchorage. Yesterday they made a bold attempt; about 2 P. M. they moved up with twenty-one barges, one rocket barge, and two schooners in tow. On making their appearance, we went down on them; they kept up a smart fire for sometime, and seemed determined to do something decisive. But they soon gave way and retreated; we pursued them down the creek. At the mouth lay the eighteen gun schooner; she attempted to beat out, but our fire was so severe, she ran ashore at the entrance, and was abandoned. We still pursued, until the razees and brig opened upon us a brisk fire, which completely covered the schooner and the flying barges, &c. We must have done them considerable damage."

Extract of a letter from commodore Barney to the Secretary of the Navy.

"ST. LEONARD'S CREEK, June 13th, 1814.

"I had the honour of addressing you on the 11th instant, giving a short detail of our action with the enemy on the 10th. By information, they suffered much. The large schooner was nearly destroyed, having several shot through her at the water's edge; her deck torn up, gun dismounted, and main-mast nearly cut off about half-way up, and rendered unserviceable. She was otherwise much cut; they ran her ashore to prevent her sinking. The

commodore's boat was cut in two; a shot went through the *rocket* boat; one of the small schooners, carrying two 32 pounders, had a shot which raked her from aft, forward; the boats, generally, suffered; but I have not ascertained what loss they sustained in men.

"Yesterday a gentleman of this county, by the name of *Parron*, who lives at the mouth of the creek, came up, and said, that himself and brother had been *taken* and carried on board. That he had been landed from the commodore, to inform the inhabitants, that if they remained at home *quietly*, they should not be molested, but if on landing he found their houses deserted, he would burn them all, as he had done the house of a *Mr. Patterson*, and the barn of *Mr. Skinner* (our purser). Saturday and yesterday, the enemy were employed on the Patuxent River, in landing on the banks to plunder stock, &c. It was on Sunday evening they burnt the property of *Mr. Patterson* and *Skinner*. *Mr. Parron* informs me, that commodore *Barrie*, of the *Dragon*, always commanded, and is much disappointed at his defeats, for that he had wrote to admiral *Cockburn*, that if the admiral would send him a frigate and brig, he would most assuredly destroy the Flotilla. The frigate is the *Acasta*, the brig the *Jasseur*. They left only 200 men, and one small boat on board the *Dragon*, at the mouth of the Patuxent, so that there must have been in the affair on Friday, upwards of 800 men! They came with a *band of music playing*."

UNITED STATES' SHIP SUPERIOR, SACKETT'S HARBOR,
June 20th, 1814.

SIR,

Knowing that the enemy was constantly receiving naval and military stores at Kingston, by the *St. Lawrence*, I thought it might be practicable to surprise and capture a brigade of boats with stores on board, and either destroy or bring them off. For this purpose I directed lieutenant Gregory to take three gigs with only their crew and one settee in each boat, and proceed down the *St. Lawrence*, secrete himself on some of the islands, and watch a favourable opportunity to surprise a brigade of loaded boats, and either bring them off or destroy them, as circumstances would point out.

Lieutenant Gregory left here with his party on the evening of the 15th instant, and proceeded to the "Thousand Islands," where he hauled his boats on shore and concealed them: saw two brigades of boats pass, one up the river with troops, of course too strong for our little party; the other down the river empty, and not worth taking.

Lieutenant Gregory found the enemy had gun-boats stationed between Kingston and Prescott, within about six miles of each other, and that they had a telegraph look out, in almost every high island, so that they convey intelligence with great expedition.

Yesterday morning, between 9 and 10 o'clock, lieutenant Gregory finding himself discovered, and a gun-boat close to him, he instantly formed the bold design to board her, which he did, and carried her without losing a man: one of the enemy was badly wounded. She proved to be the fine gun-boat Black Snake or Number 9, and mounted one eighteen pounder and manned with 18 men, chiefly royal marines, (a list of which is enclosed). Lieutenant Gregory manned his prize and proceeded up the St. Lawrence, but was soon discovered and pursued by a very large gun-boat mounting two heavy guns and rowed with upwards of forty oars, which overhauled him fast. He kept possession of his prize until the enemy threw their shot over him; he then very reluctantly (but I think properly) took out all his prisoners and scuttled the gun-boat, which sunk instantly, and escaped the enemy although so heavily loaded. Lieutenant Gregory arrived safe this morning with all his prisoners.

Permit me to recommend this gallant young officer to your notice and patronage. He is not surpassed by any of his grade in zeal, intelligence, and intrepidity. Sailing master Vaughan and Mr. Dixon, each commanding a gig under lieutenant Gregory, are entitled to my acknowledgments for their zeal and activity on all occasions to render service to their country, more particularly on the last expedition, when, from their knowledge of the river, they rendered the most important services by pointing out the proper channels to elude the pursuit of the enemy.

Will you be pleased to direct in what manner the prisoners are to be disposed of.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Secretary of the Navy.

Extract of a letter from general P. Stuart, of the Maryland militia, to the Secretary of War, dated June 23d, 1814.

"I have ordered on to Washington, under an officer who is directed upon his arrival to report himself to you, five prisoners and one deserter. The prisoners were taken on the 21st instant by a detachment of Maryland militia under my command, aided by a squadron of horse from the district of Columbia, under the command of major Peter.

"The cruel course of war waged by the enemy upon our extensive water courses, has forced me to call into service a great body of our militia.

"I must express my thanks for the aid so promptly sent from your department. It was a source of considerable regret that major Peter of the artillery, notwithstanding his great exertions, could not join us till morning. By his aid, I feel confident we could have destroyed the enemy's schooner sent up to take of

the residue of the tobacco. Major Peter's squadron acted with promptitude and ardor, displaying a temper which will render them essentially useful to the nation. The frequent injuries which arise to the service from intelligence communicated to the enemy, have determined me to suffer no deserter to remain within my command."

Sunday, June 25th, 1814.—10 A. M.

SIR,

This morning, at 4 A. M. a combined attack of the artillery, marine corps and flotilla, was made upon the enemy's two frigates, at the mouth of the creek. After two hours engagement, they got under way and made sail down the river. They are now warping round Point Patience, and I am now moving up the Patuxent with my flotilla. My floss is acting midshipman Asquith killed, and ten others killed and wounded.

Mr. Blake,* the bearer of this, was a volunteer in my barge. He will give you every other information.

With respect, &c.

JOSHUA BARNEY.

The Secretary of the Navy.

PHILADELPHIA, June 25th, 1814.

SIR,

On Sunday last the British frigate Belvidera captured a small schooner belonging to Indian river, about ten miles above Cape Henlopen; and after having her in possession thirty-four hours, ransomed her for 800 dollars. I was yesterday morning on the eve of leaving this, with about 30 officers and men, who are employed here in the equipment of the Guerriere, to join the flotilla, but received information that the Belvidera left the bay on the 21st.

The flotilla is down as low as Egg Island Flats, from which it came up to New Castle only the day before the Belvidera came into the Bay, for the purpose of replenishing its provisions.

With great respect, &c.

JOHN RODGERS.

The Secretary of the Navy.

CAMP NEAR ST. LEONARD'S, June 26th, 1814.

SIR,

We decided on attacking the enemy this morning at day-break; after two and a half or three hours cannonading, he

* Mr. T. P. Andrews, of Washington, accompanied Mr. Blake; they both acted as captains of marines, under major William B. Barney.—*Edit.*

thought proper to retreat down the river, and commodore Barney has taken advantage of his absence to pass his flotilla up the Patuxent. I was constrained to precipitate the attack before I was fully prepared, from the circumstance of all the enemy's small vessels having left the river. The ground I was obliged to occupy for a battery, consisted of a high bluff point, having the Patuxent on the right, and St. Leonard's Creek on the left, with which the communication was over a flat piece of ground, subject to be enfiladed from the Patuxent, and the hill on which the guns were to be placed, liable to a severe fire from the same quarter; therefore, in case of an attack, the enemy might have rendered our situation very uncomfortable, by stationing a small vessel so as to command the low ground I speak of.

We committed a great many blunders during the action, or our success would probably have been more complete. I forbear to enter into minute particulars, lest I should cast an indirect censure on some officers, perhaps undeserved, for I must acknowledge, I was so much engaged at the battery, as to have but an indistinct knowledge of what passed elsewhere. But the fact is, the infantry and light artillery decided upon retreating without my orders, before they had lost a single man killed or wounded; and at the time too, when the enemy were manouvring to the rear of our position with their barges. The consequence of this moving was very disadvantageous; the men at the guns perceiving the infantry retreating, and the enemy getting into the rear, their numbers began sensibly to diminish, and I was pretty soon left with only men enough to work one gun, which I was necessitated to turn to the rear for the sake of keeping the barges in check. Finally, the few men that remained were so exhausted with fatigue, we found it impracticable to fire any more, and the limbers and horses which had been ordered down the hill, having disappeared and gone, I know not where, I found myself under the painful necessity of spiking the guns, to prevent their being used by the enemy, should he get possession of them.

I might, in justice to the infantry, acknowledge they did not take to flight, but quitted the ground in perfect order; afterwards while I was able to halt them, and bring them back. In the mean time the enemy were getting under way, and retiring down the river: from the precipitancy of his retreat, I infer he must have suffered considerably. From some untoward circumstances, I had it not in my power to observe the effect of each shot we fired, otherwise I think its destruction would be complete.

Commodore Barney furnished me with twenty excellent men from his flotilla to work the guns. By some mismanagement in loading with the hot shot, one poor fellow had his arm blown off, which is the only material accident we sustained. One of the enemy's rockets passed through an ammunition box, which had been injudiciously placed, and exploded it, which did some damage.

age. An ammunition cart near it was covered with the fire, but fortunately did not explode. Some other trifling accidents were sustained.

We commenced in the night an epaulment to cover our guns; but the work progressed so little, from the shortness of time, I did not think it best to occupy it. We retreated our guns so as barely to allow the muzzles to peep over the hill. This brought us on descending ground, in a ploughed cornfield. The recoil of the gun downwards, every time it was fired, gave us excessive labour to bring it up to its position. In other respects it answered admirably. The enemy found it impossible to hit either the guns or the men. Every shot aimed by them, either fell short and struck the bank, or flew clear over. Towards the close of the firing, they adopted the method of using small charges of powder, which just threw his shot over the hill, probably firing from his carronades; but the effect was not more decisive.

To prevent the enemy taking alarm in the night, from our movements, we were necessitated to halt our ammunition wagons and carts above a quarter of a mile from the battery, and pass all our stores; even the bricks of which our furnace was constructed, were brought that distance by hand. This fatigued the men excessively. I felt certain, if the enemy should open upon us, even at a random fire, it would be impossible to get any thing done for the confusion it would create.

I ought to mention, that the situation in which the infantry and light artillery were placed, was a trying one for new raised troops. Most of the shot which missed the battery, fell among them. I had anticipated that disadvantage, but it was unavoidable. It was indispensable to have them covered by some rising ground from the waters of the Patuxent, and the position chosen, was the only one compatible with that view, and the design I had in posting them, to protect the rear of our battery.

The battalion of the 38th regiment, joined us but last evening, after a hard day's march, and were immediately marched to the ground. Some of their men were completely exhausted, and the whole excessively fatigued and half famished.

Commodore Barney's flotilla was at hand, ready to open upon the enemy, the moment a favourable opportunity should offer. He commenced firing soon after us, and drew off that of the enemy for a while. I have not seen him since the action, but understand he lost several men, killed and wounded.

I hope, on the whole, taking into consideration our not being fully prepared, the excessive fatigue the men had undergone, and that we have attained the object in view, which was the release of commodore Barney's flotilla, the affair will not reflect dishonour on our troops.

I have the honour to be, &c.

DECIUS WADSWORTH.

General John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

GENERAL BROWN'S GENERAL ORDERS.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, LEFT DIVISION,

July 2d, 1814.

Major general Brown has the satisfaction to announce to the troops of his division, on this frontier, that he is authorized by the orders of his government, to put them in motion against the enemy. The first and second brigades, with the corps of artillery, will cross the straights before them this night, or as early to-morrow as possible. The necessary instructions have been given to the brigadiers, and by them to the commanding officers of regiments and corps.

Upon entering Canada, the laws of war will govern—men found in arms, or otherwise engaged in the service of the enemy, will be treated as enemies; those behaving peaceably, and following their private occupations, will be treated as friends. Private property in all cases will be held sacred; public property, wherever found, will be seized and disposed of by the commanding general. Our utmost protection will be given to all who actually join, or who evince a desire to join us.

Plundering is prohibited. The major general does not apprehend any difficulty on this account, with the regular army, or with honourable volunteers, who press to the standard of their country to avenge her wrongs, and to gain a name in arms. Profligate men who follow the army for plunder, must not expect that they will escape the vengeance of the gallant spirits, who are struggling to exalt the national character. Any plunderer shall be punished with death, who may be found violating this order.

By order of the major general.

C. K. GARDNER, *Adj. Gen.*

In pursuance of the above orders, the army passed the Niagara river on Sunday morning, 3d instant. The brigade of general Scott, and the artillery corps of major Hindman, landed nearly a mile below Fort Erie, between two and three o'clock, while general Ripley, with his brigade, made the shore about the same distance above. The enemy was perfectly unapprised of these movements. General Scott led the van, and was on shore before the enemy's picket, which was stationed at this point, fired a gun; the guard discharged their guns and retreated.

In the morning, a small Indian corps was crossed over. The fort was approached on the right and left, and the Indians skirted the woods in the rear. General Brown now demanded a surrender of the garrison, and gave the commander two hours for consideration.—In the mean time, a battery of long 18's was planted in a position which commanded the fort. The enemy surrendered prisoners of war—marched out of the fort at six, stacked their arms, and were immediately sent across the river to the American shore; there were upwards of 170 prisoners, of the 8th and 100th

regiments, among which were seven officers. Major Burke commanded the fort.

The schooners *Tigress* and *Porcupine* assisted in crossing the troops, and lay during the day within cannon-shot of the fort.

Captain Camp, of the quarter master general's department volunteered in the expedition, and crossed in the boat with general Scott.

During the morning, the enemy fired two or three cannon from the fort, which killed one man, and wounded two or three others. We learn the enemy had one killed.

There are several pieces of ordnance in the garrison, and some military stores.

Thus has the Niagara been crossed, and a fort captured, without scarcely the loss of a man.

CRUIZE OF THE ESSEX.

ESSEX JUNIOR, July 3d, 1814—at sea.

SIR,

I have done myself the honour to address you repeatedly, since I left the Delaware; but have scarcely a hope that one of my letters has reached you; therefore consider it necessary to give you a brief history of my proceedings since that period.

I sailed from the Delaware on the 27th of October, 1812, and repaired with all diligence (agreeably to the instructions of commodore Bainbridge) to Port Praya, Fernando de Noronho, and Cape Frio, and arrived at each place on the day appointed to meet him. On my passage from Port Praya to Fernando de Noronho, I captured his Britannic majesty's packet *Nocton*; and after taking out about £11,000 sterling in specie, sent her under command of lieutenant Finch, for America. I cruized off Rio de Janeiro, and about Cape Frio, until the 12th January, 1813, hearing frequently of the commodore, by vessels from Bahia. I here captured one schooner, with hides and tallow. I sent her into Rio. The *Montague*, the admiral's ship, being in pursuit of me, my provisions getting short, and finding it necessary to look out for a supply, to enable me to meet the commodore by the 1st April, off St Helena, I proceeded to the island of St. Catharine's (the last place of rendezvous on the coast of Brazil,) as the most likely to supply my wants, and, at the same time, afford me that intelligence necessary to enable me to elude the British ships of war on the coast, and expected there. I here procured only wood, water, and rum, and a few bags of flour; and hearing of the commodore's action with the *Java*, the capture of the *Hornet* by the *Montague*, and of a considerable augmentation of the British force on the coast, several being in pursuit of me, I found it necessary to get to sea as soon as possible. I now, agreeably to the commodore's plan, stretched to the southward, scouring the coast

as far as Rio de la Plata. I heard that Buenos Ayres was in a state of starvation, and could not supply our wants, and that the government of Montevideo was inimical to us. The commodore's instructions now left it completely discretionary with me what course to pursue, and I determined on following that which had not only met his approbation, but the approbation of the then Secretary of the Navy.

I accordingly shaped my course for the Pacific; and after suffering greatly from short allowance of provisions, and heavy gales off Cape Horn, (for which my ship and men were ill provided,) I arrived at Valparaiso on the 14th March, 1813. I here took in as much jerked beef, and other provisions, as my ship would conveniently stow, and ran down the coast of Chili and Peru. In this track I fell in with a Peruvian corsair, which had on board 24 Americans, as prisoners, the crews of two whale ships, which she had taken on the coast of Chili. The captain informed me that, as allies of Great Britain, they would capture all they should meet with, in expectation of a war between Spain and the United States. I consequently threw all his guns and ammunition into the sea, liberated the Americans, wrote a respectful letter to the viceroy, explaining the cause of my proceedings, which I delivered to her captain. I then proceeded for Lima, and re-captured one of the vessels as she was entering the port. From thence I shaped my course for the Gallapagos islands, where I cruized from the 17th April until the 3d October, 1813; during this time I touched only once on the coast of America, which was for the purpose of procuring a supply of fresh water, as none is to be found among these islands, which are, perhaps, the most barren and desolate of any known. While among this group, I captured the following British ships, employed chiefly in the spermaceti whale fishery, viz.

Letters of Marque.

	Tons.	Men.	Guns.	Pierced for.
Montezuma,	270	21	2	
Policy,	275	25	10	18
Georgiana,	280	25	6	18
Greenwich,	338	25	10	20
Atlantic,	355	24	8	20
Rose,	220	21	8	20
Hector,	270	25	11	20
Catharine,	270	29	8	18
Seringapatam,	350	31	14	26
Charlton,	274	21	10	18
New Zealander,	259	23	8	18
Sir A. Hammond,	301	31	12	18
	3369	302	107	

As some of these ships were captured by boats, and others by prizes, my officers and men had several opportunities of showing their gallantry.

The *Rose* and the *Charlton*, were given up to the prisoners; the *Hector*, *Catharine* and *Montezuma*, I sent to Valparaiso, where they were laid up: the *Policy*, *Georgiana*, and *New Zealand*, I sent for America: the *Greenwich* I kept as a store ship, to contain the stores of my other prizes, necessary for us, and the *Atlantic*, now called the *Essex Junior*, I equipped with 20 guns, and gave the command of her to lieutenant Downes.

Lieutenant Downes had conveyed the prizes to Valparaiso, and on his return brought me letters, informing me that a squadron under the command of commodore James Hillyar, consisting of the frigate *Phœbe*, of 36 guns, had sailed on the 6th July for this sea. The *Raccoon* and *Cherub*, had been seeking for me for some time on the coast of Brazil, and, on the return from their cruise, joined the squadron sent in search of me to the Pacific. My ship, as it may be supposed, after being near a year at sea, required some repairs to put her in a state to meet them; which I determined to do, and bring them to action, if I could meet them on nearly equal terms. I proceeded now, in company with the remainder of my prizes, to the island of Nooaheevah, or Madison's island, lying in the Washington group, discovered by a captain Ingraham, of Boston. Here I caulked and completely overhauled my ship, made for her a new set of water casks, her old ones being nearly decayed, and took on board from my prizes, provisions and stores for upwards of four months, and sailed for the coast of Chili on the 12th December, 1813. Previous to sailing I secured the *Seringapatam*, *Greenwich*, and *Sir A. Hammond*, under the guns of a battery which I erected for their protection: after taking possession of this fine island for the United States, and establishing the most friendly intercourse with the natives, I left them under charge of lieutenant Gamble, of the marines, with 21 men, with orders to repair to Valparaiso, after a certain period.

I arrived on the coast of Chili, on the 12th January, 1814; looked into Conception and Valparaiso, found at both places only three English vessels, and learned that the squadron which sailed from Rio de Janeiro for that sea, had not been heard of since their departure, and was supposed to be lost in endeavouring to double Cape Horn.

I had completely broken up the British navigation in the Pacific; the vessels which had not been captured by me, were laid up, and dare not venture out. I had afforded the most ample protection to our own vessels, which were, on my arrival, very numerous and unprotected. The valuable whale fishery there, is entirely destroyed, and the actual injury we have done them may be estimated at two and a half millions of dollars, independent of the expenses of the vessels in search of me. They have supplied me amply with sails, cordage, cables, anchors, provisions, medi-

cines, and stores of every description: and the slops on board them have furnished clothing for the seamen. We had, in fact, lived on the enemy since I had been in that sea, every prize having proved a well-found store ship for me. I had not yet been under the necessity of drawing bills on the department for any object, and had been enabled to make considerable advances to my officers and crew on account of pay.

For the unexampled time we had kept the sea, my crew had continued remarkably healthy. I had but one case of the scurvy, and had lost only the following men by death, viz.:

John S. Cowan, lieutenant; Robert Miller, surgeon; Levi Holmes, O. S.; Edward Sweeny, do.; Samuel Groce, seaman; James Spafford, gunner's mate; Benjamin Geers, John Rodgers, quarter gunners; Andrew Mahan, corporal of marines; Lewis Price, private marine.

I had done all the injury that could be done the British commerce in the Pacific, and still hoped to signalize my cruise by something more splendid, before leaving that sea. I thought it not improbable, that commodore Hillyar might have kept his arrival secret, and believing he would seek me at Valparaiso, as the most likely place to find me, I determined to cruise about that place, and should I fail of meeting him, hoped to be compensated by the capture of some merchant ships, said to be expected from England.

The *Phœbe*, agreeable to my expectations, came to seek me at Valparaiso, where I was anchored with the *Essex*; my armed prize, the *Essex Junior*, under the command of lieutenant Downes, on the look-out off the harbor. But contrary to the course I thought he would pursue, commodore Hillyar brought with him the *Cherub* sloop of war, mounting 28 guns, eighteen 32 pound carronades, eight 24's, and two long 9's on the quarter-deck and fore-castle, and a complement of 150 men. The force of the *Phœbe* is as follows:—thirty-two long 18 pounders, sixteen 32 pound carronades, one howitzer, and six 3 pounders in the tops, in all 53 guns, and a complement of 520 men: making a force of 81 guns, and 500 men: in addition to which they took on board the crew of an English letter of marque, lying in port. Both ships had picked crews, and were sent into the Pacific, in company with the *Raccoon* of 22 guns, and a store ship of 20 guns, for the express purpose of seeking the *Essex*, and were prepared with flags bearing the motto, "God and country: British sailor's best rights; traitors offend both." This was intended as a reply to my motto, "*Free trade and sailor's rights*," under the erroneous impression, that my crew were chiefly Englishmen, or to counteract its effect on their own crews. The force of the *Essex* was 46 guns, forty 32 pound carronades, and six long 12's, and her crew, which had been much reduced by prizes, amounted to only 255 men. The *Essex Junior*, which was intended chiefly as a store ship, mounted 20 guns, ten 18 pound carronades, and ten short 6's, with only 60

men on board. In reply to their motto, I wrote at my mizen, "*God, our country and liberty; tyrants offend them.*"

On getting their provisions on board, they went off the port for the purpose of blockading me, where they cruized for near six weeks; during which time I endeavoured to provoke a challenge, and frequently, but ineffectually, to bring the *Phœbe* alone to action, first with both my ships, and afterwards with my single ship, with both crews on board. I was several times under way, and ascertained that I had greatly the advantage in point of sailing, and once succeeded in closing within gun-shot of the *Phœbe*, and commenced a fire on her, when she ran down for the *Cherub*, which was two and a half miles to leeward: this excited some surprise and expressions of indignation, as previous to my getting under way, she hove to off the port, hoisted her motto flag, and fired a gun to windward. Commodore Hillyar seemed determined to avoid a contest with me on nearly equal terms, and from his extreme prudence in keeping both his ships ever after constantly within hail of each other, there were no hopes of any advantages to my country from a longer stay in port. I therefore determined to put to sea the first opportunity which should offer; and I was the more strongly induced to do so, as I had gained certain intelligence, that the *Tagus*, rated 38, and two other frigates, had sailed for that sea in pursuit of me. I had reason to expect the arrival of the *Racoon*, from the north-west coast of America, where she had been sent for the purpose of destroying our fur establishment on the *Columbia*. A rendezvous was appointed for the *Essex Junior*, and every arrangement made for sailing, and I intended to let them chase me off, to give the *Essex Junior* an opportunity of escaping. On the 28th March, the day after this determination was formed, the wind came to blow fresh from the southward, when I parted my larboard cable and dragged my starboard anchor directly out to sea. Not a moment was to be lost in getting sail on the ship. The enemy were close in with the point forming the west side of the bay; but on opening them, I saw a prospect of passing to windward, when I took in my top-gallant-sails, which were set over single-reefed-topsails, and braced up for this purpose; but on rounding the point, a heavy squall struck the ship, and carried away her main top-mast, precipitating the men who were aloft into the sea, who were drowned. Both ships now gave chase to me, and I endeavoured, in my disabled state, to regain the port; but finding I could not recover the common anchorage, I ran close into a small bay, about three quarters of a mile to leeward of the battery, on the east side of the harbor, and let go my anchor within pistol-shot of the shore, where I intended to repair my damages as soon as possible. The enemy continued to approach, shewed an evident intention of attacking us, regardless of the neutrality of the place where I was anchored; and the caution observed in their approach to the attack of the crippled *Essex*, was truly ridiculous, as was their display

of their motto flags, and the number of jacks at all their mast heads. I, with as much expedition as circumstances would admit of, got my ship ready for action, and endeavoured to get a spring on my cable, but had not succeeded when the enemy, at 54 minutes past 3 P. M. made his attack, the *Phœbe* placing herself under my stern, and the *Cherub* on my starboard bow; but the *Cherub* soon finding her situation a hot one, bore up and ran down under the stern also, where both ships kept up a hot raking fire.

I had got 3 long twelve pounders out of the stern ports, which were worked with so much bravery and skill, that in half an hour we so disabled both as to compel them to haul off to repair damages. In the course of this firing, I had, by the great exertions of Mr. Edward Barnwell, the acting sailing master, assisted by Mr. Linscott, the boatswain, succeeded in getting springs on our cable three different times; but the fire of the enemy was so excessive, that before we could get our broadside to bear, they were shot away, and thus rendered useless to us. My ship had received many injuries and several had been killed and wounded; but my brave officers and men, notwithstanding the unfavourable circumstances under which we were brought to action, and the powerful force opposed to us, were no ways discouraged; all appeared determined to defend their ship to the last extremity, and to die in preference to a shameful surrender. Our gaff, with the ensign and the motto flag at the mizen, had been shot away, but *FREE TRADE AND SAILOR'S RIGHTS*, continued to fly at the fore. Our ensign was replaced by another; and to guard against a similar event, an ensign was made fast in the mizen rigging, and several jacks were hoisted in different parts of the ship. The enemy soon repaired his damages for a fresh attack. He now placed himself, with both his ships on my starboard quarter, out of the reach of my carronades, and where my stern guns could not be brought to bear. He there kept up a most galling fire, which it was out of my power to return, when I saw no prospect of injuring him without getting under weigh and becoming the assailant. My top-sail sheets and haul-yards were all shot away as well as the jib and fore-top-mast stay sail haul-yards. The only rope not cut was the flying jib haul-yards, and that being the only sail I could set, I caused it to be hoisted, my cable to be cut, and ran down on both ships, with an intention of laying the *Phœbe* on board. The firing on both sides was now tremendous. I had let fall my fore-top-sail and foresail, but the want of tacks and sheets had rendered them almost useless to us; yet we were enabled, for a short time, to close with the enemy; and although our decks were now strewn with dead, and our cockpit filled with wounded—although our ship had been several times on fire, and was rendered a perfect wreck, we were still encouraged to a hope to save her, from the circumstance of the *Cherub* being compelled to haul off. She did not return to close action, although she appa-

rently had it in her power to do so, but kept up a distant firing with her long guns.

The *Phœbe*, from our disabled state, was enabled, however, by edging off, to choose the distance which best suited her long guns, and kept up a tremendous fire on us, which mowed down my brave companions by the dozen. Many of my guns had been rendered useless by the enemy's shot, and many of them had their whole crews destroyed. We manned them again from those which were disabled, and one gun in particular was three times manned; 15 men were slain at it in the action! but strange as it may appear, the captain of it escaped with only a slight wound. Finding that the enemy had it in his power to chose his distance, I now gave up all hopes of closing with him, and as the wind, for the moment, seemed to favour the design, I determined to endeavour to run her on shore, land my men and destroy her. Every thing seemed to favour my wishes. We had approached the shore within musket shot, and I had no doubt of succeeding, when, in an instant, the wind shifted from the land (as is very common in this port in the latter part of the day) and payed our head down on the *Phœbe*, where we were again exposed to a dreadful raking fire. My ship was now totally unmanageable; yet, as her head was toward the enemy, and he to leeward of me, I still hoped to be able to board him. At this moment lieutenant commandant Downes came on board, to receive my orders, under the impression that I should soon be a prisoner. He could be of no use to me in the then wretched state of the *Essex*; and finding (from the enemy's putting his helm up) that my last attempt at boarding would not succeed, I directed him, after he had been about ten minutes on board, to return to his own ship, to be prepared for defending and destroying her in case of an attack. He took with him several of my wounded, leaving three of his boat's crew on board to make room for them. The *Cherub* now had an opportunity of distinguishing herself, by keeping up a hot fire on him during his return.

The slaughter on board my ship had now become horrible; the enemy continuing to rake us, and we unable to bring a gun to bear. I therefore directed a hawser to be bent to the sheet anchor, and the anchor to be cut from the bows to bring her head round. This succeeded. We again got our broadside to bear, and as the enemy was much crippled and unable to hold his own, I have no doubt he would soon have drifted out of gun-shot before he discovered we had anchored, had not the hawser unfortunately parted. My ship had taken fire several times during the action, but alarmingly so forward and aft at this moment; the flames were bursting up each hatchway, and no hopes were entertained of saving her; our distance from the shore did not exceed three quarters of a mile, and I hoped many of my brave crew would be able to save themselves, should the ship blow up, as I was informed the fire was near the magazine, and the explosion of a large

quantity of powder below, served to increase the horrors of our situation. Our boats were destroyed by the enemy's shot ; I therefore directed those who could swim to jump overboard, and endeavour to gain the shore. Some reached it, some were taken by the enemy, and some perished in the attempt ; but most preferred sharing with me the fate of the ship.

We who remained, now turned our attention wholly to extinguishing the flames ; and when we had succeeded, went again to our guns, where the firing was kept up for some minutes, but the crew had by this time become so weakened, that they all declared to me the impossibility of making further resistance, and entreated me to surrender my ship to save the wounded, as all further attempts at opposition must prove ineffectual, almost every gun being disabled by the destruction of their crews. I now sent for the officers of divisions to consult them ; but what was my surprise to find only acting lieutenant Stephen Decatur McKnight remaining, who confirmed the report respecting the condition of the guns on the quarter-deck—those on the spar-deck were not in a better state. Lieutenant Wilmer, after fighting most gallantly throughout the action, had been knocked overboard by a splinter, while getting the sheet anchor from the bows, and was drowned. Acting lieutenant John G. Cowell had lost a leg ; Mr. Edward Barnwell, acting sailing master, had been carried below, after receiving two severe wounds, one in the breast and one in the face ; and acting lieutenant William H. Odenheimer had been knocked overboard from the quarter, an instant before, and did not regain the ship till after the surrender.

I was informed that the cockpit, the steerage, the wardroom, and the birth-deck, could contain no more wounded ; and that the wounded were killed while the surgeons were dressing them, and that unless something was speedily done to prevent it, the ship would soon sink, from the number of shot-holes in her bottom. And on sending for the carpenter, he informed me that all his crew had been killed or wounded, and that he had been once over the side to stop the leaks, when his slings had been shot away, and it was with difficulty he was saved from drowning. The enemy, from the smoothness of the water, and the impossibility of our reaching him with our carronades, and the little apprehension that was excited by our fire, which had now become much slackened, was enabled to take aim at us as at a target ; his shot never missed our hull, and my ship was cut up in a manner which was perhaps never before witnessed : in fine, I saw no hopes of saving her, and at 20 minutes after 6 P. M. gave the painful order to strike the colours. Seventy-five men, including officers, were all that remained of my whole crew, after the action, capable of doing duty, and many of them severely wounded, some of whom have since died. *The enemy still continued his fire*, and my brave, though unfortunate companions were still falling about me. I directed an opposite gun to be fired, to show them we intended no further resistance ;

but they did not desist ; four men were killed at my side, and others in different parts of the ship. I now believed he intended to show us no quarter, and that it would be as well to die with my flag flying as struck, and was on the point of again hoisting it, when, about ten minutes after hauling the colours down, *he ceased firing.*

I cannot speak in sufficiently high terms of the conduct of those engaged for such an unparalleled length of time, (under such circumstances) with me, in the arduous and unequal contest. Let it suffice to say, that more bravery, skill, patriotism, and zeal, were never displayed on any occasion; every one seemed determined to die in defence of their much loved country's cause, and nothing but views to humanity could ever have reconciled them to the surrender of the ship; they remembered their wounded and helpless ship-mates below. To acting lieutenants M^r Knight and Odenheimer, I feel much indebted for their great exertions and bravery throughout the action, in fighting and encouraging the men at their divisions, for the dexterous management of the long guns, and for their promptness in re-manning their guns, as their crews were slaughtered. The conduct of that brave and heroic officer, acting lieutenant John G. Cowell, who lost his leg in the latter part of the action, excited the admiration of every man in the ship, and after being wounded, would not consent to be taken below, until loss of blood rendered him insensible. Mr. Edward Barnwell, acting sailing-master, whose activity and courage were equally conspicuous, returned on deck after his first wound, and remained after receiving his second, until fainting with loss of blood. Mr. Samuel B. Johnston, who had joined me the day before, and acted as marine officer, conducted himself with great bravery, and exerted himself in assisting at the long guns, the musketry after the first half hour being useless (from our great distance).

Mr. M. W. Bostwick, whom I had appointed acting purser of the Essex Junior, and who was on board my ship, did the duties of an aid, in a manner which reflects on him the highest honour; midshipmen Isaacs, Farragut, and Ogden, as well as acting midshipmen James Terry, James R. Lyman, and Samuel Duzenbury, and master's mate William Pierce, exerted themselves in the performance of their respective duties, and gave an earnest of their value to the service; the three first are too young to recommend for promotion, the latter I beg leave to recommend for confirmation, as well as the acting lieutenants, and Messrs. Barnwell, Johnston, and Bostwick.

We have been unfortunate, but not disgraced; the defence of the Essex has not been less honourable to her officers and crew, than the capture of an equal force, and I now consider my situation less unpleasant than that of commodore Hillyar, who, in violation of every principle of honour and generosity, and regardless of the rights of nations, attacked the Essex in her crippled state,

within pistol-shot of a neutral shore ; when for six weeks I had daily offered him fair and honourable combat, on terms greatly to his advantage ; the blood of the slain must be on his head, and he has yet to reconcile his conduct to Heaven, to his conscience, and to the world. The annexed extract of a letter from commodore Hillyar, which was written previously to his returning me my sword, will show his opinion of our conduct.

My loss has been dreadfully severe ; 58 killed or have since died of their wounds, and among them is lieutenant Cowell ; 59 were severely wounded, 27 slightly, and 31 are missing ; making in all 154, killed, wounded, and missing, a list of whose names is annexed.

The professional knowledge of doctor Richard Hoffman, acting surgeon, and doctor Alexander Montgomery, acting surgeon's mate, added to their assiduity, and the benevolent attentions and assistance of Mr. D. P. Adams, the chaplain, saved the lives of many of the wounded. Those gentlemen have been indefatigable in their attentions to them ; the two first I beg leave to recommend for confirmation, and the latter to the notice of the department.

I must in justice to myself observe, that with our six 12 pounders only we fought this action, our carronades being almost useless.

The loss in killed and wounded has been great with the enemy ; among the former is the first lieutenant of the *Phœbe*, and of the latter captain Tucker, of the *Cherub*, whose wounds are severe. Both the *Essex* and *Phœbe* were in a sinking state, and it was with difficulty they could be kept afloat until anchored in Valparaiso next morning. The shattered state of the *Essex* will, I believe, prevent her ever reaching England, and I also think it will be out of their power to repair the damages of the *Phœbe*, so as to enable her to double Cape Horn. All the masts and yards of the *Phœbe* and *Cherub* are badly crippled, and their hulls much cut up ; the former had eighteen 12 pound shot through her below her water line, some three feet under water. Nothing but the smoothness of the water saved both the *Phœbe* and *Essex*.

I hope, sir, that our conduct may prove satisfactory to our country, and that it will testify it by obtaining our speedy exchange, that we may again have it in our power to prove our zeal.

Commodore Hillyar (I am informed,) has thought proper to state to his government, that the action only lasted 45 minutes. Should he have done so, the motive may be easily discovered ; but the thousands of disinterested witnesses who covered the surrounding hills, can testify that we fought his ships near two hours and a half ; upwards of 50 broadsides were fired by the enemy, agreeably to their own accounts, and upwards of 75 by ours ; except the few minutes they were repairing damages, the firing was incessant.

Soon after my capture, I entered into an agreement with commodore Hillyar to disarm my prize, the *Essex Junior*, and proceed with the survivors of my officers and crew in her to the United States, taking with me her officers and crew. He consented to grant her a passport to secure her from re-capture. The ship was small, and we knew we had much to suffer, yet we hoped soon to reach our country in safety, that we might again have it in our power to serve it. This arrangement was attended with no additional expense, as she was abundantly supplied with provisions and stores for the voyage.

In justice to commodore Hillyar, I must observe, that, (although I can never be reconciled to the manner of his attack on the *Essex*, or to his conduct before the action) he has, since our capture, shown the greatest humanity to my wounded, (whom he permitted me to land, on condition that the United States should bear their expenses,) and has endeavoured, as much as lay in his power, to alleviate the distresses of war by the most generous and delicate deportment towards my officers and crew; he gave orders that the property of every person should be respected; which orders, however, were not so strictly attended to as might have been expected; besides being deprived of books, charts, &c. &c. both myself and officers lost many articles of our clothing, some to a considerable amount. I should not have considered this last circumstance of sufficient importance to notice, did it not mark a striking difference between the navy of Great Britain and that of the United States, highly creditable to the latter.

By the arrival of the *Tagus*, a few days after my capture, I was informed, that besides the ships which had arrived in the Pacific in pursuit of me, and those still expected, others were sent to cruise for me in the China Seas, off New Zealand, Timor, and New Holland, and that another frigate was sent to the river la Plate.

To possess the *Essex* it has cost the British government near six millions of dollars, and yet, sir, her capture was owing entirely to accident; and if we consider the expedition with which naval contests are now decided, the action is a dishonour to them. Had they brought their ships boldly into action, with a force so very superior, and having the choice of position, they should either have captured or destroyed us in one fourth the time they were about it.

During the action, our consul general Mr. Poinsett, called on the governor of Valparaiso, and requested that the batteries might protect the *Essex*. This request was refused, but he promised that if she should succeed in fighting her way to the common anchorage, that he would send an officer to the British commander and request him to cease firing, but declined using force under any circumstances, and there is no doubt a perfect understanding existed between them. This conduct, added to the assistance given to the British, and their friendly reception after the action, and

the strong bias of the faction which govern Chili in favor of the English, as well as their inhospitality to the Americans, induced Mr. Poinsett to leave that country. Under such circumstances, I did not conceive it would be proper for me to claim the restoration of my ship, confident that the claim would be made by my government to more effect. Finding some difficulty in the sale of my prizes, I had taken the Hector and Catharine to sea and burnt them with their cargoes.

I exchanged lieutenant M^r. Knight, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Lyman, and eleven seamen, for part of the crew of the *Sir Andrew Hammond*; and sailed from Valparaiso on the 27th April, where the enemy were still patching up their ships, to put them in a state for proceeding to Rio de Janeiro, previous to going to England.

Annexed is a list of the remains of my crew to be exchanged, as also a copy of the correspondence between commodore Hillyar and myself on that subject. I also send you a list of the prisoners I have taken during my cruise, amounting to 343.

I have the honour to be, &c.

D. PORTER.

The honourable Secretary of the Navy
of the United States, Washington.

P. S. To give you a correct idea of the state of the *Essex* at the time of her surrender, I send you the boatswain's and carpenter's report of damages; I also send you a report of the divisions.

Extract of a letter from commodore Hillyar to commodore Porter.

"PIICEBE, April 4th, 1814.

"MY DEAR SIR,

"Neither in our conversations, nor in the accompanying letter, have I mentioned your sword. Ascribe my remissness in the first instance to forgetfulness; I consider it only in my servant's possession with my own, until the master may please to call for it; and although I omitted, at the moment of representation, from my mind being much engrossed in attending to professional duties, to offer its restoration, the hand that received will be most gladly extended to put it in possession of him who wore it so honourably in defence of his country's cause.

"Believe me, my dear sir, &c.

"JAMES HILLYAR."

After some conversation on the subject, the following correspondence took place.

VALPARAISO, April 4th, 1814.

SIR.

Taking into consideration the immense distance we are from our respective countries, the uncertainty of the future movements

of his majesty's ships under my command, which precludes the possibility of my making a permanent arrangement for transporting the officers and crew of the late Essex to Europe; and the fast approaching season which renders a passage round Cape Horn in some degree dangerous; I have the honour to propose for your approbation the following articles, which, I hope, the government of the United States as well as that of Great Britain, will deem satisfactory; and request, that should you conceive them so, you will favor me with the necessary bond for their fulfilment.

1st. The Essex Junior to be deprived of all her armament and perfectly neutralized; to be equipped for the voyage solely and wholly at the expense of the American government; and to proceed with a proper American officers and crew (of which I wish to be furnished with a list, for the purpose of giving the necessary passport) to any port in the United States of America, that you may deem most proper.

2d. Yourself, the officers, petty officers, seamen and marines, &c. composing your crew, to be exchanged immediately on their arrival in America, for an equal number of British prisoners of similar rank; yourself and officers to be considered on their parole of honour until your and their exchange shall be effected.

In case of the foregoing articles being accepted the Essex Junior will be expected to prepare immediately for her voyage, and to proceed on it before the expiration of the present month. Should any of the wounded, at that period, be found incapable of removal, from not being sufficiently advanced in their recovery, the most humane attention shall be paid to them; and they shall be forwarded home by the first favourable conveyance that may offer.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JAMES HILLYAR.

Cap. David Porter, late commander
of the U. S. frigate Essex, Valparaiso.

VALPARAISO, April 5th, 1811.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your several favours of yesterday's date.

The conditions offered by you for our return to the United States are perfectly satisfactory to me; and I entertain no doubts of their being equally so to my country. I, therefore, do not hesitate to pledge my honour (the strongest bond I can give) that every article of the arrangement shall, on our part, be fully complied with. A list of the Essex Junior's crew shall be furnished you as soon as it can be made out, and her disarmament effected with all possible despatch.

I have the honour to be, &c.

DAVID PORTER.

Com. James Hillyar, commanding
H. B. M's frigate *Phoebe*, Valparaiso.

Commodore Hillyar sent me a paper certifying that he had exchanged certain individuals, therein named, making part of the crew of the *Sir Andrew Hammond*, for an equal number of the most severely wounded of my crew; this occasioned the following letters:

VALPARAISO, April 4th, 1814

SIR,

I have received a paper signed by you, dated yesterday, stating, that you had exchanged certain wounded prisoners, making part of my crew, for the captain and crew of the prize ship *Sir Andrew Hammond*, which paper I have taken the liberty to return to you, and protest in the strongest terms against such arrangement.

In the first place, the wounded and helpless individuals therein named, do not wish such exchange; one died last night and several others expect to share his fate.

Secondly, should I from my circumstances be separated from them, which would be more likely to be the case than if they remained prisoners, their situation would be more deplorable than it is at present.

Thirdly, this arrangement has been made without my consent, and on terms far from offering equal advantages to the United States.

I have the honour to be, &c.

D. PORTER.

Com. James Hillyar, commanding
H. B. M's frigate *Phœbe*.

— — — — —
HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S SHIP *PHOEBE*,

Valparaiso, April 4th, 1814

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date, protesting against the arrangement I made in the paper you returned, and to express a regret that my wish, which was to alleviate and not to increase the afflictions of your wounded officers and crew, has failed of being gratified. I am sorry you have thought proper to mention the dead and dying, as I so fully explained to you this morning, that in the event of the loss of any, other names should be added to the list. I shall now direct captain David Porter to consider himself still a prisoner of war on his parole; but as I have ordered the people to go on board the *Essex* to work, under the impression that no difficulty would arise, I will liberate in exchange for them an equal number of prisoners, as their names, being seamen, shall be found to follow each other on your late ship's books, and give up also two mates or midshipmen, for the two mates of the *English* prize. I hope this may prove satisfactory to your government and others.

I am yours, &c.

JAMES HILLYAR.

Captain D. Porter.

VALPARAISO, April 5th, 1814.

SIR,

The arrangement which you have suggested respecting the exchange of the seamen of the Sir Andrew Hammond, for an equal number of the seamen of the late United States' frigate Essex, as they stand on the list furnished you, is perfectly satisfactory. It will be a great satisfaction to the three officers who accompany the Essex, to know, that after your object in taking them with you shall be effected, there will be no difficulty in their proceeding immediately for the United States; I take the liberty therefore to suggest that they might be exchanged here for captain William Porter and his three mates. This will be an accommodation to all parties, and reconcile the officers so exchanged to a separation from their friends.

I have the honour to be, &c.

DAVID PORTER.

Com. James Hillyar, commanding
H. B. M's frigate Phœbe.

NEW YORK, July 13th, 1814.

SIR,

There are some facts relating to our enemy, and although not connected with the action tend to show his perfidy, and should be known.

On commodore Hillyar's arrival at Valparaiso, he ran the Phœbe close along side the Essex, and enquired politely after my health, observing that his ship was cleared for action, and his men prepared for boarding. I observed, "Sir, if you, by any accident, get on board of me, I assure you that great confusion will take place; I am prepared to receive you, but shall only act on the defensive." He observed coolly and indifferently, "Oh, sir, I have no such intention;" at this instant his ship took aback on my starboard bow, her yards nearly locking with those of the Essex. I called all hands to board the enemy; and in an instant my crew were ready to spring on her decks. Commodore Hillyar exclaimed, with great agitation, "I had no intention of coming so near you. I am sorry I came so near you." His ship fell off with the jib-boom over my decks; her bows exposed to my broadside, her stern to the fire of the Essex Junior, her crew in the greatest confusion; and in fifteen minutes I could have taken or destroyed her. After he had brought his ship to anchor, commodore Hillyar and captain Tucker, of the Cherub, visited me on shore, when I asked him if he intended to respect the neutrality of the port. "Sir," said he, "you have paid such respect to the neutrality of this port that I feel myself bound, in *honour*, to do the same."

I have the honour to be, &c.

DAVID PORTER.

The Secretary of the Navy.

[It is deemed proper to introduce the following letters in this place, as they are the sequel of captain Porter's cruise in the Pacific.—*EDITOR.*]

NEW YORK, August 28th, 1815.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that on the 12th of December, 1813, (the day on which the Essex frigate and Essex Junior took their departure from Nooaheevah,) I was left in Port Anna Maria Bay, with eighteen men under my command, and six prisoners of war in charge of the establishment on shore, together with the prize ships Greenwich, Seringapatam, Sir Andrew Hammond, and New Zealander, with orders from captain Porter to remain five and a half calendar months at that place; at the expiration of which time, should he not return or send me further instructions how to act, I was, if possible, to man two of the ships, and after taking every article of value out of the other and burning her, repair to the port of Valparaiso, where, in the event of not finding the frigate, or additional orders, I was authorized to dispose of one of the ships to the best advantage, and take all the men under my charge, as well as the prize crews of the different ships then in that port, on board of the other, and proceed to the United States.

After receiving these instructions my first object was, agreeably to captain Porter's wish, to fill the New Zealander with oil from the other ships, and on the 28th day of December, she took her departure for the United States, with a cargo of 1950 barrels, and well found in every respect for so long a voyage.

It is with regret I inform you, that the frigate had scarcely got clear of the Marquesas, before we discovered a hostile disposition in the natives, and in a few days they became so insolent, that I found it absolutely necessary, not only for the security of the ships and property on shore, but for our personal safety, to land my men and regain by force of arms the numerous articles they had in the most daring manner stolen from the encampment; and what was of still greater importance, to prevent, if possible, the execution of threats, which might have been attended with very serious consequences to us, as duty required my men to be much separated. I, however, had the satisfaction to accomplish my wish without firing a musket, and from that time lived in perfect amity with them, until the 7th day of May following, when my distressed situation had nearly placed me in their power. Before, however, mentioning the lamentable events of that and the two following days, I will give you a brief account of a few preceding occurrences, which were sources of great uneasiness:

The first was the death of John Witter, (a faithful old marine who was unfortunately drowned in the surf on the 28th of February,) and the desertion of four of my men; one of them, a black named Isaac Coffin, had deserted from the Essex the day before she left the bay, and was then a prisoner for making the second attempt. They took advantage of a dark night, and left the bay

in a whale boat, unobserved, (all, except the *prisoner*, having the watch on deck), and carried off several muskets, a supply of ammunition, and many things of but little value. I was prevented from pursuing them, as they had in a measure destroyed the only remaining boat at that time seaworthy.

On the 12th of April we commenced rigging the *Seringapatam*, and Sir Andrew Hammond, which, as I had calculated, kept the men employed until the 1st of May. All hands were then engaged in removing the remainder of the property from the *Greenwich* to the *Seringapatam*, as I began to despair of being rejoined by the frigate at that place.

The work went on well, and the men were obedient to my orders, though I discovered an evident change in their countenances which led me to suppose that there was something wrong in agitation. Under that impression I caused all the muskets, ammunition, and small arms of every description, to be removed from the other ships to the *Greenwich*, (the one on board of which I lived,) as a necessary precaution against a surprise from my own men.

On the 7th of May, while on board the *Seringapatam*, on duty which required my presence, I was suddenly and violently attacked by the men employed in that ship. After struggling a short time and receiving many bruises, I was prostrated on the deck and my hands and legs tied. They then threw me on the second deck, thence dragged me into the cabin and confined me in the run. Midshipman Feltus, and acting midshipman Clapp, were in a few minutes after thrown in, tied in the same manner as myself; the scuttle was then nailed down and a sentinel placed over it. After spiking all the guns of the *Greenwich* and of the *Fort*, and those of the *Sir Andrew Hammond* that were loaded; plundering the ships of every thing valuable; committing many wanton depredations on shore; taking all the arms and ammunition from the *Greenwich*; sending for Robert White, who was turned ashore from the *Essex* for mutinous conduct; and bending all the necessary sails; they stood out of the bay with a light wind off the land. My fellow prisoners and myself were shortly after taken out of the run and placed in the cabin, under the immediate charge of several men. I then learned the names of the mutineers, and assure you, sir, even in my truly painful situation, it afforded me no small degree of consolation, that there were no Americans among them.

The following are the names of the mutineers and prisoners of war:—Thomas Belcher, boatswain's mate, Englishman; James Bantum, negro; Martin Stanley, foreigner; Robert George, Joseph Curtis, Richard Power, and Jeremiah Workman, Englishmen, (who entered on board the *Essex* from the whaling ships captured in the Pacific Ocean,) and Robert White, mutineer.—Prisoners, William Clarke, Lewis Ransford, James Morrison, William Stiles, James Duncan, and Robert Lambries.

Shortly after getting clear of the bay, one of the sentinels, (although repeatedly cautioned against putting his finger on the trigger) fired a pistol, the contents of which passed through my left heel a little below the ankle bone. As soon as the men on deck heard the report, they immediately pointed their muskets down the sky-light and were in the act of firing, but were prevented by the sentinel, who told them that the pistol was accidentally discharged.

At nine o'clock, the night dark, and the wind blowing fresh, after receiving (by request) from the mutineers a barrel of powder and three old muskets, I was put into a leaky boat, in which I found my unfortunate companions, and the only two Americans that were in the ship at the time the mutiny took place, the others being employed on board the Greenwich, and on shore, in putting the arms in order, baking bread, and doing other work which required the most trusty. In this situation, after rowing at least six miles, and every person exhausted from the great exertions made to keep the boat from sinking, we reached the Greenwich, where I found the few remaining men anxiously looking out for me, and seriously alarmed at the conduct of the savages, who had already begun to plunder the encampment, and been informed by Wilson, (a man who had lived among them for several years, and who, as I afterwards learned, was not only instrumental in promoting the mutiny, but, in my absence, plundered the Sir Andrew Hammond) of our defenceless situation.

Finding it impossible to comply with that part of my instructions, directing me to remain in the bay until the 27th of May, I thought it most advisable to repair to the port of Valparaiso, and with that view, all hands, assisted by George Ross and William Brudenell, (who were living on the island for the purpose of collecting sandal wood,) exerted themselves in making the necessary preparations to depart. My first object was to put the Sir Andrew Hammond in such a situation, that we might get under way at any moment. After which, all hands were engaged in getting the few articles of value from shore, and in endeavouring to recover the property stolen from the Sir Andrew Hammond, when the savages made an unprovoked and wanton attack upon us, in which I have with the deepest regret to inform you, that midshipmen William Feltus, John Thomas, Thomas Gibbs, and William Brudenell, were massacred, and Peter Coddington dangerously wounded, who, with William Worth, made his escape by swimming some distance, when they were both taken out of the water by acting midshipman Clapp, and the three remaining men. Our situation at this moment was most desperate. The savages put off in every direction for the purpose of intercepting the boat and boarding the ship, but were driven back by my firing the few guns we had just before loaded with grape and cannister shot. Before the boat returned and the guns were re-loaded they made a second attempt, and afterwards repeated efforts, first to board the Green-

wich and then the Sir Andrew Hammond, but were repulsed by our keeping up a constant fire. During this time several hundred were employed in pulling down the houses and plundering the encampment, whilst others were in the fort, endeavouring (assisted by Wilson, who had received several casks of powder from the mutineers) to get the spikes out of the guns. As soon as William Worth had recovered a little strength, after having been so long in the water, I sent the boat to the Greenwich for John Pettinger, a sick man, and some things that were indispensably necessary, with orders to burn that ship and return with all possible despatch, as our ammunition was nearly expended, and we had no other means of keeping the savages one moment out of the ship. We then bent the jib and spanker, cut the moorings, and luckily had a light breeze, which carried us clear of the bay, with only six cartridges remaining.

We now found our situation most distressing, for in attempting to run the boat up she broke in two parts, and we were compelled to cut away from the bows the only remaining anchor, not being able to cast it. We mustered altogether eight souls, of whom there were one cripple confined to his bed; one man dangerously wounded; one sick; one convalescent (a feeble old man just recovering from the scurvy); and myself unable to lend any further assistance, the exertions of the day having inflamed my wound so much as to produce a violent fever; leaving midshipman Clapp and two men only capable of doing duty.

In that state, destitute of charts, and of every means of getting to windward, I saw but one alternative; to run the trade winds down, and, if possible, make the Sandwich islands, in hopes of either falling in with some of the Canton ships (that being their principal place of rendezvous) or of obtaining some assistance from Tamaahmaah, king of the Windward Islands. No time was lost in bending the topsails, and on the 10th of May we took our departure from Robert's Island, on the 25th of the same month made Owhyhee, and on the 30th, after suffering much, came to anchor in Whyttee Bay, at the Island of Woahoo. I here found captain Winship, several officers of ships, and a number of men, from whom (particularly captain W.) I received every assistance their situations could afford me. The natives, though at first surprised at our deplorable condition, and inquisitive to know the cause, of which I did not think prudent to inform them, supplied the ship with fresh meat, fruits and vegetables, partly on condition that I would take the chief man of the island and some others, with their property up to the Windward Island, where I found it necessary to go (after shipping some men) in order to procure from the king, a supply of provisions. Thence, it was my intention to have proceeded to Valparaiso, in compliance with my instructions from captain Porter, but I was unfortunately captured on the passage by the English ship Cherub, of twenty guns. I was somewhat surprised to hear captain Tucker say (when I pointed out

a valuable canoe and many other articles, which I assured him was the property of the natives, and that I was merely conveying them and it from one island to the other, the weather being too boisterous at that time for them to make the passage in their canoes) that every thing found in a prize ship belonged to the captors. I thus had the mortification to see the people, from whom I had received so much kindness, sent on shore, deprived of all they had been collecting for twelve months, and were about to present to their king as a tribute.

The Cherub proceeded to Atooi, where she captured the ship Charon, and made many fruitless attempts to get the cargo of that ship, and of several others which had been deposited on the island under the immediate protection of the king of the Leeward Islands. She took her departure on the 15th of July, and on the 28th of November arrived at Rio de Janeiro with her prizes, touching on the passage for refreshments at Otaheite and Valparaiso. During her stay at the latter place, the frigates Britton and Tagus arrived from the Marquesas, where they had been in search of the ships left under my charge. On the 15th of December the prisoners were sent on shore, having received the most rigorous treatment from captain Tucker during their long confinement in his ship, and the greater part of them, like the natives, left destitute of every thing, save the clothes on their backs. The men belonging to the Essex had little to lose, but those I shipped at Woahoo, had received in part money and goods, for one, two, and some of them three years services in the Canton ships.

On the 15th of May (by the advice of a physician who attended me,) I took my departure from Rio de Janeiro in a Swedish ship, bound to Havre de Grace, leaving behind acting midshipman Benjamin Clapp and five men, having lost one soon after my arrival at that place, with the small pox. No opportunity had previously offered by which I could possibly leave that place, the English admiral on that station, being determined to prevent, by every means in his power, American prisoners returning to their own country.

On the 10th instant, in latitude 47 north and longitude 18 west, I took passage on board the ship Oliver Elsworth, captain Roberts, 15 days from Havre de Grace, bound to New York.

I arrived here last evening, and have the honour to await, either the orders of the Navy Department or the commandant of the marine corps.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN M. GAMBLE.

The Secretary of the Navy.

UNITED STATES' FRIGATE ESSEX, AT SEA,
July 14th, 1815.

SIR,

Allow me to return to you my thanks for your handsome conduct in bringing the Seringapatam to action, which greatly

facilitated her capture, while it prevented the possibility of her escape.

Be assured, sir, I shall make a suitable representation of the affair to the honourable Secretary of the Navy.

With the greatest respect, &c.

D. PORTER:

Lieut. John M. Gamble, commanding
the prize ship *Greenwich*.

NAVY COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE, February 10th, 1816.

SIR,

Captain John M. Gamble of the marines served with me in the *Essex*, from the time of my taking command of that vessel, until my departure from Madison's Island; during the whole of which his conduct was such as to entitle him to my respect, as an officer and a gentleman. During a great part of my cruize in the South Seas, captain (then lieutenant) Gamble, continued in command of one of my most valuable prizes, and while in that situation brought to action with an inferior force, and caused to surrender, an armed vessel of the enemy, which had long been the terror of the American ships, which had been engaged in commercial and other pursuits in that ocean.

Honourable mention was made of this affair to the Secretary of the Navy, but by the capture of the vessel, the account was lost, and of course never reached the United States.

Captain Gamble at all times greatly distinguished himself by his activity in every enterprize engaged in by the force under my command, and in many critical encounters by the natives of Madison's Island, rendered essential services, and at all times distinguished himself by his coolness and bravery. I therefore do, with pleasure, recommend him to the department as an officer deserving of its patronage.

I have the honour to be, &c.

DAVID PORTER.

Hon. B. W. Crowninshield, Secretary of the Navy.

NAVY COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE, February 28th, 1816.

SIR,

Captain Gamble of the marine corps, has informed me that he had understood it to be your wish that I should state my opinion positively, whether I think him entitled to a brevet for the services rendered. Making part of the department, motives of delicacy prevented my doing so before, but I now avail myself of the opportunity of assuring you, that no marine officer in the service, ever had such strong claims as captain Gamble, and that none have been placed in such conspicuous and critical situations, and

that none could have extricated themselves from them more to their honour.

I have the honour to be, &c.

D. PORTER.

Honourable B. W. Crowninshield,
Secretary of the Navy.

HEAD QUARTERS, CHIPPEWA PLAINS, July 7th, 1814.

DEAR SIR,

On the 2d instant I issued my order for crossing the Niagara river, and made the arrangements deemed necessary for securing the garrison of fort Erie. On the 3d that post surrendered at 5 P. M. Our loss in this affair was four of the 25th regiment under major Jessup, of brigadier general Scott's brigade, wounded. I have enclosed a return of the prisoners, of the ordnance, and ordnance stores captured.

To secure my rear, I have placed a garrison in this fort, and requested captain Kennedy to station his vessels near the post.

On the morning of the 4th, brigadier general Scott, with his brigade and a corps of artillery, was ordered to advance towards Chippewa, and be governed by circumstances; taking care to secure a good military position for the night. After some skirmishing with the enemy, he selected this plain with the eye of a soldier, his right resting on the river, and a ravine being in front. At 11 at night, I joined him with the reserve under general Ripley, our field and battering train, and corps of artillery under major Hindman. General Porter arrived the next morning with a part of the New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, and some of the warriors of the Six Nations.

Early in the morning of the 5th, the enemy commenced a petty war upon our pickets, and, as he was indulged, his presumption increased; by noon he showed himself on the left of our extensive line, and attacked one of our pickets as it was returning to camp. Captain Treat, who commanded it, retired disgracefully, leaving a wounded man on the ground. Captain Biddle, of the artillery, who was near the scene, impelled by feelings highly honourable to him as a soldier and officer, promptly assumed the command of this picket, led it back to the wounded man, and brought him off the field. I ordered captain Treat, on the spot, to retire from the army, and as I am anxious that no officers shall remain under my command who can be suspected of cowardice, I advise that captain Treat,* and lieutenant ———, who was also with the picket, be struck from the rolls of the army.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, agreeably to a plan I had given general Porter, he advanced from the rear of our camp, with the volunteers and Indians (taking the woods in order to keep out of view of the enemy), with the hope of bringing his pickets and

*Captain Treat was tried by a court martial and honourably acquitted.

scouting parties between his [Porter's] line of march, and our camp. As Porter moved, I ordered the parties advanced in front of our camp to fall back gradually, under the enemy's fire, in order to draw him, if possible, up to our line. About half past 4, the advance of general Porter's command met the light parties of the enemy in the woods, upon our extreme left. The enemy were driven, and Porter advancing near to Chippewa, met their whole column in order of battle. From the cloud of dust rising, and the heavy firing, I was led to conclude that the entire force of the enemy was in march, and prepared for action. I immediately ordered general Scott to advance with his brigade, and Towson's artillery, and meet them upon the plain in front of our camp. The general did not expect to be gratified with a field engagement. He advanced in the most prompt and officer-like style, and in a few minutes was in close action upon the plain, with a superior force of British regular troops. By this time general Porter's command had given way, and fled in every direction, notwithstanding his personal gallantry, and great exertions to stay their flight. The retreat of the volunteers and Indians caused the left flank of general Scott's brigade to be greatly exposed. Captain Harris, with his dragoons, was directed to stop the fugitives, behind the ravine fronting our camp; and I sent colonel Gardner to order general Ripley to advance with the 21st regiment which formed part of the reserve, pass to the left of our camp, skirt the woods so as to keep out of view, and fall upon the rear of the enemy's right flank. This order was promptly obeyed, and the greatest exertions were made by the 21st regiment to gain their position, and close with the enemy, but in vain; for such was the zeal and gallantry of the line commanded by general Scott, that its advance upon the enemy was not to be checked. Major Jessup, commanding the left flank battalion, finding himself pressed in front and in flank, and his men falling fast around him, ordered his battalion to "*support arms and advance*;" the order was promptly obeyed, amidst the most deadly and destructive fire. He gained a more secure position, and returned upon the enemy so galling a discharge, as caused them to retire. By this time, their whole line was falling back; and our gallant soldiers pressing upon them as fast as possible. As soon as the enemy had gained the sloping ground descending towards Chippewa, and distant a quarter of a mile, he broke and ran to gain his works. In this effort he was too successful, and the guns from his batteries opening immediately upon our line, checked in some degree the pursuit. At this moment I resolved to bring up all my ordnance, and force the place by a direct attack, and gave the order accordingly. Major Wood, of the corps of engineers, and my aid, captain Austin, rode to the bank of the creek towards the right of their line of works, and examined them. I was induced by their report, the lateness of the hour, and the advice of general Scott and major Wood, to order the forces to retire to camp.

My most difficult duty remains to be performed ; I am depressed with the fear of not being able to do justice to my brave companions in arms, and apprehensive, that some who had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, and promptly embraced it, will escape my notice.

Brigadier general Scott is entitled to the highest praise our country can bestow : to him, more than any other man, I am indebted for the victory of the 5th of July. His brigade has covered itself with glory. Every officer and every man of the 9th and 22d, 11th and 25th regiments, *did his duty*, with a zeal and energy, worthy of the American character. When every officer stands so pre-eminently high in the path of his duty and honour, it is impossible to discriminate, but I cannot deprive myself of the pleasure of saying, that major Lavenworth commanded the 9th and 22d, major Jessup the 25th, and major M'Neil the 11th. Colonel Campbell was wounded early in the action, gallantly leading on his regiment.

The family of general Scott were conspicuous in the field ; lieutenant Smith of the 6th infantry, major of brigade, and lieutenants Worth and Watts, his aids.

From general Ripley and his brigade, I received every assistance that I gave them an opportunity of rendering. I did not order any part of the reserve into action, until general Porter's command had given way, and then general Scott's movements were so rapid and decisive, that general Ripley could not get up in time with the 21st, to the position as directed. The corps of artillery under major Hindman, were not generally in action ; this was not their fault. Captain Towson's company was the only one that had a full opportunity of distinguishing itself, and it is believed, that no company ever embraced an opportunity with more zeal or more success.

A detachment from the 2d brigade under the command of lieutenant M'Donald, penetrated the woods with the Indians and volunteers, and for their support. The conduct of M'Donald and his command reflects high honour on the brigade to which they belong.

The conduct of general Porter has been conspicuously gallant. Every assistance in his power to afford, with the description of force under his command, has been rendered. We could not expect him to contend with the British column of regulars which appeared upon the plains of Chippewa. It was no cause of surprise to me, to see his command retire before this column.

Justice forbids that I should omit to name my own family. They yield to none in honourable zeal, intelligence, and attention to duty. Colonel Gardner, major Jones, and my aids, captains Austin and Spencer, have been as active and as much devoted to the cause as any officers of the army. Their conduct merits my warmest acknowledgments ; of Gardner and Jones I shall have occasion again to speak to you.

Major Camp, deputy quarter master general, deserves my particular notice and approbation. By his great exertions, I was enabled to find the means of crossing. Captain Daliba, of the ordnance department, has rendered every service in his power.

The inclosed return will show you our loss, and furnish you with the names of the dead and wounded officers. These gallant men must not be forgotten. Our country will remember them, and do them justice.

With great respect, &c.

JACOB BROWN.

Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, H. Q. LEFT DIVISION,
Chippewa, July 9th, 1814.

Return of the killed, wounded, and prisoners, of the enemy, in the action of the 5th instant, fought on the plains within half a mile of Chippewa, between the left division of the United States' army, commanded by major general Brown, and the English forces, under the command of major general Riall.

KILLED.—Three captains, three subalterns, and eighty-seven rank and file of the regular troops.

WOUNDED.—Two captains of the 1st Royal Scots, one lieutenant of the 100th regiment, and seventy-two rank and file of the Royal Scots, 8th and 100th regiments.

PRISONERS.—One captain of the Indians, and nine rank and file of the regulars.

KILLED IN THE WOODS.—Of the Indians eighty-seven, of the militia and regulars eighteen.

INDIAN PRISONERS.—One chief and four privates,

Recapitulation.

	Captains.	Subalterns.	Rank and File
Killed,	3	3	192
Wounded and } Prisoners,	2	1	92
Prisoners,	1	0	14
	<hr/> 6	<hr/> 4	<hr/> 298

Total of the enemy placed *hors de combat*, that we have ascertained beyond a doubt, 6 captains, 4 subalterns, and 298 rank and file. Those reported under the head of *wounded and prisoners*, were so severely injured, that it would have been impracticable for them to have escaped. The enemy had the same facilities of carrying their wounded from the field at the commencement of the action as ourselves, and there can be no doubt, from the information that I have received from unquestionable sources, that

they carried from the field as many of their wounded as are reported above in the total.

A. ORNE, *Asst. Ins. Gen.*

Major general Brown.

Report of the killed and wounded of the left division, commanded by major general Brown, in the action of the 5th July, 1814, on the plains of Chippewa, Upper Canada.

H. Q. CAMP CHIPPEWA, July 7th, 1814.

ARTILLERY—Killed, 4 privates; wounded severely, 3 corporals, 5 privates; 8 privates slightly.

GENERAL SCOTT'S BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY—Killed, 2 musicians, 11 privates; wounded severely, 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 2 corporals, 19 privates; slightly, 2 sergeants, 18 privates.

22D INFANTRY ATTACHED—Killed, 8 privates; wounded severely, 1 captain, 8 privates; slightly, 2 sergeants, 33 privates.

11TH INFANTRY—Killed, 1 sergeant, 4 corporals, 10 privates; wounded severely, 1 colonel, 1 subaltern, 3 sergeants, 5 corporals, 28 privates; slightly, 3 sergeants, 19 privates.

23D INFANTRY—Killed, 1 sergeant, 4 privates; wounded severely, 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 5 sergeants, 2 corporals, 37 privates; slightly, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, 1 musician, 19 privates.

GENERAL RIPLEY'S BRIGADE, 21ST REGIMENT, NONE; 19TH INFANTRY ATTACHED—Killed, 3 privates; severely wounded, 2 privates; missing, 2.

23D INFANTRY—Severely wounded, 1 private.

GENERAL P. B. PORTER'S COMMAND, FENTON'S REGIMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA MILITIA—Killed, 3 privates; severely wounded, 1 private; slightly, 1 private; missing, 3 officers, 4 non-commissioned officers and privates.

CORPS OF INDIANS—Killed, 9 privates; severely wounded, 4; slightly, 4; missing, 10.

GRAND TOTAL—2 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, 52 privates, killed. 1 colonel, 3 captains, 5 subalterns, 8 sergeants, 12 corporals, 105 privates, severely wounded. 9 sergeants, 2 corporals, 1 musician, 103 privates, slightly wounded. 3 officers, 16 non-commissioned officers and privates, missing.

Total, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, 316.

Aggregate, 328.

Names and rank of Officers wounded.

Colonel Campbell, 11th infantry, severely; knee-pan fractured. Captain King, 22d infantry, dangerously; shot wound in the abdomen. Captain Read, 25th infantry, badly; flesh wound in the thigh. Captain Harrison, 42d, doing duty in the 9th infantry, severely; shot wound in the shoulder. Lieutenant Barron, 11th infantry, severely. Lieutenant De Witt, 25th infantry, severely.

Lieutenant Patchim, 25th infantry, badly ; flesh wound in the thigh.
 Lieutenant Brimhall, 9th infantry, slightly.

NOTE.—The slightly wounded are fast recovering.

C. K. GARDNER, *Adj. Gen.*

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, H. Q. LEFT DIVISION,
 Camp near Fort Erie, July 3d, 1814.

Return of the British prisoners of War, who surrendered by capitulation with Fort Erie, on the afternoon of the 3d July, 1814, to the left division of the United States' army, under the command of major general Brown.

8th or King's Regiment—1 major.

Royal Artillery—1 lieutenant, 1 corporal, 1 bombardier, and 19 gunners.

100th Regiment—1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 4 sergeants, 5 corporals, 3 musicians, 93 privates.

Recapitulation.

8th Regiment—1 major.

Royal Artillery—1 subaltern, 4 sergeants, 5 corporals, 3 musicians, 98 privates.

Aggregate, 137.

A. ORNE, *Asst. Ins. Gen.*

Major general Brown.

LOSS OF THE ALLIGATOR.

ST. HELENA ISLAND, July 2d, 1814.

SIR,

The painful task of informing you of the particulars of the loss of the United States' schooner Alligator, I am now able to undertake. On the 1st July, at 3 P. M. while at anchor in the Port Royal Sound, with lower yards down, and top-gallant-masts housed, a heavy dark cloud rose in the west, and coming rapidly by us, the squall, when within about half a mile, had the appearance of a water spout or whirlwind; supposing from its appearance it would upset or destroy us, I thought the only way to save the vessel would be to run her on shore, as it was first quarter flood; the cable was cut and the head of the jib hoisted; when before the wind, she was struck by a most tremendous blast, but no injury was done; it then cleared up. The small bower anchor was then let go, and the vessel brought up. In ten minutes she was struck by another still more violent gust, and instantly upset; the cable was again cut, in hopes that she would drive on shore, but all to no purpose; she sunk in four fathoms water, some of the men attempted to gain the shore by swimming, but dreadful to relate only four succeeded; twenty-three were drowned. Among

the number I have to lament the loss of two promising young officers, midshipmen Brailsford and Rogerson. Nineteen have been found and interred in this island. Messrs. Brailsford and Rogerson were interred in the church-yard by the gentlemen of St. Helena. Annexed is a list of the names of those who have been found, and those who are still missing.

I have the honour to be, &c.

R. BASSET.

Captain J. S. Dent.

Twelve including myself were saved on the head of the topmast.

R. B.

DROWNED—Joseph Brailsford, midshipman; Robert Rogerson, do.; Thomas T. Johnston, carpenter's mate; Presley B. Hathaway, gunner's mate; Oliver Salvador, quarter-master; Nicholas T. Rennie, purser's steward; William Ishum, seaman; William Steel, do.; Joseph Crosby, do.; Joseph Moulder, do.; Thomas Harvey, do.; John Nelson, do.; John P. Rea, ordinary seaman; Philip Fraser, cook; John Mirtinburgh, boy; Jeffery Graves, ordinary seaman; Jerry Stout, do.; Samuel Johnston, do.; William Scarlet, do.

NOT FOUND—Michael Rush, ordinary seaman; Polydor Thompson, boy; Cæsar Howard, seaman; Daniel Thompson, do.

SAVED—Russel Basset, lieutenant commandant; John M. Bald, master's mate; Elias J. Salters, volunteer; James Gelespie, boatswain's mate; John White, seaman; Joseph Lewis, do.; Henry M'Gruder, boatswain; John Roberts, seaman; Samuel Guttry, do.; John Davis, do.; Hyman Perry, quarter gunner; William Ray, master at arms; John Rodden, boy; John Cook, ordinary seaman; Charles Mercer, seaman; George Selby, ordinary seaman.

GENERAL ORDERS.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, LEFT DIVISION,
Chippewa Plains, July 6th, 1814.

Major general Brown has the gratification to say, that the soldiers of the 2d division, west of the Niagara, merit greater applause than he is able to bestow in general orders; they merit the highest approbation of their country. The conduct of brigadier general Scott's brigade, which had the opportunity to engage the whole force of the enemy, the greater part, it is believed, of all in the peninsula, removes on the day of this battle the reflection on our country, that its reputation in arms is yet to be established. His brigade consists of battalions of the 9th, the 11th, the 25th, and a detachment of the 22d. Towson's company of artil-

lery, which was attached to it, gallantly commenced, and with it sustained the action.

The volunteers and Indians performed their part; they drove the enemy's Indians and light troops until they met the British army: they meet the general's approbation.

Of the reports of killed and wounded, the names of the wounded officers will be mentioned, in order that they may be rewarded with that honourable mention which is due.

By order of major general Brown.

C. K. GARDNER, *Adj. Gen.*

UNITED STATES' SHIP SUPERIOR, SACKETT'S HARBOR,

July 7th, 1814.

SIR,

I am happy that I have it in my power to detail to you another brilliant achievement of lieutenant Gregory with his brave companions.

I received information some time since that the enemy was building a large schooner at "Presque Isle." I determined upon her destruction, but deferred the execution until she should be nearly ready for launching. Finding the alarm extensive down the St. Lawrence in consequence of taking the gun-boat Black Snake, I thought it a favourable opportunity to attempt something at "Presque Isle." On the 26th ultimo, I directed lieutenant Gregory to take with him Messrs. Vaughan and Dixon, proceed with the two largest *gigs* to Nicholas Island, (within about seven miles of "Presque Isle" harbor) and there conceal his boats and wait for some transports which I had information were expected there to take up provision and munitions of war, which had been sent up the Bay of Quinta for the troops at York and Fort George, but if these transports did not make their appearance in three or four days, then to proceed to "Presque Isle," and burn the vessel on the stocks; but with positive orders not to injure any private property. The day after lieutenant Gregory arrived on the coast, he discovered a vessel beating up, but just as he shoved off to board her, a large gun-boat hove in sight a little below him. This boat made a signal to the vessel in the offing, upon which she tacked and stood for the gun-boat. Lieutenant Gregory secreted his boats as well as he could, but was apprehensive that he had been discovered. The gun-boat and her convoy (which was full of troops) stood into "Presque Isle." Lieutenant Gregory was determined to ascertain whether he had been discovered; accordingly he sent one of his boats in the next night and took off one of the inhabitants, who informed him that it was known he was on the coast, and that two expresses had been sent to Kingston in consequence. He therefore determined upon executing the latter part of his instructions and made his arrangements accordingly,

landed, placed sentinels at the houses to prevent alarm, and set fire to the vessel, which was nearly ready to launch; she was a stout well built vessel to mount 14 guns, and would probably have been launched in about ten days. A small store-house, which contained stores for the vessel, was unavoidably burnt, as it was so near the vessel that it took fire from her.

Lieutenant Gregory learned from the inhabitants that much property had been sent up a few days previous, that a company of the Glengary regiment had been stationed there, but had been sent to York a few days before; another company was on its way from Kingston to replace them. The few militia which had been left to guard the vessel and property, retreated upon the approach of our boats. As soon as the vessel was entirely consumed, lieutenant Gregory re-embarked his men without having permitted one of them to enter a house; finding the alarm so general, he thought prudent to cross the lake immediately; he stopped one day at Oswego for refreshment, and arrived here last evening, having performed a most difficult service with his usual gallantry and good conduct.

Lieutenant Gregory speaks in the highest terms of sailing-master Vaughan, and Mr. Dixon, as well as the men under his command, for their patient endurance of hunger and fatigue, and the zeal with which they performed every part of their duty.

I think, in justice to these brave men, that they ought to be allowed something for the destruction of this vessel: they have, however, every confidence in the justice and liberality of the government, and submit their case most cheerfully to its decision.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Honourable William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

REINDEER CAPTURED BY THE WASP.

UNITED STATES' SHIP WASP, L'ORIENT, July 8th, 1814.

SIR,

On Tuesday the 28th instant, being then in latitude 48, 36, north, and longitude 11, 15, west, we fell in with, engaged, and after an action of nineteen minutes, captured his Britannic majesty's sloop of war the Reindeer, William Manners, esquire, commander.

Where all did their duty and each appeared anxious to excel, it is very difficult to discriminate. It is, however, only rendering them their merited due, when it is declared of lieutenants Reily and Bury, 1st and 3d of this vessel, and whose names will be found among those of the conquerors of the Guerriere and Java; and of Mr. Tillinghast, 2d lieutenant, who was greatly instrumental in the capture of the Boxer; that their conduct and cour-

age on this occasion fulfilled my highest expectations and gratified every wish. Sailing-master Carr is also entitled to great credit for the zeal and ability with which he discharged his various duties.

The cool and patient conduct of every officer and man, while exposed to the fire of the shifting gun of the enemy, and without an opportunity of returning it, could only be equalled by the animation and ardor exhibited when actually engaged, or by the promptitude and firmness with which every attempt of the enemy to board was met and successfully repelled. Such conduct may be seen, but cannot well be described.

The Reindeer mounted sixteen 24 pound carronades, two long 6 or 9 pounders, and a shifting 12 pound carronade, with a complement (on board) of 118 men. Her crew were said to be the pride of Plymouth.

Our loss in men has been severe, owing in part to the proximity of the two vessels and the extreme smoothness of the sea, but chiefly in repelling boarders. That of the enemy, however, was infinitely more so, as will be seen by the list of killed and wounded on both sides.

Six round shot struck our hull, and many grape which did not penetrate far. The fore-mast received a 24 pound shot, which passed through its centre, and our rigging and sails were a good deal injured.

The Reindeer was literally cut to pieces in a line with her ports; her upper works, boats and spare spars, were one complete wreck. A breeze springing up next afternoon, her fore-mast went by the board.

Having received all the prisoners on board, which from the number of wounded occupied much time, together with their baggage, the Reindeer was on the evening of the 29th set on fire, and in a few hours blew up.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. BLAKELEY.

Honourable William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

KILLED AND WOUNDED.—The loss on board the Reindeer, was 25 killed and 42 wounded, total 67. On board the Wasp, 5 killed and 21 wounded, principally in boarding; among the latter, midshipmen Langdon and Toscan, both of whom expired some days after the action.

SUN-SET, PHILADELPHIA, July 14th, 1814.

SIR,

In consequence of information received from general Foreman, at a late hour on the 11th instant, that four of the enemy's barges had been repulsed by a party of militia at Elkton, but that they were expected to return the succeeding night in greater force, I was induced to order lieutenant Morgan of the navy, to march 250 of the officers and seamen attached to the flotilla, to his assist-

ance, for the defence of that place and the adjacent country. The above officers and sailors were embarked in a few minutes, and you will not think them inactive, when I inform you that in 5 hours and 47 minutes, the whole detachment, completely armed, reached the court-house at Elkton, carrying with them two heavy pieces of travelling artillery, notwithstanding the roads were excessively bad, and the night very dark and rainy. Disappointed in meeting the enemy, and his not evincing any disposition to return, lieutenant Morgan, with the detachment of sailors (master's mate Stockton, and 12 seamen left with a field piece to co-operate with captain Gale, excepted,) returned yesterday to the flotilla, by my orders, their place being supplied by captain Gale, and lieutenant Hall, with some marines from the navy yard, added to lieutenant Kughn and the detachment of marines of the *Guerriere*, all of whom reached Elkton early yesterday afternoon.

On lieutenant Morgan's leaving the flotilla with the detachment of sailors, I ordered lieutenant Gamble, attending the equipment of the *Guerriere*, to proceed to New Castle with the seamen and marines to supply their place. On lieutenant Morgan's return to the flotilla, lieutenant Gamble with the seamen he brought with him returned to Philadelphia; and it is with much satisfaction I inform you, that the alacrity and zeal with which all these changes were made, does infinite credit to the officers, seamen and marines concerned in the same.

Captain Gale, with the detachment of marines, after proceeding as far as Cecil Furnace, will return again to Philadelphia (by the way of New Castle,) should there be no immediate necessity for his being longer absent.

I am now about to organize a corps, consisting of 100 seamen, who can be transported across in four hours at any time, with the assistance that is promised me by the proprietors of the New Castle line of stages.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN ROGERS.

The Secretary of the Navy.

PORTSMOUTH, July 15th, 1814.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you, that yesterday morning gun-boat No. 88, commanded by sailing-master George Clement, fell in with and captured, off this harbor, a Chebacco boat, tender to the *Tenedos*, commanded by her 2d lieutenant, having also on board two midshipmen, and ten seamen and marines.

She had taken, the morning previous to her being captured, a small coasting boat, which was also re-taken by Mr. Clement.

The prisoners have been given in charge of the marshal, and left here this morning for Salem.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC HULL.

Honourable William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

HEAD QUARTERS, QUEENSTON, July 22d, 1814.

DEAR SIR,

On the 20th the army moved and encamped in the rear of Fort George. General Scott, with the van, had some skirmishing before the main body came up; but as the enemy kept close to their works, nothing important occurred. No force was left in our rear; the Heights were abandoned to the enemy, and we did hope that the movement would have induced him to re-occupy them, or close in nearer to us, so as to bring on an engagement out of his works. In this we were disappointed. The army returned to-day, and found a body of militia and a few regulars in and about the Heights. General Porter pursued with his command and a few regulars, and was so fortunate as to come up with and capture seven officers and ten privates. They will be sent to Greenbush.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JACOB BROWN.

Honourable John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

HEAD QUARTERS, CHIPPEWA, July 25th, 1814.

DEAR SIR,

On the 23d instant, I received a letter by express from general Gaines, advising me, that on the 20th the heavy guns that I had ordered from the harbor, to enable me to operate against forts George and Niagara, were blockaded in that port, together with the rifle regiment that I had ordered up with them.

I had ordered these guns and troops in boats, provided the commodore should not deem it prudent or proper to convey them in his fleet, not doubting but that he would have been upon the lake for their protection, and that the enemy would have been driven into port or captured. As general Gaines informed me, that the commodore was confined to his bed with a fever, and as he did not know when the fleet would sail, or when the guns and forces that I had been expecting would even leave Sackett's Harbor, I have thought it proper to change my position, with a view to other objects. You know how greatly I am disappointed, and therefore I will not dwell upon that painful subject. And you can best perceive how much has been lost by the delay; and the command of lake Ontario being with the enemy—reliance being placed on a different state of things.

The Indians all left me some time since. It is said that they will return, but this you will perceive depends on circumstances. The reinforcement ordered on from the west have not arrived.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JACOB BROWN.

Honourable Secretary of War, Washington.

BATTLE OF NIAGARA.

BUFFALO August, 1814.

SIR,

Confined as I was, and have been, since the last engagement with the enemy, I fear that the account I am about to give may be less full and satisfactory, than under other circumstances it might have been made. I particularly fear, that the conduct of the gallant men it was my good fortune to lead, will not be noticed in a way due to their fame, and the honour of our country.

You are already apprized that the army had, on the 25th ultimo, taken a position at Chippewa. About noon of that day, colonel Swift, who was posted at Lewistown, advised me by express, that the enemy appeared in considerable force in Queenstown, and on its heights; that four of the enemy's fleet had arrived during the preceding night, and were then lying near fort Niagara, and that a number of boats were in view moving up the streight. Within a few minutes after this intelligence had been received, I was further informed by captain Denmons of the quarter master's department, that the enemy was landing at Lewistown, and that our baggage and stores at Schlosser, and on their way thither, were in danger of immediate capture. It is proper here to mention, that having received advices as late as the 20th from general Gaines, that our fleet was then in port, and the commodore sick, we ceased to look for co-operation from that quarter, and determined to disencumber ourselves of baggage, and march directly for Burlington Heights. To mask this intention, and to draw from Schlosser a small supply of provisions, I fell back upon Chippewa.

As this arrangement, under the increased force of the enemy, left much at hazard on our side of the Niagara, and as it appeared by the before stated information, that the enemy was about to avail himself of it, I conceived that the most effectual method of recalling him from this object, was to put myself in motion towards Queenstown. General Scott, with the first brigade. Towson's artillery, and all the dragoons and mounted men were accordingly put in march on the road leading thither, with orders to report, if the enemy appeared, and to call for assistance, if that was necessary. On the general's arrival at the falls, he learned that the enemy was in force directly in his front; a narrow piece of woods alone intercepting his view of them. Waiting only to give this information, he advanced upon them. By this time assistant adjutant general Jones had delivered his message, the action began, and before the remaining part of the division had crossed the Chippewa, it had become close and general between the advanced corps. Though general Ripley with the second brigade, major Hindman with the corps of artillery, and general Porter at the head of his command, had respectively pressed forward with ardor, it was not less than an hour before they were brought to

sustain general Scott, during which time his command most skillfully and gallantly maintained the conflict. Upon my arrival, I found that the general had passed the wood, and engaged the enemy on the Queenstown road, and on the ground to the left of it, with the 9th, 11th, and 22d, regiments, and Towson's artillery. The 25th had been thrown to the right, to be governed by circumstances.

Apprehending that these corps were much exhausted, and knowing that they had suffered severely, I determined to interpose a new line with the advancing troops; and thus disengage general Scott, and hold his brigade in reserve. Orders were accordingly given to general Ripley. The enemy's artillery at this moment occupied a hill which gave great advantage, and was the key of the whole position. It was supported by a line of infantry. To secure victory, it was necessary to carry this artillery and seize the height. This duty was assigned to colonel Miller, while, to favor its execution, the 1st regiment, under the command of colonel Nicholas, was directed to manœuvre and amuse the infantry. To my great mortification, this regiment, after a discharge or two, gave way and retreated some distance, before it could be rallied, though it is believed the officers of the regiment exerted themselves to shorten this distance. In the mean time, colonel Miller, without regard to this occurrence, advanced steadily and gallantly to his object, and carried the height and the cannon. General Ripley brought up the 23d regiment (which had also faltered,) to his support, and the enemy disappeared from before them. The 1st regiment was now brought into line on the left of the 21st, and the detachments of the 17th and 19th, general Porter occupying with his command the extreme left. About this time colonel Miller carried the enemy's cannon. The 25th regiment, under major Jessup, was engaged in a more obstinate conflict with all that remained to dispute with us the field of battle. The major, as has been already stated, had been ordered by general Scott, at the commencement of the action, to take ground to his right. He had succeeded in turning the enemy's flank—had captured (by a detachment under captain Ketchum,) general Riall and sundry other officers, and showed himself again to his own army, in a blaze of fire, which defeated or destroyed a very superior force of the enemy. He was ordered to form on the right of the 2d regiment. The enemy rallying his forces, and as is believed, having received reinforcements, now attempted to drive us from our position and regain his artillery. Our line was unshaken and the enemy repulsed. Two other attempts having the same object, had the same issue. General Scott was again engaged in repelling the former of these, and the last I saw of him in the field of battle, he was near the head of his column, and giving to its march a direction that would place him on the enemy's right. It was with great pleasure I saw the good order and intrepidity of general Porter's volunteers from the moment of their arrival; but dur-

ing the last charge of the enemy those qualities were conspicuous. Stimulated by the examples set them by their gallant leader, by major Wood, of the Pennsylvania corps, by colonel Dobbin of New York, and by their officers generally, they precipitated themselves upon the enemy's line, and made all the prisoners which were taken at this point of the action.

Having been for some time wounded, and being a good deal exhausted by the loss of blood, it became my wish to devolve the command on general Scott, and retire from the field ; but on enquiry, I had the misfortune to learn, that he was disabled by wounds ; I therefore kept my post, and had the satisfaction to see the enemy's last effort repulsed. I now consigned the command to general Ripley.

While retiring from the field, I saw and felt, that the victory was complete on our part, if proper measures were promptly adopted to secure it. The exhaustion of the men was, however, such as made some refreshment necessary. They particularly required water. I was myself extremely sensible of the want of this necessary article. I therefore believed it proper, that general Ripley and the troops should return to camp, after bringing off the dead, the wounded, and artillery ; and in this I saw no difficulty, as the enemy had entirely ceased to act. Within an hour after my arrival in camp, I was informed that general Ripley had returned without annoyance and in good order. I now sent for him, and after giving him my reasons, for the measure I was about to adopt, ordered him to put the troops in the best possible condition ; to give to them the necessary refreshment ; to take with him the pickets and camp guards, and every other description of force ; to put himself on the field of battle as the day dawned, and there to meet and beat the enemy if he again appeared. To this order he made no objection, and I relied upon its execution. It was not executed. I feel most sensibly how inadequate are my powers in speaking of the troops, to do justice to their merits, or to my own sense of them. Under abler direction, they might have done more and better.

From the preceding details, you have new evidence of the distinguished gallantry of generals Scott and Porter, of colonel Miller, and major Jessup of the 1st brigade. The chief, with his aid-de-camp, Worth, his major of brigade Smith, and every commander of battalion, were wounded. The 2d brigade suffered less ; but as a brigade, their conduct entitled them to the applause of their country. After the enemy's strong position had been carried by the 21st and the detachments of the 17th and 19th, the 1st and 23d assumed a new character. They could not again be shaken or dismayed. Major M'Farland of the latter, fell nobly at the head of his battalion.

Under command of general Porter, the militia volunteers of Pennsylvania and New York, stood undismayed amidst the hottest fire, and repulsed the veterans opposed to them. The Cana-

-dian volunteers, commanded' by colonel Wilson, are reported by general Porter, as having merited and received his approbation.

The corps of artillery commanded by major Hindman, behaved with its usual gallantry. Towson's company attached to the 1st brigade, was the first and the last engaged, and during the whole conflict maintained that high character which they had previously won by their skill and their valor. Captains Bidelle and Ritchie were both wounded early in the action, but refused to quit the field. The latter declared that he would never leave his piece; and, true to his engagement, fell by its side covered with wounds.

The staff of the army had its peculiar merit and distinction. Colonel Gardner, adjutant general, though ill, was on horseback, and did all in his power; his assistant, major Jones, was very active and useful. My gallant aids-de-camp, Austin and Spencer, had many and critical duties to perform, in the discharge of which the latter fell; I shall ever think of this young man with pride and regret; regret, that his career has been so short: pride, that it has been so noble and distinguished. The engineers, majors M'Ree and Wood, were greatly distinguished on this day, and their high military talents exerted with great effect; they were much under my eye and near my person, and to their assistance, a great deal is fairly to be ascribed. I most earnestly recommend them, as worthy of the highest trust and confidence. The staff of generals Ripley and Porter, discovered great zeal and attention to duty. Lieutenant E. B. Randolph of the 20th regiment, is entitled to notice; his courage was conspicuous.

X I inclose a return of our loss: those noted missing, may generally be numbered with the dead. The enemy had but little opportunity of making prisoners.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JACOB BROWN.

Honourable John Armstrong,
Secretary of War.

—
FORT ERIE, August 5th, 1814.

SIR,

Having been stationed with the 1st battalion of the 1st regiment of riflemen at Black Rock, on the evening of the 2d instant, I observed the British army moving up the river on the opposite shore, and suspecting they might make a feint on Fort Erie, with an intention of a real attack on the Buffalo side, I immediately moved and took a position on the upper side of Conjocta Creek, and that night threw up a battery of some logs, which I found on the ground, and had them torn away. About 2 o'clock the next morning, my pickets from below gave me information of the landing of 9 boats full of troops, half a mile below. I immediately got my men (240 in number) to their quarters, and patiently awaited their approach. At a quarter past 4, they advanced upon us,

and commenced the attack, sending a party before to repair the bridge, under the cover of their fire. When they had got at good rifle distance, I opened a heavy fire on them, which laid a number of them on the ground and compelled them to retire. They then formed in the skirt of the wood, and kept up the fire at long shot, continually reinforcing from the Canada shore, until they had 22 boat loads, and then attempted to flank us by sending a large body up the creek to ford it, when I detached lieutenants Ryan, Smith and Armstrong, with about 60 men, to oppose their left wing, where they were again repulsed with considerable loss, after which they appeared disposed to give up their object, and retreated by throwing six boat loads of troops on Squaw Island, which enfiladed the creek, and prevented me from harrassing their rear.

Their superior numbers enabled them to take their killed and wounded off the field, which we plainly saw, and observed they suffered severely. We found some of their dead thrown into the river, and covered with logs and stones, and some on the field. We also collected a number of muskets and accoutrements, with clothing that appeared to have been torn to bind their wounds. We took six prisoners, who stated the British force opposed to us, to consist of from 12 to 1500 men, commanded by lieutenant colonel Tucker, of the 41st regiment. They also state that their object was to re-capture general Riall, with the other British prisoners, and destroy the public stores deposited at Buffalo. The action continued about two hours and a half. I am happy to state they were completely foiled in their attempts.

Our loss is trifling compared with theirs. We had two killed and eight wounded. I am sorry to inform you that captain Hamilton, lieutenants Wadsworth and M'Intosh are among the latter. Their gallantry in exposing themselves to encourage their men, I think, entitles them to the notice of their country. My whole command behaved in a manner that merited my warmest approbation; and in justice to them I cannot avoid mentioning the names of the officers, which are as follows: Captain Hamilton, lieutenants Wadsworth, Ryan, Calhoun, M'Intosh, Arnold, Shortridge, M'Farland, Tipton, Armstrong, Smith, Cobbs, Davidson, and Austin, with ensign Page. If, sir, you believe we have done our duty, we shall feel highly gratified.

I am, sir, respectfully, &c.

L. MORGAN,

Major 1st rifle regiment.

Major general Brown.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT ERIE, UPPER CANADA.

August 7th, 1814.

SIR,

I arrived at this post on the 4th instant, and assumed the command,—the army is in good spirits, and more healthy than I could have expected.

The British army under lieutenant general Drummond, is strongly posted opposite to Black Rock, two miles east of this fort; a skirt of thick wood separates us. Yesterday endeavoured to draw him out to see and try his strength; for this purpose, I sent the rifle corps through the intervening woods, with orders to amuse the enemy's light troops until his strong column should get in motion, and then to retire slowly to the plain this side the woods, where I had a strong line posted in readiness to receive the enemy. Our riflemen met and drove the enemy's light troops into their lines, where they remained, although the riflemen kept the woods near two hours, and until they were ordered in. They returned without being able to draw any part of the enemy's force after them.

Major Morgan reports that his officers and men acted with their usual gallantry. The enemy left 11 dead, and three prisoners in our hands, and I am informed by two persons just from the British camp, that their loss was much more considerable; among their killed, were five Indians. We lost five killed, and three or four wounded.

General Drummond's force, from the best information we are able to collect from deserters and others, amounts to upwards of 4000, principally regulars. De Watteville's regiment has joined since the battle of the 25th ultimo, together with two or three companies of the Glengary corps; making a total joined since the 25th, of about 1200.

AUGUST, 18th, 1814.

The enemy's position remains unchanged; they have constructed two batteries with two embrasures each, and have erected a wooden breast work 1200 to 1400 yards in our rear. In examining their works yesterday, captain Birdsall of the 4th rifle regiment with a detachment of the 1st, and his company, amounting in the whole to 160 men, beat in two of their strong pickets with a loss on their part of 10 killed. Captain Birdsall had one killed and three wounded. General Drummond was much disappointed and chagrined at the failure of the enterprize of the 3d instant, against Buffalo, our riflemen having opposed and beaten them. Colonel Tucker, it seems, has been publicly reprimanded in general orders.

I have the honour to be, &c.

EDMUND P. GAINES.

Hon. Secretary of War.

UNITED STATES' SHIP SUPERIOR, OFF KINGSTON,
August 10th, 1814.

SIR,

I have been duly honoured with your letters of the 19th and 24th of July. I do assure you, sir, that I have never been under

any pledge to meet general Brown at the head of the Lake ; but on the contrary, when we parted at Sackett's Harbor, I told him distinctly, that I should not visit the head of the Lake, unless the enemy's fleet did. I can ascribe the intimation of general Brown, that he expected the co-operation of the fleet to no other motive, than a cautious attempt to provide an apology for the public, against any contingent disaster to which his army might be exposed.

But, sir, if any one will take the trouble to examine the topography of the peninsula, (the scene of the general's operations,) he will discover that this fleet could be of no more service to general Brown, or his army, than it could to an army in Tennessee.

General Brown has never been able to penetrate nearer to lake Ontario than Queenstown, and the enemy is in possession of all the intermediate country ; so that I could not even communicate with the army, but by a circuitous route of 70 or 80 miles.

Admitting general Brown could have invested Fort George, the only service he could have derived from the fleet, would be our preventing the supplies of the enemy from entering the Niagara river ; for the water is so shallow, that the large vessels could not approach within two miles of their works. General Brown had therefore two abundantly sufficient reasons for not expecting the co-operation of this fleet ; it was not promised him—and was chimerical in itself.

My fixed determination has always been to seek a meeting with the enemy the moment the fleet was ready, and, to deprive him of any apology for not meeting me, I have sent four guns on shore from the Superior, to reduce her armament in number to an equality with the Prince Regent's, yielding the advantage of their 68 pounders. The Mohawk mounted two guns less than the Prince Charlotte, and the Montreal and Niagara are equal to the General Pike and Madison. I have detached, on separate service, all the brigs ; and am blockading his four ships with our four ships ; and hopes that this may induce him to come out.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Honourable William Jones,
Secretary of the Navy.

UNITED STATES' SHIP SUPERIOR, OFF KINGSTON,
August 10th, 1814.

SIR,

Great anxiety of mind and severe bodily exertions have at length broken down the best constitution, and subjected me to a violent fever that confined me for eighteen days. This misfortune was no more to be foreseen than prevented, but was particularly severe at the moment it happened, as it induced a delay of five or six days in the sailing of the fleet.

In the early part of July, I expected the fleet would be made ready for sailing by the 10th or 15th; but many of the mechanics were taken sick, and amongst them the block-makers and blacksmiths, so that the Mohawk could not be furnished with blocks and iron works for the gun and spar decks before the 24th or 25th ultimo, when she was reported ready by captain Jones. As considerable anxiety had been manifested by the public to have the fleet on the lake, I should have asked captain Jones to take charge of it and go out, but I was then recovering my health, and was confident I should be able in three or four days to go on board myself. There was an additional reason for submitting to this delay in the difficulty I found in making the changes of commanders, neither of them being willing to be separated from his officers and men, and a change of crews through the fleet being inadmissible.

In the afternoon of the 31st of July, I was taken on board, but it was calm, and I did not sail before the next morning. To satisfy at once whatever expectations the public had been led to entertain of the sufficiency of this squadron to take and maintain the ascendancy on this lake, and at the same time to expose the futility of promises, the fulfilment of which had been rested on our appearance at the head of the lake, I got under weigh at 4 o'clock in the morning of the 1st instant, and steered for the mouth of the Niagara. Owing to light winds, I did not arrive off there before the 5th. There we intercepted one of the enemy's brigs, running over from York to Niagara with troops, and ran her on shore about six miles to the westward of Fort George. I ordered the Sylph in, to anchor as near to the enemy as she could with safety, and to destroy her. Captain Elliot run in, in a very gallant manner, to within from 300 to 500 yards of her, and was about anchoring, when the enemy set fire to her and she soon after blew up. This vessel was a schooner the last year, and called the Beresford—since they altered her to a brig, they changed her name, and I have not been able to ascertain it. She mounted 14 guns; 12 twenty-four pound carronades, and two long nine pounders.

Finding the enemy had two other brigs and a schooner in the Niagara river, I determined to leave a force to watch them, and selected the Jefferson, Sylph and Oneida for that purpose, and placed the whole under the orders of captain Ridgely. Having looked into York without discovering any vessel of the enemy, I left Niagara with the remainder of the squadron, on the evening of the 7th, and arrived here on the 9th. We found one of the enemy's ships in the offing, and chased her into Kingston.

My anxiety to return to this end of the lake, was increased by the knowledge I had of the weakness of Sackett's Harbor, and the apprehension that the enemy might receive large reinforcements at Kingston, and, embarking some of his troops on board his fleet, make a dash at the harbor and burn it with all my stores.

during our absence. When I left the harbor, there were but about 700 regular troops fit for duty. It is true a few militia had been called in, but little could be expected of them should an attack be made. My apprehension, it seems, was groundless, the enemy having contented himself with annoying, in some trifling degree, the coasters between Oswego and the harbor in his boats.

I cannot forbear expressing the regret I feel, that so much sensation has been excited in the public mind, because this squadron did not sail so soon as the wise heads that conduct our newspapers have presumed to think I ought. I need not suggest to one of your experience, that a man of war may appear to the eye of a landsman, perfectly ready for sea, when she is deficient in many of the most essential points of her armament, nor how unworthy I should have proved myself of the high trust reposed in me, had I ventured to sea in the face of an enemy of equal force, without being ready to meet him in one hour after my anchor was weighed.

It ought in justice to be recollected, that the building and equipment of vessels on the Atlantic, are unattended by any of the great difficulties which we have to encounter on this lake; there every department abounds with facilities. A commander makes a requisition, and articles of every description are furnished in 12 hours; but this fleet has been built and fitted in the wilderness, where there are no agents and chandlers' shops and founderies, &c. &c. to supply our wants, but every thing is to be created; and yet I shall not decline a comparison of what has been done here, with any thing done on the Atlantic, in the building or equipment of vessels. The *Guerriere*, for instance, has been building and fitting upwards of twelve months in the city of Philadelphia, and is not yet ready. The President frigate went into the navy yard at New York, for some partial repairs, a few days after the keel of the *Superior* was laid; since then, two frigates of a large class and two sloops of war of the largest class, have been built and fitted here, and have sailed before the *President* is ready for sea, although every article of their armament and rigging has been transported from New York in despite of obstacles almost insurmountable. I will go further, sir, for it is due to the unremitted and unsurpassed exertions of those who have served the public under my command, and will challenge the world to produce a parallel instance, in which the same number of vessels of such dimensions have been built and fitted in the same time by the same number of workmen.

I confess that I am mortified in not having succeeded in satisfying the expectations of the public, but it would be infinitely more painful, could I find any want of zeal or exertion in my endeavours to serve them, to which I could in any degree impute their disappointment.

I have the honour to be, &c.
ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Hon. Wm. Jones.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT ERIE, August 13th, 1814.

SIR,

It has become my painful duty to announce to you the loss of that brave and excellent officer major Morgan, of the 1st rifle regiment. He fell at the head of his corps, in an affair with the enemy, on the 12th instant, after a display of gallantry worthy of the corps, and meriting the gratitude of his country.

I had desired him to send a detachment of from 80 to 100 men to cut off a working party, supported by a guard of the enemy's light troops, engaged in opening an avenue for a battery in our rear, having directed to have his corps ready to support, in case the enemy should be reinforced. The detachment was commanded by captain Birdsall, who attacked and drove the enemy; but when about to return to camp, he discovered a large force approaching. The firing having continued longer than the major expected, he moved up the moment the enemy's reinforcements made their appearance. A warm conflict ensued, in which they were forced back, but discovering additional reinforcements, and receiving my order to fall back, on the appearance of a large force, the major gave the signal with his bugle to retire; at this moment he received a ball in his head. He was brought from the field, together with his men who were killed and wounded. Of the former were two riflemen and a New York volunteer, who, unsolicited, accompanied the riflemen with a small party of his corps, under the command of lieutenant Goodfellow, who, I am informed, has distinguished himself on similar occasions, and for whom, permit me to request a commission in one of the rifle regiments.

I have the honour to be, &c.

EDMUND P. GAINES.

Honourable Secretary of War.

DEFEAT OF THE BRITISH AT FORT ERIE.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT ERIE, U. C.

August 15th, 1814.

SIR,

My heart is gladdened with gratitude to Heaven and joy to my country, to have it in my power to inform you that the gallant army under my command has this morning beaten the enemy commanded by lieutenant general Drummond, after a severe conflict of near three hours, commencing at 2 o'clock this morning. They attacked us on each flank, got possession of the salient bastion of the old fort Erie, which was regained at point of the bayonet, with a dreadful slaughter. The enemy's loss in killed and prisoners, is about 600; near 300 killed. Our loss is considerable, but I think not one-tenth as great as that of the enemy. I will not

detain the express to give you the particulars. I am preparing my force to follow up the blow.

With great respect, &c.

EDMUND P. GAINES,

Brig. Gen. Commanding.

Honourable Secretary of War.

GENERAL RIPLEY'S REPORT.

FORT ERIE, August 17th, 1814.

SIR,

I take the liberty of reporting you the cause of operations on the left flank of the camp, during the action of the 15th instant.

From indications satisfactory to me, I was persuaded very early of the enemy's design of attacking us in our position. Before any alarm, I caused my brigade to occupy their alarm posts. On the first fire of the picket, captain Towson opened his artillery upon them from fort Williams, in a style which does him infinite credit. It was continued with very great effect upon the enemy during the whole action.

The enemy advanced with fixed bayonets, and attempted to enter our works between the fort and water. They brought ladders for the purpose of scaling, and in order to prevent their troops from resorting to any other course excepting the bayonet, had caused all the flints to be taken from their muskets. The column that approached in this direction consisted of colonel Fischer's command, and amounting in number to at least 1500 men; and, according to the representations of prisoners, they were 2,000 strong. The companies posted at the point of the works, which they attempted to escalate, were captain Ross's, captain Marston's, lieutenant Bowman's, and lieutenant Larned's, of the 21st regiment, not exceeding 250 men, under command of major Wood, of the engineer corps. On the enemy's approach they opened their musketry upon them in a manner the most powerful. Fort Williams and this little band, emitted one broad uninterrupted sheet of light. The enemy were repulsed. They rallied, came on a second time to the charge, and a party waded round our line by the lake, and came in on the flank; but a reserve of two companies, posted in the commencement of the action to support this point, marched up and fired upon the party, who were all killed or taken. Five times in this manner did the enemy advance to the charge; five times were their columns beaten back in the utmost confusion by a force one-sixth of their numbers; till at length finding the contest unavailing, they retired. At this point we made 147 prisoners.

During the contest in this quarter, the lines of the whole of the left wing were perfectly lined, in addition to the reserves; and I found myself able to detach three companies of the 23d regiment

from the left, to reinforce the troops at Fort Erie, viz : captain Wattles', lieutenant Cantine's, and lieutenant Brown's companies, and one of the 19th under captain Chunn. They were in the fort during the time of the explosion, and their conduct is highly spoken of by major Brooke, their commanding officer. Indeed, from the high state to which that regiment has been brought by major Brooke, I am convinced that no troops will behave better.

In submitting to your view the conduct of the troops under my command on this occasion, I find every thing to applaud, nothing to reprehend. The utmost coolness and subordination was manifested, both by the 21st and 23d regiments. To major Wood I feel particularly indebted. This officer's merits are so well known, that approbation can scarcely add to his reputation. He has the merit, with the Spartan band, in connexion with captain Towson's artillery, of defeating a vaunting foe of six times his force. Major Brooke did every thing in his power; and it affords me pleasure at all times to call the attention of the general commanding to this amiable and accomplished officer.

The officers commanding companies immediately engaged, have my highest commendation. Their conduct was most judicious and gallant. I cannot refrain from adverting to the manner in which captain Towson's artillery was served; I have never seen it equalled. This officer has so often distinguished himself, that to say simply that he is in action, is a volume of eulogium; the army, only to be informed he is there, by a spontaneous assent, are at once satisfied that he has performed well his part. I have no idea that there is an artillery officer in any service superior to him in the knowledge and performance of his duty.

The officers I have mentioned as commanding companies of the 21st and 23d regiments, are particularly commended by their commanding officers. Captain Marston, a most valuable officer, commanded a first line of three companies opposed to the enemy's column. Captain Ropes commanded the companies of reserve. Major Wood reports in the highest terms of the good conduct of the subalterns. Lieutenant Riddle, of the 15th, attached to the 21st, and Hall, and ensigns Bean, Jones, Cumming, and Thomas, of the 19th, as being extremely active, and performing their duties with alacrity.

The manner in which lieutenant Belknap, of the 23d, retired with his picket guard from before the enemy's column, excites my particular commendation. He gave orders to fire three times as he was retreating to camp, himself bringing up the rear. In this gallant manner, he kept the light advance of the enemy in check, for a distance of two or three hundred yards. I have to regret, that when entering our lines after his troops, the enemy pushed so close upon him that he received a severe wound from a bayonet.

Lieutenant Bushnel and Cissney, of the 19th, while gallantly engaged with the enemy at Fort Erie, were both severely, if not mortally, wounded. Their conduct merits the warmest approbation.

Permit me to recommend to your notice, the good conduct of my staff, lieutenant Kirby, of the corps of artillery, my aid-de-camp, and lieutenant Holding, acting brigade major; their activity and zeal was entirely to my satisfaction.

I close this long report, with stating to you, in the highest terms of approbation, the skilfulness exhibited by doctor Fuller, surgeon of the 23d, and doctor Trowbridge, surgeon of the 21st infantry, with their mates doctor Gale, of the 23d, and doctors Everett and Allen, of the 21st; their active, humane, and judicious treatment of the wounded, both of the enemy and of our own, together with their steady and constant attention to the duties of their station, must have attracted your personal observation, and I am confident will receive your approbation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

E. W. RIPLEY,

Brig. Gen. Comd'g 2d Brigade.

Brigadier general Gaines.

U. S. SHIP ADAMS, HAMPDEN, (MAINE.)

August 22d, 1814.

SIR,

On the 16th, at noon, our latitude by D. R. and two double altitudes was 42 20, and the longitude determined by morning and evening observations of a chronometer, which had four times proven correct within 10 miles during our preceding and present cruize, was 66 54, the wind was fresh from south south-west, and the sea smooth. In the afternoon, two vessels were discovered in chase, but at such a distance that we could not ascertain their force. The weather became very foggy at night, and the wind remaining fresh from the same quarter, I determined to push for some port of Massachusetts bay, near Portsmouth, and steered the proper course for that purpose. Deeming it extremely probable we should meet some of the enemy's vessels during the night, our prisoners were confined in the hold, and our crew remained at quarters. We sailed from 10 to 11 knots an hour, till 2 A. M. when, as I expected to be, we were in 72 fathoms water. Our estimated distance from cape Ann, 60 miles. At 4 A. M. while in the act of preparing for sounding again, the look-outs forward, announced breakers ahead, and in a moment after, the ship struck upon a rock, going 10½ knots. Believing it impossible she could bear such a shock, the prisoners were first released from their confinement below, that they might have a chance to save their lives in common with ourselves upon the rocky shore, which was now visible about 30 yards distant. On sounding the pumps,

no unusual quantity of water was at first discovered, and all sails were laid aback in hopes of forcing the ship off. It was, however, discovered in a few minutes, she was leaking so fast that it was deemed proper to remain on the rock until day-light. We accordingly furled the light sails, and clewed up courses and topsails. Day soon enabled us to distinguish objects through the fog, at 2 or 300 yards distance, and to ascertain the hopelessness of saving the ship. Her cutwater was entirely destroyed below the nine foot mark; the depth of water under her fore foot, between five and six feet; forward of her starboard main chains, 12 feet; astern, seven fathoms, into which the ship from the situation of her bows, was depressed below her stern ports. The wind fresh and a number of rocks just to leeward, a considerable surf. From the small portion of land that was visible, it was generally believed to be the nubble of cape Neddock, not far from Portsmouth. Hoisted out our boats, sent the small ones to seek a place where a landing might be most safely effected. In the mean time, engaged in getting our sick into the larger boats, with their bedding, clothes and provisions, ready for landing. The boats soon returned, having fortunately discovered a small chasm in the rock capable of admitting a boat, and a ravine connected with it, in which the sick might be sheltered in some degree from the weather. Having secured the safety of the sick, it was determined, from motives of humanity, to send the prisoners next, with every thing belonging to them, and with sails, tarpaulins and medicines for the further comfort of the sick. A surgeons' mate was also sent, and the charge of the whole committed to the purser, Mr. Rodgers. Knowing it to be near low water when the ship struck, I determined to make every effort with the remaining portion of our crew, to get her off, when the tide should rise, though with little hope that she could be kept long above water, as we had ascertained the leak to be about nine feet an hour. Our only kedge had been early laid out on our weather quarter to keep her as nearly in the same position as possible; and our only heavy anchor was now let go from the waist, to prevent her swinging into very deep water, should she go off, and to keep her from the rocks and reefs to leeward, should she float. At 10 A. M. it became evident that the tide would lift her off,—furled the topsails and light square sails; carried the kedge out from the bow, two cables lengths off shore, and continued to send such articles out of the ship as we could most conveniently spare, in case of floating. After some heavy strains, at half past 10, the surf lifted her off, and she swung to her anchor. Manned all the pumps and found we could gain upon her. The flood tide being nearly done, it was necessary to get her under weigh, instantly to reap the advantages of its weather current, the rocks astern and to leeward not being half the ship's length distant. Hove up, canted her off shore with the kedge and head sails, and fortunately passed from 10 to 50 yards to windward of the rocks and reefs which extended

about three fourths of a mile from the land. All hands were employed at the pumps and sails, during the night, in the hope of being able to reach Portland the next day. At day light, the weather was clear, and you may judge our surprise at discovering ourselves near the island of mount Desart. This discovery excited the greatest anxiety for the fate of our companions. Many of the islands in the vicinity, were uninhabited—we were ignorant on which they were, and they were probably exposed to all the inclemencies of the weather, while suffering the pain of that dreadful disease the scurvy. I soon fell in with two fishing boats, both of which I despatched in search of them, and then used every possible diligence to get into Penobscot bay, which we fortunately effected during the night; and I had the happiness to hear the next morning, that our sick companions had all been safely conveyed to Camden, with the exception of one who had expired. My first intention was to have stopt at Castine, but was induced to proceed to this place, as one much better calculated for a vessel in our situation. The extent of the injury which she has received, cannot yet be known. Our pumps are continually in motion. I have procured a light ship, and shall take every thing out of her, and then lay her on shore, as the only means of ascertaining her damages at this place. I cannot conclude this communication, without recommending, in the strongest terms, the uncommon good conduct of the officers, seamen and marines on this occasion. Never were my orders executed with more promptitude or less confusion. Their coolness during the time the ship was upon and among the rocks, could only be surpassed by their cheerful endurance of unremitted and the most fatiguing labour. Nothing but the former could have rescued her from her perilous situation, and but for the latter, she would have been rescued in vain.

Very respectfully, &c.

C. MORRIS.

Hon. Wm. Jones.

DEFENCE OF FORT ERIE.

HEAD QUARTERS, LEFT WING, 2d DIVISION,
Fort Erie, U. C. August 23d, 1814.

SIR,

I have the honour to communicate, for the information of the department of war, the particulars of the battle fought at this place, on the 15th instant, between the left wing of the 2d division of the northern army, under my command, and the British forces in the peninsula of Upper Canada, commanded by lieutenant general Drummond, which terminated in a signal victory in favour of the United American arms.

Our position on the margin of the lake, at the entrance of the Niagara river, being nearly a horizontal plain, twelve or fifteen feet above the surface of the water, possessing few natural advantages, had been strengthened in front by temporary parapet breast works, entrenchments and abattis, with two batteries and six field pieces. The small unfinished fort, Erie, with a 24, 18, and 12 pounder, forms the north-east, and the Douglass battery, with an 18 and 6 pounder near the edge of the lake, the south-east angle of our right. The left is defended by a redoubt battery, with six field pieces just thrown up on a small ridge. Our rear was left open to the lake, bordered by a rocky shore of easy ascent. The battery on the left was defended by captain Towson; fort Erie, by captain Williams, with major Trimble's command of the 19th infantry; the batteries on the front, by captains Biddle and Fanning; the whole of the artillery commanded by major Hindman. Parts of the 11th, 9th, and 22d infantry (of the late veteran brigade of major general Scott) were posted on the right, under the command of lieutenant colonel Aspinwall. General Ripley's brigade, consisting of the 21st and 23d, defended the left. General Porter's brigade of New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, with our distinguished riflemen, occupied the centre.

I have heretofore omitted stating to you, that during the 13th and 14th, the enemy had kept up a brisk cannonade, which was sharply returned from our batteries, without any considerable loss on our part. At 6 P. M. one of their shells lodged in a small magazine in fort Erie, which was fortunately almost empty. It blew up with an explosion more awful in appearance, than injurious in its effects, as it did not disable a man, or derange a gun. It occasioned but a momentary cessation of the thunders of the artillery on both sides; it was followed by a loud and joyous shout by the British army, which was instantly returned on our part, and captain Williams, amidst the smoke of the explosion, renewed the contest by an animated roar of his heavy cannon.

From the supposed loss of our ammunition, and the consequent depression such an event was likely to produce upon the minds of our men, I felt persuaded that this explosion would lead the enemy to assault, and made my arrangements accordingly. The annexed paper No. 1, is a copy of lieutenant general Drummond's order, and plan of attack. [Not published.]

The night was dark, and the early part of it raining, but the faithful sentinel slept not; one third of the troops were up at their posts. At half past two o'clock, the right column of the enemy approached, and though enveloped in darkness black as his designs and principles, was distinctly heard on our left, and promptly marked by our musketry under major Wood, and cannon under captain Towson. Being mounted at the moment, I repaired to the point of attack, where the sheet of fire rolling from Towson's battery, and the musketry of the left wing of the 21st

infantry under major Wood, enabled me to see the enemy's column of about 1500 men approaching on that point; his advance was not checked, until it had approached within ten feet of our infantry. A line of loose brush representing an *abattis* only intervened; a column of the enemy attempted to pass round the *abattis* through the water, where it was nearly breast deep. Apprehending that this point would be carried, I ordered a detachment of riflemen and infantry to its support, but having met with the gallant commander, major Wood, was assured by him that he could defend his position without reinforcements. At this moment the enemy were repulsed, but instantly renewed the charge and were again repulsed. My attention was now called to the right, where our batteries and lines were soon lighted by a most brilliant fire of cannon and musketry; it announced the approach of the centre and left columns of the enemy, under colonels Drummond and Scott; the latter was received by the veteran 9th, under the command of captain Foster, and captains Broughton and Harding's companies of New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, aided by a six pounder judiciously posted by major M'Ree, chief engineer, who was most active and useful at this point; they were repulsed. That of the centre, led by colonel Drummond, was not long kept in check; it approached at once every assailable point of the fort, and with scaling ladders ascended the parapet, but was repulsed with dreadful carnage. The assault was twice repeated, and as often checked, but the enemy having moved round the ditch covered by darkness, added to the heavy cloud of smoke which had rolled from our cannon and musketry, enveloping surrounding objects, repeated the charge, re-ascended the ladders; their pikes, bayonets and spears fell upon our gallant artillerymen. The gallant spirits of our favourite captain Williams and lieutenants M'Donough and Watmough, with their brave men, were overcome. The two former, and several of their men, received deadly wounds. Our bastion was lost; lieutenant M'Donough, being severely wounded, demanded quarter; it was refused by colonel Drummond. The lieutenant then seized a hand spike and nobly defended himself until he was shot down with a pistol by the monster who had refused him quarter, who often reiterated the order—"give the damned yankees no quarter." This officer, whose bravery, if it had been seasoned with virtue, would have entitled him to the admiration of every soldier. This hardened murderer soon met his fate. He was shot through the breast by _____ of the _____ regiment, while repeating the order "to give no quarter."

The battle now raged with increased fury on the right, but on the left the enemy was repulsed and put to flight. Thence and from the centre, I ordered reinforcements. They were promptly sent by brigadier general Ripley, and brigadier general Porter. Captain Fanning, of the corps of artillery, kept up a spirited and destructive fire with his field pieces, on the enemy attempting to

approach the fort. Major Hindman's gallant efforts, aided by major Trimble, having failed to drive the enemy from the bastion, with the remaining artillerists and infantry in the fort, captain Birdsall, of the 4th rifle regiment, with a detachment of riflemen, gallantry rushed in through the gateway to their assistance, and with some infantry, charged the enemy, but was repulsed, and the captain severely wounded. A detachment from the 11th, 19th, and 22d infantry, under captain Foster, of the 11th, were introduced over the interior bastion, for the purpose of charging the enemy. Major Hall, assistant inspector general, very handsomely tendered his services to lead the charge. The charge was gallantly made by captain Foster and major Hall, but owing to the narrowness of the passage up to the bastion, admitting only two or three men abreast, it failed. It was often repeated, and as often checked; the enemy's force in the bastion was, however, much cut to pieces and diminished by our artillery and small arms. At this moment every operation was arrested by the explosion of some cartridges deposited in the end of the stone building adjoining the contested bastion. The explosion was tremendous—it was decisive; the bastion was restored. At this moment, captain Biddle was ordered to cause a field piece to be posted so as to enfilade the exterior plain and salient glacis. The captain, though not recovered from a severe contusion in the shoulder, received from one of the enemy's shells, promptly took his position, and served his field piece with vivacity and effect. Captain Fanning's battery likewise played upon them at this time with great effect. The enemy were in a few moments entirely defeated, taken or put to flight, leaving on the field 222 killed, 174 wounded, and 186 prisoners. A large portion are so severely wounded, that they cannot survive; the slightly wounded, it is presumed, were carried off.

To brigadier general Ripley, much credit is due for the judicious disposition of the left wing, previous to the action, and for the steady disciplined courage manifested by him and his immediate command, and for the promptness with which he complied with my orders for reinforcement during the action. Brigadier general Porter, commanding the New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, manifested a degree of vigilance and judgment in his preparatory arrangements, as well as military skill and courage in the action, which proves him to be worthy the confidence of his country, and the brave volunteers who fought under him. Of the volunteers, captains Broughton and Harding with their detachments posted on the right, and attached to the line commanded by captain E. Foster, of the veteran 9th infantry, handsomely contributed to the repulse of the left column of the enemy under colonel Scott.

The judicious preparations and steady conduct of lieutenant colonel Aspinwall, commanding the first brigade, merit approbation.

To major M'Ree, chief engineer, the greatest credit is due for the excellent arrangement and skilful execution of his plans for fortifying and defending the right, and for his correct and seasonable suggestions to regain the bastion. Major Wood, of the engineers, also greatly contributed to the previous measures of defence. He has accepted the command of a regiment of infantry, (the 21st,) for which he has often proved himself well qualified, but never so conspicuously as on this occasion.

Towson's battery emitted a constant sheet of fire. Wood's small arms lighted up the space, and repulsed five terrible charges made between the battery and the lake. Brigadier general Ripley speaks in high terms of the officers and men engaged, particularly captains Marston and Ropes, lieutenants Riddle (of the 15th, doing duty with the 21st) and Hall; ensigns Benn, Jones, Cummings and Thomas of the 21st, and Keally and Green of the 19th.

Major Hindman, and the whole of the artillery under the command of that excellent officer, displayed a degree of gallantry and good conduct not to be surpassed. The particular situation of captain Towson, and the much lamented captain Williams and lieutenant M'Donough, and that of lieutenant Watmough, as already described, with their respective commands, rendered them most conspicuous. The courage and good conduct of lieutenant Zantzinger and lieutenant Childs, is spoken of in high terms by major Hindman and captain Towson, as also that of serjeant major Denhon. Captains Biddle and Fanning, on the centre and right of their entrenchments, threw their shot to the right, left and front, and annoyed the Indians and light troops of the enemy approaching from the woods. Lieutenant Fontaine in his zeal to meet the enemy, was unfortunately wounded and made prisoner. Lieutenant Bird was active and useful, and in fact every individual belonging to the corps did their duty.

The detachment of Scott's gallant brigade, consisting of parts of the 9th, 11th and 23d infantry, did its duty in a manner worthy the high reputation the brigade had acquired at Chippewa, and at the falls of Niagara. The 9th, under the command of captain Edmund Foster, was actively engaged against the left of the enemy, and with the aid of lieutenant Douglass's corps of bombards, commanding the water battery, and of that of the volunteers, under captains Broughton and Harding, effected their repulse. The good conduct of lieutenants Childs, Cushman and Foot, and ensign Blake, deserves commendation.

The officers killed, are captain Williams and lieutenant M'Donough of the artillery. Wounded, lieutenant Watmough of the artillery; ensign Cissney 19th; lieutenant Bushnel 21st; lieutenants Brown and Belknap 23d; and captain Birdsall, 4th rifle regiment, all severely.

Lieutenant Fontaine of the artillery, who was taken prisoner, writes from the British camp, that he fortunately fell into the

hands of the Indians, who, after taking his money, treated him kindly. It would seem, then, that these savages had not joined in the resolution to give no quarter.

To Major Jones, assistant adjutant general, and major Hall, assistant inspector general; captain Harris of the dragoons, volunteer aid-de-camp; lieutenant Belton, aid-de-camp, much credit is due for their constant vigilance and strict attention to every duty previous to the action, and the steady courage, zeal and activity, which they manifested during the action.

The surgeons, doctors Fuller 23d, Trowbridge 21st, with their mates; doctors Gale of the 23d, and Everitt and Allen of the 21st, deserve the warmest approbation, for their indefatigable exertions and humane attention to the wounded of our army, as well as to the prisoners who fell into their hands.

I have the honour to be, &c.

E. P. GAINES, *Brig. Gen. Comdg.*

Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

Report of the killed, wounded and prisoners, taken at the battle of Erie, U. C. August 15th, 1814.

Killed, left on the field, 222—wounded, left on the field, 174—prisoners, 186. Grand total, 582.

Two hundred supposed to be killed on the left flank, near Snake Hill (in the water) and permitted to float down the Niagara. The number on the right flank, near the woods, could not be ascertained.

Given at the inspector general's office, Fort Erie, Upper Canada.

NATHL. N. HALL,

Assist. Inspt. Gen.

Brig. Gen. E. P. Gaines, &c.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT ERIE, UPPER CANADA,

August 26th, 1814:

SIR,

In my report of the battle of the 15th instant, I inadvertently omitted the names of captain Chunn of the 19th, lieutenants Bowman and Larned, of the 21st, and Jewitt of the 11th infantry, as also my brigade major, lieutenant Gleason; each of whom bore a conspicuous part in the action,, and whom I beg leave to recommend to your notice. Lieutenants Bowman and Larned commanded companies in the 21st, which so gallantly beat the enemy's right column. Captain Chunn with his company was doing duty with the same regiment. I also omitted mentioning that a part of this regiment pursued the enemy's right upwards of a mile, and took 100 prisoners; his left was also pursued, and

more than an hundred prisoners were taken beyond our works. These facts prove, that the affair was not merely a *defence* of our position, or a mere *repulse* of the enemy, as I find it called by some. As regards myself, I am satisfied with the *result*, and am not disposed to make any difficulty about the *name* by which the affair may be called; but it is due to the brave men I have the honour to command, that I should say, that the affair was to the enemy a *sore beating* and a *defeat*, and it was to us a *handsome victory*.

Our position is growing stronger every day by the exertions of majors M'Ree and Wood, and the officers and men generally. We keep up a smart cannonade. One of the enemy's pickets yesterday approached nearer to ours than usual. Major Brooks, officer of the day, added 100 men to our picket, attacked and drove them in with considerable loss; the major brought in about 30 muskets. In this affair, however, we have to lament the loss of another gallant officer, captain Wattles, of the 23d; our loss was otherwise inconsiderable.

I have the honour to be, &c.

E. P. GAINES,

Brigadier General Commanding.

Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG.

BALTIMORE, August 27th, 1814.

SIR,

When the enemy arrived at the mouth of Potomac, of all the militia which I had been authorized to assemble there were but about 1,700 in the field, from 13 to 1400 under general Stansbury near this place, and about 250 at Bladensburg, under lieutenant colonel Kramer; the slow progress of draft, and the imperfect organization, with the ineffectiveness of the laws to compel them to turn out, rendered it impossible to have procured more.

The militia of this state, and the contiguous parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania, were called on en masse, but the former militia law of Pennsylvania had expired on the 1st of June or July, and the one adopted in its place is not to take effect in organizing the militia before October. No aid, therefore, has been received from that state.

After all the force that could be put at my disposal in that short time, and making such dispositions as I deemed best calculated to present the most respectable force at whatever point the enemy might strike, I was enabled by the most active and harrassing movements of the troops, to interpose before the enemy at Bladensburg, about 5000 men, including 350 regulars, and commodore Barney's command. Much the largest portion of this force arrived on the ground when the enemy were in sight, and were

disposed to support in the best manner the position which general Stansbury had taken. They had barely reached the ground before the action commenced, which was about one o'clock, P. M. of the 24th instant, and continued about an hour.

The contest was not as obstinately maintained as could have been desired, but was by parts of the troops sustained with great spirit and with prodigious effect, and had the whole of our force been equally firm, I am induced to believe the enemy would have been repulsed notwithstanding all the disadvantages under which we fought. The artillery from Baltimore, supported by major Pinkney's rifle battalion and a part of captain Doughty's from the Navy Yard, were in advance to command the pass of the bridge at Bladensburg, and played upon the enemy, as I have since learned, with very destructive effect; but the rifle troops were obliged after some time to retire, and of course artillery. Superior numbers, however, rushed upon them and made their retreat necessary, not however without great loss on the part of the enemy. Major Pinkney received a severe wound in his right arm, after he had retired to the left flank of Stansbury's brigade. The right and centre of Stansbury's brigade, consisting of lieutenant colonel Ragan's and Shutez's regiments, generally gave way very soon afterwards, with the exception of about forty rallied by colonel Ragan, after having lost his horse and a whole or a part of captain Trower's company, both of whom general Stansbury represents to have made, even thus deserted, a gallant stand. The fall which lieutenant colonel Ragan received from his horse, together with his great efforts to sustain his position, rendered him unable to follow the retreat; we have, therefore, to lament that this gallant and excellent officer has been taken prisoner. He has, however, been paroled, and I met him here recovering from the bruises occasioned by his fall. The loss of his services at this moment is serious. The 5th Baltimore regiment, under lieutenant colonel Sterret, being the left of brigadier general Stansbury's brigade, still, however, stood their ground, and except for a moment, when part of them recoiled a few steps, remained firm and stood until ordered to retreat with a view to prevent them from being out flanked.

The reserve under brigadier general Smith, of the district of Columbia, with the militia of the city and Georgetown, with the regulars and some detachments of the Maryland militia, flanked on their right by commodore Barney and his brave fellows, and lieutenant colonel Beall, still were to the right on the hill and maintained the contest for some time with great effect.

It is not with me to report the conduct of commodore Barney and his command, nor can I speak from observation, being too remote; but the concurrent testimony of all who did observe them, does them the highest justice for their brave resistance, and the destructive effect they produced on the enemy. Commodore

Barney, after having lost his horse, took post near one of his guns, and there unfortunately received a severe wound in the thigh, and he also fell into the hands of the enemy.

Captain Miller, of marines, was wounded in the arm fighting bravely. From the best intelligence there remains but little doubt that the enemy lost at least four hundred killed and wounded, and of these a very unusual portion killed. Our loss cannot, I think, be estimated at more than from thirty to forty killed, and fifty or sixty wounded.

You will readily understand that it is impossible for me to speak minutely of the merit or demerit of particular troops so little known to me from their recent and hasty assemblage. My subsequent movements, for the purpose of preserving as much of my force as possible, gaining reinforcements and protecting this place, you already know.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WM. H. WINDER,

Brig. Gen. Comdg. 10th M. D.

P. S. We have to lament that captain Sterret, of the 5th Baltimore regiment, has also been wounded, but is doing well; other officers, no doubt, deserve notice, but I am as yet unable to particularize.

Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

NAVY YARD, WASHINGTON, August 27th, 1814.

SIR,

After receiving your orders of the 24th, directing the public shipping, stores, &c. at this establishment, to be destroyed, in case of the success of the enemy over our army, no time was lost in making the necessary arrangements for firing the whole, and preparing boats for departing from the yard, as you had suggested. About 4 P. M. I received a message by an officer, from the Secretary of War, with information that he could "protect me no longer." Soon after this, I was informed that the conflagration of the Eastern Branch bridge had commenced; and, in a few minutes, the explosion announced the blowing up of that part near the "draw," as had been arranged in the morning.

It had been promulgated, as much as in my power, among the inhabitants of the vicinity, the intended fate of the yard, in order that they might take every possible precaution for the safety of themselves, families, and property. Immediately several individuals came, in succession, endeavoring to prevail on me to deviate from my instructions, which they were invariably informed was unavailing, unless they could bring me your instructions in writing, countermanding those previously given. A deputation also of the most respectable women came on the same errand, when I

found myself painfully necessitated to inform them that any further importunities would cause the matches to be instantly applied to the trains, with assurance, however, that if left at peace, I would delay the execution of the orders as long as I could feel the least shadow of justification. Captain Creighton's arrival at the yard, with the men who had been with him at the bridge, (probably about 5 o'clock,) would have justified me in instant operation; but he also was strenuous in the desire to obviate the intended destruction, and volunteered to ride out and gain me positive information, as to the position of the enemy, under the hope that our army might have rallied and repulsed them. I was myself, indeed, desirous of delay, for the reason that the wind was then blowing fresh from the south south west, which would most probably have caused the destruction of all the private property north and east of the yard, in its neighbourhood. I was of opinion, also, that the close of the evening would bring with it a calm, in which happily we were not disappointed. Other gentlemen, well mounted, volunteered, as captain Creighton had done, to go out and bring me positive intelligence of the enemy's situation, if possible to obtain it.

The evening came, and I waited with much anxiety the return of captain Creighton, having almost continual information that the enemy were in the neighbourhood of the marine barracks,—at the capitol hill—and that their “advance” was near Georgetown. I therefore determined to wait only until half past 8 o'clock, to commence the execution of my orders, becoming apprehensive that captain Creighton had, from his long stay, fallen into the hands of the enemy. During this delay, I ordered a few marines, and other persons who were then near me, to go off in one of the small galleys, which was done, and the boat is saved. Colonel Wharton had been furnished with a light boat, with which he left the yard, probably between 7 and 8 o'clock. At twenty minutes past 8 captain Creighton returned; he was still extremely averse to the destruction of the property, but having informed him that your orders to me were imperative, the proper disposition of the boats being made, the matches were applied, and in a few moments the whole was in a state of irretrievable conflagration. When about leaving the wharf I observed the fire had also commenced at Greenleaf's point, and in the way out of the branch, we observed the Capitol on fire. It had been my intention not to leave the vicinity of the yard with my boat during the night; but having captain Creighton and other gentlemen with me, she was too much encumbered and overladen to render that determination proper. We therefore proceeded to Alexandria, in the vicinity of which I rested till the morning of the 25th, when, having also refreshed the gig's crew, we left Alexandria at half past 7 o'clock, and proceeded again up to the yard, where I landed, unmolested, about a quarter before nine.



The schooner *Lynx* had laid alongside the burning wharf, still unhurt; hoping, therefore, to save her, we hauled her to the quarter of the hulk of the *New York*, which had also escaped the ravages of the flames. The detail issuing store of the navy store keeper had remained safe from the fire during the night, which the enemy, (being in force in the yard) about 8 o'clock set fire to, and it was speedily consumed. It appeared that they had left the yard about half an hour when we arrived. I found my dwelling house, and that of lieutenant Haraden, untouched by fire; but some of the people of the neighbourhood had commenced plundering them; therefore, hastily collecting a few persons known to me, I got some of my most valuable materials moved to neighbours' houses out of the yard, who tendered me their offers to receive them, the enemy's officers having declared private property sacred. Could I have staid another hour, I had probably saved all my furniture and stores; but being advised by some friends, that I was not safe, they believing that the admiral was by that time, or would speedily be informed of my being in the yard, he having expressed an anxious desire to make me captive, but had said that the officers' dwellings in the yard should not be destroyed. I therefore again embarked in the gig, taking along out of the branch one of the new launches, which lay safe, although along side of a floating stage enveloped in flames. I had no sooner gone than such a scene of devastation and plunder took place in the houses (by the people of the neighbourhood,) as is disgraceful to relate; not a moveable article, from the cellars to the garrets, has been left us, and even some of the fixtures, and the locks of the doors, have been shamefully pillaged. Some of the perpetrators, however, have been made known to me.

From the number and movements of the enemy, it would have appeared rash temerity to have attempted returning again that day, though my inclination strongly urged it; therefore, reconnoitering their motions, as well as could be effected at a convenient distance in the gig, until evening, I again proceeded to Alexandria for the night. Yesterday morning, the 26th, it was impossible to form (from the various and contradictory reports at Alexandria) any sort of probable conjecture, either of the proceedings and situation of our army, or that of the enemy. Determining, therefore, to have a positive knowledge of some part thereof, from ocular demonstration, I again embarked in the gig, proceeding with due caution to the yard, where I learned with chagrin the devastation and pillage before mentioned, and found also, to my surprise, that the old gun boat, which had been loaded with provisions, and had grounded, in endeavouring to get out of the branch, on the evening of the 24th, was nearly discharged of her cargo, by a number of our people, without connexion with each other. Having landed in the yard, I soon ascertained that the enemy had left the city, excepting only a serjeant's guard, for the security of the sick and

wounded. Finding it impracticable to stop the scene of plunder that had commenced, I determined instantly on re-possessing the yard, with all the force at my command. Repairing, therefore, immediately to Alexandria, lieutenant Haraden, the ordinary men, and the few marines there, were ordered directly up; following myself, I got full possession again at evening.

I am now collecting the scattered purloined provisions, ready for your orders, presuming they will now become very scarce indeed; the quantity saved, you shall be informed when known to me. The *Lynx* is safe, except her foremast being carried away in the storm of the 25th, about 4 P. M. We have also another of the gun boats, with about 100 barrels of powder, and one of the large yard cutters, nearly full, with the filled cylinders, for our different guns previously mounted; the powder of those, however, is probably much wetted by the storm. I would most willingly have an interview with you, but deem it improper to leave my station without some justifiable cause, or in pursuance of your instructions, under which I am ready to proceed, wherever my services may be thought useful.

I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS TINGEY.

Hon. W. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

NOTE. In the navy yard at Washington, there is an elegant Italian marble monument, erected by the officers of the American navy, at their own expense, sacred to the memory of their gallant brethren who fell before Tripoli. This monument was mutilated by the British on the 25th of August 1814. EDIT.

FARM AT ELK RIDGE, August 29th, 1814.

SIR,

This is the first moment I have had it in my power to make a report of the proceedings of the forces under my command, since I had the honour of seeing you at the camp at the "Old Fields." On the afternoon of that day, we were informed that the enemy was advancing upon us. The army was put under arms, and our positions taken; my forces on the right, flanked by the two battalions of the 36th and 38th, where we remained some hours; the enemy did not make his appearance. A little before sun-set *general Winder* came to me, and recommended that the heavy artillery should be withdrawn, with the exception of one 12 pounder to cover the retreat. We took up our line of march, and in the night entered Washington by the Eastern Branch bridge. I marched my men, &c. to the marine barracks, and took up quarters for the night, myself sleeping at commodore Tingeys, in the navy yard. About 2 o'clock *general Winder* came to my quarters, and we made some arrangements for the morning. In the morning I received a note from general Winder, and waited upon him; he

requested me to take command, and place my artillery to defend the passage of the bridge on the Eastern Branch, as the enemy was approaching the city in that direction. I immediately put my guns in position, leaving the marines and the rest of my men at the barracks, to wait further orders. I was in this situation when I had the honour to meet you, with the President and heads of departments, when it was determined that I should draw off my guns and men, and proceed towards Bladensburg, which was immediately put into execution. On our way, I was informed the enemy was within a mile of Bladensburg;—we hurried on. The day was hot, and my men very much crippled from the severe marches we had experienced the days before, many of them being without shoes, which I had replaced that morning. I preceded the men, and when I arrived at the *line* which separates the district from Maryland, the battle began. I sent an officer back to hurry on my men; they came up in a *trot*; we took our position on the rising ground, put the pieces in battery, posted the *marines* under captain *Miller*, and the flotilla men, who were to act as infantry, under their own officers, on my right, to support the pieces, and waited the approach of the enemy. During this period the engagement continued, and the enemy advancing, our own army retreating before them, apparently in much disorder. At length the enemy made his appearance on the main road, in force, and in front of my battery, and on seeing us made a halt. I reserved our fire. In a few minutes the enemy again advanced, when I ordered an 18 pounder to be fired, which completely cleared the road; shortly after, a second and a third attempt was made by the enemy to come forward, but all were destroyed. They then crossed over into an open field, and attempted to flank our right; he was there met by three 12 pounders, the marines under captain *Miller*, and my men, acting as infantry, and again was totally cut up. By this time not a vestige of the American army remained, except a body of five or six hundred, posted on a height on my right, from whom I expected much support, from their fine situation.

The enemy from this period never appeared in force in front of us; they pushed forward their *sharp* shooters; one of which shot my horse under me, who fell dead between two of my guns. The enemy, who had been kept in check by our fire for nearly half an hour, now began to out-flank us on the right; our guns were turned that way; he pushed up the hill, about two or three hundred, towards the corps of Americans stationed as above described, who, to my great mortification, made no resistance, giving a fire or two and retired. In this situation we had the whole army of the enemy to contend with. Our ammunition was expended; and, unfortunately, the drivers of my ammunition wagons had gone off in the general panic. At this time I received a severe wound in my thigh; captain *Miller* was wounded; sailing master

Warner killed; acting sailing master *Martin* killed; and sailing master *Martin* wounded; but to the honour of my officers and men, as fast as their companions and messmates fell at the guns, they were instantly replaced from the infantry.

Finding the enemy now completely in our rear, and no means of defence, I gave orders to my officers and men to retire. Three of my officers assisted me to get off a short distance, but the great loss of blood occasioned such a weakness, that I was compelled to lie down. I requested my officers to leave me, which they obstinately refused; but upon being ordered they obeyed, one only remained. In a short time I observed a British soldier, and had him called, and directed him to seek an officer; in a few minutes an officer came, and on learning who I was, brought *general Ross* and *admiral Cockburn* to me. Those officers behaved to me with the most marked attention, respect and politeness, had a surgeon brought, and my wound dressed immediately. After a few minutes conversation, the general informed me (after paying me a handsome compliment) that I was paroled, and at liberty to proceed to Washington or Bladensburg; as also Mr. Huffington, who had remained with me, offering me every assistance in his power, giving orders for a litter to be brought, in which I was carried to Bladensburg; captain *Wainwright*, first captain to admiral *Cochrane*, remained with me, and behaved to me as if I was a brother. During the stay of the enemy at Bladensburg, I received every marked attention possible from the officers of the army and navy.

My wound is deep, but I flatter myself not dangerous; the ball is not yet extracted. I fondly hope a few weeks will restore me to health, and that an exchange will take place, that I may resume my command, or any other that you and the President may think proper to honour me with.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOSHUA BARNEY.

Hon. W. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

PROCLAMATION

Of colonel Nichols of the British army, to the southern and western inhabitants of the United States.

NATIVES OF LOUISIANA! On you the first call is made, to assist in liberating from a faithless, imbecile government, your paternal soil; Spaniards, Frenchmen, Italians and British, whether settled, or residing for a time in Louisiana, on you, also, I call, to aid me in this just cause: the American usurpation in this country must be abolished, and the lawful owners of the soil put in possession. I am at the head of a large body of Indians, well armed, disciplined, and commanded by British officers—a good train

of artillery, with every requisite, seconded by the powerful aid of a numerous British and Spanish squadron of ships and vessels of war. Be not alarmed, inhabitants of the country, at our approach; the same *good faith and disinterestedness*, which has distinguished the conduct of Britons in Europe, accompanies them here; you will have no fear of litigious taxes imposed on you, for the purpose of carrying on an unnatural and unjust war; your property, your laws, the peace and tranquillity of your country, will be guaranteed to you by men, who will suffer no infringement of theirs; rest assured, that these brave RED men only burn with an ardent desire of satisfaction, for the wrongs they have suffered from the Americans: to join you in liberating these southern provinces from their yoke, and drive them into those limits formerly prescribed by my sovereign. The Indians have pledged themselves, in the most solemn manner, not to injure, in the slightest degree, the persons or properties of any but enemies. A flag over any door, whether Spanish, French or British, will be a certain protection; nor dare any Indian put his foot on the threshold thereof, under penalty of death from his own countrymen; not even an enemy will as Indian put to death, except resisting in arms: and as for injuring helpless women and children, the red men, by their good conduct, and treatment to them, will (if it be possible) make the Americans blush for their more inhuman conduct, lately on the Escambia, and within a neutral territory.

INHABITANTS OF KENTUCKY, you have too long borne with grievous impositions; the whole brunt of the war has fallen on your brave sons; be imposed on no longer, but either range yourselves under the standard of your forefathers, or observe a strict neutrality. If you comply with either of these offers, whatever provisions you send down will be paid for in dollars, and the safety of the persons bringing it, as well as the free navigation of the Mississippi, guaranteed to you.

MEN OF KENTUCKY, let me call to your view (and I trust to your abhorrence) the conduct of those factions, which hurried you into this civil, unjust, and unnatural war, at a time when Great Britain was straining every nerve, in defence of her own, and the liberties of the world; when the bravest of her sons were fighting and bleeding in so sacred a cause; when she was spending millions of her treasure, in endeavouring to pull down one of the most formidable and dangerous tyrants, that ever disgraced the form of man; when groaning Europe was almost at her last gasp; when Britons alone showed an undaunted front—basely did those assassins endeavour to stab her from the rear; she has turned on them, renovated from the bloody but successful struggle, Europe is happy and free, and now hastens, justly to avenge the unprovoked insult. Show them that you are not collectively unjust; leave that contemptible few to shift for themselves; let those slaves of the tyrant send an embassy to Elba, and implore his aid; but let every honest

upright American spurn them with united contempt. After the experience of twenty-one years, can you longer support those brawlers for liberty, who call it freedom, when themselves are free? Be no longer their dupes; accept of my offers; every thing I have promised in this paper, I guarantee to you, on the SACRED HONOUR of a BRITISH OFFICER.

Given under my hand, at my *head quarters*, Pensacola, this 29th day of August, 1814.

EDWARD NICHOLS.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP AT THE WHITE HOUSE, VA.

September 6th, 1814.

SIR,

Yesterday morning about 2 o'clock, the enemy's squadron discontinued the bombardment which had been kept up with little intermission, for three days, weighed anchor, and stood down the river, commencing a heavy fire on the battery, and across the neck of land through which the militia were compelled to march to its assistance. The rifle companies under captains Humphries, Tebbs and Fields, were immediately ordered down to the battery, which orders were promptly obeyed. I followed with colonel Parker's regiment, and two detachments under colonels Green and Renno, leaving instructions with general Young to take a position between us and a creek, which made up some distance behind so as to prevent the enemy falling on our rear, and to co-operate with us, if necessary, at the battery. When I had proceeded with the advance to a point within three or four hundred yards of the river, the troops were halted until I could obtain accurate information of the precise situation of the enemy; about this time, commodore Porter, as I understood, finding our little battery inefficient to impede the progress of the vessels, after having long gallantly defended it, and considering a longer contention with such a superiority of metal a wanton sacrifice of blood, ordered the battery to be evacuated and his men to retire, which they did. The two largest of the enemy's vessels, then anchored; one just above, and the other just below the battery, and commenced a most gallant cross fire of round shot, grape, canister, &c. The troops which had been previously ordered to shelter themselves from the fire of the enemy, it having become extremely severe, were immediately formed and marched back to a place of comparative security. We had scarcely retired, when information was brought that the enemy discovered a disposition to land, and aid was necessary to prevent their spiking our cannon. I again moved down with the troops under our command, colonel Dangerfield with his regiment being sent on before, and had proceeded to a valley within about fifty yards of the battery, when general Young and myself, who were following with the residue of the troops, were met by com-

modore Porter, within three or four hundred yards of the river. He thought that it was unnecessary to expose the whole army, and advised that 200 men, which he thought sufficient for the purpose, should be sent down to protect the battery. All the troops were then ordered back, the detail made and sent down under the command of colonel Green; major Banks followed with 200 men, to aid, if necessary.

Permit me to say, that it was impossible for men to have conducted themselves with more intrepidity, than the militia on this occasion. Notwithstanding the dreadful cross fire of every species of missile, by the enemy, to which they were exposed, without a possibility of returning the fire (the most trying of all situations) not a man under my command offered to move, until orders to that effect was given; and then it was done slowly and in order. I beg leave also, to mention the promptitude and alacrity with which the second order to march through a tremendous discharge of large shot and grape, for the distance of about a mile, was immediately obeyed. Captain Humphries, with his rifle company, was stationed just above the battery, and is entitled to the highest commendation for the courage and activity with which he fought. Captain Griffith, of Alexandria, was under the immediate direction of commodore Porter, who spoke of him in the highest terms of approbation. Captain Janney, of Essex, was near the battery at the time of the action, with a fatigue party of fifty or sixty men, and deserves to be particularly mentioned. Our whole loss was eleven killed, and seventeen or eighteen wounded.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN P. HUNGERFORD,
Brig. Gen. Virginia militia.

Hon. James Monroe.

BATTLE ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

U. S. SHIP SARATOGA, OFF PLATTSBURGH,
September 11th, 1814.

SIR,

The Almighty has been pleased to grant us a signal victory on lake Champlain, in the capture of one frigate, one brig, and two sloops of war of the enemy.

I have the honour to be, &c.

T. MACDONOUGH.

Honourable William Jones,
Secretary of the Navy.

THE AVON SUNK BY THE WASP.

UNITED STATES' SLOOP WASP, AT SEA,
September 11th, 1814—latitude 40 N. longitude 16 W.

SIR,

After a protracted and tedious stay at L'Orient, I had at last the pleasure of leaving that place on Saturday the 27th of

of August. On the 30th, captured the British brig Lettice, Henry Cockburn, master; and 31st August, the British brig Bon Accord, Adam Durno, master. On the morning of the 1st September, discovered a convoy of ten sail at leeward, in charge of the Armada 74, and a bomb ship; stood for them and succeeded in cutting out the British brig Mary, John D. Allen, master, laden with brass cannon taken from the Spaniards, iron cannon and military stores from Gibraltar to England, removed the prisoners set her on fire and endeavoured to capture another of the convoy, but was chased off by the Armada. On the evening of the same day at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 6, while going free, discovered four vessels nearly at the same time, two on the starboard, and two on the larboard bow, being the farthest to windward. At 7 the chase (a brig) commenced making signals with flags, which could not be distinguished for want of light, and soon after made various ones with lanterns, rockets and guns. At 26 minutes after 9, having the chase under our lee bow, the 12 pound carronade was directed to be fired into him, which he returned; ran under his lee to prevent his escaping, and at 20 minutes after 9 commenced the action. At 10 o'clock believing the enemy to be silenced, orders were given to cease firing, when I hailed and asked if he had surrendered. No answer being given to this, and his fire having re-commenced, it was again returned. At 12 minutes after 10, the enemy having suffered greatly and having made no return to our two last broadsides, I hailed him the second time to know if he had surrendered, when he answered in the affirmative. The guns were then ordered to be secured and the boat lowered to take possession. In the act of lowering the boat, a second brig was discovered, a little distance astern and standing for us. Sent the crew to their quarters, prepared every thing for another action, and waited his coming up—at 36 minutes after 10, discovered two more sail astern standing towards us. I now felt myself compelled to forego the satisfaction of destroying the prize. Our braces having been cut away, we kept off the wind until others could be rove, and with the expectation of drawing the second brig from his companions, but in this last we were disappointed. The second brig continued to approach us until she came close to our stern, when she hauled by the wind, fired her broadside which cut our rigging and sails considerably, and shot away a lower main cross tree, and retraced her steps to join her consorts; when we were necessitated to abandon the prize, he appeared in every respect a total wreck. He continued for some time firing guns of distress until probably delivered by the two last vessels who made their appearance. The second brig could have engaged us if he had thought proper, as he neared us fast, but contented himself with firing a broadside, and immediately returned to his companions.

It is with real satisfaction I have again the pleasure of bearing testimony to the merits of lieutenants Reily, Tillinghast, Berry

and sailing master Carr; and to the good conduct of every officer and man on board the Wasp. Their divisions and departments were attended and supplied with the utmost regularity and abundance, which, with the good order maintained, together with the vivacity and precision of their fire, reflects on them the greatest credit. Our loss is two killed, and one slightly wounded with a wad. The hull received four round shot, and the fore-mast many grape shot. Our rigging and sails suffered a great deal. Every damage has been repaired the day after, with the exception of our sails.

Of the vessel with whom we were engaged, nothing positive can be said with regard to her name or force. While hailing him, previous to his being fired into, it was blowing fresh (then going ten knots) and the name was not distinctly understood. Of her force, the four shot which struck us, are all thirty-two pounds in weight, being a pound and three quarters heavier than any belonging to this vessel. From this circumstance, the number of men in her tops, her general appearance and great length, she is believed to be one of the largest brigs in the British navy.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. BLAKELY.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

P. S. I am told the enemy, after his surrender, asked for assistance, and said he was sinking. The probability of this is confirmed by his firing single guns for some time after his capture.

The action took place in latitude 47° 30' north, longitude 11 west.

List of killed and wounded on board the United States' sloop of war, Wasp, Johnston Blakely, esquire, commander, in the action with his Britannic majesty's sloop of war ———, on the 1st September, 1814.

KILLED—Joseph Martin, boatswain; Henry Staples, quarter gunner. **WOUNDED**—James Snellings, seaman, collar bone fractured by a wad.

RECAPITULATION—Killed, 2; wounded, 1. Total, 3.

WM. M. CLARKE, Surgeon.

It was afterwards ascertained that the prize, the name and force of which, captain Blakely could not obtain, was the British brig of war Avon, captain Arbuthnot, of the same number of guns as the Reindeer. She sunk immediately after the Castilion which chased the Wasp, had taken out her last man.

From the enemy's account it appeared that her captain was wounded in both legs, her first lieutenant and eight men killed, and the second lieutenant, one midshipman, and 31 men wounded.

After repairing damages, the Wasp continued her cruise, and on the 21st of September, she captured, off the Madeiras, her thirteenth prize, the British brig Atalanta, of eight guns. This

vessel arrived at Havannah in the beginning of November following, with despatches from captain Blakely, and under the command of Mr. Geisinger of the Wasp.

U. S. SHIP SARATOGA, PLATTSBURGH BAY,
September 13th, 1814.

SIR,

I have the honour to give you the particulars of the action which took place on the 11th instant, on this lake.

For several days, the enemy were on their way to Plattsburgh by land and water, and it being well understood that an attack would be made at the same time, by their land and naval forces, I determined to await, at anchor, the approach of the latter.

At eight A. M. the look-out boat announced the approach of the enemy. At nine, he anchored in a line ahead, at about 300 yards distance from my line; his ship opposed the Saratoga, his brig to the Eagle, captain Robert Henley; his gallies, thirteen in number, to the schooner, sloop, and a division of our gallies; one of his sloops assisting their ship and brig, the other assisting their gallies. Our remaining gallies with the Saratoga and Eagle.

In this situation, the whole force on both sides, became engaged, the Saratoga suffering much, from the heavy fire of the Confidence. I could perceive at the same time, however, that our fire was very destructive to her. The Ticonderoga, lieutenant commandant Cassin, gallantly sustained her full share of the action. At half past 10 o'clock, the Eagle not being able to bring her guns to bear, cut her cable, and anchored in a more eligible position, between my ship and the Ticonderoga, where she very much annoyed the enemy, but unfortunately, leaving me exposed to a galling fire from the enemy's brig. Our guns on the starboard side being nearly all dismounted, or not manageable, a stern anchor was let go, the bower cut, and the ship winded with a fresh broadside on the enemy's ship, which soon after surrendered. Our broadside was then sprung to bear on the brig, which surrendered in about 15 minutes after.

The sloop that was opposed to the Eagle, had struck some time before, and drifted down the line; the sloop which was with their gallies having struck also. Three of their gallies are said to be sunk, the others pulled off. Our gallies were about obeying with alacrity, the signal to follow them, when all the vessels were reported to me to be in a sinking state; it then became necessary to annul the signal to the gallies, and order their men to the pumps. I could only look at the enemy's gallies going off in a shattered condition, for there was not a mast in either squadron that could stand to make sail on; the lower rigging being nearly shot away, hung down as though it had been just placed over mast heads.

The *Saratoga* had 55 round shot in her hull, the *Confiance* 105. The enemy's shot passed principally just over our heads, as there were not 20 whole hammocks in the nettings at the close of the action, which lasted, without intermission, two hours and twenty minutes.

The absence and sickness of lieutenant Raymond Perry, left me without the services of that excellent officer; much ought fairly to be attributed to him for his great care and attention in disciplining the ship's crew, as her first lieutenant. His place was filled by a gallant young officer, lieutenant Peter Gamble, who I regret to inform, you, was killed early in the action. Acting lieutenant Vallette worked the 1st and 2d division of guns with able effect. Sailing master Brum's attention to the springs, and in the execution of the order to wind the ship, and occasionally at the guns, met my entire approbation: also captain Youngs, commanding the acting marines, who took his men to the guns. Mr Beale, purser, was of great service at the guns, and in carrying my orders throughout the ship, with midshipmen Montgomery. Master's mate, Joshua Justin, had command of the 3d division; his conduct during the action, was that of a brave officer. Midshipmen Monteath, Graham, Williamson, Platt, Thwing, and acting midshipman Baldwin, all behaved well, and gave evidence of their making valuable officers. The *Saratoga* was twice set on fire, by hot shot from the enemy's ship.

I close, sir, this communication, with feelings of gratitude, for the able support I received from every officer and man attached to the squadron which I have the honour to command.

I have the honour to be, &c.

T. MACDONOUGH.

Honourable William Jones,
Secretary of the Navy.

UNITED STATES' SHIP *SARATOGA*,
September 13th, 1814.

SIR,

I have the honour to inclose to you a list of the killed and wounded on board the different vessels of the squadron under your command in the action of the 11th instant. It is impossible to ascertain correctly that of the enemy. From the best information received from the British officers, from my own observations and from various lists found on board the *Confiance*, I calculate the number of men on board that ship, at the commencement of the action, at 270, of whom at least 180 were killed and wounded, and on board the other captured vessels, at least 80 more, making in the whole, killed and wounded 260. This is, doubtless, short of the real number, as many were thrown overboard from the *Confiance*, during the engagement. The muster books must

have been thrown overboard, or otherwise disposed of, as they are not to be found.

I have the honour to be, &c.

GEORGE BEALE, Jr. *Purser.*

Thomas Macdonough, Esqr.

A comparative view of the forces and loss,

BRITISH—No. of guns 95; men 1050—killed 84; wounded 110,

AMERICAN—No. of guns 86; men 820—killed 52; wounded 58.

U. S. SHIP SARATOGA, OFF PLATTSBURGH,

September 13th, 1814.

DEAR SIR,

Enclosed is a copy of a letter from captain White Youngs, and a list of killed and wounded attached to his command. I beg leave to recommend captain Youngs to your particular notice; during the action, his conduct was such as to meet with my warmest approbation. I feel much indebted to him for his personal valor and example of coolness and intrepidity to his own men, as well as to the sailors. He volunteered in a sinking boat, to carry my order to the galleys for close action, in the hottest part of it; and supplied the guns with his men as fast as the sailors were disabled.

I am, with much respect, &c.

T. MACDONOUGH.

Brigadier general Maccomb.

HEAD QUARTERS, PLATTSBURGH, September 15th, 1814.

SIR,

I have the honour to communicate for the information of the war department, the particulars of the advance of the enemy into the territory of the United States, the circumstances attending the siege of Plattsburgh, and the defence of the posts entrusted to my charge.

The governor general of the Canadas, sir George Prevost, having collected all the disposable force of Lower Canada, with a view of conquering the country as far as Crown Point and Ticonderoga, entered the territories of the United States on the first of the month, and occupied the village of Champlain, there avowed his intentions, and issued orders and proclamations tending to dissuade the people from their allegiance, and inviting them to furnish his army with provisions. He immediately began to press the wagons and teams in the vicinity, and loaded them with his heavy baggage and stores. From this I was persuaded he intended to attack this place. I had but just returned from the lines, where I had commanded a fine brigade, which was broken to form the division under major general Izard, ordered

to the westward. Being senior officer he left me in command, and except the four companies of the sixth regiment, I had not an organized battalion among those remaining. The garrison was composed of convalescents and recruits of the new regiments,—all in the greatest confusion, as well as the ordnance and stores, and the works in no state of defence.

To create an emulation and zeal among the officers and men in completing the works, I divided them into detachments, and placed them near the several forts: declaring in orders, that each detachment was the garrison of its own work, and bound to defend it to the last extremity. The enemy advanced cautiously and by short marches, and our soldiers worked day and night; so that by the time he made his appearance before this place we were prepared to receive him.

General Izard named the principal work *Fort Moreau*, and to remind the troops of the actions of their brave countrymen, I called the redoubt on the right *Fort Brown*, and that on the left *Fort Scott*. Besides these three works, we have two block-houses strongly fortified.

Finding on examining the returns of the garrison, that our force did not exceed fifteen hundred effective men for duty, and well informed that the enemy had as many thousands, I called on general Mooers, of the New York militia, and arranged with him plans for bringing forth the militia *en masse*. The inhabitants of the village fled with their families and effects, except a few worthy citizens and some boys, who formed themselves into a party, received rifles, and were exceedingly useful. By the 4th of the month, general Mooers collected about 700 militia, and advanced seven miles on the Beekman town road, to watch the motions of the enemy, and to skirmish with him as he advanced; also to obstruct the roads with fallen trees, and to break up the bridges.

On the Lake road, at Deer Creek bridge, I posted 200 men under captain Sproul, of the 13th regiment, with orders to *abattis* the woods, to place obstructions in the road, and to fortify himself; to this party, I added two field pieces. In advance of that position, was lieutenant colonel Appling, with 110 riflemen, watching the movements of the enemy, and procuring intelligence. It was ascertained, that before day-light on the 6th, the enemy would advance in two columns, on the two roads before mentioned, dividing at Sampson's, a little below Chazy village. The column on the Beekman town road, proceeded most rapidly; the militia skirmished with his advanced parties, and, except a few brave men, fell back most precipitately in the greatest disorder, notwithstanding the British troops did not deign to fire on them, except by their flankers and advanced patrols. The night previous, I ordered major Wool to advance with a detachment of 250 men, to support the militia, and set them an example of firmness. Also captain Leonard, of the light artillery, was directed to proceed with two pieces, to be on the ground before day; yet he did

not make his appearance before 8 o'clock, when the enemy had approached within two miles of the village. With his conduct, therefore, I am not well pleased. Major Wool, with his party, disputed the road with great obstinacy, but the militia could not be prevailed on to stand, notwithstanding the exertions of their general and staff officers; although the fields were divided by strong stone walls, and they were told that the enemy could not possibly cut them off. The state dragoons of New York wear red coats, and they being on the heights to watch the enemy, gave constant alarm to the militia, who mistook them for the enemy, and feared his getting in their rear. Finding the enemy's columns had penetrated within a mile of Plattsburgh, I despatched my aid-de-camp, lieutenant Root, to bring off the detachment at Dead Creek, and to inform lieutenant colonel Appling that I wished him to fall on the enemy's right flank. The colonel fortunately arrived just in time to save his retreat, and to fall in with the head of a column *debouching* from the woods. Here he poured in a destructive fire from his riflemen at rest, and continued to annoy the column until he formed a junction with major Wool. The field pieces did considerable execution among the enemy's columns. So undaunted, however, was the enemy, that he never deployed in his whole march, always pressing on in column. Finding that every road was full of troops crowding on us on all sides, I ordered the field pieces to retire across the bridge and form a battery for its protection, and to cover the retreat of the infantry, which was accordingly done, and the parties of *Appling* and *Wool*, as well as that of *Sproul*, retired alternately, keeping up a brisk fire until they got under cover of the works. The enemy's light troops occupied the houses near the bridge, and kept up a constant firing from the windows and balconies, and annoyed us much. I ordered them to be driven out with hot shot, which soon put the houses in flames, and obliged these sharp shooters to retire. The whole day, until it was too late to see, the enemy's light troops endeavoured to drive our guards from the bridge, but they suffered dearly for their perseverance. An attempt was also made to cross the upper bridge, where the militia handsomely drove them back. The column which marched by the Lake road, was much impeded by the obstructions and the removal of the bridge at Dead creek, and, as it passed the creek and beach, the galleys kept up a lively and galling fire. Our troops being now all on the south side of the Saranac, I directed the planks to be taken off the bridges and piled up in the form of breastworks to cover our parties intended for disputing the passage, which afterwards enabled us to hold the bridges against very superior numbers.

From the 7th to the 11th, the enemy was employed in getting on his battering train, and erecting his batteries and approaches, and constantly skirmishing at the bridges and fords. By this time, the militia of New York, and the volunteers of Vermont, were pouring in from all quarters. I advised general Mooers to keep

his force along the Saranac, to prevent the enemy's crossing the river, and to send a strong body in his rear to harass him day and night, and keep him in continual alarm. The militia behaved with great spirit after the first day, and the volunteers of Vermont were exceedingly serviceable. Our regular troops, notwithstanding the constant skirmishing and repeated endeavours of the enemy to cross the river, kept at their work day and night strengthening the defences, and evinced a determination to hold out to the last extremity.

It was reported that the enemy had only waited the arrival of his flotilla, to make a general attack. About eight in the morning of the 11th, as was expected, the flotilla appeared in sight round Cumberland Head, and at nine, bore down and engaged our flotilla at anchor in the bay off the town. At the same instant, the batteries were opened on us, and continued throwing bomb shells, shrapnels, balls, and congreve rockets until sun-set, when the bombardment ceased, every battery of the enemy being silenced by the superiority of our fire. The naval engagement lasted but two hours, in full view of both armies. Three efforts were made by the enemy to pass the river at the commencement of the cannonade and bombardment, with a view of assaulting the works, and had prepared for that purpose an immense number of scaling ladders. One attempt to cross was made at the village bridge, another at the upper bridge, and a third at a ford about three miles from the works. At the two first, he was repulsed by the regulars; at the ford, by the brave volunteers and militia, where he suffered severely in killed, wounded and prisoners; a considerable body having crossed the stream, but were either killed, taken, or driven back. The woods at this place were very favourable to the operations of the militia. A whole company of the 76th regiment was here destroyed, the three lieutenants and 27 men prisoners, the captain and the rest killed.

I cannot forego the pleasure of here stating the gallant conduct of captain M'Glassin of the 15th regiment, who was ordered to ford the river, and attack a party constructing a battery on the right of the enemy's line, within five hundred yards of fort Brown, which he handsomely executed at midnight with fifty men; drove off the working party consisting of one hundred and fifty, and defeated a covering party of the same number, killing one officer and six men in the charge and wounding many. At dusk the enemy withdrew his artillery from the batteries, and raised the siege; at nine, under cover of the night, sent off in a great hurry all the baggage he could find transport for, and also his artillery. At two next morning the whole army precipitately retreated, leaving the sick and wounded to our generosity, and the governor left a note with a surgeon requesting the humane attention of the commanding general.

Vast quantities of provisions were left behind and destroyed, also an immense quantity of bombshells, cannon balls, grape shot,

ammunition, flints, &c. &c. intrenching tools of all sorts, also tents and marquees. A great deal has been found concealed in the ponds and creeks, and buried in the ground, and a vast quantity carried off by the inhabitants. Such was the precipitancy of his retreat, that he arrived at Chazy, a distance of eight miles, before we discovered he had gone. The light troops, volunteers and militia pursued immediately on learning of his flight; and some of the mounted men made prisoners five dragoons of the 19th regiment, and several others of the rear guard. A continual fall of rain and a violent storm prevented further pursuit. Upwards of 300 deserters have come in, and many are hourly arriving. We have buried the British officers of the army and navy with the honours of war, and shown every attention and kindness to those who have fallen into our hands.

The conduct of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of my command, during this trying occasion, cannot be represented in too high terms, and I feel it my duty to recommend to the particular notice of government, lieutenant colonel Appling of the 1st rifle corps, major Wool of the 29th, major Totten of the corps of engineers, captain Brooks of the artillery, captain McGlassin of the 15th, lieutenants De Russy and Trescott of the corps of engineers, lieutenants Smyth, Mountford, and Cromwell of the artillery, also my aid-de-camp lieutenant Root, who have all distinguished themselves by their uncommon zeal and activity, and have been greatly instrumental in producing the happy and glorious result of the siege.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ALEXANDER MACOMB,

The Secretary of War.

The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, prisoners and deserters, since his first appearance, cannot fall short of 2500, including many officers, among whom, is colonel Wellington of the buffs.

Report of the killed, wounded and missing at Plattsburgh, from the 6th to the 11th of September, 1814.

Non-commissioned officers and privates, killed—37
wounded—62
missing—20

—————119

Commissioned Officers.

1st lieutenant George W. Rank, wounded on the 7th, and died on the 8th of September.

3d lieutenant R. M. Harrison, wounded.

do. Henry Taylor, do.

List of the principal British officers, and an exhibit of the several corps under the command of lieutenant general Sir George Prevost, at the siege of PLATTSBURGH.

Lieutenant general Sir George Prevost, commander in chief, major general De Rottenburg, major general Robertson, major general Powers, major general Brisbane, major general Banes, sir Sidney Beckwith, colonel Hughes, major Sinclair, lieutenant colonel Tryall, captain Murray, colonel Burke, major Montgomery, captain Davis, &c.

Regiments and corps of the British army.

1st Brigade, - - - - -	3700
2d do. - - - - -	3600
3d do. - - - - -	3100
Light do. - - - - -	2800
do. Dragoons, - - - - -	300
Royal Artillery, - - - - -	400
Rocketeers, Sappers and Miners, - - - - -	100
	<hr/> <hr/> 14,000

HEAD QUARTERS 3d BRIGADE, BALTIMORE,
September 15th, 1814.

SIR,

I have the honour to report to you, that, in obedience to your orders, I marched from Baltimore, on Sunday the 11th instant, with part of my brigade, as the advance corps of the army under your command. My force consisted of 550 of the 5th regiment, under lieutenant colonel Sterret; 620 of the 6th, under lieutenant colonel McDonald; 500 of the 27th, under lieutenant colonel Long; 450 of the 39th, under lieutenant colonel Fowler; 700 of the 51st, under lieutenant colonel Amey; 150 riflemen, under captain Dyer; 140 cavalry, under lieutenant colonel Blays, and the Union artillery of 75 men, with six four pounders, under captain Montgomery, making an aggregate of 3,185 effective men. I moved towards North Point, by the main road, and at 8 o'clock P. M. reached the meeting-house, near the head of Bear creek, seven miles from this city. Here the brigade halted, with the exception of the cavalry, who were pushed forward to Gorsuch's farm three miles in advance, and the riflemen, who took post near the blacksmith's shop, two miles in advance of our encampment. At 7 o'clock in the morning of the 12th, I received information from the advanced videttes, that the enemy were debarking troops from and under cover of their gun vessels which lay off the bluff of North Point, within the mouth of Patapsco river. I immediately ordered back my baggage under a strong guard, moved forward the 5th and 27th regiments and my artillery to the head of Long-log-lane (so called) resting the 5th with its right on the

head of a branch of Bear creek, and its left on the main North Point road, while the 27th was posted on the opposite side of the road in line with the 5th, its left extending towards a branch of Back river. The artillery I posted directly at the head of the lane in the interval between the 5th and 27th. The 39th occupied a ground 300 yards in the rear of the 27th, and the 51st the same distance in rear of the 5th, extending each parallel to the front line. The 6th regiment was thrown back to a position a short distance this side of Cook's tavern, and half a mile in the rear of the second line. My orders were, that the 5th and 27th should receive the enemy, and if necessary, fall back through the 51st and 39th, and form on the right of the 6th or reserve regiments. The riflemen were ordered to the skirts of a thick low pine wood, beyond the blacksmith's shop, with a large sedge-field in front, that as the cavalry were still in advance, who would inform him of the enemy's approach, they might take advantage of the covering of the wood, and annoy his advance. I soon learned that the enemy's advance party was moving rapidly up the main road, and as the cavalry continually announced their progress, I flattered myself with the hope that the riflemen would soon proclaim, by a galling fire, their still nearer approach. Imagine my chagrin when I perceived the whole rifle corps falling back upon my main position, having too credulously listened to groundless information, that the enemy were landing on Back river to cut them off. My hopes of early annoyance to the enemy, being thus frustrated, I threw the riflemen on the right flank of my front line, thereby, with the addition of a few cavalry, very well securing that flank. My videttes soon brought information, that the enemy in small force, was enjoying himself at Gorsuch's farm. Insulted at the idea of a small marauding party thus daringly provoking chastisement, several of my officers volunteered their corps to dislodge it. Captains Levering's and Howard's companies, from the 5th, about 150 in number, under major Heath, of that regiment; captain Aisquith's, and a few other riflemen, in all about 70; one four pounder, with 10 men, under lieutenant Stiles, and the cavalry, were immediately pushed forward to punish the insolence of the enemy's advance, or, if his main body appeared, to give evidence of my wish for a general engagement. The latter purpose was soon answered: this small volunteer corps had proceeded scarcely half a mile before the main body of the enemy showed itself, which was immediately attacked. The infantry and riflemen maintained a fire of some loss in killed and wounded; the cavalry and artillery, owing to the disadvantageous ground, not being able to support them. In this skirmish, major Heath's horse was killed under him. At half past 2 o'clock, the enemy commenced throwing rockets across my left flank, which seemed harmless, and had no other effect than to prepare my line for the sound of the artillery, which soon commenced by us on the enemy's right column, then pushing across towards my left, and re-

turned by their six pounders and a howitzer upon my left and centre. The cannonading was brisk for some minutes, when I ordered my fire to cease, until the enemy should get within close range of cannister. Seeing that my left flank was the object of the enemy, I brought up the 39th into line, on the left of the 27th, and detached two pieces of artillery to the left of the 39th. Still more securely to protect my left flank, colonel Amey of the 51st was ordered to form his regiment at right angles with my line, resting his right near the left of the 39th. This order being badly executed, created for a moment some confusion in that quarter, but was soon rectified by the efforts of my aid-de-camp and brigade majors; who corrected the error of colonel Amey, and posted the 51st in its ordered position. The enemy's right column displayed and advanced upon the 39th and 27th. The 51st, unmindful of my object to use its fire in protection of my left flank, in case an attempt should be made to turn it, totally forgetful of the honour of the brigade, and regardless of its own reputation, delivered one random fire, and retreated precipitately, and in such confusion, as to render every effort of mine to rally them, ineffective. Some disorder was occasioned in the second battalion of the 39th, by the flight of the 51st, and a few gave way. The fire now became general from left to right; my artillery in the centre, poured forth an incessant volley of cannister upon the enemy's left column, who were endeavouring to gain the cover of a small log-house, about fifty yards in front of the 5th; which, however, caution had been taken to fire, so soon as captain Saddler's Yagers, of the 5th, (who were originally posted therein) should be compelled to leave it. The enemy's line advanced about 10 minutes before 3 o'clock, with a severe fire, which was well returned by the artillery, the whole 27th, the 5th, except the three companies of captains Levering, Howard and Saddler, which were too much exhausted by the advanced skirmish of the two former, and the ordered retreat of the latter to resume their positions in line; and from the first battalion of the 39th, who maintained its ground in despite of the disgraceful example set by the intended support on the left. The fire was incessant till about 15 minutes before 4 o'clock, when finding that my line, now 1400 strong, was insufficient to withstand the superior numbers of the enemy, and my left flank being exposed by the desertion of the 51st, I was constrained to order a movement back to the reserve regiment, under colonel McDonald, which was well posted to receive the retired line which mostly rallied well. On forming with the 6th, the fatigued state of the regiments and corps which had retired, and the probability that my right flank might be turned by a quick movement of the enemy in that direction, induced me, after proper deliberation, to fall back to Worthington's mill; which I was the more persuaded to, by my desire to have the 6th regiment (whose officers and men were eager to share the dangers of their brother soldiers) perfect and in good order to receive the enemy on his nearer approach to

the city. All retired as I could wish, and were ready to act as circumstances might require. In this situation you found the brigade on the morning of the 13th, somewhat fatigued, but with increased confidence in ourselves, and renewing our preparation for the annoyance of the enemy alone if deemed proper, or in conjunction with any other force.

I have thought it due to the merits of my brigade, to detail thus fully their whole movement, and I feel a pride in the belief that the stand made on Monday in no small degree tended to check the temerity of a foe, daring to invade a country like ours, and designing the destruction of our city, in whose defence some of the best blood in the country has already been spilt, and for whose safety and protection the citizen soldiers of the 3d brigade are ready to suffer every privation, and meet every danger. Should report be true, (and I doubt not the fact) that the enemy's commanding officer, *major general Ross*, was killed in this action, and that the enemy suffered in proportion to his superior numbers, I shall feel still more the valuable consequences of our fight.

The conduct of many of my company, officers and privates, was such as I calculated on; that of most of my field officers also merits my particular notice. Major Richard K. Heath of the 5th, who led on the advanced party to bring on the action, behaved as became an officer; the facts of his horse being killed under him in the first skirmish, his second being badly wounded, and himself receiving a contusion on the head by a musket ball, in the general action, are ample proofs of his bravery and exposure in discharge of his duty. Lieutenant colonel Sterret, and major Barry of the 5th, gained my highest approbation, and they unite with all in praise of captain Spangler and his company of volunteers from Pennsylvania, then attached to their command; also of adjutant Cheston, who is slightly wounded. Lieutenant colonel Long of the 27th, and his field and company officers, did well; this whole regiment were unsurpassed in bravery, resolution and enthusiasm. My brigade has to bewail the loss of adjutant James L. Donaldson, who fell in the hottest of the fight, bravely discharging the duties of his commission. Lieutenant colonel Fowler, and major Steiger, of the 39th, did their duty in every respect; they speak highly of the volunteer companies of captain Quantril from Hagerstown, and captain Metzgar from Hanover, Pa. Captain Quantril is wounded. Captain John Montgomery, commanding my artillery, gained for himself and his company lasting honour. Captain Aisquith and his company of riflemen, merit my thanks. Ensign Wilmot, commanding the company of United Volunteers of the 5th, and many of his men, distinguished themselves.

To brigade majors Calhoun and Frailey, I am under great obligations for the prompt and zealous performance of their duty. To my aid-de-camp, major George P. Stevenson, too much praise cannot be given: his industry in every arrangement before the

fight, and in animating the whole line, was conspicuous; the sprightliness of his manners in the most trying scenes had the happiest effect upon all to whom he had to communicate my orders; and the precision with which he delivered my commands, could be exceeded only by the coolness with which he always saw them executed. He was animated, brave, and useful. Major W. Barney, and adjutant L. Taylor, of the cavalry, who, having no opportunity of distinction in regiment owing to the grounds, did me great service, the former in aiding captain Montgomery, the latter in conveying my orders through the whole. Mr. Robert Goodloe Harper deserves my thanks. He visited me just before the action; accompanied the advanced party, and aided me much throughout. The brave soldiers under my command have suffered many privations, and I recognize among our killed and wounded many valuable men; of which I will make a report in a few days.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN STRICKER,

Brig. Gen. Commanding 3d Brigade M. M.

Major General Smith.

FORT BOWYER, September 15th, 1814, 12 o'clock at night.

SIR,

After writing the enclosed, I was prevented by the approach of the enemy from sending it by express. At meridian they were under full sail, with an easy and favourable breeze, standing directly for the fort, and at 4 P. M. we opened our battery, which was returned from two ships and two brigs, as they approached. The action became general at about 20 minutes past 4, and was continued, without intermission on either side, until 7, when one ship and two brigs were compelled to retire. The leading ship, supposed to be the commodore, mounting twenty-two 32 pound carronades, having anchored nearest our battery, was so much disabled, her cable being cut by our shot, that she drifted on shore, within 600 yards of the battery, and the other vessels having got out of our reach, we kept such a tremendous fire upon her that she was set on fire and abandoned by the few of the crew who survived. At 10 P. M. we had the pleasure of witnessing the explosion of her magazine. The loss of lives on board must have been immense, as we are certain no boats left her except three, which had previously gone to her assistance, and one of these I believe was sunk; in fact one of her boats was burned along side of her.

The brig that followed her, I am certain, was much damaged both in hull and rigging. The other two did not approach near enough to be so much injured, but I am confident they did not escape, as a well directed fire was kept on them during the whole time.

During the action a battery of a 12 pounder and a howitzer was opened on our rear, but without doing any execution, and was silenced by a few shot. Our loss is four privates killed and five privates wounded.

Towards the close of the action the flag-staff was shot away; but the flag was immediately hoisted on a sponge staff over the parapet. While the flag was down the enemy kept up their most incessant and tremendous fire; the men were withdrawn from the curtains and north-east bastion, as the enemy's own shot completely protected our rear, except the position they had chosen for their battery. Where all behaved well it is unnecessary to discriminate. Suffice it to say, every officer and man did his *duty*; the whole behaved with that coolness and intrepidity which is characteristic of the true American, and which could scarcely have been expected from men most of whom had never seen an enemy, and were now for the first time exposed for nearly three hours to a force of nearly or quite four guns to one.

We fired during the action between 4 and 500 guns, most of them double shotted, and after the first half hour but few missed an effect.

September 16th, 11 o'clock, A. M.

Upon an examination of our battery this morning, we find upwards of 300 shot holes in the inside of the north and east curtains, and north-east bastion, of all calibres, from musket ball to 32 pound shot. In the north-east bastion, there were three guns dismounted; one of which, a four pounder, was broken off near the trunnions by a 32 pound shot, and another much battered. I regret to say that both the 24 pounders are cracked in such a manner as to render them unfit for service.

I am informed by two deserters from the land force, who have just arrived here, and whom I send for your disposal, that a reinforcement is expected, when they will doubtless endeavour to wipe of the stain of yesterday.

If you will send the *Amelia* down, we may probably save most or all of the ship's guns, as her wreck is lying in six or seven feet water, and some of them are just covered. They will not, however, answer for the fort, as they are two short.

By the deserters, we learn that the ship we have destroyed was the *Hermes*, but her commander's name they did not recollect. It was the commodore, and he doubtless fell on his quarter deck, as we had a raking fire upon it at about two hundred yards distance for some time.

To captain Sands, who will have the honour of handing you this despatch, I refer you for a more particular account of the movements of the enemy than may be contained in my letters; his services, both before and during the action, were of great importance, and I consider fully justify me in having detained him. Captain Walsh and several men were much burned by the acci-

ental explosion of two or three cartridges. They are not included in the list of wounded heretofore given.

The enemy's fleet, this morning at day break, were at anchor in the channel, about four miles from the fort; shortly after it got under way and stood to sea; after passing the bar they hove to, and boats have been constantly passing between the disabled brig and the others. I presume the former is so much injured as to render it necessary to lighten her.

Fifteen Minutes after 1 P. M.

The whole fleet have this moment made sail and are standing to sea.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM LAWRENCE.

Major general Andrew Jackson, &c.

HEAD QUARTERS, 7th MILITARY DISTRICT,
Mobile, September 17th, 1814.

SIR,

With lively emotions of satisfaction, I communicate that success has crowned the gallant efforts of our brave soldiers, in resisting and repulsing a combined British naval and land force, which, on the 15th instant, attacked fort Bowyer, on the point of Mobile.

I enclose a copy of the official report of major William Lawrence, of the 2d infantry, who commanded. In addition to the particulars communicated in his letter, I have learnt that the ship which was destroyed, was the *Hermes*, of from 24 to 28 guns, captain the honourable William H. Percy, senior officer in the gulf of Mexico; and the brig so considerably damaged, is the *Sophia*, 18 guns, captain William Lockyer. The other ship was the *Carron*, of from 24 to 28 guns, captain Spencer, son of Earl Spencer; the other brig's name unknown. On board of the *Carron*, 85 men were killed and wounded; among whom, was colonel Nicoll, of the royal marines, who lost an eye by a splinter. The land force consisted of 110 marines and 200 Creek Indians, under the command of captain Woodbine, of marines, and about 20 artillerists, with one four and an half inch howitzer, from which they discharged shells and nine pound shot. They re-embarked the piece, and retreated by land towards Pensacola, whence they came.

By the morning report of the 16th, there were present in the fort, fit for duty, officers and men, 158.

The result of this engagement has stamped a character on the war in this quarter, highly favourable to the American arms; it is an event from which may be drawn the most favourable augury.

An achievement so glorious in itself, and important in its consequences, should be appreciated by the government; and those

concerned are entitled to, and will doubtless receive, the most gratifying evidence of the approbation of their countrymen.

In the words of major Lawrence, "where all behaved well it is unnecessary to discriminate." But all being meritorious, I beg leave to annex the names of the officers who were engaged and present, and hope they will, individually, be deemed worthy of distinction.

Major William Lawrence, 2d infantry, commanding; captain Walsh, of the artillery, captains Chamberlain, Brownlow and Bradley of the 2d infantry, captain Sands, deputy-commissary of ordnance, lieutenants Villard, Sturges, Conway, H. Sanders, T. R. Sanders, Brooks, Davis, and C. Sanders, all of the 2d infantry.

I am confident that your own feelings will lead you to participate in my wishes on this subject. Permit me to suggest the propriety and justice of allowing to this gallant band the value of the vessel destroyed by them.

I remain, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Brig. Gen. Com.*

The Hon. Secretary of War.

ATTACK ON BALTIMORE.

On the approach of the fleet destined against Baltimore to the mouth of the Patapsco, consisting of nearly forty sail, and among them several ships of the line, the alarm spread quickly through the adjacent country. The largest vessels anchored across the channel; the troops intended for the land attack were debarked upon North Point, fourteen miles distant from the city, by land, and twelve by water, and on the morning of September 12th, between 7 and 8000 soldiers, sailors, and marines, had effected a landing, while 16 bomb-vessels and frigates proceeded up the river, and anchored within two miles and an half of Fort M'Henry. The further result of the enterprize will be found in the letter following, from major general Smith, to the Secretary of War.

HEAD QUARTERS, BALTIMORE, September 19th, 1814.

SIR,

In compliance with the promise contained in my letter of the 15th instant, I have now the honour of stating, that the enemy landed between 7 and 8000 men, on Monday the 12th instant, at North Point, fourteen miles distant from this town. Anticipating this debarkation, general Stricker had been detached on Sunday evening with a portion of his brigade on the North Point road. Major Randal, of the Baltimore county militia, having under his command a light corps of riflemen and musketry, taken from general Stansbury's brigade and the Pennsylvania volunteers, was detached to the mouth of Bear creek, with orders to co-operate

with general Stricker, and to check any landing which the enemy might attempt to make in that quarter. On Monday, brigadier general Stricker took a good position at the two roads leading from this place to North Point, having his right flanked by Bear creek, and his left by a marsh. He here awaited the approach of the enemy, having sent an advanced corps under the command of major Heath, of the 5th regiment. This advance was met by that of the enemy, and after some skirmishing it returned to the line, the main body of the enemy being at a short distance in the rear of their advance. Between two and three o'clock the enemy's whole force came up and commenced the battle by some discharges of rockets, which were succeeded by the cannon from both sides, and soon after the action became general along the line. General Stricker gallantly maintained his ground against a great superiority of numbers during the space of an hour and twenty minutes, when the regiment on his left (the 51st) giving way, he was under the necessity of retiring to the ground in his rear, where he had stationed one regiment as a reserve. He here formed his brigade; but the enemy not thinking it advisable to pursue, he, in compliance with previous arrangements, fell back and took post on the left of my entrenchments, and a half mile in advance of them. In this affair the citizen soldiers of Baltimore, with the exception of the 51st regiment, have maintained the reputation they so deservedly acquired at Bladensburg, and their brave and skilful leader has confirmed the confidence which we had all so justly placed in him. I take the liberty of referring you to his letter for the more particular mention of the individuals who, new to warfare, have shown the coolness and valor of veterans; and who, by their conduct on this occasion, have given their country and their city an assurance of what may be expected from them when their services are again required. I cannot dismiss the subject without expressing the heartfelt satisfaction I experienced in thus bearing testimony to the courage and good conduct of my fellow townsmen. About the time general Stricker had taken the ground just mentioned, he was joined by brigadier general Winder, who had been stationed on the west side of the city, but was now ordered to march with general Douglas's brigade of Virginia militia and the United States' dragoons under captain Bird, and take post on the left of general Stricker. During these movements the brigades of general Stansbury and Foreman, the seamen and marines under commodore Rodgers, the Pennsylvania volunteers under colonels Cobean and Findley, the Baltimore artillery under captain Stiles, manned the trenches and the batteries—all prepared to receive the enemy. We remained in this situation during the night.

On Tuesday, the enemy appeared in front of my entrenchments at the distance of two miles, on the Philadelphia road, from whence he had a full view of our position. He manouvred during the morning, towards our left, as if with the intention of making

a circuitous march and coming down on the Harford or York roads. Generals Winder and Stricker were ordered to adapt their movements to those of the enemy, so as to baffle this supposed intention. They executed this order with great skill and judgment, by taking an advantageous position, stretching from my left across the country, when the enemy was likely to approach the quarter he seemed to threaten. This movement induced the enemy to concentrate his forces (between one and two o'clock) in my front, pushing his advance to within a mile of us, driving in our videttes, and showing an intention of attacking us that evening. I immediately drew generals Winder and Stricker nearer to the left of my entrenchments and to the right of the enemy, with the intention of their falling on his right or rear, should he attack me; or, if he declined it, of attacking him in the morning. To this movement, and to the strength of my defences, which the enemy had the fairest opportunity of observing, I am induced to attribute his retreat, which was commenced at half past one o'clock on Wednesday morning. In this he was so favoured by the extreme darkness and a continued rain, that we did not discover it until day-light. I consented to general Winder's pursuing with the Virginia brigade and the United States' dragoons; at the same time, major Randal was despatched with his light corps, in pursuit of the enemy's right, whilst the whole of the militia cavalry was put in motion for the same object. All the troops were, however, so worn out with continued watching, and with being under arms three days and nights, exposed the greater part of the time to very inclement weather, that it was found impracticable to do any thing more than pick up a few stragglers. The enemy commenced his embarkation that evening, and completed it the next day at one o'clock. It would have been impossible, even had our troops been in a condition to act offensively, to have cut off any part of the enemy's rear guard during the embarkation, as the point where it was effected was defended from our approach, by a line of defences extending from Back river to Humphrey's creek, on the Patapsco, thrown up by ourselves previous to their arrival.

I have now the pleasure of calling your attention to the brave commander of Fort M'Henry, major Armistead, and to the operations confined to that quarter. The enemy made his approach by water, at the same time that his army was advancing on the land, and commenced a discharge of bombs and rockets at the fort as soon as he got within range of it. The situation of major Armistead was peculiarly trying. The enemy having taken a position at such a distance as to render offensive operations on the part of the fort entirely fruitless, whilst their bombs and rockets were every moment falling in and about it; the officers and men being at the same time entirely exposed. The vessels, however, had the temerity to approach somewhat nearer; they were as soon compelled to withdraw. During the night, whilst

the enemy on land was retreating, and whilst the bombardment was most severe, two or three rocket vessels and barges succeeded in getting up the ferry branch; but they were soon compelled to retire by the forts in that quarter, commanded by lieutenant Newcomb, of the navy, and lieutenant, Webster, of the flotilla. These forts also destroyed one of the barges with all on board. The barges and battery at the lazaretto, under the command of lieutenant Rutter, of the flotilla, kept up a brisk, and is believed, a successful fire during the hottest period of the bombardment. Major Armistead being seriously ill, in consequence of his continued exposure to the weather, has rendered it impossible for him to send in his report. It is not, therefore, in my power to do justice to those gallant individuals who partook with the danger of a tremendous bombardment, without the ability of retorting, and without that security, which, in more regular fortifications, is provided for such occasions. Our loss in the fort is, I understand, about 27 killed and wounded; amongst the former, I have to lament the fall of lieutenants Clagget and Clemm, who were both estimable citizens and useful officers.

From general Stricker's brigade, the return of the killed and wounded has not yet come in. It is supposed, however, to amount to about 150; among the former, this city has to regret the loss of its representative in the state legislature, James L. Donaldson, esq. adjutant of the 27th regiment. This gentleman will ever be remembered by his constituents for his zeal and talents, and by his corps for his bravery and military knowledge.

I cannot conclude this report, without informing you of the great aid I have derived from commodore Rodgers. He was ever present and ready to afford his useful counsel, and to render his important services. His presence, with that of his gallant officers and seamen, gave confidence to every one.

The enemy's loss in his attempt on Baltimore, amounts, as near as we can ascertain it, to between 6 and 700 killed, wounded and missing. General Ross was certainly killed.

I have the honour to be, &c.

S. SMITH, *Maj. Gen. Comdg.*

Col. James Monroe,
acting Secretary of War.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT ERIE, September 20th, 1814.

SIR,

Among the officers lost to this army at the battle of Niagara falls, was my aid-de-camp, captain Ambrose Spencer, who, being mortally wounded, was left in the hands of the enemy. By flags from the British army, I was shortly afterwards assured of his convalescence, and an offer was made me by lieutenant general Drummond to exchange him for his own aid, captain Loring, then a prisoner of war with us. However singular this proposition

appeared, as captain Loring was not wounded, nor had received the slightest injury, I was willing to comply with it on captain Spencer's account; but as I knew his wounds were severe, I first sent to ascertain the fact of his being then living. My messenger, with a flag, was detained, nor even once permitted to see captain Spencer, though in his immediate vicinity. The evidence I wished to acquire failed, but my regard for captain Spencer would not permit me longer to delay, and I informed general Drummond that his aid should be exchanged even for the body of mine. This offer was no doubt gladly accepted, and the corpse of captain Spencer sent to the American shore.

Indignant as I am at this ungenerous procedure, I yet hold myself bound in honour to lieutenant general Drummond to return captain Loring; and must therefore earnestly solicit of you his immediate release. He can return to lieutenant general Drummond by the way of Montreal.

Very respectfully, &c.

JACOB BROWN.

Hon. James Monroe:

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

*Fellow citizens of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives:*

Notwithstanding the early day which had been fixed for your session of the present year, I was induced to call you together sooner, as well that any inadequacy in the existing provisions for the wants of the Treasury might be supplied, as that no delay might happen in providing for the result of the negotiations on foot with Great Britain, whether it should require arrangements adapted to a return of peace, or further and more effective provisions for prosecuting the war.

The result is not yet known. If, on one hand, the repeal of the orders in council, and the general pacification in Europe, which withdrew the occasion on which impressments from American vessels were practised, suggest expectations that peace and amity may be re-established, we are compelled, on the other hand, by the refusal of the British government to accept the offered mediation of the Emperor of Russia; by the delays in giving effect to its own proposal of a direct negotiation; and, above all, by the principles and manner in which the war is now avowedly carried on, to infer that a spirit of hostility is indulged more violent than ever against the rights and prosperity of this country.

This increased violence is best explained by the two important circumstances, that the great contest in Europe for an equilibrium guaranteeing all its estates against the ambition of any, has been closed without any check on the overbearing power of Great Bri-

tain on the ocean; and it has left in her hands disposable armaments with which, forgetting the difficulties of a remote war with a free people, and yielding to the intoxication of success, with the example of a great victim to it before her eyes, she cherishes hopes of still further aggrandizing a power already formidable in its abuses to the tranquillity of the civilized and commercial world.

But, whatever may have inspired the enemy with these more violent purposes, the public councils of a nation, more able to maintain than it was to acquire its independence, and with a devotion to it rendered more ardent by the experience of its blessings, can never deliberate but on the means most effectual for defeating the extravagant views or unwarrantable passions with which alone the war can now be pursued against us.

In the events of the present campaign, the enemy, with all his augmented means, and wanton use of them, has little ground for exultation, unless he can feel it in the success of his recent enterprizes against this metropolis and the neighbouring town of Alexandria, from both of which his retreats were as precipitate as his attempts were bold and fortunate. In his other incursions on our Atlantic frontier, his progress often checked and chastised by the martial spirit of the neighboring citizens, has had more effect in distressing individuals, and in dishonoring his arms, than in promoting any object of legitimate warfare. And, in the two instances mentioned, however deeply to be regretted on our part, he will find in his transient success, which interrupted for a moment only the ordinary public business at the seat of government, no compensation for the *loss of character with the world*, by his violations of private property, and by his destruction of public edifices, protected, as monuments of the arts, by the laws of civilized warfare.

On our side, we can appeal to a series of achievements which have given new lustre to the American arms. Besides the brilliant incidents in the minor operations of the campaign, the splendid victories gained on the Canadian side of the Niagara, by the American forces under major general Brown, and brigadiers Scott and Gaines, have gained for those heroes, and their emulating companions, the most unfading laurels; and, having triumphantly tested the progressive discipline of the American soldiers, have taught the enemy that the longer he protracts his hostile efforts, the more certain and decisive will be his final discomfiture.

On our southern border, victory has continued also to follow the American standard. The bold and skilful operations of major general Jackson, conducting troops drawn from the militia of the states least distant, particularly of Tennessee, have subdued the principal tribes of hostile savages, and, by establishing a peace with them, preceded by recent and exemplary chastisement, has best guarded against the mischief of their co-operation with the British enterprizes which may be planned against that quarter of our country. Important tribes of Indians on our northwestern

frontier have also acceded to stipulations, which bind them to the interests of the United States, and to consider our enemy as theirs also.

In the recent attempt of the enemy on the city of Baltimore, defended by militia and volunteers, aided by a small body of regulars and seamen, he was received with a spirit which produced a rapid retreat to his ships; whilst a concurrent attack by a large fleet was successfully resisted by the steady and well directed fire of the fort and batteries opposed to it.

In another recent attack by a powerful force on our troops at Plattsburgh, of which regulars made a part only, the enemy, after a perseverance for many hours, was finally compelled to seek safety in a hasty retreat, with our gallant bands pressing upon him.

On the lakes, so much contested throughout the war, the great exertions for the command made on our part, have been well repaid. On lake Ontario our squadron is now, and has been for some time, in a condition to confine that of the enemy to his own port; and to favour the operations of our land forces on that frontier.

A part of the squadron on lake Erie has been extended into lake Huron, and has produced the advantage of displaying our command on that lake also. One object of the expedition was the reduction of Mackinaw, which failed, with the loss of a few brave men, among whom was an officer justly distinguished for his gallant exploits. The expedition, ably conducted by both the land and naval commanders, was otherwise highly valuable in its effects.

On lake Champlain, where our superiority had for some time been undisputed, the British squadron lately came into action with the American, commanded by captain Macdonough. It issued in the capture of the whole of the enemy's ships. The best praise for this officer, and his intrepid comrades, is in the likeness of his triumph to the illustrious victory which immortalized another officer, and established, at a critical moment, our command of another lake.

On the ocean, the pride of our naval arms has been amply supported. A second frigate, indeed, has fallen into the hands of the enemy, but the loss is hidden in the blaze of heroism with which she was defended. Captain Porter, who commanded her, and whose previous career had been distinguished by daring enterprise and by fertility of genius, maintained a sanguinary contest against two ships, one of them superior to his own, and under other severe disadvantages, till *humanity tore down the colours which valor had nailed to the mast*. This officer and his brave comrades, have added much to the rising glory of the American flag, and have merited all the effusions of gratitude which their country is ever ready to bestow on the champions of its rights and of its safety.

Two smaller vessels of war have also become prizes to the enemy ; but by a superiority of force which sufficiently vindicates the reputation of their commanders ; whilst two others, one commanded by captain Warrington, the other by captain Blakely, have captured British ships of the same class, with a gallantry and good conduct which entitle them and their companions to a just share in the praise of their country.

In spite of the naval force of the enemy accumulated on our coasts, our private cruizers have also not ceased to annoy his commerce, and to bring their rich prizes into our ports ; contributing thus, with other proofs, to demonstrate the incompetency and illegality of a blockade, the proclamation of which is made the pretext for vexing and discouraging the commerce of neutral powers with the United States.

To meet the extended and diversified warfare adopted by the enemy, great bodies of militia have been taken into service for the public defence, and great expenses incurred. That the defence every where may be both more convenient and more economical, Congress will see the necessity of immediate measures for filling the ranks of the regular army, and of enlarging the provision for special corps, mounted and unmounted, to be engaged for longer periods of service than are due from the militia. I earnestly renew, at the same time, a recommendation of such changes in the system of the militia, as, by classing and disciplining, for the most prompt and active service, the portions most capable of it, will give to that great resource for the public safety, all the requisite energy and efficiency.

The monies received into the Treasury during the nine months ending on the 30th day of June last, amounted to thirty-two millions of dollars, of which, near eleven millions were the proceeds of the public revenue, and the remainder derived from loans. The disbursements for public expenditures during the same period, exceeded thirty-four millions of dollars. The demands during the remainder of the present year, already authorized by Congress, and the expenses incident to an extension of the operations of the war, will render it necessary that large sums should be provided to meet them.

From this view of the national affairs, Congress will be urged to take up, without delay, as well the subject of pecuniary supplies, as that of military force, and on a scale commensurate with the extent and the character which the war has assumed. It is not to be disguised that the situation of our country calls for its greatest efforts. Our enemy is powerful in men and in money, on the land and on the water. Availing himself of fortuitous advantages, he is aiming, with his undivided force, a deadly blow at our growing prosperity, perhaps at our national existence. He has avowed his purpose of trampling on the usages of civilized warfare, and given earnest of it in the plunder and wanton destruction of private property. In his pride of maritime dominion,

thirst of commercial monopoly, he strikes with pecuniary at the progress of our navigation and of our manufactures.

His barbarous policy has not even spared those monuments of taste with which our country had adorned and embellished its infant metropolis. From such an hostility, in its greatest force and in its worst form, we are asked for. The American people will face it with the spirit which, in their revolutionary struggle, defeated all such projects. His threats and his barbarities, instead of kindling in every bosom an indignation not to be kindled but in the disaster and expulsion of such cruel invaders, providing the means necessary, the national legislature will trust the heroic and enlightened patriotism of its countrymen. They will cheerfully and proudly bear every burden under which the safety and honour of the nation demand. They see them every where paying their taxes, direct and indirect, with the greatest promptness and alacrity. We see them with enthusiasm to the scenes where danger and duty require their blood, they give the surest pledge that no sacrifice will be withheld.

It is not forborne to declare war until to other aggressions had been added the capture of nearly a thousand American vessels, the imprisonment of thousands of American seafaring citizens, until a final declaration had been made by the government of Great Britain, that her hostile orders against our commerce should not be revoked, but on conditions as impossible as to list it was known that these orders would not otherwise be withdrawn with a war which had lasted nearly twenty years, and during which appearances at that time, might last as many years as manifested, on every occasion, and in every protest, a sincere desire to arrest the effusion of blood, and to remedy on the ground of justice and reconciliation, our country, in still opposing to his persevering hostility all our efforts, with an undiminished disposition towards peace and on honourable terms, must carry with it the good wishes of the impartial world, and the best hopes of support from a merciful and kind Providence.

JAMES MADISON.

Washington, September 20th, 1814.

FORT ERIE, September 22d, 1814.

In cutting the duty you have imposed on me, of reporting to you the names of the officers and men composing the left column, I was pleased to place under my command, in the *sortie* of the instant, the pleasure I derive in representing to you the conduct of the whole, is deeply chastened by sorrow for the loss of many brave and distinguished men.

Being obliged, from the nature of the ground, to act on foot, it was impossible that my own personal observation should reach to every officer. Some part of this report must therefore rest upon the information of others.

It is the business of this communication to speak of the conduct of individuals ; yet you will permit me to premise, although well known to yourself already, that the object of the left column was to penetrate, by a circuitous route, between the enemy's batteries, where one-third of his force was always kept on duty, and his main camp, and that it was subdivided into three divisions—the advance of 200 riflemen, and a few Indians, commanded by colonel Gibson, and two columns moving parallel to, and 30 yards distant from, each other. The right column was commanded by lieutenant colonel Wood, headed by 400 infantry, under major Brook, of the 28d, and followed by 500 volunteers and militia, being parts of lieutenant colonels Dobbin's, M'Burney's and Fleming's regiments, and was intended to attack the batteries.

The left column of 500 militia, was commanded by brigadier general Davis, and comprised the commands of lieutenant colonels Hopkins, Churchill and Crosby, and was intended to hold in check any reinforcements from the enemy's camp ; or both columns (circumstances requiring it, which frequently happened) to co-operate in the same object.

After carrying by storm, in the handsomest style, a strong block house, in rear of the third battery, making its garrison prisoners, destroying the three 24 pounders and their carriages in the third battery, and blowing up the enemy's magazine, and after co-operating with general Miller in taking the second battery, the gallant leaders of the three divisions all fell nearly at the same time ; colonel Gibson, at the second battery, and general Davis and lieutenant colonel Wood in an assault upon the first.

Brigadier general Davis, although a militia officer of little experience, conducted on this occasion with all the coolness and bravery of a veteran, and fell while advancing upon the enemy's entrenchments. His loss as a citizen as well as a soldier, will be severely felt in the patriotic county of Genessee. Colonel Gibson fully sustained the high military reputation, which he had before so justly acquired. You know how exalted an opinion I have always entertained of lieutenant colonel Wood of the engineers. His conduct on this day was what it uniformly has been, on every similar occasion, on an exhibition of military skill, acute judgment, and heroic valor. Of the other regular officers, lieutenant colonel M'Donald and major Brook, senior in command, will report to you in relation to their respective divisions. Permit me, however, to say of these two officers, that, much as was left to them by the fall of their distinguished leaders, they were able to sustain their parts in the most admirable manner, and they richly deserve the notice of the government.

Of the militia, I regret that the limits of a report will not permit me even to name all of those, who on this occasion established claims to the gratitude of their fellow citizens; much less to particularize individual merit. Lieutenant colonels Hopkins, M'Burney, Churchhill and Crosby, and majors Lee, Marcle, Wilson, Lawrence, Burr, Dunham, Kellogg, and Ganson, are entitled to the highest praise for their gallant conduct; their steady and persevering exertions. Lieutenant colonel Dobbin being prevented by severe indisposition from taking the field, major Hall, assistant inspector general, volunteered his services to join major Lee in the command of the volunteer regiment; and major Lee and every other officer speaks in the highest terms of the gallant and good conduct of this young officer.

Captain Fleming, who commanded the Indians, was, as he always is, in the front of the battle. There is not a more intrepid soldier in the army. I should be ungrateful were I to omit the names of captains Knapp and Hull of the volunteers, and captain Parker and lieutenant Chatfield of the militia, by whose intrepidity I was, during the action, extricated from the most unpleasant situation. Captains Richardson, Buel and Kennedy, lieutenants Parkhurst and Brown, and adjutants Dobbin, Bates and Robinson, particularly distinguished themselves. The patriotic conduct of captain Elliot, with twenty young gentlemen, who volunteered from Batavia, and of major Hubbard with fourteen men, exempted by age from military duty, should not be omitted. They were conspicuous during the action.

You will excuse me if I shall seem partial in speaking of my own family, consisting of my brigade major Frazer, my volunteer aid-de-camp Riddle, (both first lieutenants in the 15th infantry) captain Bigger of the Canadian volunteers, Messrs. Williams and Delapierre, volunteer aids for the day, all of whom, except Mr. Williams, were wounded.

Lieutenants Frazer and Riddle were engaged for most of the preceding day with fatigue parties, cutting roads for the advance of the column through the swamp, and falling timber to the rear, and within 150 yards of the enemy's right: which service they executed with so much address as to avoid discovery; and on the succeeding day they conducted the two columns to the attack. Frazer was severely wounded by a musket ball while spiking a gun on the second battery. Riddle, after the first battery was carried, descended into the enemy's magazine, and after securing (with the assistance of quarter master Greene of the volunteers, whose good conduct deserves much praise) a quantity of fixed ammunition, blew up the magazine and suffered severely by the explosion. I must solicit, through you, sir, the attention of the general government to these meritorious young men. Captain Bigger is an excellent officer, and rendered me much assistance, but was dangerously wounded. The other young gentlemen are citizens, and deserve much credit for their activity, and for having volunta-

rily encountered danger. My aid-de-camp, major Dox, was confined at Buffalo by sickness.

On the whole, sir, I can say of the regular troops attached to the left column, of the veteran volunteers of lieutenant colonel Dobbin's regiment, that every man did his duty, and their conduct on this occasion reflects a new lustre on their former brilliant achievements. To the militia, the compliment is justly due, and I could pay them no greater one, than to say, that they were not surpassed by the heroes of Chippewa and Niagara in steadiness and bravery.

The studied intricacy of the enemy's defences, consisting not only of the breast-work connecting their batteries, but of successive lines of entrenchments for a hundred yards in the rear, covering the batteries and enfilading each other, and the whole obstructed by abattis, brush and felled timber, was calculated to produce confusion among the assailants, and led to several contests at the point of the bayonet. But by our double columns and temporary irregularity in the one, was always corrected by the other. Our success would probably have been more complete, but for the rain which unfortunately set in soon after we commenced our march, which rendered the fire of many of our muskets useless, and by obscuring the sun, led to several unlucky mistakes. As an instance of this, a body of 50 prisoners who had surrendered, were ordered to the fort in charge of a subaltern and 14 volunteers; the officer mistaking the direction, conducted them towards the British camp in the route by which we had advanced, and they were re-taken with the whole of the guard, excepting the officer and one man, who fought their way back. Several of our stragglers were made prisoners by the same mistake. But, sir, notwithstanding these accidents, we have reason to rejoice at our signal success, in inflicting a vastly disproportionate injury on the enemy, and in wholly defeating all his plans of operation against this army.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P. B. PORTER,

Brig. Gen. comdg. volunteers and militia.

Major General Brown, Commanding, &c.

Names and rank of the officers killed, wounded, and missing.

Killed—lieutenant colonel E. D. Wood, captain and brevet lieutenant colonel of engineers; captain L. Bradford, 21st infantry; captain H. Hale, 11th infantry; captain L. G. A. Armstead, 1st riflemen.

Wounded—Staff, brigadier general Ripley, 2d brigade, dangerously, shot through the neck; 1st lieutenant Crawford, 11th infantry; brigade major 1st brigade, slightly, shot in the arm; 9th infantry, lieutenant colonel Aspinwall, severely, left arm amputated; captain Ingersol, slightly, in the head; 1st lieutenant E. Childs, severely, bayonet wound through the thigh. 11th infantry

1st lieutenant W. F. Hale, dangerously, shot in the body; 2d lieutenant I. Clarke, severely in the body; 3d lieutenant Stevenson, severely, through the thigh; 5d lieutenant Davis, dangerously, through the body; 19th infantry, major Trimble, dangerously, shot through the body; ensign Neely, slightly, shot in the thigh; 21st infantry, ensign Cummings, severely, in the arm; 23d infantry, 1st lieutenant Brown, slightly, in the arm; ensign O'Fling, mortally, since dead; 1st riflemen, captain Ramsey, severely, in the groin; 3d lieutenant Cobb, severely, in the body; 4th riflemen, colonel James Gibson, mortally, since dead; 1st lieutenant Grant, severe wounds in the arm and side.

Missing—1st lieutenant Ballard, adjutant 4th riflemen, prisoner.

OF THE MILITIA—killed—brigadier general Davis, of volunteer brigade; captain Buel, of lieutenant colonel Crosby's regiment; lieutenant Brown, of lieutenant colonel M'Burney's regiment; lieutenant W. Belknap, of lieutenant colonel Flemming's regiment; ensign Blakely, of lieutenant colonel M'Burney's regiment.

Wounded—Staff, major general P. B. Porter, sword wound in the hand; 1st lieutenant Frazer, 13th infantry, brigade major, severely, in the leg; 1st lieutenant Riddle, 15th infantry, acting as aid-de-camp, slight contusion; captain Bigger, New York volunteers, acting aid, severely through the breast and shoulder; lieutenant colonel Dobbin's regiment—captain Knapp, in the hip; lieutenant Bailey, in the side; lieutenant colonel M'Burney's regiment—captain Hale, wounded and prisoner; lieutenant colonel Hopkins' regiment—lieutenant Gillet, through the thigh.

Missing—lieutenant colonel W. L. Churchill; major E. Wilson; quarter master O. Wilcox; captain Crouch; captain Case; lieutenant Case; ensign Chambers; ensign Clark; ensign Church, prisoners.

FORT M'HENRY, September 24th, 1814.

SIR,

A severe indisposition, the effect of great fatigue and exposure, has prevented me heretofore from presenting you with an account of the attack on this post. On the night of Saturday the 10th instant, the British fleet, consisting of ships of the line, heavy frigates and bomb vessels, amounting in the whole to 30 sail, appeared at the mouth of the river Patapsco, with every indication of an attempt upon the city of Baltimore. My own force consisted of one company of United States' artillery, under captain Evans, and two companies of sea-fencibles, under captains Bunbury and Addison. Of these three companies, 35 men were unfortunately on the sick list, and unfit for duty. I had been furnished with two companies of volunteer artillery from the city of Baltimore under captain Berry and lieutenant commandant Pen-

nington. To these I must add another very fine company of volunteer artilleryists, under judge Nicholson, who had proffered their services to aid in the defence of this post whenever an attack might be apprehended; and also a detachment from commodore Barney's flotilla, under lieutenant Redman. Brigadier general Winder had also furnished me with about 600 infantry, under the command of lieutenant colonel Stewart and major Lane, consisting of detachments from the 12th, 14th, 36th, and 38th regiments of United States' troops—the total amounting to about 1000 effective men.

On Monday morning, very early, it was perceived that the enemy was landing troops on the east side of the Patapsco, distance about ten miles. During that day and the ensuing night, he had brought sixteen ships (including five bomb ships) within about two miles and a half of this fort. I had arranged my force as follows:—the regular artilleryists under captain Evans, and the volunteers under captain Nicholson, manned the bastions in the Star Fort. Captains Bunbury's, Addison's, Rodman's, Berry's, and lieutenant commandant Pennington's commands were stationed on the lower works, and the infantry, under lieutenant colonel Stewart and major Lane, were in the outer ditch, to meet the enemy at his landing, should he attempt one.

On Tuesday morning, about sun-rise, the enemy commenced the attack from his five bomb vessels, at the distance of about two miles, and kept up an incessant and well directed bombardment. We immediately opened our batteries, and kept up a brisk fire from our guns and mortars, but unfortunately our shot and shells all fell considerably short of him. This was to me a most distressing circumstance; as it left us exposed to a constant and tremendous shower of shells, without the most remote possibility of our doing him the slightest injury. It affords me the highest gratification to state, that though we were left thus exposed, and thus inactive, not a man shrunk from the conflict.

About two o'clock P. M. one of the 24 pounders of the southwest bastion, under the immediate command of captain Nicholson, was dismounted by a shell, the explosion from which killed his second lieutenant, and wounded several of his men; the bustle necessarily produced in removing the wounded and replacing the gun, probably induced the enemy to suspect we were in a state of confusion, as he brought in three of his bomb ships, to what I believed to be good striking distance. I immediately ordered a fire to be opened, which was obeyed with alacrity through the whole garrison, and in half an hour those intruders again sheltered themselves by withdrawing beyond our reach. We gave three cheers, and again ceased firing—The enemy continued throwing shells, with one or two slight intermissions, till one o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, when it was discovered that he had availed himself of the darkness of the night, and had thrown a considerable force above to our right; they had approach

ed very near to Fort Covington, when they began to throw rockets; intended, I presume, to give them an opportunity of examining the shores—as I have since understood, they had detached 1250 picked men, with scaling ladders, for the purpose of storming this fort. We once more had an opportunity of opening our batteries, and kept up a continued blaze for nearly two hours, which had the effect again to drive them off.

In justice to lieutenant Newcomb, of the United States' navy, who commanded at fort Covington, with a detachment of sailors, and lieutenant Webster, of the flotilla, who commanded the six gun battery near that fort, I ought to state, that during this time they kept up an animated, and I believe, a very destructive fire, to which I am persuaded, we are much indebted in repulsing the enemy. One of his sunken barges has since been found with two dead men in it; others have been seen floating in the river. The only means we had of directing our guns, was by the blaze of their rockets, and the flashes of their guns. Had they ventured to the same situation in the day time, not a man would have escaped.

The bombardment continued on the part of the enemy until 7 o'clock on Wednesday morning, when it ceased; and about 9, their ships got under weigh, and stood down the river. During the bombardment, which lasted 25 hours (with two slight intermissions) from the best calculation I can make, from 15 to 1800 shells were thrown by the enemy. A few of these fell short. A large proportion burst over us, throwing their fragments among us, and threatening destruction. Many passed over, and about 400 fell within the works. Two of the public buildings are materially injured, the others but slightly. I am happy to inform you (wonderful as it may appear) that our loss amounts only to four men killed, and 24 wounded. The latter will all recover. Among the killed, I have to lament the loss of lieutenant Clagget, and sergeant Clemm, both of captain Nicholson's volunteers; two men whose fate is to be deplored, not only for their personal bravery, but for their high standing, amiable demeanor, and spotless integrity in private life. Lieutenant Russel, of the company under lieutenant Pennington, received, early in the attack, a severe contusion in the head; notwithstanding which he remained at his post during the whole bombardment.

Were I to name any individuals who signalized themselves, it would be doing injustice to others. Suffice it to say, that every officer and soldier under my command did their duty to my entire satisfaction.

I have the honour to be, &c.

G. ARMISTEAD, *Lt. Col. U. S. A.*

The Secretary of War.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP FORT ERIE, September 29th, 1814.

SIR,

In my letter of the 18th instant I briefly informed you of the fortunate issue of the sortie which took place the day preceding.

But it is due to the gallant officers and men, to whose bravery we are indebted for our success on this occasion, that I should give you a more circumstantial and detailed account of this affair.

The enemy's camp I had ascertained to be situated in a field, surrounded by woods, nearly two miles distant from their batteries and entrenchments, the object of which was to keep the parts of their force which was not upon duty, out of the range of our fire from Fort Erie and Black Rock. Their infantry was formed into three brigades, estimated at 12 or 1500 men each. One of these brigades, with a detail from their artillery, was stationed at their works, (these being but 500 yards distant from old Fort Erie, and the right of our line.) We had already suffered much from the fire of two of their batteries, and were aware that a third was about to open upon us. Under these circumstances, I resolved to storm the batteries, destroy the cannon, and roughly handle the brigade upon duty, before those in reserve could be brought into action.

On the morning of the 17th, the infantry and riflemen, regulars and militia, were ordered to be paraded and put in readiness to march precisely at 12 o'clock. General Porter with the volunteers, colonel Gibson with the ffilemen, and major Brooks with the 23d and 21st infantry, and a few dragoons acting as infantry, were ordered to move from the extreme left of our position, upon the enemy's right, by a passage opened through the woods for the occasion. General Miller was directed to station his command in the ravine, which lies between fort Erie and the enemy's batteries, by passing them by detachments through the skirts of the wood, and the 21st infantry, under general Ripley, was posted as a corps of reserve between the new bastions of fort Erie: all under cover and out of the view of the enemy.

About 20 minutes before 3 P. M. I found the left columns, under the command of general Porter, which were destined to turn the enemy's right, within a few rods of the British entrenchments. They were ordered to advance and commence the action. Passing down the ravine, I judged from the report of musketry, that the action had commenced on our left; I now hastened to general Miller and directed him to seize the moment and pierce the enemy's entrenchments between batteries No. 2 and 3. My orders were promptly and ably executed. Within 30 minutes after the first gun was fired, batteries No. 3 and 2, the enemy's line of entrenchments, and his two block houses, were in our possession. Soon after, battery No. 1 was abandoned by the British. The guns in each were spiked by us, or otherwise destroyed, and the magazine of No. 3 was blown up.

A few minutes before the explosion, I had ordered up the reserve under general Ripley. As he passed me at the head of his column, I desired him, as he would be the senior in advance, to ascertain, as near as possible, the situation of the troops in ge-

general, and to have a care that not more was hazarded than the occasion required; that, the object of the sortie effected, the troops would retire in good order, &c. General Ripley passed rapidly on; soon after, I became alarmed for general Miller, and sent an order for the 21st to hasten to his support towards battery No 1. Colonel Upham received the order, and advanced to the aid of general Miller. General Ripley had inclined to the left, where major Brooks' command was engaged, with a view of making some necessary enquiries of that officer, and in the act of doing so, was unfortunately wounded. By this time, the object of the sortie was accomplished beyond my most sanguine expectations. General Miller had consequently ordered the troops on the right to fall back; observing this movement, I sent my staff along the line to call in the other corps. Within a few minutes they retired from the ravine, and from thence to camp.

Thus, one thousand regulars and an equal portion of militia, in one hour of close action, blasted the hopes of the enemy, destroyed the fruits of fifty days labour, and diminished his effective force 1000 men at least. I am at a loss how to express my satisfaction at the gallant conduct of the officers and men of this division, whose valor has shone superior to every trial. General Porter, in his official report herein inclosed, has very properly noticed those patriotic citizens who have done so much honour to themselves, by freely and voluntarily tendering their services at a dangerous and critical period.

As the scene of action was in a wood, in advance of the position I had chosen for directing the movements of the whole, the several reports of commandants of corps, must guide me in noticing individuals.

General Miller mentions lieutenant colonel Aspinwall, lieutenant colonel Beedle, major Trimble, captain Hull, captain Ingersoll, lieutenant Crawford, lieutenant Lee, and *particularly* ensign O'Fling, as entitled to distinction.

Lieutenant colonel M'Donald, upon whom the command of the rifle corps devolved, upon the fall of the brave and generous *Gibson*, names adjutants Shortridge of the 1st, and Ballard of the 4th regiments, as deserving the highest applause for their promptness and gallantry in communicating orders. Of the other officers of the corps, he reports generally, that the bravery and good conduct of all was so conspicuous, as to render it impossible to discriminate.

Major Brooks, to whom much credit is due for the distinguished manner in which he executed the orders he received, speaks in high terms of lieutenants Goodell, Ingersoll, Livingston, and ensigns Brant and O'Fling, of the 23d, *particularly* of the latter. Also of captain Simms, lieutenants Bissel, Shore, and Brinot, of the 1st infantry, and lieutenant Watts, of the dragoons.

Lieutenant colonel Upham, who took command of the reserve after general Ripley was disabled, bestows great praise upon major Chambers, of the 4th regiment of riflemen, attached to the 21st infantry, as also upon captain Bradford and lieutenant Holding of that regiment.

My staff, colonel Snelling, colonel Gardner, major Jones, and my aids-de-camp, major Austin and lieutenant Armstrong, were, as usual, zealous, intelligent and active; they performed every duty required of them to my entire satisfaction.

Major Hall, assistant inspector general, led a battalion of militia, and conducted with skill and gallantry. Lieutenant Kirby, aid-de-camp to general Ripley, was extremely active and useful during the time he was in action.

Lieutenants Frazer and Riddle were in general Porter's Staff; their bravery was conspicuous, and no officers of their grade were more useful.

The corps of artillery, commanded by major Hindman, which has been so eminently distinguished throughout this campaign, had no opportunity of taking a part in the sortie. The 25th infantry, under colonel Jessup, was stationed in fort Erie to hold the key of our position.

Colonel Brady, on whose firmness and good conduct every reliance could be placed, was on command at Buffalo with the remains of the 22d infantry. Lieutenant colonel M'Ree and lieutenant colonel Wood, of the corps of engineers, having rendered to this army services the most important, I must seize the opportunity of again mentioning them particularly. On every trying occasion, I have reaped much benefit from their sound and excellent advice. No two officers of their grade could have contributed more to the safety and honour of this army. Wood, brave, generous and enterprising, died as he had lived, without a feeling but for the honour of his country and glory of her arms. His name and example will live to guide the soldier in the path of duty so long as true heroism is held in estimation. M'Ree lives to enjoy the approbation of every virtuous and generous mind, and to receive the reward due to his services and high military talents.

It is proper here to notice, that although but one-third of the enemy's force was on duty when his works were carried, the whole were brought into action while we were employed in destroying his cannon. We secured prisoners from seven of his regiments, and know that the 6th and 82d suffered severely in killed and wounded, yet these regiments were not upon duty.

Lieutenant general Drummond broke up his camp during the night of the 21st, and retired to his entrenchments behind the Chippewa. A part of our men came up with the rear of his army at Frenchman's creek; the enemy destroyed part of their stores, by setting fire to the buildings from which they were employed in conveying them. We found in and about the camp,

considerable quantity of cannon ball, and upwards of one hundred stand of arms.

I send you enclosed herein, a return of our loss. The return of prisoners enclosed, does not include the stragglers that came in after the action.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JACOB BROWN.

Hon. Secretary of War.

H. Q. CAMP FORT FRIE, October 1st, 1814.

SIR,

Looking over my official account of the action of the 17th ultimo, I find that the names of the regiments which composed general Miller's command have not been given. As I believe it even more important to distinguish corps than individuals, I am anxious to correct this mistake. General Miller on that day commanded the remains of the 9th and 11th infantry and a detachment of the 19th. Of three field officers who were attached to them, two were severely wounded; lieutenant colonel Aspinwall of the 9th, gallantly leading his men to the attack upon the enemy's entrenchments; and major Trimble, of the 19th, who was shot within their works, conducting with great skill and bravery. A detachment of the 17th regiment was attached to the 21st.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JACOB BROWN.

Hon. Secretary of War.

PRIVATEER GENERAL ARMSTRONG.

FAYAL, October 4th, 1814.

SIR,

With infinite regret I am constrained to say, it has eventually fallen to my lot to state to you the loss and destruction of the private armed brig General Armstrong, late under my command.

We sailed from Sandy Hook on the evening of the 9th ultimo, and about midnight fell in chase, aboard of a razee and ship of the line. They pursued till next day noon, when they thought proper to give over the chase. On the 11th, after a nine hours' chase, boarded the private armed schooner Perry, John Colman, six days from Philadelphia, had thrown over all his guns. On the following day fell in with an enemy's gun brig; exchanged a few shots with and left him. On the 24th, boarded a Spanish brig and schooner, and a Portuguese ship, all from the Havana. On the 26th following, came to in Fayal Roads, for the purpose of filling water; called on the American consul who very politely ordered our water immediately sent off, it being our intention to proceed to sea

early the next day. At 5 P. M. I went on board, the consul and some other gentlemen in company. I asked some questions concerning enemy's cruizers, and was told there had been none at these islands for several weeks; when about dusk, while we were examining, the British brig, *Carnation*, suddenly hove in sight close under the north-east head of the harbor, within gun-shot when first discovered. The idea of getting under weigh was instantly suggested; but finding the enemy's brig had the advantage of a breeze, and but little wind with us, it was thought doubtful if we should be able to get to sea without hazarding an action. I questioned the consul to know if in his opinion the enemy would regard the neutrality of the port? He gave me to understand I might make myself perfectly easy, assuring me at the same time, they would never molest us while at anchor. But no sooner did the enemy's brig understand from the pilot boat who we were, than she immediately hauled close in and let go her anchor within pistol shot of us: at the same moment the *Plantagenet*, and frigate *Rota*, hove in sight, to whom the *Carnation* instantly made signal, and a constant interchange took place for some time.

The result was, the *Carnation* proceeded to throw out all her boats; despatched on board the commodore, and appeared otherwise to be making unusual exertions. The moon was near its full, which enabled us to observe them very minutely; and I now determined to haul in nearer the shore. Accordingly, after clearing for action, we got under weigh, and began to sweep in. The moment this was observed by the enemy's brig, she instantly cut her cable, made sail, and despatched four boats in pursuit of us. Being now about 8 P. M. as soon as we saw the boats approaching, we let go our anchor, got springs on our cable, and prepared to receive them. I hailed them repeatedly as they drew near, but they felt no inclination to reply. Sure of their game, they only pulled up with the greater speed. I observed the boats were all manned, and apparently as well armed; and as soon as they had cleverly got along side, we opened our fire, which was soon returned; but meeting with rather a warmer reception than they had probably been aware of, they very soon cried out for quarters and hauled off. In this skirmish, I had one man killed, and my first lieutenant wounded. The enemy's loss must have been upwards of twenty killed and wounded.

They had now repaired to their ships to prepare for a more formidable attack. We, in the interim, having taken the hint, prepared to haul close into the beach, where we moored head and stern, within half pistol shot of the castle. This done, we again prepared in the best possible manner for their second reception. At 9 P. M. we observed the enemy's brig towing in a fleet of boats. They soon after left the brig and took their station in three divisions, under cover of a small reef of rocks, within about musket shot of us. Here they continued manœuvring for some

time, the brig still keeping under weigh to act with the boats, should we at any time attempt our escape.

The shores were lined with the inhabitants, waiting the expected attack; from the brightness of the moon, they had a most favourable view of the scene. The governor, with most of the first people of the place, stood by and saw the whole affair.

At length, about midnight, we saw the boats in motion, (our crew having laid at their quarters during the whole of this interval.) They came on in one direct line, keeping in close order; and we plainly counted twelve boats. As soon as they came within proper distance we opened our fire, which was warmly returned from the enemy's carronades and small arms. The discharge from our Long Tom rather staggered them; but soon reconnoitering, they gave three cheers, and came on most spiritedly; in a moment they succeeded in gaining our bow and starboard quarter, and the word was *board*. Our great guns now becoming useless, we attacked them sword in hand, together with our pikes, pistols, and musketry, from which our lads poured on them a most destructive fire. The enemy made frequent and repeated attempts to gain our decks, but were repulsed at all times, and at all points, with the greatest slaughter. About the middle of the action I received the intelligence of the death of my second lieutenant; and soon after of the third lieutenant being badly wounded. From this, and other causes, I found our fire had much slackened on the forecastle; and, fearful of the event, I instantly rallied the whole of our after division, who had been bravely defending, and now had succeeded in beating the boats off the quarters. They gave a shout, rushed forward, opened a fresh fire, and soon after decided the conflict, which terminated in the total defeat of the enemy, and the loss of many of their boats; two of which, belonging to the Rota, we took possession of, literally loaded with their own dead. Seventeen only escaped from them both, who swam to the shore. In another boat under our quarter, commanded by one of the lieutenants of the Plantagenet, all were killed saving four. This I have from the lieutenant himself, who further told me that he jumped overboard to save his own life.

The duration of this action was about 40 minutes. Our decks were now found in much confusion, our Long Tom dismounted, and several of our carriages broken; many of our crew having left the vessel, and others disabled. Under these circumstances, however, we succeeded in getting Long Tom in his birth, and the decks cleared in sort for a fresh action, should the enemy attack us again before day-light. About 3 A. M. I received a message from the American consul, requesting to see me on shore, where he informed me the governor had sent a note to captain Lloyd, begging him to desist from further hostilities. To which captain Lloyd sent for answer, that he was determined to have the priva-

teer at the risk of knocking down the whole town ; and that if the governor suffered the Americans to injure the privateer in any manner, he should consider the place an enemy's port, and treat it accordingly. Finding this to be the case, I considered all hopes of saving our vessel to be at an end. I therefore went on board, and ordered all our wounded and dead to be taken on shore, and the crew to save their effects as fast as possible. Soon after this it became day-light, when the enemy's brig stood close in, and commenced a heavy fire on us with all her force. After several broadsides she hauled off, having received a shot in her hull, her rigging much cut, and her fore-top mast wounded ; (of this I was informed by the British consul.) She soon after came in again, and anchored close to the privateer. I then ordered the Armstrong to be scuttled, to prevent the enemy from getting her off. She was soon after boarded by the enemy's boats, and set on fire, which soon completed her destruction.

They have destroyed a number of houses in the town, and wounded some of the inhabitants.

By what I have been able to learn from the British consul and officers of the fleet, it appears there were about 400 officers and men in the last attack by the boats, of which 120 were killed and about 130 wounded. Captain Lloyd, I am told by the British consul, is badly wounded in the leg ; a jury of surgeons had been held, who gave it as their opinion, that amputation would be necessary to insure his life. 'Tis said, however, that the wound was occasioned by an *ox treading on him*. The fleet has remained here about a week, during which they have been principally employed in burying their dead and taking care of their wounded.

Three days after the action they were joined by the ship *Thais* and brig *Calypso* (two sloops of war ;) they were immediately taken into requisition by captain Lloyd, to take home the wounded men. The *Calypso* sailed for England with part of the wounded on the 2d instant, among whom was the first lieutenant of the *Plantagenet*. The *Thais* sails this evening with the remainder. Captain Lloyd's fleet sailed to-day, supposed for the West Indies.

The loss on our part, I am happy to say, is comparatively trifling ; two killed and seven wounded. With regard to my officers in general, I feel the greatest satisfaction in saying they one and all fought with the most determined bravery, and to whom I feel highly indebted for their officer-like conduct during the short period we were together ; their exertions and bravery deserved a better fate.

I here insert, for your inspection, a list of the killed and wounded.

KILLED—M. Alexander O. Williams, 2d lieutenant, by a musket ball in the forehead, died instantly ; Burton Lloyd, seaman, do. through the heart do.

WOUNDED—Frederick A. Worth, 1st lieutenant, in the right side; Robert Johnson, 3d do. left knee; Razilla Hammond, quarter master, left arm; John Piner, seaman, knee; William Castle, do. arm; Nicholas Scalson, do. arm and leg; John Harrison, do. hand and face by the explosion of a gun.

It gives me much pleasure to announce to you that our wounded are all in a fair way of recovery, through the unremitting care and attention of our worthy surgeon.

Mr. Dabney, our consul, is a gentleman possessing every feeling of humanity, and to whom the utmost gratitude is due from us, for his great care of the sick and wounded, and his polite attention to my officers and myself.

Mr. Williams was a most deserving and promising officer. His country in him has lost one of its brightest ornaments; and his death must be sadly lamented by all who knew his worth.

Accompanied with this you will find a copy of my protest, together with copies of letters written by Mr. Dabney to the governor of Fayal, our minister at Rio Janeiro, and our Secretary of State. These letters will develop more fully the circumstances of this unfortunate affair.

We expect to sail to-morrow in a Portuguese brig for America Island, who takes the whole of our crew.

I remain gentlemen, &c.

SAMUEL C. REID.

To the editor of the
Mercantile Advertiser, New York.

BRUTALITY OF THE ENEMY.

Messrs Gales & Seaton,

Having seen the following publication in the Alexandria Herald, of the 19th October, with horror, as capping the climax of atrocity—

“TO THE EDITORS OF THE HERALD.

“Gentlemen,

“I have no recollection of having seen any account of the conduct of the enemy at Chaptico published in any of the public prints; you are at liberty to publish the following extract of a letter to a friend, written shortly after that affair. It is a very imperfect account written in a hurry amidst the bustle of a camp, but contains most of the facts. My name is enclosed, which you are at liberty to make public, if any respectable person should deny the truth of the following statement.

“*A citizen of Maryland.*”

“I passed through Chaptico shortly after the enemy left it, and I am sorry to say that their conduct would have disgraced cannibals.”

bals; the houses were torn to pieces, the well which afforded water for the inhabitants was filled up, and, what was still worse, the church and the ashes of the dead shared an equally bad or worse fate. Will you believe me when I tell you that the sunken graves were converted into barbacie holes? The remaining glass of the church windows broken, the communion table used as a dinner table, and then broken to pieces. Bad as the above may appear, it dwindles into insignificance, when compared with what follows: the vault was entered and the remains of the dead disturbed. Yes, my friend, the winding sheet was torn from the body of a lady of the first respectability, and the whole contents of the vault entirely deranged! The above facts were witnessed by hundreds as well as myself, and I am happy to say, that but one sentiment pervaded our army."

I immediately showed it to general Philip Stuart, lately commanding the American troops at that place, who read and declared it strictly true; that Cockburn was at the head of it; that they also destroyed the organs; that judge Key's lady, who had been last put into the vault, was the person alluded to; that her winding sheet was torn in pieces, and her person wantonly exposed; and that his men were exasperated to desperation by this conduct. You will publish this.

Yours, &c.

ROBERT WRIGHT.

October 19th, 1814.

AFFAIR AT LYON'S CREEK.

General Order.

HEAD QUARTERS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY.

Camp near Fort Erie, October 23d, 1814.

The indisposition of brigadier general Bissell has prevented, till this morning, his report of the handsome affair which took place on the 19th, between a detachment of his brigade and a superior force of the enemy,

The object of the expedition, entrusted to the brigadier, was the seizure of some provisions, intended for the British troops. He marched from Black Creek, on the morning of the 18th, with parts of the 5th, 14th, 15th and 16th infantry, a small party of dragoons, and a company of riflemen, the whole 900 men. After driving before them a picket, of which they made the commanding officer prisoner, they encamped for the night, throwing beyond Lyon's Creek two light infantry companies, under captain Dorman, 5th, and lieutenant Horrell, 16th infantry, and the riflemen under captain Irvine; a picket on the Chippewa road, commanded by major Gassaway was attacked by two companies of Glen-

gery light infantry, which were beaten back with loss. On the morning of the 19th, the detachment was attacked by a select corps of the enemy, not less than 1200 strong. The light infantry under captain Dorman, and Irvine's riflemen, sustained the whole fire of the enemy, for fifteen minutes, during which time the 5th and 14th were formed—the 5th was ordered to turn the enemy's right flank, while the 14th charged them in front. This was executed in the most gallant manner, by colonel Pinkney of the 5th, and major Barnard of the 14th, who greatly distinguished himself by the officer like style, in which he conducted his battalion. The enemy were compelled to a precipitate retreat, and hid themselves, once more, behind their fortifications.

General Bissell particularly mentions the skill and intrepidity of colonel Snelling, inspector general, colonel Pinkney, commanding the 5th regiment, major Barnard, 14th infantry, major Barker, 45th infantry, acting with the 5th, captain Dorman, captain Allison, whose horse was shot under him, and brigade major, lieutenant Prestman, of the 5th. Lieutenant Anspaugh, of dragoons, was conspicuous by his alertness in communicating the brigadier general's orders, during the action. It is with the highest satisfaction the commanding general tenders, to the brave officers and troops of the 2d brigade of the right division, his thanks for their good conduct on this occasion. The firmness of the 15th and 16th regiments, commanded by colonel Pearce, and who were posted as a reserve, proved, that had the resistance of the enemy afforded them an opportunity of going into action, they would have emulated the valor of the 5th and 14th. A number of prisoners were taken, among whom a picket of dragoons with their horses; a large quantity of grain also fell into our hands. The brigadier, after completing the orders he received, and burying the few of our brave soldiers who fell in the action, and the dead of the enemy, which were left on the ground by the latter, returned to Black Creek. To the cool and intrepid conduct of brigadier general Bissell, the general offers the praise he has so justly entitled himself to.

By order of major general Izard,

C. K. GARDNER, *Adj. Gen. N. army.*

HEAD QUARTERS, SEVENTH MILITARY DISTRICT,
TENSAN, November 14th, 1814.

SIR,

On last evening I returned from Pensacola to this place. I reached that post on the evening of the 6th. On my approach I sent major Pierre with a flag to communicate the object of my visit to the governor of Pensacola. He approached fort St. George, with his flag displayed, and was fired on by the cannon from the fort; he returned and made report thereof to me. I immediately

went with the adjutant general and the major with a small escort, and viewed the fort, and found it defended by both British and Spanish troops. I immediately determined to storm the town; retired and encamped my troops for the night, and made the necessary arrangements to carry my determination into effect the next day.

On the morning of the 7th I marched with the effective regulars of the 3d, 39th, and 44th infantry, part of general Coffee's brigade, the Mississippi dragoons, and part of the West Tennessee regiment, commanded by lieutenant colonel Hammonds (colonel Lowry having desired and gone home,) and part of the Choctaws led by major Blue, of the 39th, and major Kennedy of Mississippi territory. Being encamped on the west of the town, I calculated they would expect the assault from that quarter, and be prepared to rake me from the fort, and the British armed vessels, seven in number, that lay in the bay. To cherish this idea I sent out part of the mounted men to show themselves on the west whilst I passed in rear of the fort undiscovered to the east of the town. When I appeared within a mile, I was in full view. My pride was never more heightened than in viewing the uniform firmness of my troops, and with what undaunted courage they advanced, with a strong fort ready to assail them on the right, seven British armed vessels on the left, strong block-houses and batteries of cannon in their front; but they still advanced with unshaken firmness, entered the town, when a battery of two cannon was opened upon the centre column, composed of regulars, with ball and grape, and a shower of musketry from the houses and gardens. The battery was immediately stormed by captain Lavall and company, and carried, and the musketry was soon silenced by the steady and well-directed fire of the regulars.

The governor met colonels Williamson and Smith, who led the dismounted volunteers, with a flag, begged for mercy, and surrendered the town and fort unconditionally. Mercy was granted and protection given to the citizens and their property, and still Spanish treachery kept us out of possession of the fort until nearly 12 o'clock at night.

Never was more cool determined bravery displayed by any troops; and the Choctaws advanced to the charge with equal bravery.

On the morning of the 8th, I prepared to march and storm the Barancas, but before I could move, tremendous explosions told me that the Barancas, with all its appendages, was blown up. I despatched a detachment of two hundred men to explore it, who returned in the night with the information that it was blown up, all the combustible parts burnt, the cannon spiked and dismounted, except two. This being the case, I determined to withdraw my troops, but before I did, I had the pleasure to see the British depart. Colonel Nicholls abandoned the fort on the night of the

sch, and betook himself to his shipping, with his friend captain Woodbine, and their red friends.

The steady firmness of my troops has drawn a just respect from our enemies. It has convinced the Red Sticks that they have no strong hold or protection, only in the friendship of the United States. The good order and conduct of my troops, whilst in Pensacola, has convinced the Spaniards of our friendship and our prowess, and has drawn from the citizens an expression, that our Choctaws are more civilized than the British.

In great haste, I am, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON.

To the Gov. of Tennessee.

CAMP, BELOW NEW ORLEANS, December 27th, 1814.

SIR,

The loss of our gun-boats near the pass of the Rigolets, having given the enemy command of lake Borgne, he was enabled to choose his point of attack. It became, therefore, an object of importance to obstruct the numerous bayous and canals leading from that lake to the highland on the Mississippi. This important service was committed, in the first instance, to a detachment of the 7th regiment, afterwards to colonel De Laronde, of the Louisiana militia, and lastly, to make all sure, to major general Villere, commanding the district between the river and the lakes, and who, being a native of the country, was presumed to be best acquainted with all those passes. Unfortunately, however, a picket which the general had established at the mouth of the bayou Bienvenu, and which, notwithstanding my orders, had been left unobstructed, was completely surprised, and the enemy penetrated through a canal leading to his farm, about two leagues below the city, and succeeded in cutting off a company of militia stationed there. This intelligence was communicated to me about 12 o'clock of the 23d. My force at this time consisted of parts of the 7th and 44th regiments, not exceeding six hundred together, the city militia, a part of general Coffee's brigade of mounted gun men, and the detached militia from the western division of Tennessee, under the command of major general Carroll. These two last corps were stationed four miles above the city. Apprehending a double attack by the way of Chief-Menteur, I left general Carroll's force and the militia of the city posted on the Gentilly road; and at 5 o'clock P. M. marched to meet the enemy, whom I was resolved to attack in his first position, with major Hind's dragoons, general Coffee's brigade, parts of the 7th and 44th regiments, the uniformed companies of militia, under the command of major Planche, 200 men of colour, chiefly from St. Domingo, raised by colonel Savary and acting under the command of major Dagwing, and a detachment of artillery under the direction of colonel M'Rea, with two six pounders, under the command of lieutenant Spots;

not exceeding in all 1500. I arrived near the enemy's encampment about 7, and immediately made my dispositions for the attack. His forces amounting, at that time, on land to about 3000, extended half a mile on that river, and in the rear nearly to the wood. General Coffee was ordered to turn their right, while with the residue of the force I attacked his strongest position on the left near the river. Commodore Patterson having dropped down the river in the schooner *Caroline*, was directed to open a fire upon their camp, which he executed at about half past seven. This being a signal of attack, general Coffee's men, with their usual impetuosity, rushed on the enemy's right and entered their camp, while our right advanced with equal ardour. There can be but little doubt, that we should have succeeded on that occasion with our inferior force, in destroying or capturing the enemy, had not a thick fog which arose about 8 o'clock, occasioned some confusion among the different corps. Fearing the consequence, under this circumstance, of the further prosecution of a night attack with troops, then acting together for the first time, I contented myself with lying on the field that night; and at four in the morning, assumed a stronger position, about two miles nearer the city. At this position I remained encamped, waiting the arrival of the Kentucky militia, and other reinforcements. As the safety of the city will depend on the fate of this army, it must not be incautiously exposed.

In this affair the whole corps under my command, deserve the greatest credit. The best compliment I can pay to general Coffee and his brigade, is to say, they have behaved as they have always done while under my command. The 7th, led by major Pierre, and 44th, commanded by colonel Ross, distinguished themselves. The battalion of city militia, commanded by major Planche, realized my anticipations, and behaved like veterans. Savary's volunteers manifested great bravery: and the company of city riflemen having penetrated into the midst of the enemy's camp, were surrounded, and fought their way out with the greatest heroism, bringing with them a number of prisoners. The two field pieces were well served by the officers commanding them.

All my officers in the line did their duty, and I have every reason to be satisfied with the whole of my field and staff. Colonels Butler and Platt and major Chotard, by their intrepidity, saved the artillery. Colonel Haynes was every where that duty or danger called. I was deprived of the services of one of my aids, captain Butler, whom I was obliged to station, to his great regret, in town. Captain Reid, my other aid, and Messrs, Livingston, Duplis and Davizac, who had volunteered their services, faced danger wherever it was to be met, and carried my orders with the utmost promptitude.

We made one major, two subalterns and sixty-three private prisoners; and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded must have been at least ———. My own loss, I have not as yet been able

to ascertain with exactness, but suppose it to amount to 100 in killed, wounded, and missing. Among the former, I have to lament the loss of colonel Lauderdale, of general Coffee's brigade, who fell while bravely fighting. Colonels Dyer and Gibson, of the same corps, were wounded, and major Kavenaugh taken prisoner.

Colonel De Laronde, major Villere, of the Louisiana militia, major Latour, of engineers, having no command, volunteered their services, as did doctors Kerr and Hood, and were of great assistance to me.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON.

Hon. James Monroe,
acting Secretary of War.

HEAD QUARTERS, 7th MILITARY DISTRICT,
Camp below New Orleans, December 29th, 1814.

SIR,

The enemy succeeded on the 27th, in blowing up the *Caroline*, (she being becalmed) by means of hot shot from a land battery which he had erected in the night. Emboldened by this event, he marched his whole force the next day, up the level, in the hope of driving us from our position, and with this view opened upon us, at the distance of about half a mile, his bombs and rockets. He was repulsed, however, with considerable loss—not less, it is believed, than 120 in killed, *Ours* was inconsiderable, not exceeding half a dozen in killed, and a dozen wounded.

Since then, he has not ventured to repeat his attempt, though lying close together. There has been frequent skirmishing between our pickets.

I lament that I have not the means of carrying on more offensive operations. The Kentucky troops have not arrived, and my effective force at this point, does not exceed 3000. *Theirs* must be at least double—both prisoners and deserters agreeing in the statement that 7000 landed from their boats.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON.

The Hon. Secretary of War,

CAMP, FOUR MILES BELOW NEW ORLEANS.
January 9th, 1815.

SIR,

During the days of the 6th and 7th, the enemy had been actively employed in making preparations for an attack on my lines. With infinite labour they had succeeded on the night of the 7th, in getting their boats across from the lake to the river, by widening and deepening the canal on which they had effected

their disembarkation. It had not been in my power to impede these operations by a general attack : added to other reasons, the nature of the troops under my command, mostly militia, rendered it too hazardous to attempt extensive *offensive* movements in an open country, against a numerous and well disciplined army. Although my forces, as to number, had been increased by the arrival of the Kentucky division, my strength had received very little addition ; a small portion only of that detachment being provided with arms. Compelled thus to wait the attack of the enemy, I took every measure to repel it when it should be made, and to defeat the object he had in view. General Morgau, with the New Orleans contingent, the Louisiana militia, and a strong detachment of the Kentucky troops, occupied an entrenched camp on the opposite side of the river, protected by strong batteries on the bank, erected and superintended by commodore Patterson.

In my encampment every thing was ready for action, when, early in the morning of the 8th, the enemy after throwing a heavy shower of bombs and congreve rockets, advanced their columns on my right and left, to storm my entrenchments. I cannot speak sufficiently in praise of the firmness and deliberation with which my whole line received their approach—more could not have been expected from veterans inured to war. For an hour the fire of the small arms was as incessant and severe as can be imagined. The artillery, too, directed by officers who displayed equal skill and courage, did great execution. Yet the columns of the enemy continued to advance with a firmness which reflects upon them the greatest credit. Twice the column which approached me on my left, was repulsed by the troops of general Carroll, those of general Coffee, and a division of the Kentucky militia, and twice they formed again and renewed the assault. At length, however, cut to pieces, they fled in confusion from the field, leaving it covered with their dead and wounded. The loss which the enemy sustained on this occasion, cannot be estimated at less than 1500 in killed, wounded and prisoners. Upwards of three hundred have already been delivered over for burial ; and my men are still engaged in picking them up within my lines and carrying them to the point where the enemy are to receive them. This is in addition to the dead and wounded whom the enemy have been enabled to carry from the field, during and since the action, and to those who have since died of the wounds they received. We have taken about 500 prisoners, upwards of 300 of whom are wounded, and a great part of them mortally. My loss has not exceeded, and I believe has not amounted to, 10 killed and as many wounded. The entire destruction of the enemy's army was now inevitable, had it not been for an unfortunate occurrence which at this moment took place on the other side of the river. Simultaneously with his advance upon my lines, he had thrown over in his boats a considerable force to the otherside of the river. These having landed, were hardy enough to advance

against the works of general Morgan; and what is strange and difficult to account for, at the very moment when their entire discomfiture was looked for with a confidence approaching to certainty, the Kentucky reinforcements ingloriously fled, drawing after them, by their example, the remainder of the forces; and thus yielding to the enemy that most fortunate position. The batteries which had rendered me for many days, the most important service, though bravely defended, were of course now abandoned; not, however, until the guns had been spiked.

This unfortunate route had totally changed the aspect of affairs. The enemy now occupied a position from which they might annoy us without hazard, and by means of which, they might have been enabled to defeat, in a great measure, the effect of our success on this side the river. It became, therefore, an object of the first consequence to dislodge him as soon as possible. For this object, all the means in my power, which I could with any safety use, were immediately put in preparation. Perhaps, however, it was somewhat owing to another cause that I succeeded beyond my expectations. In negotiating the terms of a temporary suspension of hostilities to enable the enemy to bury their dead and provide for their wounded, I had required certain propositions to be acceded to as a basis; among which, this was one: that although hostilities should cease on *this* side the river until 12 o'clock of this day, yet it was not to be understood that they should cease on the *other* side; but that no reinforcements should be sent across by *either* army until the expiration of that day. His excellency major general Lambert begged time to consider of those propositions until 10 o'clock of to-day, and in the mean time re-crossed his troops. I need not tell you with how much eagerness I immediately regained possession of the position he had thus hastily quitted.

The enemy having concentrated his forces, may again attempt to drive me from my position by storm. Whenever he *does*, I have no doubt my men will act with their usual firmness, and sustain a character now become dear to them.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON.

Hon. Secretary of War.

CAMP BELOW NEW ORLEANS, January 10th, 1815.

SIR,

I have the honour to make the following report of the killed, wounded, and prisoners, taken at the battle at Larond's plantation, on the left bank of the Mississippi, on the night of the 23d December, 1814, seven miles below New Orleans.

Killed—left on the field of battle—100

Wounded—left on the field of battle—250

Prisoners taken—One major, 2 lieutenants, 1 midshipman, 66 non-commissioned officers and privates, making a grand total of 400.

I have the honour to be, &c.

A. P. HAYNE, *Inspect. Gen.*

Major general Andrew Jackson.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP, 4 MILES BELOW NEW ORLEANS,
January 13th, 1815.

SIR,

At such a crisis, I conceive it my duty to keep you constantly advised of my situation.

On the 10th instant I forwarded you an account of the bold attempt made by the enemy, on the morning of the 8th, to take possession of my works by storm, and of the severe repulse which he met with. That report having been sent by the mail which crosses the lake, may possibly have miscarried; for which reason, I think it the more necessary briefly to repeat the substance of it.

Early on the morning of the 8th, the enemy having been actively employed the two preceding days in making preparations for a storm, advanced in two strong columns on my right and left. They were received, however, with a firmness which it seems they little expected, and which defeated all their hopes. My men, undisturbed by their approach, which indeed they long anxiously wished for, opened upon them a fire so deliberate and certain, as rendered their scaling ladders and fascines, as well as their more direct implements of warfare, perfectly useless. For upwards of an hour, it was continued with a briskness of which there have been but few instances, perhaps in any country. In justice to the enemy, it must be said, they withstood it as long as could be expected from the most determined bravery. At length, however, when all prospect of success became hopeless, they fled in confusion from the field, leaving it covered with their dead and wounded. Their loss was immense. I had at first computed it at 1500; but it is since ascertained to have been much greater. Upon information, which is believed to be correct, colonel Haynes, the inspector general, reports it to be in total 2600. His report I enclose you. My loss was inconsiderable, being only seven killed and six wounded. Such a disproportion in loss, when we consider the number and kind of troops engaged, must, I know, excite astonishment, and may not every where be fully credited; yet I am perfectly satisfied that the account is not exaggerated on the one part, nor underrated on the other.

The enemy having hastily quitted a post which they had gained possession of on the other side of the river, and we having immediately returned to it, both armies at present occupy their former positions. Whether, after the severe losses he has sustained, he is preparing to return to his shipping, or to make still mightier

efforts to attain his first object, I do not pretend to determine. It becomes me to act as though the latter were his intention. One thing, however, seems certain, that if he still calculates on effecting what he has hitherto been unable to accomplish, he must expect considerable reinforcements; as the force with which he landed must undoubtedly be diminished by at least 3000. Besides the loss which he sustained on the night of the 23d ultimo, which is estimated at 400, he cannot have suffered less between that period and the morning of the 18th instant than 3000—having, within that time, been repulsed in two general attempts to drive us from our position, and there having been continual cannonading and skirmishing, during the whole of it. Yet he is still able to show a very formidable force.

There is little doubt that the commanding general, sir Edward Packenham, was killed in the action of the 8th, and that major-generals Keane and Gibbs were badly wounded.

Whenever a more leisure moment shall occur, I will take the liberty to make and forward you a more circumstantial account of the several actions, and particularly that of the 8th; in doing which my chief motive will be to render justice to those brave men I have the honour to command, and who have so remarkably distinguished themselves.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON.

Hon. Secretary of War.

CAMP BELOW NEW ORLEANS, January 13th, 1815.

SIR,

I have the honour to make the following report of the killed, wounded and prisoners, taken at the battle of Mac Prardie's plantation, on the left bank of the Mississippi, on the morning of the 8th of January, 1815, and five miles below the city of New Orleans.

Killed, - - - - - 700

Wounded, - - - - - 1,400

Prisoners taken—1 major, 4 captains, 11 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 483 camp officers and privates, making a grand total of 2,600.

I have the honour to be, &c.

A. P. HAYNE, *Inspector General*.

Major General Andrew Jackson.

CAMP BELOW NEW ORLEANS, January 19th, 1815.

SIR,

Last night at 12 o'clock, the enemy precipitately decamped and returned to their boats, leaving behind him, under medical attendance, eighty of his wounded including two officers, 14 pieces of his heavy artillery, and a quantity of shot, having de-

stroyed much of his powder. Such was the situation of the ground he abandoned, and of that through which he retired, protected by canals, redoubts, entrenchments and swamps on his right, and the river on his left, that I could not, without encountering a risk which true policy did not seem to require, or to authorize, attempt to annoy him much on his retreat. We took only eight prisoners.

Whether it is the purpose of the enemy to abandon the expedition altogether, or renew his efforts at some other point, I do not pretend to determine with positiveness. In my own mind, however, there is but little doubt, that his last exertions have been made in this quarter, at any rate for the present season, and by the *next* I hope we shall be fully prepared for him. In this belief I am strengthened not only by the prodigious loss he has sustained at the position he has just quitted, but by the failure of his fleet to pass fort St. Philip.

His loss on this ground, since the debarkation of his troops, as stated by the last prisoners and deserters, and as confirmed by many additional circumstances, must have exceeded four thousand; and was greater in the action of the 8th than was estimated, from the most correct data then in his possession, by the inspector general, whose report has been forwarded to you. We succeeded, on the 8th, in getting from the enemy about 1000 stand of arms of various descriptions.

Since the action of the 8th, the enemy have been allowed very little respite—my artillery from both sides of the river being constantly employed, till the night, and indeed until the *hour* of their retreat, in annoying them. No doubt they thought it quite time to quit a position in which so little rest could be found.

I am advised by major Overton, who commands at fort St. Philip, in a letter of the 18th, that the enemy having bombarded his fort for 8 or 9 days from 13 inch mortars without effect, had, on the morning of that day, retired. I have little doubt that he would have been able to have sunk their vessels had they attempted to run by.

Giving the proper weight to all these considerations, I believe you will not think me too sanguine in the belief that *Louisiana* is now clear of its enemy. I hope, however, I need not assure you, that wherever I command, such a belief shall never occasion any relaxation in the measures for resistance. I am but too sensible that the moment when the enemy is opposing us, is not the most proper to provide for them.

I have the honour to be, &c.
ANDREW JACKSON.

The Secretary of War.

P. S. On the 18th our prisoners on shore were delivered us, on exchange having been previously agreed to. Those who are on board the fleet will be delivered at Petit Coquille—after which I shall still have in my hands an excess of several hundred.

20th—Mr. Shields, purser in the navy, has to-day taken 54 prisoners; among them are four officers.

A. J.

Report of the American loss in the several actions below New Orleans.

December 23d,—killed 24; wounded 115; missing 74.—Total 213.

December 28th,—killed 7; wounded 8; missing none.—Total 15.

January 1st,—killed 11; wounded 23; missing none.—Total 34.

do. 8th,—do. 13; do. 30; do. 19.—Total 62.

RECAPITULATION—killed 55; wounded 176; missing 93—Grand total, 324.

NEW ORLEANS, January 27th, 1815.

SIR,

The enemy having retreated, as I had the honour to inform you by my letter of the 20th instant, I have the pleasing duty only of reporting to you, that during the late most eventful struggle for the preservation of this important portion of the United States, I have received from all the officers whom I have the honour to command, every aid and support which could possibly be rendered; they have been exposed to extraordinary hardships, both by day and night, to all the changes of this unstable climate, in this inclement season of the year, performing the most arduous duties on shore, out of the line of their profession, independent of their ordinary duties; and all has been borne and executed with a cheerfulness and alacrity that reflects upon them the highest credit; and that the unwearied exertions of the small naval force on this station, from the first appearance of the enemy, has contributed, in a great degree, to his expulsion, is freely acknowledged by the gallant general commanding the land forces, and will be, I trust, by all who have witnessed their endeavours to effect the end, which has so happily and with so little loss, been accomplished. It affords me great pleasure to have in all cases co-operated with the army, to the entire satisfaction of their commander.

Captain Henley merits my acknowledgments for his unremitting attention to the execution of the various duties committed to him, particularly the superintendence of the erection of two batteries on the bayou St. John, and one opposite the city. His gallant conduct on the night of the 23d ultimo, as already detailed, (the fire from the Caroline proving, as I have since learned, truly destructive to the enemy, and producing disorder, and confusion in their troops, giving to our army a manifest advantage) and for the able assistance I received from him when serving at the marine battery erected by me on the right bank of the river, where he remained till the departure of the enemy.

To lieutenant Lewis Alexis, commanding the naval arsenal at this place, I am greatly indebted for his indefatigable exertions to furnish the various munitions, &c. which were constantly required for the navy, army, and militia, and which were furnished with a promptitude and correctness that reflect upon him and those under his immediate command, as named in the accompanying copy of a letter from him, the greatest credit—his services and merit entitle him to the notice of the department.

Great credit is also due to lieutenant Charles C. B. Thompson, for his great exertions in fitting his ship for service, with a crew obtained by coercion from the streets of the city, composed of all nations, (English excepted) two-thirds of whom could not speak or understand English, for the spirited fire supported by his ship on the 28th ultimo, and his continued endeavours to annoy the enemy when they approached within the range of his guns, his prompt execution of my orders, particularly in landing the guns from his ship, transporting them to my battery, and his attention in supplying the battery with ammunition from his ship, in whose magazine it was deposited. To the accompanying letter from him, I beg leave to refer for a detailed account of the merits of his officers, all of whom merit the encomiums passed on them.

Lieutenant Otho Norris, acting lieutenant Crawley, Messrs. E. Watkins, and J. Pelott, midshipmen, and William Livingston, master's mate, who were stationed at the heavy cannon in general Jackson's lines, and named in the letter which accompanies this, have, by their gallant conduct, reflected upon the navy great credit, and warranted my highest approbation.

Acting lieutenant Thomas S. Cunningham, commanding gun vessel No. 65, stationed at fort Saint Philip, solicited and obtained the command of two 32 pounders, which are mounted in the most exposed situation at that fort, being outside the walls, which he manned with his crew and rendered great service to the officer commanding at that post, during the heavy bombardment by the enemy from the 8th to the 17th instant.

Mr. Thomas Shields, purser of the station, and doctor Robert Morrell, attached to the marine corps, (who volunteered his services in any way they could be useful) and who were sent by me with a flag of truce to the enemy on the 15th ultimo, supported with becoming dignity their stations, and commanded from the enemy that respect which was due to them and their mission, during their detention by the enemy, prolonged beyond what I could have possibly expected, and have merited, in a special manner, my approbation. Of those officers, and Mr. Richard Dealey, sailing master, whose gallant conduct during their subsequent successful expedition, (a detailed account of which you will herewith receive) reflects upon them the greatest credit, and merits the particular notice of the department.

Doctor Lewis Heerman, hospital surgeon, who, with my sanction, volunteered his services to aid the hospital surgeon of the

army in the various duties devolving upon him, from the number of our own sick, and the wounded of the enemy, is thereby, and from his uniform attention to his professional duties, entitled to my acknowledgments, as are all the officers of the medical department. For the particulars of his services, I refer you to the letter to him which you will herewith receive.

Mr. John K. Smith, navy agent, has, by his unremitting attention to his department, the promptitude with which he has furnished articles for both the navy and the army, and procuring me the funds that were necessary during this period of alarm and confusion, enabled me to carry on my operations in conjunction with the army against the enemy, and contributed to that success with which the arms of the United States have been crowned, and will receive my warmest thanks. His services rendered in camp will be seen by the enclosed copy of a letter from the commanding general, of the 19th instant.

To major Carmick, commanding the marine corps on this station, I am indebted for the promptness with which my requisitions on him have been complied with, and the strong desire he has always manifested to further, as far as was in his power, my views.

Mr. R. D. Shephard, who very handsomely volunteered his services to me, and acted as my aid-de-camp, and rendered me very essential assistance by the uniform promptitude with which he bore and executed my various orders, merits my warmest acknowledgments.

Mr. J. B. Nevitt, of Natchez, formerly a lieutenant in the navy, who left his home and proffered to me his services, has rendered me important assistance from his practical knowledge, and which I acknowledge with much pleasure.

My petty officers, seamen and marines, performed their duties to my entire satisfaction.

I beg leave, sir, to solicit a confirmation of their present rank, for the different officers named herein and in the accompanying letters, acting by appointment, as also for acting lieutenants Speeden and McKeever, and to recommend them all as meriting, in a special manner, the notice of the department.

I have the honour to be, &c.

DANIEL T. PATTERSON.

Hon. Secretary of the Navy.

Extract of a letter from general Jackson to the Secretary of War.

“HEAD QUARTERS 7th MILITARY DISTRICT,
“New Orleans, February 17th, 1815.

“I have the honour to enclose you major Overton's report of the attack of Fort St. Philip, and of the manner in which it was defended.

"The conduct of that officer and of those who acted under him, merits, I think, great praise. They nailed their own colors to the standard, and placed those of the enemy underneath them, determined never to surrender the fort."

PORT St. PHILIP, January 19th, 1815.

SIR,

On the 1st of the present month, I received the information that the enemy intended passing this fort, to co-operate with their land forces, in the subjugation of Louisiana, and the destruction of New Orleans. To effect this with more facility, they were first with their heavy bomb vessels to bombard this place into compliance. On the grounds of this information, I turned my attention to the security of my command. I erected small magazines in different parts of the garrison, that if one blew up I could resort to another; built covers for my men to secure them from the explosion of the shells, and removed the combustible matter without the works. Early in the day of the 8th instant, I was advised of their approach, and on the 9th, at a quarter past 10 A. M. have in sight two bomb vessels, one sloop, one brig and one schooner; they anchored two and one quarter miles below. At half past 11 and at half past 12, they advanced two barges apparently for the purpose of sounding within one and a half miles of the fort; at this moment, I ordered my water battery, under the command of lieutenant Cunningham, of the navy, to open upon them: its well directed shot caused a precipitate retreat. At half past 3 o'clock, P. M. the enemy's bomb vessels opened their fire from four sea mortars, two of 13 inches, two of 10, and to my great mortification I found they were without the effective range of my shot, as many subsequent experiments proved; they continued their fire with little intermission, during the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th. I occasionally opened my batteries on them with great vivacity, particularly when they showed a disposition to change their position.

On the 17th, in the evening, our heavy mortar was said to be in readiness. I ordered that excellent officer, captain Wolstcroft, of the artillerists, who previously had charge of it, to open a fire, which was done with great effect, as the enemy from that motion became disordered, and at day light, on the 18th, commenced their retreat, after having thrown upwards of a thousand heavy shells, besides shells from howitzers, round shot and grape which he discharged from boats under cover of the night.

Our loss in this affair has been uncommonly small, owing entirely to the great pains that were taken by the different officers to keep their men under cover; as the enemy left scarcely ten feet of this garrison untouched.

The officers and soldiers through this whole affair, although nine days and nights under arms in the different batteries, the

consequent fatigue and loss of sleep, have manifested the greatest firmness and the most zealous warmth to be at the enemy. To distinguish individuals would be a delicate task, as merit was conspicuous every where. Lieutenant Cunningham, of the navy, who commanded my water battery, with his brave crew, evinced the most determined bravery and uncommon activity throughout, and in fact, sir, the only thing to be regretted is that the enemy was too timid to give us an opportunity of destroying him.

I herewith enclose you a list of the killed and wounded.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

W. H. OVERTON.

Major general Jackson.

Killed 2 and wounded 7 during the bombardment on fort St. Philip, commencing on the 9th and ending on the 18th January, 1815.

ADDRESS.

Of Major General Jackson on the 8th of January, 1815, to the troops on the right bank of the Mississippi.

While, by the blessing of heaven, one of the most brilliant victories was obtained by the troops under my immediate command, no words can express the mortification I felt, at witnessing the scene exhibited on the opposite bank.* I will spare your feelings and my own, nor enter into detail on the subject. To all who reflect, it must be a source of eternal regret, that a few moments' exertion of that courage you certainly possess, was alone wanting, to have rendered your success more complete than that of your fellow citizens in this camp. To what cause was the abandonment of your lines owing? To fear? No! You are the countrymen, the friends, the brothers of those who have secured to themselves, by their courage, the gratitude of their country; who have been prodigal of their blood in its defence, and who are strangers to any other fear than disgrace. To disaffection to our glorious cause? No! My countrymen, your general does justice to the pure sentiments by which you are inspired. How then could brave men, firm in the cause in which they are enrolled, neglect their first duty, and abandon the post committed to their care? The want of discipline, the want of order, a total disregard to obedience, and a spirit of insubordination, not less destructive than cowardice itself, are the causes that led to this disaster, and they must be eradicated, or I must cease to command. I desire to be distinctly understood, that every breach of orders,

* Commodore Patterson and general Morgan at the moment attributed the disaster to the flight of the *Kentucky militia*, which proved on investigation not to be the fact. Had all the circumstances, as they existed, been disclosed, they would not have been reproached by general Jackson.

all want of discipline, every inattention of duty, will be seriously and promptly punished; that the attentive officers, and good soldiers, may not be mentioned in the disgrace and danger, which the negligence of a few may produce. Soldiers! you want only the will, in order to emulate the glory of your fellow citizens on this bank of the river. You have the same motives for action; the same interest, the same country to protect; and you have an additional interest, from past events, to wipe off reproach, and show that you will not be inferior, in the day of trial, to any of your countrymen.

But remember! without obedience, without order, without discipline, all your efforts are vain. The brave man, inattentive to his duty, is worth little more to his country than the coward who deserts her in the hour of danger. Private opinions, as to the competency of officers, must not be indulged, and still less expressed; it is impossible that the measures of those who command should satisfy all who are bound to obey; and one of the most dangerous faults in a soldier, is a disposition to criticise and blame the orders and characters of his superiors. Soldiers! I know that many of you have done your duty; and I trust, in future, I shall have no reason to make any exception. Officers! I have the fullest confidence that you will enforce obedience to your commands; but, above all, that by subordination, in your different grades, you will set an example to your men; and that, hereafter, the army of the right will yield to none, in the essential qualities which characterize good soldiers;—that they will earn their share of those honours and rewards, which their country will prepare for its deliverers.

ANDREW JACKSON,
Major General Commanding.

ADDRESS

Delivered to major general Andrew Jackson, by the reverend W. Dubourg, administrator apostolic of the diocese of Louisiana.

NEW ORLEANS, January 23d, 1815.

GENERAL,

While the state of Louisiana, in the joyful transports of gratitude, hails you as her deliverer, and the assertor of her menaced liberties: while grateful America, so lately wrapped up in anxious suspense, on the fate of this important city, is reaching from shore to shore your splendid achievements, and preparing to inscribe your name on her immortal rolls, among those of her Washingtons: while history, poetry, and the monumental art, will vie in consigning to the latest posterity, a triumph unparalleled in their records: while thus raised, by universal acclamation, to the very pinnacle of fame, how easy had it been to

you, general, to forget the prime mover of your wonderful successes, and to assume to yourself a praise, which must eventually return to that exalted source, whence every merit is derived. But better acquainted with the nature of true glory, and justly placing the summit of your ambition, in approving yourself the worthy instrument of Heaven's merciful designs, the first impulse of your religious heart was to acknowledge *the signal interposition of providence*—your first step, a solemn display of *your humble sense of his favours*.

Still agitated at the remembrance of those dreadful agonies, from which we have been so miraculously rescued, it is our pride to acknowledge, that the Almighty has truly had the principal hand in our deliverance, and, to follow you, general, in attributing to his infinite goodness, the homage of our unfeigned gratitude. Let the infatuated votary of a blind chance deride our credulous simplicity; let the cold hearted atheist look for the explanation of important events, to the mere concatenation of human causes; to us, the whole universe is loud in proclaiming a Supreme Ruler, who, as he holds the hearts of man in his hands, holds also the thread of all contingent occurrences. "Whatever be his intermediate agents," says an illustrious prelate, "still on the secret orders of his all-ruling providence, depend the rise, and prosperity, as well as the decline and downfall of empires. From his lofty throne, he moves every scene below, now curbing, now letting loose, the passions of men; now infusing his own wisdom into the leaders of nations; now confounding their boasted prudence, and spreading upon their councils a spirit of intoxication; and thus executing his uncontrollable judgments on the sons of men, according to the dictates of his own unerring justice."

To him therefore, our most fervent thanks are due, for our unexpected late rescue. It is *him* we intend to praise, when considering you, general, as the *man of his right hand*, whom he has taken pains to fit out for the important commission of our defence. We extol that fecundity of genius, by which, under the most discouraging distress, you created unforeseen resources, raised, as it were, from the ground, hosts of intrepid warriors, and provided every vulnerable point with ample means of defence. To him we trace that instinctive superiority of mind, which at once rallied around your universal confidence; impressed one irresistible movement to all the jarring elements of which this political machine is composed; aroused their slumbering spirits, and diffused through every rank the noble ardour which glowed in your own bosom. To him, in fine, we address our acknowledgments for that consummate prudence, which defeated all the combinations of a sagacious enemy, entangled him in the very snares which he had spread for us, and succeeded in effecting his utter destruction, without exposing the lives of our citizens. Immortal thanks be to his Supreme Majesty, for sending us such an instrument of his bountiful designs! A gift of that value is the

best token of the continuance of his protection—the most solid encouragement to sue for new favours. The first which it emboldens us humbly to supplicate, as nearest our throbbing hearts, is that you may long enjoy the honour of your grateful country; of which you will permit us to present you a pledge, in this wreath of laurel, the prize of victory, the symbol of immortality. The next is a speedy and honourable termination of the bloody contest, in which we are engaged. No one has so efficaciously laboured as you, general, for the acceleration of that blissful period: may we soon reap that sweetest fruit of your splendid and uninterrupted victories.

GENERAL JACKSON'S REPLY.

REVEREND SIR,

I receive, with gratitude and pleasure, the symbolical crown, which piety has prepared. I receive it in the name of the brave men who have so effectually seconded my exertions; they will deserve the laurels which their country will bestow. For myself, to have been instrumental in the deliverance of such a country, is the greatest blessing that Heaven could confer. That it has been effected with so little loss—that so few should cloud the smiles of our triumph, and not a cypress leaf be interwoven in the wreath which you present, is a source of the most exquisite pleasure.

I thank you, reverend sir, most sincerely, for the prayers which you offer up for my happiness. May those your patriotism dictates, for our beloved country, be first heard; and may mine for your individual prosperity, as well as that of the congregation committed to your care, be favourably received—the prosperity, wealth, and happiness of this city, will then be commensurate with the courage and other qualities of its inhabitants.

NEW ORLEANS, March 20th, 1815.

SIR,

I have the honour, agreeably to your request, to state to your excellency, in writing, the substance of a conversation that occurred between quarter master Perrie of the British army, and myself, on the 11th instant, on board his Britannic majesty's ship Herald. Quarter master Perrie observed, that the commanding officers of the British forces were daily in the receipt of every information from New Orleans, which they might require, in aid of their operations, for the completion of the objects of the expedition; that they were perfectly acquainted with the situation of every part of our forces, the manner in which the same was situated, the number of our fortifications, their strength, position, &c. As to the battery on the left bank of the Mississippi, he described its situation, its distance from the main post, and

promptly offered me a plan of the works. He furthermore stated, that the above information was received from seven or eight persons in the city of New Orleans, from whom he could, at any hour, procure every information necessary to promote his majesty's interest.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CHARLES K. BLANCHARD.

To Major General Jackson.

GENERAL JACKSON'S *Farewell address to his army.*

The major general is at length enabled to perform the pleasing task of restoring to Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, and the territory of the Mississippi, the brave troops who have acted such a distinguished part in the war which has just terminated. In restoring these brave men to their homes, much exertion is expected of, and great responsibility imposed on, the commanding officers of the different corps. It is required of major generals Carroll and Thomas, and brigadier general Coffee, to march their commands, without unnecessary delay, to their respective states. The troops from the Mississippi territory and state of Louisiana, both militia and volunteers, will be immediately mustered out of service, paid, and discharged.

The major general has the satisfaction of announcing the approbation of the President of the United States to the conduct of the troops under his command, expressed, in flattering terms, through the honourable the Secretary of War.

In parting with those brave men, whose destinies have been so long united with his own, and in whose labors and glories it is his happiness and his boast to have participated, the commanding general can neither suppress his feelings, nor give utterance to them as he ought. In what terms can he bestow suitable praise on merit so extraordinary, so unparalleled? Let him, in one burst of joy, gratitude, and exultation, exclaim, "These are the saviours of their country; these the patriot soldiers, who triumphed over the invincibles of Wellington, and conquered the conquerors of Europe!" With what patience did you submit to privations—with what fortitude did you endure fatigue—what valor did you display in the day of battle! You have secured to America a proud name among the nations of the earth; a glory which will never perish.

Possessing those dispositions which equally adorn the citizen and the soldier, the expectations of your country will be met in peace, as her wishes have been gratified in war. Go, then, my brave companions, to your homes; to those tender connexions, and blissful scenes, which render life so dear—full of honour, and crowned with laurels that will never fade. When participating,

in the bosoms of your families, the enjoyment of peaceful life, with what happiness will you not look back to the toils you have borne—to the dangers you have encountered? How will all your past exposures be converted into sources of inexpressible delight? Who, that never experienced your sufferings, will be able to appreciate your joys? The man who slumbered ingloriously at home, during your painful marches, your nights of watchfulness, and your days of toil, will envy you the happiness which these recollections will afford; still more will he envy the gratitude of that country, which you have so eminently contributed to save.

Continue, fellow-soldiers, on your passage to your several destinations, to preserve that subordination, that dignified and manly deportment, which have so ennobled your character.

While the commanding general is thus giving indulgence to his feelings, towards those brave companions, who accompanied him through difficulties and danger, he cannot permit the names of Blount, and Shelby, and Holmes, to pass unnoticed. With what generous ardour and patriotism have these distinguished governors contributed all their exertions, to provide the means of victory! The recollection of their exertions, and of the success which has resulted, will be to them a reward more grateful than any which the pomp of title, or the splendour of wealth, can bestow.

What happiness it is to the commanding general, that, while danger was before him, he was, on no occasion, compelled to use, towards his companions in arms, either severity or rebuke. If, after the enemy had retired, improper passions began their empire in a few unworthy bosoms, and rendered a resort to energetic measures necessary for their suppression, he has not confounded the innocent with the guilty—the seduced with the seducers. Towards you, fellow-soldiers, the most cheering recollections exist blended, alas! with regret, that disease and war should have ravished from us so many worthy companions. But the memory of the cause in which they perished, and of the virtues which animated them while living, must occupy the place where sorrow would claim to dwell.

Farewell, fellow-soldiers. The expression of your general's thanks is feeble; but the gratitude of a country of freemen is yours—yours the applause of an admiring world.

ANDREW JACKSON,
Major General Commanding.

New Orleans, March, 1815.

AFFAIR AT POINT PETRE.

POINT PETRE, GEORGIA, January 10th, 1815.

SIR,

The collector having informed me he was about to despatch an express to Savannah immediately, I avail myself of a few mo-

ments allowed me to apprize you of the movements of the enemy. It has just been reported that he has effected a landing on the north point of Cumberland. A frigate is at anchor off that point. As my order *contemplate a retreat*, I have thought it best to prepare in time, and to direct the assistant deputy quarter master general to remove the most of the provisions (of which we have a large supply) together with all the ammunition except what shall be necessary for immediate defence of the battery, and troops under marching orders, to a safe point near St. Mary's. But I hope to have it in my power to give the enemy a brush before I leave the ground. I have had an interview with colonel Scott of the Georgia militia. He promises, in the event of an attack of my post, to co-operate. I advised him to take post at Sweet Water branch, should the enemy attack me in my rear. This will place him between two fires. Colonel Scott thinks he can bring two hundred men with him; if so, we shall do *something*.

Very respectfully, &c.

A. A. MASSIAS, *Capt. U. S. Rifle Corps,*
comdg. U. S. forces near St. Mary's.

Brigadier general Floyd.

KING'S BAY, 12 O'CLOCK, January 11th, 1815.

SIR,

I deem it expedient to apprize you of the movements of the enemy, by express. They effected a landing on the north point of Cumberland Island this morning. This moment two divisions, with nineteen barges, attended by two look-out boats in front, and flanked by two large boats mounting one gun each, are passing within my view. At first they discovered a disposition towards King's Bay; but ascertaining we were prepared to receive them, they altered their course and took the Plumb Orchard passage, keeping Cumberland close aboard. The first division effected its landing at Plumb Orchard, the second at first shewed a disposition towards the point. The officer left in charge of the battery (at the point) was ordered to be on the look out and not to let him approach with impunity, which it appears he promptly obeyed. One of the enemy's barges went out of line in chase of a boat making its retreat towards St. Mary's, but on receiving a shot from a long eighteen which came rather *too* near him, he gave up the chase.

A. A. MASSIAS.

Brigadier general Floyd.

POINT PETRE, 3 O'CLOCK, P. M. January 11th, 1815.

We are now against the Point. Sixteen of the enemy's barges of the largest size have passed to Dunginess and have landed. I

compute his force to be about fifteen hundred *white and black*. Their fleet is now beating off and on St. Andrew's bar, at which end they came in.

It was my intention at first to receive them at Cabin Bluff with riflemen. This could have been done with much advantage, but it seems they were apprized of our intention, and altered their course for the other side and took the Plumb Orchard passage.

We are now at the point, and on the alert, waiting an attack, which I expect momentarily. I shall do my best in the event of a retreat. The assistant deputy quarter master general has been ordered to place a supply of ammunition and provisions at a post in my rear (selected by myself.) The men have always four days' provisions in advance (cooked and in their haversacks) and ready to move to any point at a moment's warning. I have the pleasure to anticipate the best of conduct from the officers and men under my command. *Though few*, they are well chosen; they discover great eagerness for battle. They behaved well this morning in preparing to receive the enemy at King's Bay.

Very respectfully, &c.

A. A. MASSIAS,

comdg. U. S. troops, St. Mary's station.

Brigadier general Floyd.

SWEET WATER BRANCH, January 13th, 1815.

SIR,

The enemy moved against Point Petre this morning, at half past 7 o'clock, with his whole force (about fifteen hundred.) His operations were simultaneous. At an early hour this morning I received information of his approach on my picket, near major Johnson's, about four and a half miles from this point, with about eight hundred to a thousand men, a rocket machine, and two pieces of artillery: aware of his intentions to place himself in my rear, while he at the same moment was advancing in considerable force in front (about six hundred) to attack the battery at Point Petre (on the St. Mary's) with an evident view to cut off my retreat; I accordingly made the following disposition of my brave little force. I ordered captain Stallings to remain at the point, with about thirty-six effectives, with orders to defend it as long as possible, and if overpowered, to spike the guns, fire the train (already prepared at the magazine and works) and retreat to me, with the remainder, (about 80 men, riflemen and infantry.) I moved out against the main force in the rear, determined to oppose his passage to the point, at a narrow defile near major King's, and make good our retreat (if it should be found necessary) at all hazards. At about 9 o'clock we came up with the defile, near major King's and Johnson's; it is flanked by a deep marsh on each side, and has a complete cover for riflemen (in a thick live oak underwood) on the right and left; the evening previous (at a late hour) I had

caused some large trees to be fallen and placed across the defile in several places, with a view to obstruct his passage as much as possible. As we entered the defile at one end, the enemy did so at the other. It was my intention (if possible) to gain the cross roads near Major King's; but finding myself stopped, I ordered 1st lieutenant Holt, of the 43d infantry, with a detachment of riflemen, to advance and gain the thicket on the enemy's left; at the same time 1st lieutenant Harlee, of the 1st rifle regiment, with another detachment of riflemen, was ordered to take post in the thicket on their right, and to be in readiness to pass the thicket in the enemy's rear: this order was promptly obeyed. Captain Tattnall, of the 43 infantry, who was with me with the remainder (infantry) was ordered to advance in close column and pass the defile. At this moment the enemy's bugle sounded, when a brisk fire commenced on both sides, the riflemen on the right and left keeping a deadly fire on the enemy, who was in close column; we had already passed the defile some distance, and the enemy had given way twice, when captain Tattnall, who stood near me, received a severe wound which obliged him to retire. This produced a momentary pause, when the enemy, being encouraged, pressed forward, but was received with unequalled firmness by the infantry and riflemen with me. By the absence of captain Tattnall, his platoon became in charge of a serjeant (Benson) from whom I received unexampled support. But alas! our efforts were unavailing, the number of the enemy too imposing, a thousand to eighty was too much odds: and finding it impossible to maintain my position, and believing the battery to be in the hands of the enemy, (as three signal guns had been fired) it was with reluctance I ordered a retreat, and which I am happy to state was effected in good order.

We took the path to Mrs. Gordon's plantation on the North River, at which point I had (in the event of my not being able to maintain myself in my position or pass by major King's,) previously secured a large boat; but this was by *some one* taken away. I had then but one resource left to pass the North River (at miller's Bluff) in a paddling canoe; upon which orders were sent to captain Stallings to retreat to me, which he promptly obeyed; the enemy following close in his rear. I have nevertheless the pleasure to state we effected the retreat without the loss of a man. While I lament the necessity of informing you of the loss of the battery at Point Petre, I console myself with the consciousness of having done my best for its preservation, and of being peculiarly fortunate in making good a retreat by many considered impracticable.

The enemy's loss must have been considerable. The defile was covered with blood. It is reported an officer of distinction, wearing a pair of gold epaulets, was among their slain. Our loss was very inconsiderable, as will appear by the report annexed to

this ; and I have reason to hope that some of our men who were missing will yet join.

I should not do justice to the gentlemen I had the honour to command, did I not say they all performed prodigies, beyond reasonable expectation ; they were equally brave. But if I may be allowed to discriminate and to recommend any to your particular notice and attention, it would be captain E. T. Tatnall, of the 43d infantry. He was conspicuous in every act, and gave me the utmost support.

I cannot but consider my little band highly complimented by the number of the enemy thought necessary to bring against them.

Very respectfully, &c.

A. A. MASSIAS, Capt.

Comdg. U. S. forces, near St. Mary's, Geo.

Brig. Gen. Floyd.

In this affair there was 1 killed, 4 wounded, and 9 missing.

GENERAL JACKSON'S ADDRESS,

*Read at the head of each of the corps composing the line below
New Orleans, January 21st, 1815.*

CITIZENS AND FELLOW SOLDIERS,

The enemy has retreated, and your general has now leisure to proclaim to the world what he has noticed with admiration and pride—your undaunted courage, your patriotism, and patience under hardships and fatigues. Natives of different states, acting together for the first time in this camp, differing in habits and in language, instead of viewing in these circumstances the germ of distrust and division, you have made them a source of honourable emulation, and from the seeds of discord itself, have reaped the fruits of an honourable union. This day completes the fourth week since fifteen hundred of you attacked treble your number of men, who had boasted of their discipline, and their services under a celebrated leader in a long and eventful war—attacked them in their camp the moment they had profaned the soil of freedom with their hostile tread, and inflicted a blow which was a prelude to the final result of their attempt to conquer, or their poor contrivances to divide us. A few hours was sufficient to unite the gallant band, though at the moment they received the welcome order to march, they were separated many leagues in different directions from the city. The gay rapidity of the march, the cheerful countenances of the officers and men, would have induced a belief that some festive entertainment, not the strife of battle, was the object to which they hastened with so much eagerness and hilarity. In the conflict that ensued, the same spirit was supported, and my communications to the executive of the United States have testified the sense I have entertained of the

merits of the corps and officers that were engaged. Resting on the field of battle, they retired in perfect order on the next morning to these lines, destined to become the scene of future victories, which they were to share with the rest of you, my brave companions in arms. Scarcely were your lines a protection against musket shot, when, on the 28th, a disposition was made to attack them with all the pomp and parade of military tactics, as improved by those veterans of the Spanish war.

Their batteries of heavy cannon kept up an incessant fire; their rockets illumined the air, and under their cover two strong columns threatened our flanks. The foe insolently thought that this spectacle was too imposing to be resisted, and in the intoxication of his pride he already saw our lines abandoned without a contest—how were those menacing appearances met? By shouts of defiance, by a manly countenance not to be shaken by the roar of his cannon, by the glare of his fire work rockets; by an artillery served with superior skill and with deadly effect. Never, my brave friends, can your general forget the testimonials of attachment to our glorious cause, of indignant hatred to our foe, of affectionate confidence in your chief, that resounded from every rank as he passed along your line. This animated and unexpected scene damped the courage of the enemy; he dropped his scaling ladders and fascines, and the threatened attack dwindled into a *demonstration*, which served only to show the emptiness of his parade, and to inspire you with a just confidence in yourselves.

The new year was ushered in with the most tremendous fire his whole artillery could produce; a few hours only, however, were necessary for the brave and skilful men who directed our own, to dismount his cannon, destroy his batteries, and effectively silence his fire. Hitherto, my brave friends, in the contests on our lines, your courage had been passive only; you stood with coolness, a fire that would have tried the firmness of a veteran, and you anticipated a nearer contest with an eagerness which was soon to be gratified.

On the 8th of January, the final effort was made. At the dawn of day the batteries opened, and the columns advanced. Knowing that the volunteers from Tennessee and the militia from Kentucky were stationed on your left, it was there they directed their chief attack.

Reasoning always from false principles, they expected no opposition from men whose officers even were not in uniform, who were ignorant of the rules and dress, and who had never been *trained* into discipline—fatal mistake! a fire incessantly kept up, directed with calmness and with unerring aim, strewed the field with the bravest officers and men of the column which slowly advanced, according to the most approved rules of European tactics, and was cut down by the untutored courage of American militia. Unable to sustain this galling and unceasing fire, some hundreds nearest the entrenchments, called for quarter, which

was granted; the rest retreating, were rallied at some distance, but only to make them a surer mark for the grape and canister shot of our artillery, which, without exaggeration, mowed down whole ranks at every discharge; and at length they precipitately retired from the field.

Our right had only a short contest to sustain with a few rash men, who, fatally for themselves, forced their entrance into the unfinished redoubt on the river. They were quickly dispossessed, and this glorious day terminated with the loss to the enemy of their commander in chief and one major general killed, another major general wounded, the most experienced and bravest of their officers, and more than *three thousand men*, killed, wounded and missing; while our ranks, my friends, were thinned only by the loss of *six* of our brave companions killed, and *seven* disabled by wounds—*wonderful interposition of heaven! unexampled cost in the history of war!*

Let us be grateful to the God of battles who has directed the arrows of indignation against our invaders, while he covered with his protecting shield the brave defenders of their country.

After this unsuccessful and disastrous attempt, their spirits were broken, their force was destroyed, and their whole attention was employed in providing the means of escape. Thus they have effected, leaving their heavy artillery in our power, and many of their wounded to our clemency. The consequences of this short but decisive campaign, are incalculably important. The pride of our arrogant enemy humbled, his forces broken, his leaders killed, his insolent hopes of our disunion frustrated, his expectation of rioting in our spoils and wasting our country changed into ignominious defeat, shameful flight, and reluctant acknowledgment of the humanity and kindness of those whom he had doomed to all the horrors and humiliation of a conquered state.

On the other side, unanimity established, disaffection crushed, confidence restored, your country saved from conquest, your property from pillage, your wives and daughters from insult and violation, the union preserved from dismemberment, and perhaps a period put by this decisive stroke to a bloody and savage war. These, my brave friends, are the consequences of the efforts you have made, and the success with which they have been crowned by heaven.

These important results have been effected by the united courage and perseverance of the army; which the different corps, as well as the individuals that compose it, have vied with each other in their exertions to produce. The share they have respectively had will be pointed out in the general order accompanying this address. But the gratitude, the admiration of their country, offers a fairer reward than that which any praise of the general can bestow, and the best is that of which they can never be deprived, the consciousness of having done their duty, and of meriting the applause they will receive.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, 7th MILITARY DISTRICT,
Camp before New Orleans, Adj. General's Office, January 21st, 1815.

Before the camp at these memorable lines shall be broken up, the general thinks it a duty to the brave army which has defended them, publicly to notice the conduct of the different corps which compose it. The behaviour of the regular troops, consisting of parts of the 7th and 44th regiments of infantry, and the corps of marines, all commanded by colonel Ross, has been such as to merit his warm approbation. The 7th regiment was led by major Peyre, and the 44th by captain Baker, in the action of the 23d, in a manner that does those officers the highest honour. They have continued through the campaign to do their duty with the same zeal and ability with which it was commenced. On that occasion the country lost a valuable officer in the death of lieutenant McClellan, of the 7th infantry, who fell while bravely leading his company. Lieutenant Dupuy, of the 44th, although severely wounded in this action, returned in time to take a share in all the subsequent attacks.

To the Tennessee mounted gun men, to their gallant leader, brigadier general Coffee, the general presents his warmest thanks, not only for their uniformly good conduct in action, but for the wonderful patience with which they have borne the fatigue, and the perseverance with which they surmounted the difficulties of a most painful march, in order to meet the enemy—a diligence and zeal to which we probably owe the salvation of the country. Ordinary activity would have brought them too late to act the brilliant part they have performed in the defeat of our invaders. All the officers of that corps have distinguished themselves; but the general cannot avoid mentioning the name of lieutenant colonel Lauderdale, who fell on the night of the 23d, and those of colonels Dyer, Gibson, and Elliott, who were wounded, but, disdaining personal considerations, remained firm to their duty.

The cavalry from the Mississippi territory, under their enterprising leader, major Hinds, was always ready to perform every service, which the nature of the country enabled them to execute. The daring manner in which they reconnoitred the enemy on his lines, excited the admiration of one army and the astonishment of the other.

Major general Carroll, commanding the detachment of West Tennessee militia, has shown the greatest zeal for the service; a strict attention to duty, and an ability and courage that will always recommend him to the gratitude of his country. His troops have, since the lines were formed, occupied and defended the weakest part of them, and borne, without a murmur, an encampment on a marshy and unhealthy soil. In the memorable action of the 8th of January, the chief effort of the enemy was directed against them, but their valor, and that of the brave men who sup-

ported them (general Coffee's brigade on the left, and a part of the Kentucky troops on the right,) soon made it clear that a rampart of high-minded men is a better defence than the most regular fortification.

General Adair, who, owing to the indisposition of general Thomas, brought up the Kentucky militia, has shown that troops will always be valiant when their leaders are so. No men ever displayed a more gallant spirit than they did under that most valuable officer. His country is under obligations to him.

The general would be ungrateful or insensible to merit if he did not particularly notice the conduct of the officers and men who so bravely supported, and so skilfully directed, his artillery. Colonel McRea, in the action of the 23d, showed as he always does, great courage. Lieutenant Spotts, under whose immediate direction our artillery had been placed, led it to action with a daring courage worthy of admiration. Captain Humphreys commanded the first battery on our right. The service is greatly indebted to that officer, not only for the able and gallant manner in which he directed his fire, but for the general activity he displayed in his department.

Lieutenant Norris, of the navy, with Mr. Walkers Martin, and a detachment of seamen, was stationed at the 2d battery, and lieutenant Crawley, with Mr. W. Livingston, master's mate, with a similar detachment, were stationed at a 32 pounder, which was remarkably well directed. They performed their duty with the zeal and bravery, which has always characterized the navy of the United States. Captains Dominique and Belluche, lately commanding privateers at Baratania, with part of their former crew and many brave citizens of New Orleans, were stationed at numbers 3 and 4. The general cannot avoid giving his warm approbation of the manner in which these gentlemen have uniformly conducted themselves while under his command, and of the gallantry with which they have redeemed the pledge they gave at the opening of the campaign to defend the country. The brothers Lafitte have exhibited the same courage and fidelity, and the general promises that the government shall be duly apprized of their conduct. Colonel Perry, deputy quarter master general, volunteered his services at number 6. He was ably aided by lieutenant Kerr, of the artillery. His battery was well served, bravely supported, and greatly annoyed the enemy. Numbers 8 and 9 were directed by lieutenant Spotts with his usual skill and bravery, assisted by Mr. Cheaveau.

The general takes the highest pleasure in noticing the conduct of general Garrique de Flaujac, commanding one of the brigades of militia of this state, and member of the Senate. His brigade not being in the field, as soon as the invasion was known he repaired to the camp and offered himself as a volunteer for the service of a piece of artillery, which he directed with the skill which was to be expected from an experienced artillery officer.

ning the exemption afforded by his seat in the Senate, he led in this subordinate but honourable station; and by his labors as well as his exertion has rendered essential services to the country. Mr. Sebastian Hiriart, of the same body, set the example, served a considerable time in the ranks of the 2d colored battalion, and afterwards as adjutant of the colored

Major Planche's battalion of volunteers, though deprived of the valuable services of major Carmac, who commanded them, and the wound which that officer received in the attack of the 28th of September, have realized all the anticipations which the general formed of their conduct. Major Planche and major St. James, of the 1st corps, have distinguished themselves by their activity, courage, and their zeal; and the whole corps have greatly aided to enable the general to redeem the pledge he gave, at the opening of the campaign he promised the country the safety, but a splendid triumph over its insolent invaders. Two corps of colored volunteers, have not disappointed the expectations that were formed of their courage and perseverance in the discharge of their duty. Majors Lacoste and Daquin, who commanded them, have deserved well of their country. Captain Beale's conduct has been noticed in the account rendered of the 23d; and that officer has since continued to merit the highest praise. Captain Beale's company of the city riflemen maintained, by its subsequent conduct, the reputation it acquired at the action of the 23d. Colonel de la Ronde, of the Louisiana militia, has been extremely serviceable by his exertions, and has shown great courage, and an uniform attachment to the cause of the country. General Humbert, who offered his services as a volunteer, has continually exposed himself to the greatest dangers, and his characteristic bravery, as has also the Mexican field marshal don Juan de Anayer, who acted in the same capacity. The general acknowledges the important assistance he has received from commodore Patterson, as well by his professional exertions as the zealous co-operation of his department during the course of the campaign. Captain Henley, on board the *Canby*, and afterwards in directing the erection of several batteries on the Bayou and on the right bank of the river, was of great service to the army. Lieutenant Alexis, of the navy, stationed in the navy arsenal, was indefatigable in exertions to forward to the army every thing which could facilitate its operations—his zeal and activity deserve the notice of government. Major Nicks, who, from an accidental wound was deprived of the pleasure of commanding the 7th regiment during the campaign, was continually present in the fort, and furnished the ammunition and the artillery as wanted, with the greatest activity and promptitude. The volunteers of the Mississippi territory, and to the militia from the remoter parts of this state, who have arrived since the declaration of the 8th, the general tenders his thanks, and is satisfied that nothing but opportunity was wanting to entitle

them to the praises that have been merited by the rest of the army. Captain Ogden's troop of horse was peculiarly useful by their local knowledge of the ground on which they acted; and the small detachment of the Attacapas dragoons, stationed near head quarters, were indefatigable in performing all the duties which devolved on them.

The general would not do justice to his staff, if he did not bestow deserved praise on the adjutant general, colonel Butler, and his assistant, major Chotard, for the zeal and activity in the important department of service confided to them, and for the bravery which led them wherever danger or duty required their presence. The vigilance, courage and attention to duty exhibited during the campaign, by colonel Haynes, and his two assistants, majors Davis and Hampton, have been appreciated as they deserved to be by their general.

The general's aids-de-camp, Thomas L. Butler and captain John Reid, as well as his volunteer aids, Messrs. Livingston, Duncan, Grymes, Dupeasis, and major Daverac de Castera, the judge advocate, have merited the thanks of the general by the calm and deliberate courage they have displayed on every occasion, and in every situation that called it forth. The topographical engineer, major Tatum, exhibited all the ardor of youth in the hour of peril, united to the experience acquired by his long services. The chief engineer, major Lacarriere de la Tour, has been useful to the army by his talents and bravery. The same praises are due to his assistants, captain Lewis Livingston and Mr. Latrobe. The medical staff has merited well of the country, and the general would not do justice to his own feelings, were he to withhold from doctor Ker, hospital surgeon, who volunteered his services, and doctor Flood, the just tribute of applause deserved by them for their medical skill and personal bravery. The quarter master's department, though deprived of the personal exertions of colonel Piatt, who was wounded in the night action of the 23d, performed well all their duties. Major general Villere and brigadier general Morgan, have merited the approbation of the general by their unwearied attention since they took the field.

The large mortar was ably directed by captain Lefebre and by Mr. Gilbert. Captain Blanchard was very useful as an engineer, and merits the general's praise for the celerity and skill with which he erected the battery which now commands the river, on the right of the camp. Mr. Busquet and Mr. Ducoin, of major St. Gene's company, displayed great knowledge and dexterity as artillerymen. To the whole army, the general presents the assurance of his official approbation and of his individual regard. This splendid campaign will be considered as entitling every man who has served in it to the salutation of his brother in arms.

By command,

ROBERT BUTLER, *Adj. Gen.*

CAPTURE OF THE FRIGATE PRESIDENT.

H. B. M. SHIP ENDYMION, AT SEA, January 18th, 1815.

SIR,

The painful duty of detailing to you the particular cause which preceded and led to the capture of the late United States' frigate President, by a squadron of his Britannic majesty's ships (as per margin) has devolved upon me. In my communication of the 14th, I made known to you my intention of proceeding to sea on that evening. Owing to some mistake of the pilots, the ship in going out grounded on the bar, where she continued to strike heavily for an hour and a half. Although she had broken several of her rudder-braces, and had received such other material injury as to render her return into port desirable, I was unable to do so from the strong westerly wind which was then blowing. It being now high water, it became necessary to force her over the bar before the tide fell; in this we succeeded by 10 o'clock, when we shaped our courses along the shore of Long Island for 50 miles, and then steered south-east by east. At 5 o'clock, three ships were discovered ahead; we immediately hauled up the ship and passed two miles to the northward of them. At day light, we discovered four ships in chase, one on each quarter and two astern, the leading ship of the enemy a razee; she commenced a fire upon us, but without effect. At meridian, the wind became light and baffling, we had increased our distance from the razee, but the next ship astern, which was also a large ship, had gained and continued to gain upon us considerably; we immediately occupied all hands to lighten ship, by starting water, cutting the anchors, throwing overboard provisions, cables, spare spars, boats, and every article that could be got at, keeping the sails wet from the royals down. At three, we had the wind quite light; the enemy, who had now been joined by a brig, had a strong breeze and were coming up with us rapidly. The Endymion mounting 50 guns, 24 pounders on the main deck, had now approached us within gun shot, and had commenced a fire with her bow guns, which we returned from our stern. At 5 o'clock, she had obtained a position on our starboard quarter, within half point blank shot, on which neither our stern nor quarter guns would bear; we were now steering east by north, the wind north-west. I remained with her in this position for half an hour, in the hope that she would close with us on our broadside, in which case I had prepared my crew to board, but from his continuing to yaw his ship to maintain his position, it became evident that to close was his intention. Every fire now cut some of our sails or rigging. To have continued our course under these circumstances, would have been placing it in his power to cripple us, without being subject to injury himself, and to have hauled up more to the northward to bring our stern guns to bear, would have exposed us to his raking fire. It was now dusk, when I determined to alter my

course south, for the purpose of bringing the enemy abeam, and although their ships astern, were drawing up fast, I felt satisfied I should be enabled to throw him out of the combat before they could come up, and was not without hopes, if the night proved dark, (of which there was every appearance) that I might still be enabled to make my escape. Our opponent kept off at the same instant we did, and commenced at the same time. We continued engaged steering south with steering sails set two hours and a half, when we completely succeeded in dismantling her. Previously to her dropping entirely out of the action, there were intervals of minutes, when the ships were broadside and broadside, in which she did not fire a gun. At this period (half past 8 o'clock) although dark, the other ships of the squadron were in sight and almost within gun shot. We were of course compelled to abandon her. In resuming our former course for the purpose of avoiding the squadron, we were compelled to present our stern to our antagonist; but such was his state, though we were thus exposed and within range of his guns for half an hour, that he did not avail himself of this favourable opportunity of raking us. We continued this course until 11 o'clock, when two frigate ships of the enemy (the Pomona and Tenedos) had come up. The Pomona had opened her fire on the larboard bow, within musket shot; the other about two cables' length astern, taking a raking position on our quarter; and the rest, with the exception of the Edymion, within gun shot. Thus situated, with about one-fifth of my crew killed and wounded, my ship crippled, and a more than four fold force opposed to me, without a chance of escape left, I deemed it my duty to surrender.

It is with emotions of pride I bear testimony to the gallantry and steadiness of every officer and man I had the honour to command on this occasion, and I feel satisfied that the fact of their beating a force equal to themselves, in the presence and almost under the guns of so vastly a superior force, when too, it was almost self-evident, that whatever their exertions might be, they must ultimately be captured, will be taken as evidence of what they would have performed, had the force opposed to them been in any degree equal.

It is with extreme pain I have to inform you that lieutenants Babbit, Hamilton, and Howell, fell in the action. They have left no officers of superior merit behind them.

If, sir, the issue of this affair had been fortunate, I should have felt it my duty to have recommended to your attention, lieutenants Shubrick and Gallagher. They maintained through the day the reputation they had acquired in former actions.

Lieutenant Twiggs, of the marines, displayed great zeal; his men were well supplied and their fire incomparable, so long as the enemy continued within musket range.

Midshipman Randolph, who had charge of the fore-castle division, managed it to my entire satisfaction.

From Mr. Robinson, who was serving as a volunteer, I received essential aid, particularly after I was deprived of the services of the master, and severe loss I had sustained in my officers on the quarter deck.

Of our loss in killed and wounded, I am unable at present to give you a correct statement; the attention of the surgeon being so entirely occupied with the wounded, that he was unable to make out a correct return when I left the President, nor shall I be able to make it until our arrival into port, we having parted company with the squadron yesterday. The enclosed list, with the exception I fear of its being short of the number, will be found correct. For twenty-four hours after the action it was nearly calm, and the squadron were occupied in repairing the crippled ships. Such of the crew of the President as were not badly wounded, were put on board the different ships; myself and part of my crew were put on board this ship. On the 17th we had a gale from the eastward, when this ship lost her bowsprit, fore and main-mast, and mizen top-mast, all of which were badly wounded, and was, in consequence of her disabled condition, obliged to throw overboard all her upper deck guns. Her loss in killed and wounded, must have been very great. I have not been able to ascertain the extent. Ten were buried after I came on board, (36 hours after the action;) the badly wounded, such as are obliged to keep their cots, occupy the starboard side of the gun deck from the cabin-bulk head to the main-mast. From the crippled state of the President's spars, I feel satisfied she could not have saved her masts, and I feel serious apprehensions for the safety of our wounded left on board.

It is due to captain Hope to state, that every attention has been paid by him to myself and officers that have been placed on board his ship, that delicacy and humanity could dictate.

I have the honour to be, &c.

STEPHEN DECATUR.

Hon. B. W. Crowninshield,
Secretary of the Navy.

The correct account of the loss on board the President as afterwards ascertained, was 25 killed, and 60 wounded.

This vessel having been taken to Bermuda, was there repaired and sent to England.

LOSS OF FORT BOWYER.

MOBILE, February 17th, 1815.

SIR,

It becomes my duty to communicate to you the very unpleasant news of the loss of fort Bowyer. It was closely invested by and, as well as water, on the 8th instant. On the 10th and 11th, I

passed a detachment over the bay with a view to divert the enemy from his object; but it arrived about 24 hours too late, though time enough to capture one of the enemy's barges with seventeen seamen, who say the garrison capitulated on the 12th; that the besiegers had advanced their works on the land side to within certain musket shot of the parapets of the fort; that the loss in killed on either side is inconsiderable. I am in possession of no other account but that which comes from the prisoners. About 30 of the enemy's vessels, besides boats and barges, are laying within the bar and above Mobile Point, and several ships of the line on the south and west of Dauphin Island. The wind is fair, and I expect the honour of seeing them here every night; if I do, I have great confidence my next will be on a more pleasant subject.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. WINCHESTER,

Brigadier General.

Hon. Secretary of War.

P. S. The garrison consisted of about 360 men, including officers. Three small schooners in which the detachment was transported over the bay, were captured by the enemy's barges after the troops had landed.

J. W.

— — — — —
FORT BOWYER, February 12th, 1815.

SIR,

Imperious necessity has compelled me to enter into articles of capitulation with major general Lambert, commanding his Britannic majesty's forces in front of fort Bowyer, a copy of which I forward you for the purpose of effecting an immediate exchange of prisoners. Nothing but the want of provisions, and finding myself completely surrounded by thousands; batteries erected on the sand, mounds which completely commanded the fort—and the enemy having advanced, by regular approaches, within thirty yards of the ditches, and the utter impossibility of getting any assistance or supplies, would have induced me to adopt this measure. Feeling confident, and it being the unanimous opinion of the officers, that we could not retain the post; and that the lives of many valuable officers and soldiers would have been uselessly sacrificed, I thought it most desirable to adopt this plan. A full and correct statement will be furnished you as early as possible.

Captain Chamberlain, who bears this to B. Livingston, esquire, will relate to him every particular, which will I hope be satisfactory.

I am, with respect, &c.

W. LAWRENCE.

Major General Jackson.

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION

Agreed upon between lieutenant colonel Lawrence and major general Lambert, for the surrender of fort Bowyer, on the Mobile Point, 11th of February, 1815.

1. That the fort shall be surrendered to] the arms of his Britannic majesty in its existing state as to the works, ordnance, ammunition, and every species of military stores.

2. That the garrison shall be considered as prisoners of war, the troops marching out with their colors flying and drums beating, and ground their arms on the glacis—the officers retaining their swords, and the whole to embark in such ships as the British naval commander in chief shall appoint.

3. All private property to be respected.

4. That a communication shall be made immediately of the same to the commanding officer of the 7th military district of the United States, and every endeavour made to effect an early exchange of prisoners.

5. That the garrison of the United States remain in the fort until 12 o'clock to-morrow, a British guard being put in possession of the inner gate at 3 o'clock to-day, and the British flag be hoisted at the same time; an officer of each service remaining at the head quarters of each commander until the fulfilment of these articles.

H. G. SMITH, *major and military secretary.*

Agreed on the part of the royal navy.

T. H. RICKETS, *captain H. M. ship Vengent.*

R. CHAMBERLAIN, *2d regt. U. S. infantry.*

W. LAWRENCE, *Lt. col. 2d infantry comdg.*

APPROVED,

ALEXANDER COCHRANE,

Commander in chief of his majesty's shipping.

JOHN LAMBERT, *maj. gen. comdg.*

A true copy—Test.

JOHN REID, *aid-de-camp.*

CAPTURE OF THE ARGUS.

NORFOLK, March 2d, 1815.

SIR,

Circumstances during my residence in England, having heretofore prevented my attention to the painful duty which devolved on me by the death of my gallant commander, captain William H. Allen, of the late United States' brig Argus, I have now the honour to state for your information, that, having landed the minister plenipotentiary (Mr. Crawford) and suit, at L'Orient, we proceeded on the cruize which had been directed by the department, and

after capturing 20 vessels (a list of the names and other particulars of which I have the honour to enclose) being in latitude 52 15 north, longitude 5 50 west, on the 14th August, 1813, we discovered at 4 o'clock A. M. a large brig of war, standing down under a press of sail upon our weather quarter, the wind being at south, and the Argus close hauled on the starboard tack, we immediately prepared to receive her; and at 4 30, being unable to get the weather gage, we shortened sail and gave her an opportunity of closing. At 6, the brig having displayed English colours, we hoisted our flag, wore round, and gave her the larboard broadside (being at this time within grape distance,) which was returned, and the action commenced within the range of musketry. At 6 4, captain Allen was wounded, and the enemy shot away our main braces, main spring stay, gaff, and trisail mast. At 6 8, captain Allen, being much exhausted by the loss of blood, was taken below. At 6 12, lost our spritsail yard, and the principal part of the standing rigging on the larboard side of the foremast. At this time, I received a wound on the head from a grape-shot, which, for a time, rendered me incapable of attending to duty, and was carried below. I had, however, the satisfaction of recollecting on my recovery, that nothing which the most gallant exertions could effect, would be left undone by lieutenant William H. Allen, junior, who succeeded to the command of the deck. Lieutenant Allen reports, at 6 14, the enemy, being on our weather quarter, edged off for the purpose of getting under our stern; but the Argus luffed close to, with the maintopsail aback, and giving him a raking broadside, frustrated his attempt. At 6 18, the enemy shot away our preventer, mainbraces, and maintopsail tye; and the Argus having lost the use of her after sails, fell off before the wind, when the enemy succeeded in passing our stern, and ranged up on the starboard side. At 6 25, the wheel ropes and rigging of every description being shot away, the Argus became unmanageable; and the enemy, not having sustained any apparent damage, had it completely in his power to choose a position, continued to play upon our starboard quarter, occasionally shifting his situation until 6 30, when I returned to the deck; the enemy being under our stern, within pistol shot, where he continued to rake us until 6 38, when we prepared to board, but in consequence of our shattered condition, were unable to effect it. The enemy then passed our broadside, and took a position on our starboard bow. From this time until 6 47, we were exposed to a cross or raking fire, without being able to oppose but little more than musketry to the broadside of the enemy, our guns being much disabled and seldom brought to bear.

The Argus, having now suffered much in hull and rigging, as also in killed and wounded, among the former of whom (exclusive of our gallant captain,) we have to lament the loss of two meritorious young officers in midshipmen Delphy and Edwards; and being exposed to a galling fire, which, from the enemy's ability to manage his vessel, we could not avoid, I deemed it necessary to sur-

under, and was taken possession of by his Britannic majesty's ship Pelican, of twenty-one carriage guns, viz : sixteen 32 pound carronades, four long sixes, and one 12 pound carronade. I hope this measure will meet your approbation, and that the result of this action, when the superior size and metal of our opponent, and the fatigue which the crew, &c. of the Argus underwent, from a very rapid succession of captures, is considered, will not be thought unworthy the flag under which we serve.

I have the honour to inclose a list of killed and wounded, and feel great satisfaction in reporting the general good conduct of the men and officers engaged on this occasion, and particularly the zeal and activity displayed by lieutenant Allen, who, you will observe, for a time commanded on deck.

I have the honour to be, &c.

W. H. WATSON,

Late first Lt. U. S. brig Argus.

on. B. W. Crowninshield, &c.

Killed, 6—died of their wounds, 5—wounded, 12.

NEW ORLEANS, March 17th, 1815.

SIR,

Inclosed I have the honour to transmit for your information a copy of a letter from lieutenant Thomas Ap Catesby Jones, giving a detailed account of the action between the gun vessels under his command and a flotilla of the enemy's launches and barges, on the 14th December, 1814, which, after a most gallant resistance, terminated as stated in my letter of the 17th December, in the capture of our squadron.

The courage and skill which was displayed in the defence of the gun-vessels and tender, for such a length of time, against such an overwhelming force as they had to contend with, reflects additional splendour on our naval glory ; and will, I trust, diminish the regret occasioned by their loss.

I have the honour to be, &c.

DANIEL T. PATTERSON.

on. B. W. Crowninshield,
Secretary of the Navy.

NEW ORLEANS, March 12th, 1815.

SIR,

Having sufficiently recovered my strength, I do myself the honour of reporting to you the particulars of the capture of the division of United States' gun-boats, late under my command.

On the 12th December, 1814, the enemy's fleet off Ship Island had increased to such a force as to render it no longer safe or prudent for me to continue in that part of the lake with the small force which I commanded. I therefore determined to gain a station near the Malheroux Islands as soon as possible, which situation

would better enable me to oppose a further penetration of the enemy up the lakes, and at the same time afford me an opportunity of retreating to the Petite Coquilles if necessary.

At 10 A. M. on the 13th, I discovered a large flotilla of barges had left the fleet, (shaping their course towards the Pass Christian) which I supposed to be a disembarkation of troops intending to land at that place. About 2 P. M. the enemy's flotilla having gained the Pass Christian, *and continuing* their course to the westward, convinced me that an attack on the gun boats was their design. At this time the water in the lakes was uncommonly low, owing to the westerly wind which had prevailed for a number of days previous, and which still continued from the same quarter. Nos. 156, 162, and 163, although in the best channel, were in 12 or 18 inches less water than their draught. Every effort was made to get them afloat by throwing overboard all the articles of weight that could be dispensed with. At 3 30, the flood tide had commenced; got under weigh making the best of my way towards the Petite Coquille. At 3 45, the enemy despatched three boats to cut out the schooner Sea-Horse, which had been sent into the bay St. Louis that morning to assist in the removal of the public stores, which I had previously ordered. There finding a removal impracticable, I ordered preparations to be made for their destruction, lest they should fall into the enemy's hands. A few discharges of grape shot from the Sea-Horse compelled the three boats, which had attacked her, to retire out of the reach of her guns, until they were joined by four others, when the attack was recommenced by the seven boats. Mr. Johnson having chosen an advantageous position near the two 6 pounders mounted on the bank, maintained a sharp action for near 50 minutes, when the enemy hauled off, having one boat apparently much injured, and with the loss of several men killed and wounded. At 7 30, an explosion at the bay, and soon after a large fire, induced me to believe the Sea-Horse was blown up and the public store house set on fire, which has proved to be the fact.

About 1 A. M. on the 14th, the wind having entirely died away, and our vessels become unmanageable, came to anchor at the west end of Malheroux Island's passage. At daylight and morning, still a perfect calm, the enemy's flotilla was about ~~ten~~ miles from us at anchor, but soon got in motion and rapidly advanced towards us. The want of wind, and the strong ebb-tide which was setting through the Pass, left me but one alternative which was to put my vessels in the most advantageous position, to give the enemy as warm a reception as possible. The commanders were all called on board and made acquainted with my intentions, and the position which each vessel was to take, the whole to form a close line abreast across the channel, anchored by the ~~light~~ with springs on the cables, &c. &c. Thus we remained anxiously awaiting an attack from the advancing foe, whose force I now clearly distinguished to be composed of ~~forty-two~~ heavy launch

and gun barges, with three light gigs, manned with upwards of one thousand men and officers. About 9 30, the Alligator (tender) which was to the southward and eastward, and endeavouring to join the division, was captured by several of the enemy's barges, when the whole flotilla came to with their grapples, a little out of reach of our shot, apparently making arrangements for the attack. At 10 39, the enemy weighed, forming a line abreast in open order, and steering direct for our line, which was unfortunately in some degree broken by the force of the current, driving numbers 156 and 163 about one hundred yards in advance. As soon as the enemy came within reach of our shot, a deliberate fire from our long guns was opened upon him, but without much effect, the objects being of so small a size. At 10 minutes before 11, the enemy opened a fire from the whole of his line, when the action became general and destructive on both sides. At 11 49, the advanced boats of the enemy, *three* in number, attempted to board No. 156, but were repulsed with the loss of nearly every officer killed or wounded, and *two* boats sunk. A second attempt to board was then made by *four* other boats, which shared almost a similar fate. At this moment I received a severe wound in my left shoulder, which compelled me to quit the deck, leaving it in charge of Mr. George Parker, master's mate, who gallantly defended the vessel until he was severely wounded, when the enemy, by his superior numbers, succeeded in gaining possession of the deck, about 10 minutes past 12 o'clock. The enemy immediately turned the guns of his prize on our other gun-boats, and fired several shot *previous* to striking the American colours. The action continued with unabated severity, until 40 minutes past 12 o'clock, when it terminated with the surrender of No. 23, all the other vessels having previously fallen into the hands of the enemy.

In this unequal contest, our loss in killed and wounded has been trifling, compared to that of the enemy, which amounts to nearly four hundred.

Enclosed you will receive a list of the killed and wounded, and a correct statement of the force which I had the honour to command at the commencement of the action, together with an estimate of the force I had to contend against, as acknowledged by the enemy, which will enable you to decide how far the honour of our country's flag has been supported in this conflict.

With much respect, &c.

THOMAS AP CATESBY JONES,
Lieut. Com. U. S. Navy.

Capt. Daniel T. Patterson, commanding.

Statement of the effective force of a division of the United States gun-boats, under the command of lieutenant commanding Thomas Ap Catesby Jones, at the commencement of the action, with a flotilla of English boats, on the 14th of December, 1814.

Gun-boat, No. 5, 5 guns, 36 men, sailing master John D. Ferris; gun-boat, No. 156, 5 guns, 41 men, lieutenant commandant T. A. C. Jones; gun-boat, No. 162, 5 guns, 35 men, lieutenant Robert Speeden; gun-boat, No. 163, 3 guns, 31 men, sailing master George Ulrick.—Total, 23 guns, 182 men.

N. B. The schooner Sea Horse had one 6 pounder and 14 men, sailing master William Johnson, commander; none killed or wounded.

The sloop Alligator (tender) had one 4 pounder and eight men, sailing master Richard S. Sheppard, commander.

THOMAS AP CATESBY JONES,

Lieut. Com. U. S. Navy.

The following is a correct statement of the British forces which were engaged in the capture of the late United States' gun-boats, Nos. 23, 156, 5, 162 and 163, near Malheroux islands, lae Borgne, 14th December, 1814.

Forty launches and barges, mounting one carronade each, of 12, 19, and 24 calibre.

One launch, mounting one long brass 12 pounder.

One do. do. do. do. 9 do.

Three gigs, with small arms only.

Total number of boats,

do. do. cannon, - - - - - 43

The above flotilla was manned with 1200 men and officers, commanded by captain Lockyer, who received three severe wounds in the action. The enemy, as usual, will not acknowledge his loss on this occasion, in boats or men; but from the nature of the action, and the observations made by our officers while prisoners in their fleet, his loss in killed and wounded may be justly estimated to exceed three hundred, among whom are an unusual proportion of officers.

CAPTURE OF THE PENGUIN.

U. S. SLOOP HORNET, OFF TRISTAN D'ACUNHA,

March 25th, 1815.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you, that on the morning of the 25d instant, at half past ten, when about to anchor, off the north end of the island of Tristan d'Acunha, a sail was seen to the southward and eastward, steering to the westward, the wind fresh from the S. S. W. In a few minutes she had passed on to the westward, so that we could not see her for the land. I immedi-

ately made sail for the westward, and shortly after getting in sight of her again, perceived her to bear up before the wind. I hove to for him to come down to us. When she had approached near, I filled the maintopsail, and continued to yaw the ship, while she continued to come down, wearing occasionally to prevent her passing under our stern. At 1 40 P. M. being within nearly musket shot distance, she hauled her wind on the starboard tack, hoisted English colours and fired a gun. We immediately luffed to, hoisted our ensign and gave the enemy a broadside. The action being thus commenced, a quick and well directed fire was kept up from this ship, the enemy gradually driving near to us, when at 1 65 minutes he bore up apparently to run us on board. As soon as I perceived he would certainly fall on board, I called the boarders, so as to be ready to repel any attempt to board us. At the instant every officer and man repaired to the quarter deck, where the two vessels were coming in contact, and eagerly pressed me to permit them to board the enemy; but this I would not permit, as it was evident, from the commencement of the action, that our fire was greatly superior both in quickness and in effect. The enemy's bowsprit came in between our main and mizen rigging, on our starboard side, affording him an opportunity to board us, if such was his design, but no attempt was made. There was a considerable swell on, and as the sea lifted us ahead, the enemy's boom carried away our mizen shrouds, stern davits and spanker boom, and he hung upon our larboard quarter. At this moment an officer, who was afterwards recognized to be Mr. McDonald, the first lieutenant, and the then commanding officer, called out that they had surrendered. I directed the marines and musketry men to cease firing, and, while on the taffrail asking if they had surrendered, I received a wound in the neck. The enemy just then got clear of us, and his fore-mast and bowsprit being both gone, and perceiving us wearing to give a fresh broadside, he again called out that he had surrendered. It was with difficulty I could restrain my crew from firing into him again, as he had certainly fired into us after having surrendered. From the firing of the first gun, to the last time the enemy cried out he had surrendered, was exactly 22 minutes by the watch. She proved to be his Britannic majesty's brig Penguin, mounting six 32 pound carronades, two long 12's, a twelve pound carronade on the top-gallant fore-castle, with swivels on the capstern in the tops. She had a spare port forward, so as to fight both her long guns of a side. She sailed from England in September last. She was shorter upon deck than this ship, by two feet, but she had a greater length of keel, greater breadth of beam, thicker sides, and higher bulwarks than this ship, and was in all respects a remarkably fine vessel of her class. The enemy acknowledge a complement of 132, 12 of them supernumerary marines from the Medway 74, received on board in consequence of their being ordered to cruise for the American privateer Young Wasp. They

acknowledge, also, a loss of 14 killed and 28 wounded; but Mr. Mayo, who was in charge of the prize, assures me that the number of killed was certainly greater. Among the killed is captain Dickenson, who fell at the close of the action, and the boatswain; among the wounded, is the second lieutenant, purser, and two midshipmen. Each of the midshipmen lost a leg. We received on board, in all, 118 prisoners, four of whom have since died of their wounds. Having removed the prisoners, and taken on board such provisions and stores as would be useful to us, I scuttled the Penguin this morning, before day-light, and she went down. As she was completely riddled by our shot, her foremast and bowsprit both gone, and her main-mast so crippled as to be incapable of being secured, it seemed unadvisable, at this distance from home, to attempt sending her to the United States.

This ship did not receive a single round shot in her hull, nor any material wound in her spars; the rigging and sails were very much cut; but having bent a new suit of sails and knotted and secured our rigging, we are now completely ready, in all respects, for any service. We were eight men short of complement, and had nine upon the sick list the morning of the action.

Enclosed is a list of killed and wounded. I lament to state that lieutenant Conner is wounded dangerously. I feel great solicitude on his account, as he is an officer of much promise, and his loss would be a serious loss to the service.

It is a most pleasing part of my duty to acquaint you, that the conduct of lieutenants Conner and Newton, Mr. Mayo, acting lieutenant Brownlow, of the marines, sailing master Romney, and the other officers, seamen and marines I have the honour to command, was in the highest degree creditable to them, and calls for my warmest recommendation. I cannot, indeed, do justice to their merits. The satisfaction which was diffused throughout the ship when it was ascertained that the stranger was an enemy sloop of war, and the alacrity with which every one repaired to quarters, fully assured me that their conduct in the action would be marked with coolness and intrepidity.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. BIDDLE.

Hon. Secretary of the Navy.

The loss on board the Hornet, was one killed and 11 wounded.

CAPTURE OF THE CYANE AND LEVANT.

U. S. FRIGATE CONSTITUTION, May—, 1815.

SIR,

On the 20th of February last, the island of Madeira bearing about west south-west, distant 60 leagues, we fell in with his Britannic majesty's two ships of war, the Cyane and Levant; and brought them to action about 6 o'clock in the evening, both of

which, after a spirited engagement of 40 minutes, surrendered to the ship under my command.

Considering the advantages derived by the enemy, from a divided and more active force, as also their superiority in the weight and number of guns, I deem the speedy and decisive result of this action the strongest assurance which can be given to the government, that all under my command did their duty, and gallantly supported the reputation of American seamen.

Enclosed you will receive the minutes of the action, and a list of the killed and wounded on board this ship; also enclosed you will receive for your information, a statement of the actual force of the enemy, and the number killed and wounded on board their ships, as near as could be ascertained.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CHARLES STEWART.

Hon. Secretary of the Navy.

American loss—3 killed, 12 wounded.

British loss—35 killed, 42 wounded.

Prisoners taken, 313.

Minutes of the action between the United States' frigate Constitution, and his Britannic majesty's ships Cyane and Levant, on the 20th February, 1815.

Commences with light breezes from the east, and cloudy weather. At one, discovered a sail two points on the larboard bow—hailed up and made sail in chase. At $\frac{1}{4}$ past one, made the sail to be a ship; at $\frac{1}{2}$ past one, discovered another sail ahead; made them out at two P. M. to be both ships, standing close hauled, with their starboard tacks on board; at 4 P. M. the weather most ship made signals, and bore up to her consort, then about 10 miles to leeward; we bore up after her, and set lower top-mast, top-gallant, and royal studding sails in chase; at $\frac{1}{4}$ past 4, carried away our main royal mast; took in the sails and got another prepared; at 5 P. M. commenced firing on the chase from our two larboard bow guns; our shot falling short, ceased firing; at $\frac{1}{4}$ past five, finding it impossible to prevent their junction, cleared ship for action, then about four miles from the two ships; at 40 minutes after 5, they passed within hail of each other, and hauled by the wind on the starboard tack, hauled up their courses, and prepared to receive us; at forty-five minutes past five, they made all sail close hauled by the wind, in hopes of getting to the windward of us; at 55 minutes past 5, finding themselves disappointed in their object, and we were closing with them fast, they shortened sail, and formed on a line of wind, about half a cable's length from each other. At 6 P. M. having them under command of our battery, hoisted our colours, which was answered by both ships hoisting English ensigns. At 5 minutes past 6, ranged up on the starboard side of the sternmost ship, about 300 yards distant, and commenc-

ed the action by broadsides, both ships returning our fire with the greatest spirit for about 15 minutes, then the fire of the enemy beginning to slacken, and the great column of smoke collected under our lee, induced us to cease our fire to ascertain their positions and conditions. In about three minutes the smoke clearing away, we found ourselves abreast of the headmost ship, the sternmost ship luffing up for our larboard quarter; we poured a broadside into the headmost ship, and then braced aback our main and mizen topsails, and backed astern under cover of the smoke, abreast the sternmost ship, when the action was continued with spirit and considerable effect, until 35 minutes past 6, when the enemy's fire again slackened, and we discovered the headmost bearing up; filled our topsails, shot ahead, and gave her two stern rakes. We then discovered the sternmost ship wearing also; wore ship immediately after her, and gave her a stern rake, she luffing to on our starboard bow, and giving us her larboard broadside. We ranged upon her larboard quarter, within hail, and was about to give her our starboard broadside, when she struck her colours, fired a lee gun and yielded. At 50 minutes past 6, took possession of his Britannic majesty's ship *Cyane*, captain Gordon Falcon, mounting 34 guns. At 8 P. M. filled away after her consort, which was still in sight to leeward. At half past 8, found her standing towards us, with her starboard tacks close hauled, with topgallant sails set and colours flying. At 50 minutes past 8, ranged close alongside to windward of her, on opposite tacks, and exchanged broadsides; wore immediately under her stern and raked her with a broadside. She then crowded all sail and endeavoured to escape by running; hauled on board our tacks, set spanker and flying jib in chase. At half past 9, commenced firing on her from our starboard bow chaser; gave her several shot, which cut her spars and rigging considerably. At 10 P. M. finding they could not escape, fired a gun, struck her colours, and yielded. We immediately took possession of his Britannic majesty's ship *Levant*, hon. captain George Douglas, mounting 21 guns. At 1 A. M. the damages of our rigging were repaired, sails shifted, and the ship in fighting condition.

CAPTAIN BIDDLE'S ESCAPE FROM A 74

U. S. SHIP HORNET, ST. SALVADORE, June 10th, 1815

SIR,

I have the honour to report, that the *Peacock* and this ship having continued off Christian D'Acunha, the number of days directed by you, in your letter of instructions, proceeded in company to the eastward on the 12th of April, bound to the second place of rendezvous. Nothing of any importance occurred until the 27th of April, when at 7 A. M. in latitude 38 30 north and longitude 53 east, we made a strange sail to the south east

which we gave chase. The wind was from the north east by north and light throughout the day, and by sun-down we had neared the chase considerably. It was calm during the night, and at day-light on the 28th he was still in sight. A breeze springing up from the north west, we crowded sail with steering sails on both sides; the chase standing to the northward upon a wind. At 2 45 P. M. the Peacock was about six miles ahead of this ship; and observing that she appeared to be suspicious of the chase, I took in starboard steering sails, and hauled up for the Peacock. I was still, however, of opinion that the chase was an Indiaman, though indeed the atmosphere was quite smoky and indistinct, and I concluded, as she was very large, that captain Warrington was waiting for me to join him, that we might together go along side of her. At 3 22 P. M. the Peacock made the signal that the chase was a ship of the line and an enemy. I immediately took in all steering sails, and hauled upon a wind; the enemy then upon our lee quarter, distant about eight miles. By sun-down I had perceived the enemy sailed remarkably fast, and was very weatherly. At 9 P. M. as the enemy was gaining upon us, and as there was every appearance that he would be enabled to keep sight of us during the night, I considered it necessary to lighten this ship. I therefore threw overboard 12 tons of kentledge, part of our shot, some of our heavy spars, cut away the sheet anchor and cable, and started the wedges of the masts. At 2 A. M. the enemy being rather before our lee-beam, I tacked to the westward; the enemy also tacked and continued in chase of us. At day-light, on the 29th, he was within gun shot upon our lee quarter. At 7 A. M. having hoisted English colours, and a rear admiral's flag, he commenced firing from his bow guns. As his shot went over us, I cut away the remaining anchor and cable, threw overboard the launch, six of our guns, more of our shot, and every heavy article that was at hand; the enemy fired about thirty shot, not one of which took effect, though most of them passed over us. While he was firing, I had the satisfaction to perceive that we slowly dropt him, and at 9 A. M. he ceased his fire.

At 11 A. M. the enemy was again coming up with us. I now therefore threw overboard all our remaining guns but one long gun, nearly all our shot, all our spare spars, cut away the top-gallant forecastle, and cleared every thing off deck, as well as from below, to lighten us as much as possible. At noon the enemy again commenced firing. He fired many shot, only three of which came on board; two striking the hull and one passing through the jib. It is, however, extraordinary, that every shot did not take effect, for the enemy, the second time he commenced firing, was certainly within three quarters of a mile of this ship, and the sea quite smooth.

I perceived from his sails that the effect of his fire was to deaden his wind, and at 2 P. M. he again ceased firing. At 2 30 P. M. the wind which had previously, and greatly to our disadvantage, backed to the south east, hauled to the westward, and freshened up.

At sun-down the enemy was about four miles astern. The wind was fresh, and we went at the rate of nine knots throughout the night. We saw the enemy at intervals through the squalls during the night, and at day-light on the 30th he was about 12 miles astern, still in chase of us. At 9 30 A. M. he took in steering sails, reefed his top-sails and hauled to the eastward, and at 11 A. M. he was entirely out of sight. During the chase the enemy appeared to be very crank, and I therefore conclude he must have lightened while in chase of us. I did not at any time fire our stern chasers, because it was manifest the enemy injured his sailing by his firing.

As we had now no anchor, no cable, no boat, and but one gun, there was of course an absolute necessity for relinquishing our intended cruise; and as in our then condition, it would have been extremely hazardous on account of the enemy's cruisers, to approach our own coast, I considered it most advantageous to proceed for this port. I arrived here yesterday, and on my arrival received information of the peace between the United States and Great Britain. Permit me to state that it was with the most painful reluctance, and upon the fullest conviction that it was indispensable in order to prevent a greater misfortune, that I could bring my mind to consent to part with my guns; and I beg leave to request, that you will be pleased to move the honourable the Secretary of the Navy, to call a court of inquiry to investigate the loss of the armament of this ship. It will be very satisfactory to me to have such an investigation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. BIDDLE.

Commodore Decatur.

Extract from the journal of one of the officers of the Hornet.

"During this tedious and anxious chase, the wind was variable, so as to oblige us to make a perfect circle round the enemy. Between 2 and 3 o'clock yesterday, not a person on board had the most distant idea that there was a *possibility* of escape. We all packed up our things, and waited until the enemy's shot would compel us to heave to and surrender, which appeared certain. Never has there been so evident an interposition of the goodness of a Divine Father; my heart with gratitude acknowledges his supreme power and goodness. On the morning of the 28th it was very calm, and nothing but murmurings were heard throughout the ship, as it was feared we should lose our anticipated prize; many plans had been formed by us for the disposal of our plunder. The seamen declared they would have the birth deck carpeted with East India silk, supposing her an *Indiaman* from India; while the officers, under the impression that she was from *England*, were making arrangements how we should dispose of the money, *porcelain*, *cheese*, &c. &c. Nothing perplexed us more than the idea that

we should not be able to take out all the *good things*, before we should be obliged to destroy her. We were regretting our ship did not sail faster, as the Peacock would certainly capture her first, and would take out many of the best and most valuable articles before we should get up. (This very circumstance of our not sailing as fast as the Peacock, saved us in the first instance from inevitable capture; for when captain Warrington made the signal for the sail to be an enemy of superior force, we were four leagues to windward.) We all calculated our fortunes were made, but alas! "we caught a Tartar."

"During the latter part of the chase, when the shot and shells were whistling about our ears, it was an interesting sight to behold the varied countenances of our crew. They had kept the deck during all the preceding night, employed continually in lighting the ship, were excessively fatigued, and under momentary expectation of falling into the hands of a barbarous and enraged enemy. The shot that fell on the main deck, struck immediately over the head of one of our gallant fellows, who had been wounded in our glorious action with the Penguin, where he was lying in his cot very ill with his wounds; the shot was near coming through the deck, and it threw innumerable splinters all around this poor fellow, and struck down a small paper *American ensign*, which he had hoisted over his bed. Destruction apparently stared us in the face, if we did not soon surrender, yet no officer, no man, in the ship showed any disposition to let the enemy have the poor little Hornet. Many of our men had been *impressed* and *imprisoned* for years in their horrible service, and hated *them* and their *nation* with the most deadly animosity; while the rest of the crew, horror struck by the relation of the sufferings of their ship-mates, who had been in the power of the English, and now equally flushed with rage, joined heartily in execrating the present authors of our misfortune.

"Captain Biddle mustered the crew and told them he was pleased with their conduct during the chase, and hoped still to perceive that propriety of conduct which had always marked their character, and that of the American tar generally, that we might soon expect to be captured; &c. Not a dry eye was to be seen at the mention of capture. The rugged hearts of the sailors, like *ice* before the *sun*, warmed by the divine power of sympathy, wept in unison with their brave commander. About 2 o'clock, the wind which had crossed us, and put to the test all our nautical skill to steer clear of the enemy, now veered in our favour and we left him. This was truly a glorious victory over the horrors of banishment and the terrors of a British floating dungeon. Quick as thought every face was changed from the gloom of despair to the highest smile of delight, and we began once more to breathe the sweets of liberty. The bitter sighs of regret were now changed, and I put forth my expression of everlasting gratitude to him, the supreme

Author of our being, who had thus signally delivered us from the power of a cruel and vindictive enemy."

NEW YORK, August 24th, 1815.

SIR,

Conceiving it my duty to make known the treatment exhibited by British officers and men to those who are so unfortunate as to fall in their power, I am induced to acquaint you with the following circumstances.

After the surrender of the *Syren* to the *Medway*, the officers and crew of the former were removed to the latter, the crew not being allowed to take their clothing, &c. with them, so that the prize crew had a fair opportunity of plundering such articles as they thought proper, which opportunity they took care to profit by, as many of our men were pillaged of every article they possessed, excepting what they had on at the time; and the officers in like manner were plundered on board the *Medway*; the midshipmen, some of them, were completely stripped, others lost their watches, &c.

For my own part, I came off with the loss of about half my clothing, and thought myself well off when compared with the losses of my shipmates. The morning after our capture we were mustered on the quarter deck to undergo a search; the men were there stript to the skin, and their clothing not returned, so that many of them were left without any thing more than a shirt and trowsers; the next day Mr. Barton (the first lieutenant of the *Medway*) distributed the clothing he had taken from our men to his quarter masters and quarter gunners, in my presence. After being on board the *Medway* five weeks, we were landed at Simon's town, twenty-five miles to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, myself and brother officers paroled, and the men marched to Cape town under an escort of dragoons, being obliged to ford a lake on the march, where the boys were compelled to go over on the backs of the tall men; this march of twenty-five miles was performed in one day, and without shoes or food, the latter article they were kept without four and twenty hours; their shoes were stolen by the crew of the *Medway* while they were asleep. After remaining in this situation nearly eight months, without bed or bedding (they were not even furnished with straw, and their hammocks were taken on the plea of their being public property) we were all embarked in different men of war and Indiamen, for England; myself, with about sixty officers and men in the *Cumberland* 74, captain Baker: we were all put in the lower gun-deck without distinction, among their own crew, and fed on prisoners' allowance; and on my remonstrating with the captain for receiving such treatment, he ordered me off the quarter deck, with a threat at the same time to put me in irons. We remained in this situation eighteen days, after which, lieutenants German, Gordon,

and myself, were removed to the Grampus, 50 guns, at St. Helena, admitted to the ward room mess, and treated with civility.

I have the honour to be, &c.

N. D. NICHOLSON.

Capt. Samuel Evans.

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS WERE *accidentally* OMITTED TO BE INSERTED IN THEIR PROPER PLACES ACCORDING TO THEIR DATES.

Extract from Commodore Bainbridge's Journal, containing minutes of the action with the British frigate Java.

"Wednesday, December 30th, 1812 (nautical time) in latitude 13 degrees, 6 minutes south, and longitude 39 west, ten leagues from the coast of Brazil—commences with clear weather and moderate breezes from east north-east, hoisted our ensign and pendant. At 15 minutes past meridian, the ship hoisted her colours, an English ensign having a signal flying at her main, red, yellow and red. At 1 26 P. M. being sufficiently from the land, and finding the ship to be an English frigate, took in the main-sail and royals, tacked ship and stood for the enemy. At 1 50 P. M. the enemy bore down with the intention of raking us, which we avoided by wearing. At 2 P. M. the enemy being within half a mile of us, and to windward, and having hauled down his colours, except an Union Jack at the mizen-mast head, induced me to give orders to the officers of the 3d division to fire one gun ahead of the enemy to make him show his colours, which being done, brought on a fire from us of the whole broadside, on which the enemy hoisted his colours and immediately returned our fire. A general action with round and grape then commenced, the enemy keeping at a much greater distance than I wished, but could not bring him to closer action without exposing ourselves to several rakes. Considerable manœuvres were made by both vessels to rake and avoid being raked. The following minutes were taken during the action.

"At 2 10 P. M. commenced the action within good grape and canister distance, the enemy to windward, but much further than I wished. At 2 30 our wheel was shot entirely away. Two 40, determined to close with the enemy, notwithstanding his raking, set the fore and main-sail and luffed up close to him. Two 50, the enemy's jib-boom got foul of our mizen-rigging. Three, the head of the enemy's bowsprit and jib-boom shot away by us. Three 5, shot away the enemy's foremast by the board. Three 15, shot away his main topmast just above the cap. Three 40, shot away gaff and spanker boom. Three 55, shot away his mizen mast nearly by the board. Four 5, having silenced the fire of the enemy completely, and his colours in main rigging being down, supposed he had struck, then hauled aboard the

courses to shoot ahead to repair our rigging which was extremely cut, leaving the enemy a complete wreck. Soon after, discovered the enemy's flag was still flying; hove to, to repair some of our damage. Four 20, the enemy's mainmast went nearly by the board. Four 50, wore ship and stood for the enemy. Five 25, got very close to the enemy in a very effectual *raking position*, athwart his bows, and was at the very instant of raking him, when he most prudently struck his flag, for had he suffered the broadside to have raked him, his additional loss must have been extremely great, as he laid an unmanageable wreck upon the water.

"After the enemy had struck, wore ship and reefed the topsails, then hoisted out one of the only two remaining boats we had left out of eight, and sent lieutenant Parker, 1st of the Constitution, to take possession of the enemy, which proved to be his Britannic majesty's frigate Java, rated 38 but carried 49 guns, and manned with upwards of 400 men, commanded by captain Lambert, a very distinguished officer, who was mortally wounded. The action continued from the commencement to the end of the fire, one hour and fifty-five minutes. The Constitution had 9 killed and 25 wounded. The enemy had 60 killed and 101 certainly wounded; but by a letter written on board the Constitution, by one of the officers of the Java, and accidentally found, it is evident the enemy's wounded must have been considerably greater than as above stated, and who must have died of their wounds previously to their being removed. The letter states 60 killed and 170 wounded. The Java had her own complement of men complete, and upwards of 100 supernumeraries, going to join the British ships of war in the East Indies; also several officers, passengers, going out on promotion. The force of the enemy in number of men, at the commencement of the action, was no doubt considerably greater than we have been able to ascertain, which is upwards of 400 men. The officers were extremely cautious in discovering the number. By her quarter bill she had one man more stationed at each gun than we had.

"The Constitution was very much cut in her sails and rigging and many of her spars injured. At 7 P. M. the boat returned with lieutenant Chada, the first lieutenant of the enemy's frigate, and lieutenant general Hyslop, (appointed governor of Bombay) major Walker and captain Wood, belonging to his staff. Captain Lambert of the Java was too dangerously wounded to be removed immediately. The cutter returned on board the prize for the prisoners, and brought captain Marshall, master and commander of the British navy, who was passenger on board, as also several other naval officers, destined for ships in the East Indies.

The Java was an important ship, fitted out in the completest manner, to carry lieutenant general Hyslop and staff to Bonaire, and several naval officers for different ships in the East Indies, and had despatches for St. Helena, Cape of Good Hope, and every British establishment in the India and China seas. She had as

board copper for a 74 and two brigs building at Bombay, and I expect a great many other valuables; but every thing was blown up in her except the officers' baggage, when we set her on fire at 3 P. M. on the 1st of January, 1813, (nautical time.)"

Prisoner on board the American frigate Constitution, St. Salvador,
January 1st, 1813, Brazil:

MY DEAR SIR,

I am sorry to inform you of the unpleasant news of Mr. Gascoigne's death. Mr. Gascoigne and myself were shipmates in the Marlboro, and first came to sea together. He was shot in the early part of the action by a round shot in his right thigh, and died a few minutes after; four others of his messmates shared the same fate, together with 60 men killed and 170 wounded. The official account you no doubt heard of before this reaches you. I beg you will let all his friends and relations hear of his untimely fate. We were on board the Java frigate for a passage to India, when we fell in with this frigate. Two parcels I have sent you under good care—hope this will reach you safe.

Yours truly,
H. D. CORNECK.

Lt. Peter V. Wood, 22d regiment of foot,
Isle of France or Bourbon, East Indies.

A true copy,

WILLIAM BAINBRIDGE.

CAPTURE OF THE BOXER.

UNITED STATES' BRIG ENTERPRIZE, PORTLAND,
September 7th, 1813.

SIR,

In consequence of the unfortunate death of lieutenant commandant William Burrows, late commander of this vessel, it devolves on me to acquaint you with the result of our cruize. After sailing from Portsmouth on the 1st instant, we steered to the eastward: and on the morning of the 3d, off Wood Island, discovered a schooner, which we chased into this harbor, where we anchored. On the morning of the 4th weighed anchor and swept out, and continued our cruize to the eastward. Having received information of several privateers being off Manhagan, we stood for that place; and on the following morning, in the bay near Penguin Point, discovered a brig getting under weigh, which appeared to be a vessel of war, and to which we immediately gave chase. She fired several guns and stood for us, having four ensigns hoisted. After reconnoitering and discovering her force, and the nation to which she belonged, we hauled upon a wind to stand out of the bay, and at 3 o'clock shortened sail, tacked and run down with an intention to bring her to close action. At 20 minutes after 3 P. M. when within half pistol shot, the firing commenced from both, and after being warmly kept up, and with

some manœuvring, the enemy hailed and said they had surrendered, about 4 P. M. Their colours being nailed to the masts, could not be hauled down. She proved to be his Britannic majesty's brig Boxer, of 14 guns, Samuel Blythe, esquire, commander, who fell in the early part of the engagement, having received a cannon shot through the body. And I am sorry to add that lieutenant Burrows, who had gallantly led us to action, fell also about the same time by a musket ball, which terminated his existence in 8 hours.

The Enterprize suffered much in spars and rigging, and the Boxer both in spars, rigging and hull, having many shots between wind and water. It would be doing injustice to the merit of Mr. Tillinghast, 2d lieutenant, were I not to mention the able assistance I received from him during the remainder of the engagement, by his strict attention to his own division and other departments. And the officers and crew, generally, I am happy to add, from their cool and determined conduct have my warmest approbation and applause.

As no muster roll that can be fully relied on came into my possession, I cannot exactly state the number killed on board the Boxer; but from information received from the officers of that vessel, it appears there were between twenty and twenty-five killed, and fourteen wounded. Enclosed is a list of killed and wounded on board the Enterprize.

I have the honour to be, &c.

EDWARD R. M'CALL, *senior officer.*

Isaac Hull, Esquire.

KILLED, 1. WOUNDED, 13—of whom lieutenant Burrows, commander, midshipman Kervan Waters, and carpenter's mate Elias Blossom, have since died.

Officers killed and wounded in the battle of Niagara.

Killed. Major M'Farland, 23d infantry. Captain Ritchie, corps of artillery. Captain Hull, 9th infantry. Captain M'Kinney, 25th do. Captain Goodrich, 11th do. 1st lieutenant Bigelow, 21st do. 1st lieutenant Turner, 9th do. 2d lieutenant Burghardt, 9th do. Ensign Hunter, 25th do. Captain Hooper, New York volunteers. Adjutant Poe, Pennsylvania volunteers.

Wounded. Major general Brown, severely. Captain Spencer, his aid (since dead). Artillery, captain Biddle, slightly. 2d lieutenant Campbell, badly. 2d lieutenant Schmuck, severely.

First brigade. Brigadier general Scott, severely. Lieutenant J. D. Smith, 5th infantry, brigade major, badly. Lieutenant Worth, 23d infantry, A. D. C. severely. Major Leavenworth, slightly. Captain W. L. Foster, slightly. Lieutenant and paymaster Fowle, slightly. Lieutenant and quarter master Brown, slightly. 2d lieutenant Fisher, severely. 3d lieutenant

Cushman, slightly. Ensign G. Jacobs, severely. Ensign J. P. Jacobs, slightly. Ensign Blake slightly. 11th infantry—major M'Neil, severely. Captain Bliss, badly. 1st lieutenant Hail, slightly. 2d lieutenant Cooper, slightly. 3d lieutenant Stephenson, slightly. Ensign Bedford, slightly. Ensign Thompson (26th, doing duty in the 11th, severely. 22d infantry—colonel Brady, severely. Captain Pentlant, severely. Captain Faulk, severely. 1st lieutenant Culbertson, severely. 1st lieutenant Furguson, canister shot in the hand. 2d lieutenant Armstrong, dangerously. 3d lieutenant Bean, slightly. 25th infantry—Major Jessup, severely. Lieutenant and adjutant Shaylor, severely. Lieutenant and quarter master M'Glassi, badly. 3d lieutenant Gifford severely.

Second brigade. 1st infantry—1st lieutenant Vasquiz, slightly. 1st lieutenant Bissel, slightly. 21st infantry—Captain Burbank, severely. 1st lieutenant Cilley, severely. 2d lieutenant Fisk (of the 19th attached) slightly. Ensign Jones, slightly. Ensign Camp (2d rifle regiment attached) slightly. Ensign Thomas, slightly. 23d infantry—Captain Odell, severely. 1st lieutenant H. Whiting, severely. 2d lieutenant Ingersoll, slightly. 2d lieutenant Tappan, slightly. 3d lieutenant Abeel, slightly. 3d lieutenant Deitereich, slightly. 3d lieutenant Lamb, severely.

BRIGADIER GENERAL PORTER'S COMMAND. New York volunteers—Lieutenant colonel Dobbin, slightly. Lieutenant O'Fling, slightly. Pennsylvania volunteers—major Wood, severely. Quarter master Maclay, severely. Lieutenant Dick, severely. Brigadier general Porter was slightly wounded, but declined being reported.

Officers missing. 1st lieutenant Perry, 9th infantry, a prisoner. 3d lieutenant Webster, severely, shot in the head and taken prisoner. Lieutenants Sturgis, Keps and Davidson, 2d infantry, supposed to be killed. Volunteers—Brigade major Stanton, of New York, taken prisoner. Captain Roberts, of Pennsylvania, taken prisoner. Lieutenant Hunt, of New York, supposed to be killed.

BRITISH PRISONERS TAKEN.

One major general, (Riall, severely wounded in the arm.) 1 aide-de-camp. 1 captain and 2 subalterns of the 103d regiment. 1 captain 89th regiment. 1 captain provincial dragoons. 3 captains, 2 subalterns. Militia.—1 lieutenant royal engineers. 3 subalterns royal Scots. 1 do. Glengary corps. Quarter master of 8th or King's regiment. Quarter master of 41st regiment, and 150 rank and file. Aggregate 169.

Treaty of peace and amity between his Britannic majesty and the United States of America.

His Britannic majesty, and the United States of America, desirous of terminating the war which has unhappily subsisted between the two countries, and of restoring, upon principles of perfect reciprocity, peace, friendship, and good understanding, between them, have, for that purpose, appointed their respective plenipotentiaries, that is to say: His Britannic majesty, on his part, has appointed the right honourable James lord Gambier, late admiral of the white, now admiral of the red squadron of his majesty's fleet, Henry Goulburn, esquire, a member of the imperial parliament, and under secretary of state, and William Adams, esquire, doctor of civil laws: And the president of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the senate thereof, has appointed John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin, citizens of the United States, who, after a reciprocal communication of their respective full powers, have agreed upon the following articles:

ART. 1. There shall be a firm and universal peace between his Britannic majesty and the United States, and between their respective countries, territories, cities, towns, and people, of every degree, without exception of places or persons. All hostilities, both by sea and land, shall cease as soon as this treaty shall have been ratified by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned. All territory, places, and possessions whatsoever, taken by either party from the other, during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, excepting only the islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, or any slaves or other private property. And all archives, records, deeds, and papers, either of a public nature, or belonging to private persons, which, in the course of the war, may have fallen into the hands of the officers of either party, shall be, as far as may be practicable, forthwith restored and delivered to the proper authorities and persons to whom they respectively belong. Such of the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties, shall remain in the possession of the party in whose occupation they may be at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, until the decision respecting the title to the said islands shall have been made in conformity with the fourth article of this treaty. No disposition made by this treaty, as to such possession of the islands and territories claimed by both parties, shall, in any manner whatever, be construed to affect the right of either.

ART. 2. Immediately after the ratifications of this treaty by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned, orders shall be sent to the

armies, squadrons, officers, subjects, and citizens, of the two powers, to cease from all hostilities: and, to prevent all causes of complaint which might arise on account of the prizes which may be taken at sea after the said ratifications of this treaty, it is reciprocally agreed, that all vessels and effects which may be taken after the space of twelve days from the said ratifications, upon all parts of the coast of North America, from the latitude of twenty-three degrees north, to the latitude of fifty degrees north, and as far eastward in the Atlantic ocean as the thirty-sixth degree of west longitude from the meridian of Greenwich, shall be restored on each side: That the time shall be thirty days in all other parts of the Atlantic ocean, north of the equinoctial line or equator, and the same time for the British and Irish channels, for the Gulf of Mexico, and all parts of the West Indies: forty days for the North seas, for the Baltic, and for all parts of the Mediterranean: sixty days for the Atlantic ocean south of the equator, as far as the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope: ninety days for every other part of the world south of the equator: and one hundred and twenty days for all other parts of the world, without exception.

ART. 3. All prisoners of war taken on either side, as well by land as by sea, shall be restored as soon as practicable after the ratifications of this treaty, as hereinafter mentioned, on their paying the debts which they may have contracted during their captivity. The two contracting parties respectively engage to discharge, in specie, the advances which may have been made by the other for the sustenance and maintenance of such prisoners.

ART. 4. Whereas it was stipulated by the second article in the treaty of peace, of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three, between his Britannic majesty and the United States of America, that the boundary of the United States should comprehend all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries, between Nova Scotia, on the one part, and East Florida, on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy, and the Atlantic ocean, excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of Nova Scotia; and whereas the several islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, which is part of the Bay of Fundy, and the island of Grand Menan, in the said Bay of Fundy, are claimed by the United States, as being comprehended within their aforesaid boundaries, which said islands are claimed as belonging to his Britannic majesty, as having been at the time of, and previous to, the aforesaid treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, within the limits of the province of Nova Scotia: in order, therefore, finally to decide upon these claims, it is agreed that they shall be referred to two commissioners to be appointed in the following manner, viz: one commissioner shall be appointed by his Britannic majesty, and one by the president of

the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the senate thereof, and the said two commissioners so appointed, shall be sworn *impartially to examine and decide upon the said claims, according to such evidence as shall be laid before them on the part of his Britannic majesty and of the United States, respectively.* The said commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said commissioners shall, by a declaration or report, under their hands and seals, decide to which of the two contracting parties the several islands aforesaid do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three. And if the said commissioners shall agree in their decision, both parties shall consider such decision as final and conclusive. It is further agreed, that in the event of the two commissioners differing upon all or any of the matters so referred to them, or in the event of both or either of the said commissioners refusing, or declining, or wilfully omitting, to act as such, they shall make, jointly or separately, a report or reports, as well to the government of his Britannic majesty as to that of the United States, stating, in detail, the points on which they differ, and the grounds upon which their respective opinions have been formed or the grounds upon which they, or either of them, have so refused, declined, or omitted to act. And his Britannic majesty, and the government of the United States, hereby agree to refer the report or reports of the said commissioners, to some friendly sovereign or state, to be then named for that purpose, and who shall be requested to decide on the differences which may be stated in the said report or reports, or upon the report of one commissioner, together with the grounds upon which the other commissioner shall have refused, declined, or omitted to act, as the case may be. And if the commissioner so refusing, declining, or omitting to act, shall also wilfully omit to state the grounds upon which he has so done, in such manner that the said statement may be referred to such friendly sovereign or state, together with the report of such other commissioner, then such sovereign or state shall decide, *ex parte*, upon the said report alone. And his Britannic majesty and the government of the United States engage to consider the decision of such friendly sovereign or state to be final and conclusive on all the matters so referred.

ART. 5. Whereas neither that point of the highlands lying due north from the source of the river St. Croix, and designated, in the former treaty of peace between the two powers, as the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, nor the northwesternmost head of Connecticut river, has yet been ascertained; and whereas that part of the boundary line between the dominions of the two powers which extends from the source of the river St. Croix directly north to the above mentioned northwest angle of Nova Scotia, thence along the said highlands which divide those rivers

that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic ocean, to the northwesternmost head of Connecticut river; thence, down along the middle of that river, to the forty-fifth degree of north latitude; thence, by a line due west on said latitude, until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguy, has not yet been surveyed; it is agreed, that for these several purposes, two commissioners shall be appointed, sworn, and authorized, to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding article, unless otherwise specified in the present article. The said commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said commissioners shall have power to ascertain and determine the points abovementioned, in conformity with the provisions of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, and shall cause the boundary aforesaid, from the source of the river St. Croix to the river Iroquois or Cataraguy, to be surveyed and marked according to the said provisions. The said commissioners shall make a map of the said boundary, and annex to it a declaration under their hands and seals, certifying it to be the true map of the said boundary, and particularizing the latitude and longitude of the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, of the north-westernmost head of Connecticut river, and of such other points of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such map and declaration as finally and conclusively fixing the said boundary. And, in the event of the said two commissioners differing, or both, or either of them, refusing, or declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements, shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or state shall be made, in all respects, as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

ART. 6. Whereas, by the former treaty of peace, that portion of the boundary of the United States, from the point where the forty-fifth degree of north latitude strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguy to the lake Superior, was declared to be "along the middle of said river into lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and lake Erie, thence along the middle of said communication into lake Erie, through the middle of said lake, until it arrives at the water communication into the lake Huron, thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and lake Superior;" And whereas doubts have arisen what was the middle of the said river, lakes, and water communications, and whether certain islands lying in the same were within the dominions of his Britannic majesty or of the United States: in order, therefore, finally to decide these doubts, they shall be referred to two commissioners, to be appointed;

sworn, and authorized to act, exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding article unless otherwise specified in this present article. The said commissioners shall meet, in the first instance, at Albany, in the state of New York, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit: the said commissioners shall, by a report or declaration, under their hands and seals, designate the boundary through the said river, lakes, and water communications, and decide to which of the two contracting parties the several islands lying within the said river, lakes, and water communications, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three. And both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And, in the event of the said two commissioners differing, or both, or either of them, refusing, declining or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements, shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or state shall be made, in all respects, as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

ART. 7. It is further agreed, that the said two last mentioned commissioners, after they shall have executed the duties assigned to them in the preceding article, shall be, and they are hereby authorized, upon their oaths, impartially to fix and determine, according to the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, that part of the boundary between the dominions of the two powers, which extends from the water communication between lake Huron and lake Superior, to the most northwestern point of the lake of the Woods, to decide to which of the two parties the several islands lying in the lakes, water communications, and rivers, forming the said boundary, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three: and to cause such parts of the said boundary as require it, to be surveyed and marked. The said commissioners shall, by a report or declaration under their hands and seals, designate the boundary aforesaid, state their decision on the points thus referred to them, and particularize the latitude and longitude of the most northwestern point of the lake of the Woods, and of such other parts of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And, in the event of the said two commissioners differing, or both, or either of them, refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements, shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or state, shall be made, in all respects, as in the latter part of the fourth article is

contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

ART. 8. The several boards of two commissioners mentioned in the four preceding articles, shall, respectively, have power to appoint a secretary, and to employ such surveyors or other persons as they shall judge necessary. Duplicates of all their respective reports, declarations, statements, and decisions, and of their accounts, and of the journal of their proceedings, shall be delivered by them to the agents of his Britannic majesty, and to the agents of the United States, who may be respectively appointed and authorized to manage the business on behalf of their respective governments. The said commissioners shall be, respectively, paid in such manner as shall be agreed between the two contracting parties, such agreement being to be settled at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. And all other expenses attending the said commission shall be defrayed equally, by the two parties. And in the case of death, sickness, resignation, or necessary absence, the place of every such commissioner, respectively, shall be supplied in the same manner as such commissioner was first appointed, and the new commissioner shall take the same oath or affirmation, and do the same duties. It is further agreed between the two contracting parties, that in case any of the islands mentioned in any of the preceding articles, which were in the possession of one of the parties prior to the commencement of the present war between the two countries, should, by the decision of any of the boards of commissioners aforesaid, or of the sovereign or state so referred to, as in the four next preceding articles contained, fall within the dominions of the other party, all grants of land made previous to the commencement of the war by the party having had such possession, shall be as valid as if such island or islands had, by such decision or decisions, been adjudged to be within the dominions of the party having had such possession.

ART. 9. The United States of America engage to put an end, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians, with whom they may be at war at the time of such ratification; and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessions, rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: provided always, that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly. And his Britannic majesty engages, on his part, to put an end, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom he may be at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations, respectively, all the posses-

sions, rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to, in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: provided always, that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against his Britannic majesty, and his subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly.

ART. 10. Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and whereas both his majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed, that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object.

ART. 11. This treaty, when the same shall have been ratified on both sides, without alteration by either of the contracting parties, and the ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding on both parties; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington, in the space of four months from this day, or sooner, if practicable.

In faith whereof, we, the respective plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty, and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done, in triplicate, at Ghent, the twenty-fourth day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen.

[L. S.]
[L. S.]
[L. S.]
[L. S.]
[L. S.]
[L. S.]
[L. S.]
[L. S.]

GAMBIER,
HENRY GOULBURN,
WILLIAM ADAMS,
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
J. A. BAYARD,
H. CLAY,
JONA. RUSSELL,
ALBERT GALLATIN.







